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Abstract 
One of the most significant historical projects of the twenty-first century has 
involved the examination of important transnational circuits and 
interconnections. Historians have lagged behind many disciplines in accepting 
transnationalism as a serious form of investigation. Studying past events from a 
transnational perspective is important for historians. It challenges the 
assumption that ideologies, political cultures, economics, trade and societal 
organisation coincide within national boundaries and it allows us to analyse a 
party, group or ideology’s strengths and weaknesses on a different scale and on 
a separate stage, thus potentially uncovering the less apparent when viewed 
from a single-country viewpoint. 
 
This thesis seeks to identify and understand the role of transnationalism for the 
far right and fascism. Using a combination of mainly archival files, contemporary 
newspapers, pamphlets and periodicals, this study investigates the 
transnationalism of the three most important fascist movements operating in 
interwar Britain – the British Fascisti, the Imperial Fascist League and the British 
Union of Fascists. It uncovers previously unknown cross-border links and 
influences between British fascists and their overseas counterparts. 
Significantly, this is the first extensive investigation focused on the transnational 
British far right in the interwar period. 
Chapter One is on the British Fascisti. It uncovers transnational influences that 
allowed continental fascism to exercise control over the movement, the impact 
of Italian Fascism and German Nazism on the Fascisti as well as its overseas 
activities. Chapter Two focuses on the Imperial Fascist League. It analyses the 
ways in which the Nazis and the Fascists impacted on the ideological make up 
of the League, and the transnational physical links and influences relating to the 
British movement. Chapter Three examines the British Union of Fascists. 
Investigated in this chapter is the relationship between the movement and 
Mussolini and Hitler as well as the Union’s branches abroad and the 
organisation’s imperial policy. 
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Introduction 
 
The transnational far right is currently flourishing. The unexpected Brexit vote to leave 
the European Union and the right-wing populist Donald Trump as President of the 
United States has galvanised far-right groups across the world. In Europe, the rise of 
Trump combined with an increase in jihadi Islamist terrorism and an influx of refugees 
escaping Middle Eastern and North African conflicts has led to a resurgence of far-right 
activity. Politically, the far right has become mainstream in many countries, for 
example, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, Denmark and Poland, and far right 
tropes (xenophobia, anti-liberalism, nationalism and social conservatism, among others) 
are gaining traction with European electorates at an alarming rate. The far right, 
therefore, is very relevant in today’s world.1  
 
Literature Review 
The far right is not a subject that has been neglected by historians. Unsurprisingly, 
given the political, social and cultural turmoil that swept across mainland Europe (and 
beyond) in the interwar years and the subsequent horrors of the Holocaust where an 
estimated 11 million people (including six million Jews) were brutally executed, 
scholars have tirelessly sought to highlight and explain the phenomena.2 However, 
research has largely been conducted from a national perspective. According to Martin 
Durham and Margaret Power, the ‘Right’ has been seen as ‘quintessentially a nation-
 
1 Cas Mudde, ‘The far right may not have cleaned up, but its influence now dominates 
Europe’, The Guardian, 28 May 2019, 
[www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/28/far-right-european-elections-eu-
politics], accessed 28 June 2019; ‘Cas Mudde: No Western Democracy Naturally 
Immune to Far-Right’, The Global Post, 18 September 2018, 
[https://theglobepost.com/2018/09/18/mudde-far-right-europe/], accessed 28 June 2019; 
‘Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide’, BBC News, 24 May 
2019, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36130006], accessed 28 June 2019. For 
scholarship on the rise of the contemporary right in Europe, see Enzo Traverso, The 
New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right (London, 2019); Liz Fekete, 
Europe’s Fault Lines: Racism and the Rise of the Right (London, 2019); Alina 
Polyakova, The Dark Side of European Integration: Social Foundations and Cultural 
Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe 
(Columbia University, 2016). 
2 Calculating the number of those who perished is a difficult task. The Nazis did not 
create a single wartime document that identifies the figure. Many agencies, including 
scholars, have relied on various records such as census reports, captured German and 
Axis archives, and post-war investigations, to compile these statistics. 
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bound phenomenon’.3 Merlyn Trued’s What is Fascism? A Study in the Government of 
Austria (1950) was one of the first in a comprehensive array of academic literature that 
examined fascism from a nation-centred viewpoint.4 Following Trued, studies were, and 
continue to be, published on German, Italian, Spanish, French and the British far right.5    
 
Included in the nation-centric model was the comparative approach. One of the first 
comprehensive overviews of the interwar European far right was Stuart Woolf’s 
European Fascism (1968). In it, Woolf argued that ‘regional differences were more 
salient than other criteria of differentiation’. Arguably, the most important comparative 
work on the subject was the extensive volume Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of 
European Fascism (1980) compiled by a group of leading scholars who identified the 
social groups and occupations that were most likely to support European fascist 
movements.6 
 
In addition to nation-focused studies, other research projects have been undertaken. The 
1990s were largely characterised by intense debates by scholars such as Roger Eatwell, 
Roger Griffin and Stanley Payne over the definition of the ‘fascist minimum’, while in 
the same decade academics focused on ‘generic fascism’, where a breakthrough finally 
occurred. From 2000, historians of the far right have mostly concentrated on the nexus 
 
3 Martin Durham & Margaret Power (eds.), New Perspectives on the Transnational 
Right (New York, 2010), p. 1. 
4 Merlyn Nelson Trued, Was it Fascism?: A Study in the Government of Austria, 1934–
1938 (University of Oregon, 1950).  
5 Examples of national studies: William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 
(New York, 1960); Hamish Macdonald, Mussolini and Italian Fascism (Cheltenham, 
1999); Stanley Payne, Fascism in Spain (London, 1999); Fabio Rizi, Benedetto Croce 
and Italian Fascism (University of Toronto, 2003); Thomas Linehan, British Fascism 
1918–1939: Parties, Ideology and Culture (Manchester, 2000); Richard Thurlow, 
Fascism in Modern Britain (London, 2000); Kevin Passmore, From Liberalism to 
Fascism: The Right in a French Province, 1928–1939 (Cambridge, 1997). More recent 
studies include Passmore, The Right in France from the Third Republic to Vichy 
(Oxford, 2012); Helen Graham (ed.), Interrogating Francoism (London, 2016); Antonio 
Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco’s Spain, 1939–1975 
(Oxford, 2010); Christopher Duggan, Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of 
Mussolini’s Italy (New York, 2013). 
6 Stuart Woolf, European Fascism (Indiana University, 1968), p. 7; Stein Ugelvik 
Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet & Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), Who Were The Fascists: Social 
Roots of European Fascism (University of Michigan, 1980). 
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of fascism, political religions, totalitarianism and most recently on the ‘nearly fascist’ 
movements and ideologies, such as ‘para-fascism’.7 
 
However, a more recent change of direction that seeks to examine history from a 
different perspective has gained prominence: the transnational approach. Transnational 
study challenges the assumption that ideologies, political cultures, economics and 
societies coincide with national boundaries and allows us to analyse a party, group or 
ideology’s strengths and weaknesses on a different scale and on a separate stage, thus 
potentially uncovering the less obvious when viewed from a single-country viewpoint. 
Unlike international history, which is usually focused on ‘interrelations among nations, 
in particular at the political and strategic level’, raising key questions that focus on war 
and diplomacy,8 transnational history concerns the movement of peoples, ideas, 
technologies and institutions across national boundaries. It is important to note that 
transnational history should be understood as a perspective, rather than a new historical 
paradigm or master narrative. It does not attempt to undermine or even replace national 
history but instead aims to complement it. As Niall Whelehan explains, ‘instead of 
choosing between local, national and transnational, new approaches explore how one 
relates to the other’.9 The examination of important transnational circuits and 
interconnections has become one of the most significant historical projects of the 
twenty-first century. Writing in 2013, Simon Macdonald proclaimed that ‘an 
elaboration of the scholarly purchase of the term “transnational history” is now well 
 
7 Main studies on the ‘fascist minimum’ include Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 
(London, 1991); Roger Eatwell, Fascism: A History (London, 1996); Payne, A History 
of Fascism 1914–45 (London, 1997). For studies on totalitarianism and political 
religions, see Hans Maier (ed.), Totalitarianism and Political Religions: Concepts for 
the Comparison Of Dictatorships Volume 1 (Abingdon, 2004); Maier & Michael 
Schäfer (eds.), Totalitarianism and Political Religions: Concepts for the Comparison Of 
Dictatorships Volume 2 (Abingdon, 2007); Maier (ed.), Totalitarianism and Political 
Religions: Concepts for the Comparison Of Dictatorships Volume 3 (Abingdon, 2007); 
Peter Bartley (ed.), Catholics Confronting Hitler: The Catholic Church and the Nazis 
(San Francisco, 2016). For more on the ‘nearly fascist’ movements, see Antonio Costa 
Pinto & Aristotle Kallis (eds.), Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe 1919–
1945 (London, 2014); David Roberts, Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New 
Approach to Fascism and Its Era, 1919–1945 (New York, 2016). 
8 Giles Scott-Smith, Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network (Basingstoke, 
2012). 
9 Niall Whelehan (ed.), Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History (Abingdon, 
2015), p. 1. 
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underway’. Another scholar in the field, Matthew Guterl, confirms that historians have 
now ‘taken up the banner of [this] transnational inquiry’.10    
 
As it stands today, transnational history has seen a wealth of recent scholarship. In 
2009, Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier compiled the groundbreaking Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History (2016), which has been identified as ‘an 
indispensable resource’ for the field of transnational history.11 The 1200 page book 
consists of contributions from over 350 experts in transnationalism from 25 countries 
spanning across six continents and covers a broad array of topics. The previous year, 
The Transnational Studies Reader (2008) was published. This collection of articles 
challenged the isolationism of various fields within the discipline of history and 
demonstrates the ways in which a transnational approach to researching areas such as 
religion, politics and culture can defy the deep-rooted ideas of community, authority 
and identity. Other important contemporary literature includes Connected Worlds 
(2005) which provides fresh (transnational) insights into the past by historians of Islam 
and India, the Pacific and the Atlantic, imperialism and race, modernity and travel; 
Organizing the Transnational (2011) which focuses on politics, labour and social 
change; and the European cross-national focused Comparison and History (2004). A 
‘how to’ book, named Transnational Challenges to National History Writing (2015), 
has even been published on the various ways to write and conceptualise history beyond 
the ‘nation-state-container’.12 In addition, universities across the world are increasingly 
designating sections of their history departments to the field of transnational study.13  
 
 
10 Simon Macdonald, ‘Transnational history: a review of past and present scholarship 
(January 2013)’, Objectives of studying Transnational History, 
[www.ucl.ac.uk/cth/objectives/simon_macdonald_tns_review], accessed 2 July 2019, p. 
11; Matthew Guterl, ‘Comment: The Futures of Transnational History’, The American 
Historical Review 118:1 (2013), p. 130. 
11 See back cover of Akira Iriye & Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds.) The Palgrave Dictionary 
of Transnational History (Basingstoke, 2009). 
12 Sanjeev Khagram & Peggy Levitt (eds.), The Transnational Studies Reader: 
Intersections & Innovations (Abingdon, 2008); Ann Curthoys & Marilyn Lake (eds.), 
Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective (Canberra AUS, 2005); Luin 
Goldring & Sailaja Krishnamurti (eds.), Organizing the Transnational: Labour, 
Politics, and Social Change (University of British Columbia, 2007); Deborah Cohen & 
Maura O’Connor (eds.), Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National 
Perspective (Abingdon, 2004); Matthias Middell & Lluís Roura (eds.), Transnational 
Challenges to National History Writing (London, 2015). 
13 University College London, University of St Andrews, Freie Universität Berlin, 
University of Toronto, Yale University. 
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The study of transnational history has also begun to impact on scholarship relating to 
the far right. An increasing number of scholars whose research lies within this field are 
advocating, and even adopting, a transnational methodological approach to their work. 
Andrea Mammone, one of the most important scholars using a transnational approach to 
study the far right,14 stresses the importance of a ‘more rounded historical and cross-
national analyses for the study of [the far right] political phenomena’. He asserts that a 
‘genuine “fascist wind” blew across interwar European state borders (and probably also 
outside them) […] A web of exchanges, transfers and adaptations then made this fascist 
galaxy’.15 Matteo Albanese and Pablo Del Hierro claim that ‘neo-fascist movements 
after 1945 cannot be fully understood without the transnational dimension’.16 In 
addition, Federico Finchelstein considers fascism to be a genuine global-transnational 
doctrine with distinct redeveloping offshoots and transformations.17  
 
Recent works have illuminated the field. The impressive Mapping the Extreme Right in 
Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational (2012) hosts a collection of essays 
where the authors have attempted to evaluate specific issues in relation to certain far-
right parties but also identify sets of common features shared across Europe. Mammone 
has analysed the transnational neofascist connections between post-war France and 
Italy, while Arnd Bauerkämper and Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe’s Fascism Without 
Borders: Transnational Connections and Cooperation Between Movements and 
Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945 (2017) looks at the transnational dimension to 
interwar European movements inspired by the early example of Fascist Italy. Other 
studies have examined transnational links that breach this narrow European block. In 
 
14 Mammone’s work includes ‘The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-Fascist 
National Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy’, Contemporary European 
History (2008), pp. 213–236; with Emmanuel Godin & Brian Jenkins, ‘Introduction: 
The Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: History, Interpretations, Performance’, 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17:2 (2009); ‘The Eternal Return? Faux 
Populism and Contemporarization of Neo-Fascism across Britain, France and Italy’, 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17:2 (2009), pp. 171–192; with Godin & 
Jenkins, Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to 
Transnational (Abingdon, 2012); Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy 
(Cambridge, 2015). 
15 Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy, p. 15.  
16 Matteo Albanese & Pablo Del Hierro, ‘A Transnational Network, The Contact 
between Fascist Elements in Spain and Italy 1945–1968’, Politics, Religion and 
Ideology 15:1 (2014), p. 84. 
17 Federico Finchelstein, Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in 
Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945 (Duke University, 2010), p. 13. 
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Transatlantic Fascism (2010), Federico Finchelstein traces the intellectual and cultural 
connections between Argentine and Italian fascisms. Paul Jackson and Anton 
Shekhovtsov have coedited The Post-War Anglo-American Far Right: A Special 
Relationship of Hate (2014), while Durham (2010) explores attempts by European and 
American groups to forge various transnational links in areas such as music, religion 
and Holocaust revision. Contributors to Albanese and Hierro’ Transnational Fascist in 
the Twentieth Century (2018) examine Spain, Italy and the ‘Global Neo-Fascist 
Network’ and, most recently, Graham Macklin and Fabian Virchow analyse the 
international cooperation between extreme right groups in the post-war period in 
Transnational Extreme Right Networks (2019).18 
 
Fascism in Britain 
Politically, the far right in Britain has been an abject failure. When compared with 
movements on the Continent, most notably interwar Italy and Germany, their British 
counterparts seemed almost an irrelevance. This ‘failure’ can be clearly seen by its lack 
of electoral support. No candidate from a British far-right group has come anywhere 
near being elected to the UK Parliament, with only a small number elected at the local 
level to council and parishes. For example, in 1926, Arnold Leese, a well-known local 
vet was elected to the Stamford council in Lincolnshire along with another fascist 
colleague. In 1938, landowner and local British Union of Fascists (BUF) leader, Ronald 
Creasy, was elected after finishing fourth of five in a four-member constituency in Eye, 
Suffolk. In the 1940s, Mosleyite Robert Saunders was elected as an ‘Independent’ in 
Dorset. The post-war period saw the National Front gain a minute number of 
(uncontested) council seats. In 1969, two Conservative councillors on the Wandsworth 
 
18 Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe; Transatlantic Fascism; Paul 
Jackson & Anton Shekhovtsov (eds.), The Post-War Anglo-American Far Right: A 
Special Relationship of Hate (Basingstoke, 2014); Durham, ‘White Hands across the 
Atlantic’ in New Perspectives on the Transnational Right, pp. 149–171; Transnational 
Neofascism in France and Italy; Matteo Albanese & Pablo del Hierro, Spain, Italy and 
the Global Neo-Fascist Network (London, 2016); Arnd Bauerkämper & Grzegorz 
Rossoliński-Liebe, Fascism Without Borders: Transnational Connections and 
Cooperation Between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945 (Oxford, 
2017); Graham Macklin & Fabian Virchow, Transnational Extreme Right Networks 
(Abingdon, 2017). Also, see Macklin, ‘Transatlantic Connections and Conspiracies: 
A.K. Chesterton and The New Unhappy Lords’, Journal of Contemporary History 47:2 
(2012); Macklin, ‘Transnational Networking on the Far Right: The Case of Britain and 
Germany’, West European Politics 36:1 (2013); Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black: 
Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British Fascism after 1945 (New York, 
2007). 
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London Borough Council, Peter Mitchell and Athlene O’Connell, defected to the NF for 
two months before returning to join the Tories, and, in 2010, John Gamble of 
Rotherham council defected from the BNP to the NF.  
 
The most electorally successful far-right party in British history, however, is the BNP. 
The party’s first triumph was a seat on the London Borough of Tower Hamlets’ council 
in the early nineties, but their most fruitful spell occurred between 2002 and 2009. 
Beginning in 2002 with three council election victories in Burnley, the party increased 
its seat share. Their most successful period was 2008 and 2009, winning 55 local 
council and three county council seats, and two to the European Parliament. During the 
2010 campaign, numerous commentators predicted an electoral breakthrough for the 
BNP; however, their vote share collapsed at the election. ‘Success’ was short lived and 
by the 2014 elections, the BNP lost all but one of their seats. Some argued that the 
British far right had been ‘wiped out’, others that it had been dealt a ‘mortal blow’.19    
 
However, the lack of political success does not mean that the British far right is 
unworthy of serious scholarship. The subject has attracted an abundance of academic 
attention which has illuminated the topic and shown that the British far right did (and 
still does) have more than a fleeting impact on the country’s society and was not simply 
the ‘political joke’ it was commonly believed to be. In fact, such assumptions were 
challenged as long ago as 1975 when Robert Skidelsky’s biography of Sir Oswald 
Mosley demonstrated that the British far right has a well thought out set of ideas and is 
not just a brutish movement that exists on the margins.20 At the same time, earlier 
contributions from Colin Cross (1961) and Robert Benewick (1973) highlighted the 
 
19 Matthew Taylor & Hugh Muir, ‘General election 2010: the defeat of the BNP’, The 
Guardian, 14 May 2010, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/14/general-
election-2010-fall-bnp], accessed 2 July 2019; Fiona Hamilton, ‘BNP hopes of a 
breakthrough dashed as party defeated in target seats’, The Times, 7 May 2010, 
[www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article2504152.ece], accessed 2 July 2019; 
Cahal Milmo ‘Griffin’s future in doubt as BNP campaign implodes’, Independent, 7 
May 2010, [www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/griffins-future-in-doubt-as-bnp-
campaign-implodes-1968206.html], 2 July 2019. 
For the BNP’s electoral history, see ‘Electoral Performance of the British National Party 
in the UK (2009)’, House of Commons Library, 
[http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05064], accessed 
2 July 2019; Nigel Copsey & Graham Macklin (eds.), British National Party: 
Contemporary Perspectives (Abingdon, 2011), pp. 1–6; Matthew Goodwin, New British 
Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (Abingdon, 2011), pp. 1–4.  
20 Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London, 1975).  
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significance of political violence and the response of the social and political 
mainstream.21 Skidelsky’s work prompted scholars to undertake research on the British 
far right and to take it more seriously. Following Skidelsky, a wealth of work emerged, 
including comprehensive surveys of the British far right and studies attempting to 
understand its ‘failure’.22 A particularly interesting avenue of inquiry has been ideology. 
Richard Thurlow, for example, argues that a coherent political ideology existed behind 
fascist movements in Britain. He insists that ‘fascism was and is an action-oriented 
movement, where the function of ideas is to explain behaviour more in terms of instinct 
than rationality’.23 Although antisemitism has been an area of interest to scholars for 
some time, more recent studies have again begun looking at the matter in greater 
detail.24 Historians have also extended investigations beyond fascist self-representation 
by viewing the British far right as a ‘cultural phenomenon’ and are currently analysing 
interactions between far-right cultures and mainstream popular culture in terms of 
values and beliefs, core ideas, group behaviours, music, dress codes, literature and texts. 
As Nigel Copsey and John Richardson (2015) point out ‘unquestionably, culture was, 
and remains, central to the fascist dystopian project’.25 
 
The study of the British far right has also been used as a prism through which to view 
other aspects of British politics and society. For example, Copsey’s comprehensive 
 
21 Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London, 1961), and Robert Benewick, Fascist 
Movement in Britain (London, 1973). 
22 See Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918–1985 (Oxford, 1987); 
David Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society, 1931–81 
(Manchester, 1987); David Baker, Ideology of Obsession: K. Chesterton and British 
Fascism (London, 1996); Fascism in Modern Britain; British Fascism 1918–1939; Alan 
Sykes, The Radical Right in Britain (Basingstoke, 2005). For studies that examine the 
failure of Britain’s far right, see Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism: the 
Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition (Basingstoke, 1996). 
23 Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918–1985, p. x; Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: From 
Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts to the National Front (London, 1998); Fascism in Modern 
Britain; Salvatore Garau, Fascism and Ideology: Italy, Britain, and Norway (Abingdon, 
2015). For a counter-argument, see David Renton, ‘Was Fascism an ideology? British 
Fascism Reconsidered’, Race & Class 43:3 (1999).  
24 Daniel Tilles & Garau (eds.), Fascism and the Jews: Italy and Britain (Edware, 
2011); Tilles, British Fascist Antisemitism and Jewish Responses, 1932–1940 (London, 
2015). The earlier work was conducted by authors such as William Mandle, Anti-
Semitism and the British Union of Fascists (London, 1968). 
25 Copsey & John Richardson (eds.), Cultures of Post-War British Fascism (Abingdon, 
2015), p. 1. For work on the interwar years, see Julie Gottlieb & Linehan (eds.), The 
Culture of Fascist Visions of the Far Right in Britain (London, 2004); for the post-war 
period, see Cultures of Post-War British Fascism. 
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study of Anti-Fascism in Britain (1999, revised 2016) investigates the fascists’ 
opponents. Julie Gottlieb illuminates the gender sphere by analysing the role of women 
in British fascism. Roger Griffin uses British fascism as a case study into the difficulties 
fascists face in gaining power while operating in unfavourable environments. Richard 
Griffiths and Martin Pugh explore the relationship between the interwar British 
conventional political right and the far right, noting the ‘flourishing traffic in ideas and 
in personnel’ between the two. Mike Cronin used British fascism’s failings to call for 
resistance to extremism, which is allegedly characteristic of British politics. While, 
most recently, Daniel Tilles brings together British fascism and Anglo-Jewry with the 
intention of ‘helping shed light on both’.26 This research on the transnational nature of 
the British far right adds to this illumination of other aspects of British politics and 
society.  
 
Aims and Scope of this Thesis 
This thesis focuses on the underdeveloped sphere of the British far right from a 
transnational perspective. It will examine the British Fascisti, the Imperial Fascist 
League and the British Union of Fascists, described by Paul Stocker as ‘the three major 
fascist parties during the interwar era’.27 In fact, this will be the first extensive 
investigation focused on the transnational British far right in the interwar period. The 
goal is to uncover, analyse, and explain the transnational connections from abroad on 
the British far right and, in turn, the impact that the British far right had on their 
overseas counterparts.  
 
The study will enhance historical scholarship threefold: First, it will add a much-needed 
cross-border dimension to the British far right, of the kind recent transnational studies 
on overseas far-right groups have achieved.28 The vast majority of studies on the British 
 
26 Copsey, Anti-Fascism in Britain (Basingstoke, 1999, revised 2016); Gottlieb, 
Feminine Fascism: Women in Britain’s Fascist Movements (London, 2003); Griffin, 
‘British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling’ in The Failure of British Fascism; Martin Pugh, 
Hurrah for the Blackshirts! Fascists and Fascism in Britain Between the Wars (London, 
2005), p. 5; Richard Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsey, The Right Club 
and British Anti-Semitism 1939–1940 (London, 1998); Cronin,‘“Tomorrow We Live” – 
The Failure of British Fascism’, in The Failure of British Fascism; British Fascist 
Antisemitism and Jewish Responses, 1932–1940, p. 1. 
27 Paul Stocker, ‘“The Imperial Spirit”’: British Fascism and Empire, 1919–1940’, 
Religion Compass 9:2 (2015), Abstract.  
28 Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy; ‘A Transnational Network, The 
Contact between Fascist Elements in Spain and Italy 1945–1968’; Transatlantic 
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far right, and the far right in general, have been nation-centred. This research will 
challenge the impression of this national uniqueness by transcending the borders and 
tracing connections and parallel developments between the movements and individuals 
at home and their multiple counterparts abroad. This approach intends to add a 
transnational dimension to the topic, therefore providing a greater understanding of the 
British far right. Second, by being the first in-depth study on the British far right from a 
transnational perspective, it will contribute an original and innovative area of study to 
the relatively new historical sphere of Transnational History. Third, it will uncover 
significant and unexplored aspects of the far right as a result, offering a more complete 
picture of the larger context of which it is a part. Furthermore, the investigation will 
cover three fields: historical, cultural and political. Therefore, it will extend our 
understanding of the significance of fascism/far right in Britain and beyond. 
 
Note on Terms 
The concept of the left-right political scale is a useful holistic tool for understanding the 
fundamental goals and values of political movements.29 In Left and Right: The 
Significance of a Political Distinction (1996), Noberto Bobbio argues that, although its 
usefulness has been challenged from ‘various quarters’, the left-right distinction is 
crucial because it reflects the essentially antithetical nature and dynamics of democratic 
politics.30 However, scholars contest the exact positions where parties and ideologies 
should appear on this spectrum. The left is commonly associated with egalitarian, social 
equality and anti-Capitalism, with Communism being the antithesis of capitalism, 
considered far left. Communism, which incorporates several schools of thought 
(including Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism and anarchism), is structured, in theory, upon 
a classless and moneyless society where common ownership of production and property 
is established. The right, on the other hand, is regarded as conservative, as defenders of 
hierarchies and tradition, and pro-Capitalists.31  
 
Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945, p. 13; 
The Post-War Anglo-American Far Right; Christian Goeschel, ‘Italia docet? The 
Relationship between Italian Fascism and Nazism Revisited’, European History 
Quarterly 42:3 (2012) 
29 Roderick Stackelberg, Hitler’s Germany; Origins, Interpretations and Legacies 
(London, 1999), pp. 15–16. 
30 Noberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction 
(Cambridge, 1996), pp. 18–37.  
31 Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, pp. 37,51,62 & 69; Steven 
Lukes, ‘Epilogue: The Grand Dichotomy of the Twentieth Century’, in Terence Ball & 
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Despite its frequent use by journalists and scholars alike, the term far right, otherwise 
referred to as ‘extreme right’ or ‘radical right’, is rarely explicitly defined.32 In fact, 
Peter Davies and Derek Lynch in The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far 
Right (2002) set their own simple test: ‘could we avoid commenting on a particular 
movement in a discussion of far-right politics? If not, we will include it.’33 The far right 
consists of those anti-socialists and anti-Communists who, in pursuing their goals, either 
reject or are indifferent to the principles and practices of liberal democracy and are not 
averse to using violence or terror. Common features often prevalent in far-right parties 
or movements include racism, xenophobia, extreme nationalism and the desire for a 
strong state. Fascism, a hotly contested concept, is included in the broader far-right 
spectrum but possesses its own unique characteristics. These include elements of 
populism, radicalism and anarchism. Unlike the broader far right that usually intends to 
defend the status quo, the quest of fascism is to create a new society. A further set of 
concepts that are genuine variants of fascism also join the far-right family. For example, 
‘para-fascism’, ‘proto-fascism’, ‘abortive-fascism’ and ‘crypto-fascism’.34  
 
Scholars have debated the term ‘fascism’ for generations. At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, fascism remains probably the vaguest of the major political terms. 
The most likely explanation for this is that the word itself contains no explicit political 
reference, however abstract, as terms such as socialism, liberalism, communism and 
democracy do. As one of the first works on Italian Fascism, written by German Social 
Democrat Fritz Schotthöfer in 1924, accurately observes ‘Fascism has a name that tells 
us nothing about the spirit and goals of the movement. A fascio is a union, a league; 
 
Richard Bellamy (eds.), Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 602–626; Rodney Carlisle, The Encyclopaedia of Politics: The 
Left and The Right Volume 2 (London, 2005), pp. 692–694. 
32 Paul Hainsworth, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Abingdon, 2008), pp. 7–8. 
33 Peter Davis & Derek Lynch (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far 
Right (London, 2002), p. 7. 
34 The Encyclopaedia of Politics: The Left and The Right Volume 2, p. 694; The 
Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right, pp. 1–7; Cas Mudde, ‘The War of 
Words: Defining of the Extreme Right Family’, West European Politics 19:2 (1996), 
pp. 225–248; Meindert Fennema, ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the 
Comparison of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics 3:4 (1997), 
p. 474. 
15 
 
Fascists are unionists and Fascism a league-type organisation’.35 In fact, the term has 
probably been used less by its proponents than its opponents, the latter being 
responsible for the adjective’s depreciation, which is most frequently linked to words 
such as ‘repressive’, ‘violent’, ‘dictatorial’ and ‘brutal’ or others that are used in a 
negative context. Yet, if fascism were restricted to terms such as these then Communist 
regimes, for example, would be included as among the most fascist, therefore diluting 
the word to an almost useless label.  
 
However, defining fascism is no straightforward task. Political scientists, social 
scientists, historians and other scholars have wrestled with the term for more than half a 
century with many immersing themselves in extensive and exhaustive debates over the 
exact nature and core tenets of fascism. In fact, the definition confused the original 
Italian Fascists from the beginning, with the problem frequently being compounded by 
most of the interwar fascist movements not using the name for themselves, whereby 
nearly all Communist regimes and parties preferred to call themselves ‘Communist’.36 
Indeed, one of the few uncontested statements that can be made about the word is that it 
was a name given to an Italian interwar political force headed by Benito Mussolini, 
although this model is referred to with a capital ‘F’ (Fascism) unlike the ‘generic’ type 
that is not confined to the Italian peninsula. 
 
By and large, interwar research on fascism was confined within the Marxist-Leninist 
‘camp’. They were the first to offer a general theory of fascism, explaining its 
ideological roots, social-political and structural conditions that favoured the rise of 
fascist movements, their evolution over time, and the main characteristics and goals of 
fascist regimes. The Comintern meetings held frequently during the period debated at 
length and published definitions of fascism alongside the dangers posed by it. One of 
the earliest interpretations viewed it as simply a reactionary movement that surfaced 
when the Biennio Rosso threatened bourgeois-liberal order.37A decade later, a report by 
 
35 Fritz Schotthöfer, Il Fascio: Sinn und Wirklichkeit des Italienischen Fascismus 
(Frankfurt, 1924), p. 64. 
36 A History of Fascism 1914–45, p. 3. 
37 Amadeo Bordiga, Relazione del PCd’I al IV Congresso dell’ Internazionale 
Comunista (5 November – 5 December 1922, reprinted in Milan, 1976).  
Translated to English ‘Biennio Rosso’ means the ‘Red Biennium’. This was a two-year 
period immediately following the First World War in Italy of intense social conflict 
revolved around fears of a possible Bolshevik revolution, which rose from the economic 
crisis following the War. For a recent analysis of the subject, see Andrea Ungari, ‘New 
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the Comintern declared that ‘fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most 
reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of financial capital’.38 By the 
mid-thirties, ‘fascist’ was used extensively within the left as a debasing term for any 
movement or regime that encouraged the destruction of Marxism and any governments 
that represented it.39 
 
After a period of stagnation that followed the first post Second World War decades, the 
1960s saw the beginning of serious scholarship by non-Marxist historians. Several 
pioneering scholars from Western Europe and North America founded the Journal of 
Contemporary History which set out to establish the basis of comparative fascism as a 
distinct field of study.40 Their work has had a significant impact on fascist studies and 
was to last a long time. A number of related but distinct areas of research were created 
from their works: 1) comparable historical analysis of fascist movements and regimes 2) 
focus on a distinct ideology and culture which appealed to the masses and 3) the debate 
over arriving at a consensual theoretical model of generic fascism. In 1963, one of the 
editors, Ernst Nolte, made an original and seminal contribution to generic fascism by 
creating a theory based on a history of ideas. Nolte saw fascism as the ‘great anti-
movement’ based on a set of negations: anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, anti-bourgeois and 
most importantly, anti-communism. For Nolte fascism was  
 
anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically 
opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet 
 
Italian Nationalism’, in Lawrence Rosenthal & Vesna Rodic (eds.), The New 
Nationalism and the First World War (Basingstoke, 2015). 
38 Georgi Dimitrov, ‘The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist 
International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism’ (2 August 1935) in 
Georgi Dimitrov, Selected Works Volume 2 (Sofia, 1972), available online at 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm. This was 
the main report at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International.  
39 For interwar documents published by The Communist International, see Jane Degras, 
The Communist International 1919–1943 Documents Volumes 1, 2 & 3 (Oxford 
University Press, 1965) also available in full on Marxists.org. To see a more ‘abridged’ 
version of the documents, see ‘Extracts from Comintern Debates over the Dangers 
Posed by Fascism’ in Griffin & Matthew Feldman (eds.), Critical Concepts in Political 
Science Volume 1 (London, 2004). 
40 These were cultural historians George Mosse & Walter Lacquer, a German scholar 
who researched predominantly fascism and communism, Ernst Nolte, and historian of 
Modern Europe, Eugen Weber. The journal still runs today and is now edited by 
Richard Evans & Payne, and is available online at http://jch.sagepub.com/. 
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typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework 
of national self-assertion and autonomy.41 
 
Nolte’s new theory had an immense impact on the scholarly community. British 
historian, Sir Ian Kershaw suggests that it was one of the most influential academic 
contributions of the decade.42 As a result, Nolte’s work generated such debate that 
numerous international conferences were held to discuss generic fascism as a concept, 
while collections were devised and significant academic literature that dealt with the 
subject as an intellectual phenomenon was published. A leading scholar of generic 
fascist studies, Roger Griffin, said Nolte’s book considerably enhanced the research into 
the field and ‘encouraged other academics to take generic fascism seriously as a subject 
worth investigating’.43 
 
However, the proliferation of fascist studies that followed Nolte’s book brought more 
confusion to the field than light. The ‘all-inclusive’ studies did illuminate numerous 
complex aspects of fascism, yet because of the excessive broadening of the sample 
undermined its generic value.44 To add further confusion, many of the non-Marxist 
authors propagated their own unique definitions. This chronic lack of consensus made 
the process of studying generic fascism difficult for those students and academics 
attempting to investigate certain aspects of the subject, therefore causing many to avoid 
the subject altogether.45 This resulted in requests from certain scholars to call a halt in 
 
41 Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism (New York, 1966), p. 20. This work was 
originally published in German as Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (1963) before 
being translated to English. Nolte later added ‘positive’ characteristics of fascist 
movements to his theory as well as the leadership principle (1968). Then, in his 
subsequent work, Nolte questioned whether generic fascism was a suitable subject for 
research (1977/1982). 
42 Ian Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship (London, 1989), p. 24. 
43 Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (London, 
1998), p. 48. 
44 See, for example, European Fascism; Stuart Woolf (ed.), Nature of Fascism (New 
York, 1968); Paul Hayes (ed.), Fascism (London, 1973); Henry Turner, ‘Fascism and 
Modernization’, in Henry Turner (ed.), Reappraisals of Fascism (New York, 1975), pp. 
117–139; George Mosse (ed.), International Fascism (London, 1979); Who Were the 
Fascists? 
45 Griffin, ‘The Palingenetic Core of Generic Fascist Ideology’ in Alessandro Campi 
(ed.), Che cos'è il fascismo? Interpretazioni e prospettive di ricerche, Ideazione editrice 
(Roma, 2003), p. 99. 
18 
 
the search for a generic type of fascism, with one academic suggesting ‘few concepts 
are more in need of Ockham’s razor than fascism’.46  
 
When it looked as if the search for a generic type of fascism was fading into obscurity, a 
breakthrough occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, and the situation changed beyond 
recognition, transforming the theory into in a new and more developed form. This 
‘remarkable revival’47 was predominantly down to the pioneering work of, the then self-
confessed ‘maverick’, Roger Griffin.48 Griffin’s The Nature of Fascism (1991) 
invigorated the international debate. He identifies what he calls the ‘fascist minimum’ – 
that is, the minimum conditions that a certain political movement must meet in order to 
be considered ‘fascist’ – without which, he claims, there is no fascism.49 According to 
Griffin, ‘Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various 
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.’50  
 
This new ideal type model of generic fascism has become a ‘mandatory’ reference in 
the field, prompting scholars of fascism to argue their position in relation to the model 
and re-evaluate or reconsider their own definitions. Outlining a workable definition of 
fascism is a crucial element to this study. This thesis, therefore, accepts Roger Griffin’s 
premise that all fascisms are (ultra)nationalistic and derive from their own unique 
permutations: ‘Fascism is a political ideology whose mythic core in its various 
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.’51  
 
However, by so doing, the study considers ultra-nationalism and transnationalism not to 
be mutually exclusive. In fact, Griffin argues that the spread of the Italian Fascist model 
outside of Italy by default makes fascism more than a nationalistic entity: ‘When 
political movements […] appropriated the word as a badge of honour it showed that 
some political activists at least were convinced that Mussolini's dictatorship was to be 
 
46 In Gilbert Allardyce, ‘What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept’, 
The American Historical Review 84:2 (1979), for quote see p. 368; In Karl Bracher, The 
German Dictatorship (New York, 1970), pp. 85–86, Bracher argued that the entire 
notion of generic fascism is intellectually invalid; Also, see Renzo De Felice, Le 
interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici (Rome, 1970). 
47 As described by Constantin Iordachi, Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives 
(London, 2009), p. 21. 
48 ‘The Palingenetic Core of Generic Fascist Ideology’, p. 60. 
49 The term was first used by Nolte in the 1960s.  
50 The Nature of Fascism, p. 26. 
51 Ibid. 
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emulated as the manifestation of a positive new force in modern politics, one not 
confined to the Italian peninsula but supra-national, and hence ‘generic’.’52 In addition, 
each of the three the studies examined here appropriated the word ‘Fascist’ or ‘Fascisti’ 
into their name from the outset (until their demise); therefore, this scenario in itself goes 
a long way to adding the Griffin-type fascist tag to each case study.   
 
What is transnational history? As Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor note, no 
consensus exists between historians for the term’s definition as it is generally defined by 
the researcher’s investigations.53 However, a number of working definitions can be 
referenced. For example, Ian Tyrrell considers transnational history to be ‘the 
international context of national action in all of its manifestations’, while Akira Iriye 
suggests it should be viewed as ‘the study of movements and forces that have cut across 
national boundaries’. Patricia Clavin argues that transnationalism is ‘first and foremost 
about people: the social spaces they inhabit, the networks they form and the ideas they 
exchange’. David Thelen offers a similar vision: ‘scholars can use transnational 
movements and moments as sites for listening to people as they look beyond national 
borders to place in larger context and find solutions for problems they first discovered 
within their nations.’54   
 
Although scholars seem to agree that cross-border flows is one fundamental aspect to 
the investigation of transnational history, this is not a comprehensive definition. 
Historian of nineteenth century America, Sven Beckert describes transnational history 
as a progressive approach beginning with ‘the interconnectedness of human history as a 
whole, and while it acknowledges the extraordinary importance of states, empires, and 
the like, it pays attention to networks, processes, beliefs, and institutions that transcend 
these politically defined spaces’.55 In other words, taken in the context of 
transnationalism, ‘nation’ is often understood as incorporating a variety of political 
 
52 The Nature of Fascism, p. 1. 
53 Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective, p. xii. 
54 Ian Tyrrell, ‘American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History’, American 
Historical Review 96:4 (1991), p. 1053; Akira Iriye, ‘Transnational History’, 
Contemporary European History 13:2 (2004), p. 213; Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining 
Transnationalism’, Contemporary European History, 14:4 (2005), p. 442; David 
Thelen, ‘The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History’, 
The Journal of American History 86:3 (1999), p. 973. 
55 ‘Defining Transnationalism’; C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel 
Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational 
History’, American Historical Review, 111:5 (2006), p. 1459. 
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units instead of simply the nation-state. No single definition of transnationalism exists, 
so for the purpose of this study transnationalism is defined as the movement of people, 
cultures, ideas, technologies, organisations and institutions across either metaphorical or 
literal boundaries. 
 
Transnational history is one of a series of terminologies that has evolved with the 
intention of investigating spheres that go beyond rigidly focused areas of study such as 
state or nation-centred history. However, debate exists around how transnational history 
relates to these other cross-border terms. It has been argued that comparative history 
concentrates on the similarities and differences of nations (although other units are also 
investigated) by asking which factors or conditions were largely shared and which were 
idiosyncratic and, most importantly for some, comparative history fails to even 
transcend the national boundaries and is still bound to national exceptionalism.56 
MacDonald suggests these reasons, among others, explain why comparative approaches 
have ‘not greatly prospered across historical scholarship as a whole’.57 Global history, 
as Tyrrell points out, tends to operate on a world level. He explains that Globalisation is 
focused ‘on unidirectional activity [and] on the homogenisation of the world’.58 Further 
work, pioneered by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, focuses on 
‘entangled’ or ‘crossed’ histories, namely ‘histoire croisée’, and has been described as 
the crossings between different historical formations: ‘intercrossing can be 
distinguished from intermixing’.59 Cultural Transfer is also a cross-border form of 
study. MacDonald describes this concept by suggesting that ‘not all cultural differences 
map onto national differences: but where cultural differences do exist, they imply 
processes of acculturation, whose proper study requires that valorized notions of 
national cultural paradigms should be corrected by attentiveness to the particular 
economic, technological, and human vehicles of cultural transfer.’60 
 
 
56 See Jürgen Kocka, ‘Comparison and Beyond’, History and Theory, 42:1 (2003), p. 
41, and Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Going Transnational? News from Down Under: 
Transnational History Symposium, Canberra, Australian National University, 
September 2004’, Historical Social Research, 31:2 (2006), p. 127. 
57 ‘Transnational history: a review of past and present scholarship’, pp. 5-6. 
58 Tyrrell, ‘What is transnational history? (2007)’, Ian Tyrrell, 
[www.iantyrrell.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/], accessed 9 October 
2019. 
59 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée 
and the Challenge of Reflexivity’, History and Theory 45:1 (2006), p. 38. 
60 ‘Transnational history: a review of past and present scholarship’, p.6. 
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However, most historians have avoided setting transnational against other spheres of 
cross-border study and have argued that they should work in conjunction with each 
other instead. Although Tyrrell admits transnational historians generally separate their 
work from comparative history, leading scholar of German transnational study, Jurgen 
Osterhammel insists the transnational and comparative approaches ‘complement one 
another’, and cites a number of recent examples.61 According to Beckert, cross-border 
studies ‘are all engaged in a project to reconstruct aspects of the human past that 
transcend any one nation-state, empire, or other politically defined territory'.62 All the 
various approaches, according to many commentators, are aligned side-by-side with 
transnational history and should be seen as, what MacDonald explains, ‘having certain 
family resemblances’, which involve the study of ‘conjunctions and divergences, share 
various common points of reference, or have comparable goals’.63 
 
Included in this study is the examination of transnational activity between the case 
studies and the British Dominions. By the First World War, anti-colonial nationalist 
discourse was already imagining itself as a nation. Therefore, the aspiration to ‘national’ 
was also, in effect, producing the ‘transnational’. Furthermore, Australia, Canada, the 
Irish Free State, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa were essential self-governing 
states. After a campaign by the dominions, this was eventually made into law in the 
Balfour Declaration of 1926. The document declared the Dominions to be ‘autonomous 
Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to 
another’ within a ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’.64 The parliaments of Australia, 
Canada, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa (and certain 
others) were no longer under British legislative control, and therefore free to make their 
own laws and govern how they saw fit. Leader of the Greyshirts in South Africa, Louis 
Weichardt, for example, stated that ‘the vast majority of South Africans now think of 
the [South African] Union as an entirely independent state, sovereign in all matters both 
internal and external, whose connection to the British Crown and Empire is purely 
 
61 ‘What is transnational history?’; Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘A “Transnational” History of 
Society: Continuity or New Departure?’, in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, 
Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New 
Perspectives (New York, 2009), p. 39. 
62 ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, p. 1445. 
63 ‘Transnational history: a review of past and present scholarship’, p. 7. 
64 ‘Dominion status and legislation’, The National Archives, 
[www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/dominion-status-legislation.htm], 
accessed 11 October 2019. 
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voluntary’.65 Weichardt claimed that even among English-speaking sections ‘imperialist 
feeling is often lukewarm’.66 Therefore transnationalism within the British Empire.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis will adhere to the guidance of the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) concerning the spelling of ‘antisemitism’, as opposed to 
the often-rendered ‘anti-Semitism’. The IHRA’s concern is that 
 
the hyphenated spelling allows for the possibility of something called 
‘Semitism’, which not only legitimizes a form of pseudo-scientific racial 
classification that was thoroughly discredited by association with Nazi ideology, 
but also divides the term, stripping it from its meaning of opposition and hatred 
toward Jews […]The unhyphenated spelling is favored by many scholars and 
institutions in order to dispel the idea that there is an entity ‘Semitism’ which 
‘anti-Semitism’ opposes. Antisemitism should be read as a unified term so that 
the meaning of the generic term for modern Jew-hatred is clear. At a time of 
increased violence and rhetoric aimed towards Jews, it is urgent that there is 
clarity and no room for confusion or obfuscation when dealing with 
antisemitism.67 
 
Sources and Methodology 
While drawing on secondary literature, this study revolves mainly around primary 
research, much of which exploit underused sources. In particular, it focuses on the 
material published by the British Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist League. Collections 
of BF newspapers The Fascist Bulletin, The British Lion and British Fascism and the 
IFL newspaper, The Fascist, are housed at the British Library. Furthermore, in its 
collection on fascism, the Working Class Movement Library in Salford hosts a number 
of rare, yet invaluable, leaflets and pamphlets on pre-BUF fascist movements. 
 
In greater supply are BUF periodicals, almost all of which are now digitised by a 
number of online research companies. UK Press Online, for example, hosts the ‘Mosley 
Press Personal’ package, which features complete collections of Action, Blackshirt, and 
Fascist Week. The British Online Archives house the ‘The British Union of Fascists: 
newspapers and secret files, 1933–1951’ collection, which includes Action, Blackshirt, 
 
65 L.T. Weichardt, ‘National Socialism in South Africa’, The Fascist Quarterly, October 
1936, p. 567. 
66 Ibid., p. 556. 
67 ‘Spelling of Antisemitism’, International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 
[www.holocaustremembrance.com/spelling-antisemitism?usergroup=5], accessed 28 
June 2019. 
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Fascist Week and The East End London Pioneer, as well as government files relating to 
Oswald and his wife Diana Mosley.68  
 
Mainstream newspapers have been consulted extensively for this thesis. Historical 
issues of The Times, The Manchester Guardian, The Observer, the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Express are among the many UK nationals that are widely cited. The digitisation 
of many regional and local newspapers of the interwar period by The British Newspaper 
Archive has provided access to another arm of the British and Irish press. The National 
Library of Australia’s Trove online archive, which holds hundreds of freely accessible 
newspapers, has been an invaluable source for examining links between British and 
Australian fascists. Finally, because of digitisation, global newspapers such as The New 
York Times, The Washington Post and The Times of India have also been sourced for 
this thesis.  
 
The National Archives hosts previously classified material from the Home and Foreign 
Offices on fascism, much of which has been investigated for this thesis. The Security 
Service began monitoring the activities of the British fascists immediately after the 
inception of the British Fascisti in 1923. Due to the popularity of the BUF, MI5 
increased its surveillance on fascist groups in the 1930s, with files also opened on 
British fascists operating in Italy and Germany during this period. Furthermore, German 
intelligence (Abwehr) officers operating in Britain were also monitored. During the 
Second World War, high-profile members of the BUF, including Mosley, were 
interrogated by the Home Office. For obvious reasons, the interviewers were 
particularly interested in the BUF’s relationship with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, 
including the financial arrangements Mosley had managed to secure. 
 
As this study is based largely around ideas, ‘cause and effect’ methodology will be 
applied to interrogate the sources and attempt to define what significant policies and 
ideas were national and what came from overseas and, in turn, what, if any, influence 
the British far right might have had on their counterparts from abroad. To approximate 
an adequate explanation of past events, some distinction needs to be made between 
background causes and direct causes. Lawrence Stone provides an effective example of 
 
68 www.ukpressonline.co.uk/ukpressonline/open/services.jsp; 
www.microform.digital/boa/collections/9/the-british-union-of-fascists-newspapers-and-
secret-files-1933-1951. 
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this procedure. In his study of the ‘The Causes of the English Revolution’, Stone 
considers, in turn, the ‘preconditions’ that came into being in the century before 1629, 
the ‘precipitants’ (1629–39) and the ‘triggers’ (1640–2). By constructing this approach, 
he shows the interaction of long-term factors, such as the spread of Puritanism and the 
Crown’s failure to acquire the instruments of autocracy, with the role of individual 
personalities and fortuitous events.69 This multi-layered method will be applied to this 
study to analyse whether certain characteristics or policies come from historical and 
national traditions, or whether they are influenced by events or ideas occurring from 
abroad.  
 
The two key concepts that form the research methodology for this thesis are ‘fascism’ 
and ‘transnationalism’. Through examination of the movements’ ideologies, each 
chapter will explain why the respective group investigated should be considered fascist 
as per Griffin’s minimum: ‘Fascism is a political ideology whose mythic core in its 
various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism’. However, 
based almost exclusively on primary material, the majority of each chapter is devoted to 
the transnational – defined as the movement of people, cultures, ideas, technologies, 
organisations and institutions across either metaphorical or literal boundaries – aspect of 
each group. Both concepts will be developed through the subsequent chapters by 
showing how they are being used to analyse similarity, difference and the nature of 
transnational exchanges across the case studies.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
In The Practice of History, G.R. Elton suggests the job of the historian is to search for 
the objective truth about the past through historic documentary records, which he argues 
as the ultimate arbiter of historical accuracy and truth.70 Ideally, all sources need to be 
corroborated with other sources. However, this is not always possible, as every source 
has an agenda. In respect of this thesis, the materials published by fascists are nothing 
short of propaganda for their cause, while techniques used by MI5, such as blackmail 
and ‘motives and machinations of those who worked in the shadows of the secret 
 
69 Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529–1642 (London, 1972). 
For further analysis on ‘Cause and Effect’, see John Tosh, Pursuit of History Fifth 
Edition (Harlow, 2010), chapter six: ‘Writing and Interpretation’, pp. 147–175. 
70 G.R. Elton, The Practice of History (London 1967). 
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world’, may have shaped sources.71 As explained in British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies 
and Sources  
 
Information, whether deriving from human or technical intelligence, is seldom 
cut and dried, neatly packaged and sealed from doubt, and the murky worlds of 
double or even triple agents create a hall of mirrors in which nothing may be 
what it seems […] [Intelligence] has its limitations and can never give the whole 
picture.72  
 
The theoretical implications for this study challenge the notion that the British far right 
(and the far right more broadly) is a ‘nationalistic’ entity. As Mammone explains 
 
the classic ultra-rightist doctrine has been often perceived to be indissolubly 
related with the concepts of nation and race. Parties and political cultures 
belonging to the right of the mainstream right might be consequently better 
analyzed only in given national contexts, as they are tied with some deep virtues 
of the fatherland and should be mainly seen as genuine products of single 
nation-states. Hence, these prominent features led some scholars to consider the 
extreme right as an exclusive national tradition, and profoundly different from 
similar foreign movements, regimes, and doctrines.73 
 
This approach fails to acknowledge the connections and exchanges of far-right groups 
and individuals from different countries with each other, or, in other words, their ‘inner 
universalist tendencies’.74 By combining the historical dimension with the transnational 
lens of investigation, it allows us to depart from the parochialism that may limit the 
single-country focus without going too far in the opposite direction of overtly general 
conceptual models. Consequently, this method of analysis gives us the opportunity to 
observe, trace, describe, and eventually contextualise the new dimensions. As 
Mammone stresses, these commonalities, exchanges and transfers, are what ‘creates 
transnational political webs, spaces, as well as ideologies’.75 Put simply, the 
transnational element sheds a strong light on the roots and antecedence of strands of 
British fascism that is impossible to get from elsewhere. 
 
 
 
71 Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire & Graham Macklin, British Intelligence: 
Secrets, Spies and Sources (Richmond, 2009), p. 16. 
72 Ibid., p. 17. 
73Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy, p. 2. 
74 Ibid., p. 3. 
75 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Current Research 
Research already undertaken has shown that the BUF had clear transnational 
connections.76 Research already undertaken from the author’s Master’s thesis has 
uncovered an influx of funding for the BUF from both Mussolini and Hitler in exchange 
for support for Italy and Germany’s aggressive foreign policy. In April 1935, MI5 
reported that regular payments of £3,000 a month were made to the BUF by the Italian 
government. In return, the British fascists were to ‘render the Italians all support in their 
power should this country attempt to interfere over the question of Abyssinia’.77 Several 
months later Mosley bragged to his members that ‘capital was to be made out of the 
Italo-Abyssinian situation’.78 Until recently, although always rumoured, no evidence 
was available that Hitler also provided financial assistance to the BUF. However, 
Stephen Dorril’s analysis of the diaries of Dr Josef Goebbels identifies that he had given 
monetary aid. Goebbels diary states that ‘[Mosley] has already had £2,000…£100,000 
necessary. £60,000 promised. Must submit to Fuhrer’.79 Dorril managed to go beyond 
the Goebbels diaries to the files of the Luxembourg Nazi Party, which he acquired 
through the former socialist barrister Frederick Elwyn. In them, Dorril discovered that 
the BUF received payments in francs through ‘Agent 18’.80 Dorril has also analysed 
Nazi connections with the BUF, especially following the 1936 wedding of Diana 
Mitford to Mosley, which took place at Joseph Goebbels’ home, in the presence of none 
other than Adolf Hitler.81 In Exporting Fascism: Italian Fascists and Britain's Italians 
in the 1930s, Claudia Baldoli (2003) charted the BUF’s sizable activities within Italy: a 
subject too neglected; not least as the BUF and other British fascist movements had 
notable support from British expatriates overseas.82 Gary Love’s (2007) ground-
 
76 Robert May, ‘British Fascism: Imitative or Indigenous?’, (Master’s thesis: Teesside 
University, 2015). 
77 TNA KV 3/53, ‘Fascist Activities in London’, 27 April 1935. Italy invaded Abyssinia 
in 1934. 
78 TNA KV 3/53, September 1935. Evidence of Mussolini’s funding was announced in 
1945 in the House of Commons. For figures and more in-depth analysis on Italian 
funding of the BUF, see Gary Love, ‘“What’s the Big Idea?”: Oswald Mosley, the 
British Union of Fascists and Generic Fascism’, Journal of Contemporary History 42:3 
(2007), pp. 453–455. 
79 Cited in Stephen Dorril, Black Shirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism 
(London, 2006), pp. 376–377. For figures and more in-depth analysis on Nazi funding 
of the BUF, see Black Shirt, pp. 376–381. 
80 Ibid., p. 381. 
81 Black Shirt, pp. 376–381.  
82 Claudia Baldoli, Exporting Fascism: Italian Fascism and Britain’s Italians in the 
1930s (Oxford, 2003). 
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breaking work has investigated Mosley and his party’s ideological influences, which 
shows that there was more than just the standard fascist fare in, for instance, Mosley’s 
monetary policies. He concluded that, although the BUF was a homegrown movement, 
aspects of it imitated the Italian and German models.83  
 
Indeed, contemporaries such as prominent BUF writer and former Ulster Unionist MP, 
W.E.D. Allen, and from the opposite perspective the famous novelist and socialist 
commentator, George Orwell, recognised that fascism was a pan-European and 
internationalist movement. Allen (1934) argued that ‘Fascism as the expression of the 
European will-to-renewal is essentially a Pan-European movement. It draws its strength 
from the historic seats of European culture.’84 In The Road to Wigan Pier, Orwell 
(1937) simply claimed that ‘Fascism is now an international movement, which means 
not only that the Fascist nations can combine for purposes of loot, but that they are 
groping, perhaps only consciously as yet, towards a world system.’85 Interestingly, as 
Love has pointed out, if these two men, so diverse in their thinking, perceived fascism 
to be an internationalist movement, it is puzzling why many historians struggle to do the 
same. Indeed, it is striking that only in recent years that transnational connections have 
become an accepted part of Fascist Studies, so heretofore nationally bounded in 
approach. 
 
The Germans, like the Italians, probably believed that if they funded the BUF it might 
reduce British hostility to their expansionist plans. Mosley eventually struck a deal with 
the Nazis to set up and broadcast a commercial radio station to Britain from Germany. 
In 1933 in a bid to obtain ‘Empire autarky’, the BUF formed The New Empire Union, 
which consisted of fascist groups from Australia and Ulster. In the interwar period, 
British fascists looked up to the Nazis and Italian Fascists as a source of sustenance, 
ideology (to an extent) and financial aid. These dynamics shifted in the post-war years. 
The external props that were so valuable in the interwar period were removed, hence 
their transnational organising takes on a slightly different hue with regards to what 
benefited them directly. Interestingly, the initial years of the post-war period saw a 
 
83 “‘What’s the Big Idea?’, p. 446. 
84 James Drennan, B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London 1934). 
‘Drennan’ was a pseudonym for Allen. 
85 George Orwell, Road to Wigan Pier (London, 2001 /original 1937), p. 200. 
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reversal in positions; old comrades were attempting to prop up and support their 
defeated German counterparts and help them and their movements rise again. 
 
Due to the attention that Mosley and his BUF received from scholars, very little 
research has been undertaken on the BF and IFL from a transnational perspective. Of 
the exceptions are James Loughlin and Paul Stocker. Loughlin has uncovered a number 
of links – ideological, class and personal – between the BF and Ulster loyalism. In so 
doing, he has demonstrated that research on the BF in Ireland provides an important 
insight into Ulster Unionism across the interwar period.86 Stocker, by contrast, has 
investigated the BF’s ideology from 1923 to 1926. In his research, he argues that the 
movement was a ‘hybridisation’ of domestic reactionary factors and Italian Fascism.87 
This challenged the common perception among scholars that the BF was merely an 
overt form of conservativism.88  
 
In the post-war years, far right transnational discourse continued. Following the defeat 
of fascism and the subsequent discovery of the horrors of the Holocaust, the European 
far right was severely depleted. Public opinion was almost unanimously hostile. In 
History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions (2014), Aline Sierp 
identifies the intense ‘moral dismay and moral accusations […towards] 
Fascism/Nazism’ that existed across Europe at the time.89 In addition, many of the main 
players of interwar fascism were either executed, exiled or imprisoned, leaving a 
fragmented rump to try to reignite the flame of the far right. Therefore, a transnational 
impetus was pivotal if the far right was to mount a resurgence in Europe once again.  
 
New ideas emerged during this period. ‘What Europe is’ became a hot topic in far-right 
circles. Following his internment during the war, Mosley formed a new party, the Union 
Movement, which argued for a single nation-state that would span the continent of 
 
86 James Loughlin, ‘Rotha Lintorn-Orman, Ulster and the British Fascist Movement’, 
Immigrants & Minorities 32:1 (2014).  
87 Paul Stocker, ‘Importing Fascism: Reappraising the British Fascisti, 1923–
1926’, Contemporary British History 30:3 (2016), p. 331. 
88 Fascist Movement in Britain, pp. 28–29; Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right 
(London, 2010), p. 86; A History of Fascism, p. 223; Hurrah for the Blackshirts!, p. 55; 
Black Shirt, p. 196; British Fascism 1918–39, p. 64; David Baker, Extreme Right in the 
1920s in The Failure of Fascism; Barbara Farr, The Development and Impact of Right-
wing Politics in Britain, 1903–1932 (New York, 1987), p. 60. 
89 Aline Sierp, History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions 
(Abingdon, 2014), p. 1. 
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Europe – ‘Europe a Nation’. According to Graham Macklin, Mosley’s ‘drive and 
determination to disseminate this ideal represented a concerted effort to revise and 
relocate Fascist and Nazi thought within the context of a post-Fascist Europe’.90 The 
leader of the National Socialist Movement, Colin Jordan, also embraced this tendency 
by co-establishing the World Union of National Socialists with the American Nazi Party 
leader, George Lincoln Rockwell, and adopted the title ‘World Führer’, as Jackson and 
Shekhovtsov, and Frederick Simonelli have explained.91 In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
influence of white power music spread far beyond Britain’s shores, while Holocaust 
Denial remained a constant cross-border theme throughout the post-war period.92  
 
Modern online communications have undoubtedly aided cross-national links.93 In 2007, 
Europol released a report indicating a tendency of the European far right to increasingly 
organise cross-nationally.94 In ‘Radical Right Wing Mobilization and Discourses on 
Europe in Time of Crisis’, Manuela Caiani illustrates how far-right groups have utilised 
‘technological globalization’ to build relationships with their overseas counterparts and 
keep abreast of international activities. Interestingly, her research shows that the British 
far-right rank joint second (with Austria, and only behind the US) as ‘the most 
internationalized’, with half of the organisations active internationally.95 This has 
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become a useful tool for further forging a sense of common identity amongst activists, 
resulting in the far right becoming more transnational than ever before.96  
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One: The British Fascisti  
Chapter One begins by building on historians’ work on the BF’s ideology. It challenges 
the common perception by historians that the BF was little more than an ultra-
conservative movement. By using Griffin’s fascist minimum, it argues that Britain’s 
first fascist movement, formed in the months following the March on Rome and 
founded by war hero of the First World War, Rotha Lintorn-Orman, was essentially 
fascist. Attention then turns to uncovering transnationals aspects of the BF. First to be 
explored is the transnational influences that continental fascism exercised over the BF: 
Italian Fascism in particular and German Nazism influenced the British movement 
significantly. Attention then turns to the BF’s quest to become an internationalist 
movement. The perceived threat of a Bolshevik uprising led the BF to prioritise the 
defence of the British Empire. BF branches were formed in a number of British 
overseas territories. Attention is given to each one, but the main focus of this section is 
on its branches in Australia and Ireland, which were undoubtedly the BF’s greatest 
transnational ‘successes’.  
 
Chapter Two: The Imperial Fascist League 
Chapter Two is divided into two sections. Part one analyses the ideological makeup of 
the IFL, which there can be little doubt fits in Griffin’s fascist minimum. Beginning 
with its formative years in which an idiosyncratic mix of Mussolini’s Fascism and 
Leese’s own fascist philosophy – anti-democratic, anti-Communist, ultra-nationalist and 
White supremacist – dominated IFL thought. It then turns its attention to the 
considerable impact Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party had on the British movement. Part 
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two focuses on transnational physical links and influences relating to the IFL. Most 
notably, the relationship between the IFL and the Nazi Party. The section also 
investigates the question of whether the IFL favoured the Third Reich over its own 
nation, concluding that it did. 
 
Chapter Three: The British Union of Fascists 
By far the most popular and most significant of the interwar British movements 
investigated in this thesis was the British Union of Fascists led by aristocrat, war hero 
and experienced politician Sir Oswald Mosley. This chapter begins by analysing 
Mosley’s pre-BUF years, in which he had a history of cross-border activities and how 
he flirted with fascism before finally created his own fascist party in November 1932. 
Thereafter, the myriad of transnational activity undertaken by the BUF is examined. 
First to be explored is its vision a corporate state, which was significantly influenced by 
the Italian system. Attention then turns to the ways in which Mosley courted Mussolini 
from the outset in an attempt to not only create solidarity and brotherhood between the 
Italian Fascists and the BUF but also to extract financial support. Following this, BUF 
branches abroad – most notably in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany – and BUF imperial 
policy, which included forming The New Empire Union, are investigated. Finally, the 
considerable impact Hitler and his Nazi movement had on the BUF is examined.  
    
The aforementioned chapters that examine British fascism through a transnational lens 
will enhance our understanding of the phenomena and expand the theoretical and 
empirical horizons relating to British fascism. The conclusion will reflect upon what all 
these newly uncovered transnational links add to our understanding of British fascism.
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Chapter One: ‘History proved that the right people were in a minority always, but 
the difficulty lay in finding which minority held them.’1 
 
The British Fascisti was a movement based on fear of communism. Its transnationalism 
reflected this. The belief that communism would destroy the British Empire and 
conquer Britain if it did not intervene was the driving force behind Britain’s first fascist 
movement. Fascism’s defeat of Communism in Italy inspired Rotha Lintorn-Orman to 
create the BF – the Italian-sounding name ‘British Fascisti’ is perhaps the most obvious 
indication of how inspirational the Italian model was to the forming of the BF. 
However, the influence of Italian Fascism did not stop here. 
 
The influence of continental fascism on the BF was considerably more ideological than 
physical. The BF considered itself the British version of the Italian Fascists. Besides the 
name, the BF copied the Fascist salute, Fascist violence and military tactics – the Pollitt 
case, which was inspired by the abduction of the Italian anti-fascist Giacomo Matteotti a 
short time earlier, is the most notable example – Fascist-inspired revolutionary 
undertones and later corporatism became central to the movement’s ideology. As a 
result of the surge in popularity of the Nazi Party in Germany in the early 1930s, the 
BF, in attempt to attract more support at home, adopted rabid antisemtism. Italian 
Fascism and, to a lesser extent, Nazi Germany had a significant impact on BF ideology.      
 
The transnationalism between the BF and Fascism and Nazism was almost entirely one-
way. Despite regular attempts by the BF to build relations with the continental fascists, 
neither Italy nor Germany were interested in developing a ‘brotherhood’ with the 
British movement. The BF did make acquaintance with one of Mussolini’s main men in 
London, and a columnist named only as ‘An Italian Fascist’ wrote one article for the BF 
publication The Fascist Bulletin, while, in an article on British fascism, the Fascist 
newspaper, Critica Fascista, used various quotes from BF literature. An unconfirmed 
report suggested that the BF received a donation from the Nazis in its later years. Even 
if the report was correct, the amount was negligible – enough to purchase posters to put 
up in an area of London.  
 
 
1 Quote by the Archbishop of York at Huddersfield on 21 September 1929 printed in 
The Fascist, November 1929, p. 3.  
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However, what was not one-way was the BF’s transnationalism. The influence of 
continental fascism on the British movement’s ideology forms only half of its 
transnational activities. Ideologically and physically, the BF expanded its influence to 
outside of Britain. It was particularly keen to spread its tentacles across the Empire in a 
bid to prevent a perceived communist-inspired uprising. BF branches abroad, at least 
part-controlled by its London headquarters, were set up. The two most active were BF 
Ireland and BF Australia, which are the main focus of this chapter’s section titled ‘The 
Quest to Become an Internationalist Movement’. The movement spread patriotic and 
anti-Communist sentiments through various mediums such as sport, newspapers, 
children’s clubs, entertainment, politics, rallies and violence. It is perhaps surprising 
that the BF managed to set up active branches abroad given its ineffectuality at home.  
 
Research on interwar British fascism from a transnational perspective is still very much 
in its infancy. Of the many fascist organisations in modern British history, the British 
Union of Fascists (BUF) has doubtless been the focus of the majority of academic 
attention. A wealth of local and regional case studies have been written spanning the 
breadth of the country.2 Yet, this chapter will do something different in turning to 
Britain’s first fascist movement through archival sources, especially newspaper 
accounts, to integrate the issue of fascist transnationalism before it became an Axis 
endeavour. These paradoxical attempts at nationalist internationalism have become a 
rich topic of debate in Fascist Studies of late, with work by Salvatore Garau, Arnd 
Bauerkämper and Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe all showing that, despite claims of 
nationalist priority, many fascist movements learned from each other and, 
paradoxically, worked across borders to advance their ‘palingenetic ultra-nationalist’ 
message.3 
 
 
2 Works examining this include Todd Gray, Blackshirts in Devon (Exeter, 2006); Liz 
Kibblewhite & Andrew Rigby, Fascism in Aberdeen: Street Politics in the 1930s 
(Aberdeen, 1978). No fewer than twenty local and regional case studies have been 
written on the BUF. 
3 Palingenetic ultranationalism is a theory concerning generic fascism created by Roger 
Griffin: Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London, 1991), p. 26; Salvatore Garau, 
Fascism and Ideology: Italy, Britain, and Norway (Abingdon, 2015); Arnd 
Bauerkämper, ‘Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and 
Movements in Europe, 1922–1939’ East Central Europe, 37:2–3 (2010); Bauerkämper 
& Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Fascism Without Borders: Transnational Connections 
and Cooperation Between Movements and Regimes in Europe from 1918 to 1945 
(Oxford, 2017). 
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Alongside more localised work on the BUF in the 1930s, national membership and 
support have also been of scholarly interest.4 Recent perspectives have focused on the 
party’s ideology, its vision for a corporate state, its attitude towards antisemitism, its 
impact on British culture; while Mosley, the BUF leader and his ‘thoroughly 
programmatic’ fascist philosophy are all areas of interest to historians.5 As well as being 
considered ‘intellectually the most coherent and rational of all the parties in Europe’, the 
BUF was by far the most successful, organised and important of the interwar far-right 
British movements.6 It also had a respected and charismatic leader, Sir Oswald Mosley, 
who ‘probably had the greatest intellectual gifts […] of all the fascist chiefs’.7  
 
Perhaps for this reason, a group that has attracted much less historical analysis than the 
BUF is Britain’s first avowedly fascist movement, the British Fascisti (BF), founded by 
war hero of the First World War, Rotha Lintorn-Orman.8 Of the few historians who 
have written on the BF, most have provided brief overviews of the movement and have 
argued that it was a progenitor for the fully-fledged fascist movements of the 1930s and 
beyond.9 The rare exceptions are Paul Jackson who has examined the religious 
dimensions of the BF, the Imperial Fascist League and the BUF, and Julie Gottlieb, who 
has devoted a chapter of her book Feminine Fascism to the ‘feminization’ of the BF, 
noting that  
 
 
4 Works examining this include David Shermer, Blackshirts: Fascism in Britain (New 
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of Fascists’, Journal of Contemporary History 19:4 (1984). 
5 Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism 1914–45 (London, 1997), p. 305. Works 
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and the British Union of Fascists’, Intersections 11:2 (2010). 
6 Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London, 2005), p. 75. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Lintorn-Orman volunteered as a rescue ambulance driver. She twice won the Croix de 
Charité for rescues in Salonica, Greece. 
9 See, for example, Thomas Linehan, British Fascism 1918–1939: Parties, Ideology and 
Culture (Manchester, 2000), pp. 61–71; Robert Benewick, Fascist Movement in Britain 
(London, 1973), pp. 27–36; Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right (London, 
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[m]emories of the roles played by women during the war were central to the 
definition of the movement and to constructing notions of self-worth. […] 
Right-wing women emerged from their war-time experiences with a renewed 
sense of patriotic endeavour.10  
 
However, in recent years, James Loughlin and Paul Stocker have investigated the BF 
from a transnational perspective. Loughlin has examined a number of links –
ideological, class and personal – between the BF and Ulster loyalism. In so doing, he 
has demonstrated that research on the BF in Ireland provides an important insight into 
Ulster Unionism across the interwar period.11 Stocker, by contrast, has investigated the 
BF’s ideology from 1923 to 1926. In it, he argued that the movement was a 
‘hybridisation’ of domestic reactionary factors and Italian Fascism.12 This challenged 
the common perception among scholars that the BF was merely an overt form of 
conservativism.13  
 
In a separate article, Stocker examined the importance of the British Empire to the BF. 
The British Empire, he claimed, was of the utmost significance to the BF as it was 
evidence of British prestige and greatness. According to Stocker, the BF believed that 
the only way to prevent a Bolshevik invasion of British lands was for a fascist system of 
governance to rule Britain and her empire: ‘The BF championed the British Empire as 
both the country’s proudest heritage and completely essential to a British fascist state.’14 
Not only did this highlight the significance of Britain’s overseas territories to the BF but 
also demonstrated how integral it was to BF ideology. 
 
 
10 Paul Jackson, ‘Extremes of Faith and Nation: British Fascism and Christianity’, 
Religion Compass 4:8 (2010), pp. 507–517; Gottlieb, Feminine Fascism: Women in 
Britain’s Fascist Movements (London, 2003), p. 14.  
11 James Loughlin, ‘Rotha Lintorn-Orman, Ulster and the British Fascist Movement’, 
Immigrants & Minorities 32:1 (2014).  
12 Paul Stocker, ‘Importing Fascism: Reappraising the British Fascisti, 1923–
1926’, Contemporary British History 30:3 (2016), p. 331. 
13 Fascist Movement in Britain, pp. 28–29; Fellow Travellers of the Right, p. 86; Roger 
Eatwell, Fascism: A History (London, 1996), p. 223; Hurrah for the Blackshirts!, p. 55; 
Black Shirt, p. 196; British Fascism 1918–39, p. 64; David Baker, ‘Extreme Right in the 
1920s’, in Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism (Basingstoke, 1996); 
Barbara Farr, The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in Britain, 1903–
1932 (New York, 1987), p. 60. 
14 Stocker, ‘“The Imperial Spirit”’: British Fascism and Empire, 1919–1940’, Religion 
Compass 9:2 (2015), p. 49. 
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Scholars are unanimous in their assertions that the British Empire played a major role in 
interwar British fascist thought. In fact, John Brewer has argued that fascism only 
appeared in Britain as a bulwark to the breakup of its Empire, which was under threat 
by growing colonial demands for self-government.15 Thomas Linehan has also 
suggested that the threat to ‘imperial security’ was a key feature in the emergence of 
British fascism.16 More recently, scholars have examined the attitudes of a number of 
fascist groups in Britain towards the Empire during the interwar period, the BUF 
commanding the most attention.17  
 
This chapter adds to the growing field of transnational scholarship on the British 
Fascisti. Although ideology will be explored, most of the chapter will be devoted to 
transnational physical links and activities, the majority of which have not been written 
about until now, most notably, in its quest for world expansion, the BF’s overseas 
exploits. The BF was formed in the months following the March on Rome and founded 
by war hero of the First World War, Rotha Lintorn-Orman. This section begins with a 
discussion on how ‘fascist’ the BF was and will argue that the movement, considered by 
almost all historians as not fascist, is more fascist than is commonly perceived. 
Attention then turns to the BF’s relationship with Italian Fascism and German Nazism 
and explains how Mussolini and Hitler’s regimes influenced the British movement. The 
focus of the final section is on the BF’s quest to develop itself as an international 
movement. Its greatest ‘successes’ were in Australia and Northern Ireland. Both of these 
contexts are explored as well as other less ‘successful’ endeavours abroad.  
 
During the first decade of Mussolini’s rule, the Duce and his Fascist party attracted 
many admirers beyond Italian shores. Following the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy 
in Russia in 1917 and the subsequent consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks, a real 
fear existed that this ‘Russian poison’ would spread across Europe.18 In fact, the 
Russians founded and sponsored the Communist International (1919–1943), which 
intended to fight ‘by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of 
 
15 John Brewer, ‘Looking Back at Fascism: A Phenomenological Analysis of BUF 
Membership’, The Sociological Review 32:4 (1984), p. 3. 
16 British Fascism 1918–39, p. 39. 
17 Liam Liburd, ‘Beyond the Pale: Whiteness, Masculinity and Empire in the British 
Union of Fascists, 1932–1940’, Fascism 7:2 (2018), pp. 275–276; Evan Smith, ‘The 
Pivot of Empire: Australia and the Imperial Fascism of the British Union of Fascists’, 
History Australia 14:3 (2017). 
18 ‘Mr. Churchill On Fascism’, The Times, 21 January 1927, p. 14. 
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the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a 
transition stage to the complete abolition of the State’.19 The emergence of Communism 
demonstrated to the wider world the existence of an alternative to parliamentary 
politics. With much of Europe suffering from the carnage of the Great War, where many 
countries were on the verge of economic and political collapse, revolutionary sentiments 
were widespread.  
 
Italy experienced widespread civil unrest following the war. Alarm at the prospect of a 
communist revolution engulfed the country. The Partito Comunista Italiano 
(Communist Party of Italy – PCI) was a section of the Communist International that 
accorded to Vladimir Lenin’s vision, and it adopted the same programme and tactics as 
agreed at the Second Congress in Moscow in 1920.20 In contrast, the Fascist movement 
in Italy led by Mussolini opposed the rise of the international far left. In a bid for power, 
the opposing sides fought bloody battles on the streets, before Mussolini masterminded 
a successful coup against the Italian government in 1922, resulting in his appointment 
as Prime Minister by King Victor Emmanuel III. The following years saw Mussolini 
brutally suppress his leftist opponents, leading to the eventual termination of the PCI in 
late 1926. 
 
Of course, fascism’s appeal was much wider than just Italy. The worldwide economic 
depression following the First World War caused many to lose faith in democracy and 
capitalism. Economic liberalism was deemed to be an outdated doctrine, while political 
liberalism was blamed for government inefficiency and waste, excessive bureaucracy, 
class egoism and encouraging party factionalism. Fascism, on the other hand, was 
virulently opposed to the concepts outlined above, its propagandists favouring nativist 
traditions and influences, where the nation came before all else, including the 
individual. The rise of communism added an innate fear that these ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ 
governmental systems could not stand up to the challenge. Therefore, ‘anti-
communism’ at this juncture helped underpin an emerging movement that, whatever its 
national differences, was united by this ideological theme. 
 
 
19 Cited from Adam Fuller, Taking the Fight to the Enemy: Neoconservatism and the 
Age of Ideology (Plymouth, 2012), pp. 57–58. 
20 In 1921, the PCI membership was 43,000: John Riddell (ed. and translated), To the 
Masses: Proceedings of the Third Congress of the Communist International, 1921 
(Boston, 2015), p. 12. 
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Mussolini’s example inspired other like-minded groups across Europe into action, 
particularly in the countries closest to Italy who experienced similar social and 
economic upheavals, most notably France, Germany and Austria where nationalist 
movements were already in existence before 1914. For example, the writer for the 
French far-right monarchist political movement Action Française, Leon Daudet was 
enthusiastically applauded by a student audience when he claimed that Action Française 
‘would soon seize power by force and that then the purges carried out by the Fascists 
would pale in comparison with those in France’. Its youth wing, Camelots du Roi 
perpetuated violence similar to those dealt out by their Italian counterparts. While on 
their way to a mass meeting, three left-wing politicians were beaten and covered in tar.21  
 
In the months following the March on Rome, the then largely unknown German Nazi 
Party sought a German-Italian alliance. Even then, Hitler was being spoken of in 
nationalist circles as Germany’s Mussolini.22 To riotous applause, the close associate of 
Hitler, Hermann Esser, declared: ‘What has been done in Italy by a handful of 
courageous men is not impossible. In Bavaria too we have Italy’s Mussolini. His name 
is Adolf Hitler.’23 In an interview with the Daily Mail on 3 October 1923, Hitler, in an 
obvious reference to himself and a comparison with the Italian leader, was quoted as 
saying, ‘If a German Mussolini is given to Germany […] people would fall down on 
their knees and worship him more than Mussolini has ever been worshipped.’24 As 
Hitler’s biographer, Ian Kershaw explains, ‘The model of Mussolini’s triumph in Italy 
now offered the opening for such ideas to be incorporated into the vision of national 
revival, a key aspect of fascism, preached by the National Socialists.’25 
 
The Italian leader gave Hitler a role model.26 Less than a month after Italy succumbed to 
Fascism, Hitler, with reference to Mussolini, reportedly said, ‘So will it be with us. We 
only have to have the courage to act. Without struggle, no victory!’27 As evidence of his 
infatuation, Hitler kept ‘a monumental bust’ of Mussolini in his home, and even wrote 
 
21 Quoted in Francis Ludwig Carsten, The Rise of Fascism Second Edition (University 
of California, 1980), p. 79. 
22 Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London, 2009) p. 78.  
23 Quoted in The Rise of Fascism, p. 80. 
24 ‘A Visit to Hitler’, Daily Mail, 3 October 1923, p. 9. 
25 Hitler, p. 111. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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to the Duce pleading for a signed photograph.28 While in prison for unsuccessfully 
launching a Mussolinian inspired putsch of his own in November 1923, Hitler wrote of 
the Italian leader:  
 
I conceived the profoundest admiration for the great man south of the Alps, who, 
full of ardent love for his people, made no pacts with the enemies of Italy, but 
strove for their annihilation by all ways and means. What will rank Mussolini 
among the great men of this earth is his determination not to share Italy with 
the Marxists, but to destroy internationalism and save the fatherland from it.29 
 
In Britain, as across the world, Italian Fascism was seen as a bulwark against the spread 
of communism. Many British statesmen lauded attacks on the ‘Red evil’, as they saw 
the Russian model as not only a threat to their country but a challenge to their own 
positions. In the 1920s, despite commentators’ widely overlooking his early praise for 
Fascism, Winston Churchill was in awe of Mussolini.30 While addressing the 
‘international aspect of Fascismo’, Churchill told the Italians that their movement had 
rendered a service to the whole world and had provided the necessary antidote to the 
‘Russian poison’. ‘If I had been an Italian’, Churchill declared, ‘I am sure that I should 
have been wholeheartedly with you from the start to finish in your triumphant struggle 
against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism.’31 The British Foreign Secretary 
(1924 to 1929), Austen Chamberlain, was also clearly impressed by the Italians and 
 
28 Ibid., pp. 211–212. 
29 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf [Complete and Unabridged and Fully Annotated], 
[www.archive.org/stream/meinkampf035176mbp/meinkampf035176mbp_djvu.txt], 
accessed 2 July 2019, p. 986. Even in the mid-thirties, when Hitler was several years 
into his reign, he told Mussolini’s son-in-law, Count Ciano, that Mussolini was ‘the 
leading statesman in the world, to whom none may even remotely compare himself’: 
Hitler, p. 369. 
30 For example, in his huge 900-page biography of Churchill, Roy Jenkins skips over in  
one sentence his subject’s admiration for Italian Fascism: ‘[He had] two encounters 
with Mussolini in Rome, after which he issued much too friendly statements’, see Roy 
Jenkins, Churchill (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 412. The Guardian published ‘The Churchill 
You Didn't Know’, which listed many of Churchill’s little-known quotes, yet failed to 
mention either Mussolini or Italy, 
[www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2002/nov/28/features11.g21], accessed 2 July 
2019.  
31 ‘Mr. Churchill on Fascism’, The Times, 21 January 1927, p. 14. 
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considered Mussolini to be ‘a man with whom business could be done’.32 Even Ramsey 
MacDonald, Britain’s first Labour prime minister, sent Mussolini friendly letters.33    
 
Similarly, the majority of the British press extolled Fascism’s victory over the ‘Red 
Menace’. The Daily Mail was particularly supportive of Mussolini and his regime. 
Among the other pro-Italian columns that were printed, it ran a series of articles by their 
‘Special Correspondent’, Sir Percival Phillips, describing how the threat of Communism 
‘stirred all that was best in Italy to combination against the Bolsheviks’.34 The paper 
also encouraged its readers to read pro-Fascist literature, while praising the ‘actual 
achievement of Fascism as […] sufficiently wonderful.’35 The Spectator claimed that 
Fascism was much more ‘constructive than destructive’ and was led by a man who had 
demonstrated ‘exceptional talents for organization’.36 While columnist for The Sunday 
Times, ‘Scrutator’, remarked how ‘Signor Mussolini destroyed a stupid Communist 
tyranny that would have ruined Italy.’37  
 
In 1920, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was formed. As with the PCI in 
Italy, and dozens of other groups across the globe, the CPGB adhered to its Russian 
masters and became the British section of the Communist International. The party 
gained the support of several workers’ bodies and clubs, was represented by the Red 
Clydeside movement, and played a role in the General Strike of 1926.38 Links between 
the CPGB and the Labour Party gained traction, and the affair of the Zinoviev Letter 
(1924) identified the communists as being involved in widespread subversion which, 
according to the forged document, they hoped would lead to a communist uprising in 
the country.39  
 
32 Gijs van Hensbergen, Guernica: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Icon 
(London, 2005), p. 92. Other admirers included Thomas Edison, Sigmund Freud, 
Mahatma Gandhi and George Bernard Shaw.  
33 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 
(London, 2010), p. 124.  
34 ‘Battle of the Pygmy and the Giant’, Daily Mail, 22 December 1922, p. 7. 
35 ‘New Books: Fascism From Within’, Daily Mail, 8 June 1923, p. 13; ‘Fascism From 
Within’, Daily Mail Atlantic Edition, 19 July 1923, p. 6. 
36 The Spectator, 20 January 1923, p. 6.  
37 ‘“Scrutator”. Force and its Nemesis’ The Sunday Times, 22 June 1924, p. 12. 
38 Red Clydeside existed between 1910 and the early 1930s. It was the era of political 
radicalism that characterised the city of Glasgow and surrounding urban areas and was 
often referred to as the political militancy of the time. 
39 Published by the Daily Mail four days before the 1924 General Election. Alleged to 
be a directive from Grigory Zinoviev, head of the Communist International, to the 
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It is important to note that, in hindsight, the communist threat in Britain was not as 
severe as in other parts of Europe. Yet, many contemporaries perceived Britain to be at 
risk of a communist takeover.40 Shortly after the war, in a meeting with the then Prime 
Minister Lloyd George, the Food Controller, Mr G. H. Roberts, claimed that ‘there are 
large groups preparing for Soviet government [in Britain]’.41 Media reports heightened 
tension amongst the public. The Financial Times ran the headline, ‘Menace of the 
Communist: London Danger’, warning Londoners of the ‘danger […] of being ruined or 
crippled by Labour-cum Communist-cum Bolshevist efforts to create a world of their 
own and to apply in practice the theories of “Comrade Lenin” and the fellow extremists 
who have brought Russia to her present terrible pass’.42 The Daily Mail also emphasised 
the ‘Communist Threat’, uncovering a supposed plot by the ‘extremists’ to ‘create as 
much public nuisance as possible.’ The aim was to exploit the unemployed by enticing 
them to undertake a ‘stink bomb’ campaign across the capital in an attempt to disrupt 
Christmas and the trade leading up to it, as Communists rejected religion. To make the 
‘upmost nuisance of themselves’, activists were told to ‘operate’ where people 
congregated, such as cinemas, crowded theatres, in large crowds in the stores and in 
busy lifts, where the ‘foul-smelling chemicals […] would be an admirable annoyance’. 
According to the Daily Mail, the police had taken steps to deal with the ‘emergency’, 
should it have arisen.43  
 
Six months following Mussolini’s March on Rome, the British Fascisti emerged as a 
counter-revolutionary organisation dedicated to the ‘unrelenting struggle against the 
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powers of evil represented by Bolshevism’.44 ‘We are resolutely opposed to 
Communism, which is another word for Bolshevism, regarding it as a fraud designed to 
hoodwink the masses, and reduce them to slavery under alien domination.’45 Although 
the BF was gravely concerned about a Red revolution in Britain, they were equally as 
anxious about the potentially destabilising effect of Communism on the Empire:  
 
Very powerful forces are at work within the confines of these shores, but 
inspired and stimulated from without, for the disruption of the great Empire of 
which we are so justly proud and for which thousands of our countrymen have 
fought and died. These forces work openly, but more often secretly, in different 
ways and under different names, all striving ceaselessly for the same object, 
namely, the overthrow of the British Constitution and the establishment of the 
Bolshevik regime, misnamed ‘Workers’ Republic,’ in which the ‘workers’ 
would actually have no real part – similar to that which has reduced Russia to a 
welter of anarchy, slavery and ruin, and would have brought about the same 
condition in Italy but for the heroic determination of her people.46 
 
The majority of historians agree with the fascist Arnold Leese, a one-time member of 
the BF, when he described the movement as not fascist but merely ‘Conservatism with 
Knobs On’.47 Richard Griffiths suggested that Britain’s first fascist movement was 
nothing more than ‘a Conservative movement, obsessed by the dangers of civil 
emergency’.48 Thomas Linehan described them as ‘super-patriots who harboured an 
intense aversion to Bolshevism, radical socialism and militant direct action trade 
unionism, which were thought to pose a serious threat to property, civil order and 
ordered government’.49 David Baker has claimed that BF activity centred on ‘military-
style discipline, organised strike-breaking and stewarding right-wing Conservative 
meetings’, dismissing the movement as ‘little more than [… a] defence league, made up 
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Blackshirts!, p. 51; Black Shirt, p. 196. 
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largely of Conservatives obsessed with the dangers of civil strife and Bolshevism, and 
seeking to maintain public order and guarantee essential services through a network of 
paramilitary units if Red Revolution should come to the Home Counties’. Similarly, 
Barbara Farr considers the movement a form of ‘constitutional right-wing activism’.50 
As Linehan has remarked, ‘The predominant view in the historiography is that the BF 
was essentially a reactionary right-wing conservative movement which, in terms of its 
outlook and policy, differed very little from Baldwin’s Conservative Party.’51 
 
Examination of security service files held at The National Archive as well as the BF’s 
own publications challenges these rather simplistic claims that the fascisti were simply 
overenthusiastic stewards at Conservative meetings. Britain’s first fascist movement 
was, in fact, more ‘fascist’ than originally perceived. Initially, certain MI5 agents 
assigned to infiltrate the BF, including Maxwell Knight – reputedly the model for the 
James Bond character ‘M’ – were sympathetic to fascism, supporting its fight against 
communism.52 Therefore, it is unsurprising that reports show considerable bias in 
favour of the movement. For example, commending the fascists on their continual 
‘good work’, describing the propaganda section of the BF as ‘excellent’ in its attempts 
to penetrate ‘the worst Labour centres throughout the country’, complementing the 
stewards for the way they ‘policed’ (Tory) elections meetings and describing certain 
members as ‘good men’.53 
 
Other, less biased, officers were worried by the BF. On 20 September 1923, Inspector 
Joseph Clarkson sent a police report on the BF to Intelligence Officer, Major General 
Sir Vernon Kell – the founder and first Director of the British Security Service – 
warning him that the fascist movement was ‘a poor sort of business, and if it 
materialises will do some harm’.54 Kell was particularly troubled over the information 
he received on a young man calling on the Regimental Headquarters, Buckingham Gate, 
with a view to obtaining recruits for the British Fascisti. According to the reports, the 
adjutant informed him that he had no business approaching any officer or man of British 
 
50 ‘Extreme Right in the 1920s’; The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in 
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53 TNA KV 3/57, ‘Report on “The British Fascists”, 23 November 1924, p. 1, (31a[?]). 
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forces for any such purpose, whereupon he withdrew. Following an investigation lasting 
six weeks, the man was identified as salesman, Fred Jeffers, but no action was taken, 
although Kell’s superiors were informed.55 Furthermore, MI5 received a letter from 
former BF member, F.M. Lowe, reporting on the ‘rumours’ that he had heard 
questioning the loyalty of the movement to its country.56  
 
Suspicion mounted as to the revolutionary intent of the BF. The Daily Herald argued 
that the BF was a threat to democracy. On 18 January 1924, the paper suggested that the 
BF’s tactics meant ‘deadly business’, claiming that their archives contain lists of names 
and addresses of arms and explosive makers.57 MI5 also believed the BF to be ‘a 
dangerous organisation’. In March 1925, information obtained from ‘recent reports’, 
described the danger from ‘several points of view’. Firstly, they ‘bring discredit by their 
methods on all who really wish to maintain law and order’. Secondly, ‘Some of them 
talk about “the Day” when they will take charge, using the Police as mere assistants – 
much as Sanballat was allowed to help in building the post-captivity Temple.’ Thirdly, 
‘[t]heir Secretary, Hewlett, has political ambitions and has been heard to say that he is 
looking forward to the day when the Empire shall be a Republic with one parliament’.58  
 
The BF claimed to be a ‘peaceful’ movement, stressing that fascism in Britain would 
only occur by ‘constitutional means’.59 However, columns in its own newspaper appear 
to contradict this assertion. In August 1927, District Officer, E.G. Mandeville Roe, 
called for fascism to ‘capture’ all political parties: ‘it is only by ridding all political 
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parties with Fascism that national salvation is possible’.60 In an article titled ‘The Ideals 
of British Fascism’ (1925), Lintorn-Orman hints at revolutionary intent: 
 
The peculiarity about British Fascism is that it has no past traditions to fetter its 
actions. It is based on certain principles, and can therefore speak out in favour of 
what it believes to be remedial measures, without having to explain its non-
adherence to the previous declarations of weak-kneed exponents whose only 
desire was to shelve awkward questions. 
 
During the two years of its existence certain basic principles have emerged, and 
on them its past, present and future actions are based. First of all, it is a definite 
challenge to put an end to the vile disease that has brought us to our present 
deplorable condition. Softness, sentimentalism, flabby compromise and 
thoughtless acceptance of catchphrases without examination as to their truth or 
falsity are amongst the many symptoms of the malady. What we want is a return 
to VIRILITY, a fearless exposure of plain truth, and a determination to get the 
right Kingdom regardless of immediate consequences […] Fascists can, and 
must, show the way – it is really a matter of life or death. 
 
[…] 
 
Surely there must be millions in this land who feel as we do. Let us be up and 
doing; let us give up something of our spare time and resources for our Country; 
and let the word go forth that we do not intend to allow faint-hearted politicians 
on the one side, or Moscow-driven traitors on the other to wreck our homes, our 
lives, or the Land of our Fathers.  
 
The truth is, that politicians are afraid of grasping the nettle, what with 
financiers controlling Party activities through the “war chest”, and wretched 
postponements and tergiversations in successive cabinets, we are drifting fast 
towards the rapids.61  
 
As a result of a change in personnel in the Grand Council at the beginning of the 
thirties, the BF adopted a fully fascist programme. The intention was to ‘capture the 
political power of the State’ – as identified in its mouthpiece, British Fascism – and 
abolish General Elections, which ‘subject affairs of State to uncertainty’.62 According to 
the BF, the party system had become ‘obsolete and totally inadequate’ for the 
conditions of the twentieth century: ‘Every Briton must thoroughly realise that the time 
is in hand when the Party system will be thrust aside and the fight for power restricted 
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between Fascism and Social-Communism.’63 The BF argued that ‘[t]his is an age of 
change’ in which ‘old ideas and values no longer apply’.64 It is time to replace the ‘Old 
Gang Parties’ with a ‘United body’ consisting of a ‘higher standard of life [and] a 
higher social conception’.65 The ‘Fascists are out to capture the control of the British 
State in order to erect the Fascist Corporate System and eliminate the present chaotic 
and vicious party system’.66 This revolutionary shift in tone did not escape the attention 
of MI5, who, as well as collecting snippets from British Fascism, remarked that, under 
the BF, the language used by the BF shows that in a crisis, they would probably have 
little regard for the ‘Parliamentary machine’, therefore preferring to create a new social, 
political and cultural order in Britain.67  
 
The Italian Fascist Influence  
The BF was certainly influenced by Mussolini and Italian Fascism. In a bid to increase 
its membership, the movement appeared to openly distance itself from the Italian model 
in an attempt to appear less foreign and more ‘British’. In 1924, the BF anglicised their 
name from the British Fascisti to the British Fascists. In June 1926, The Fascist Bulletin 
stated that the movement had nothing to do with the Blackshirts.68 In fact, ‘[we] do not 
consider that Italian [violent] methods pure and simple will ever do in this country, for 
the simple reason that the population is only apathetic and not communistic as in Italy. 
What we consider is that the British form of Fascism must be adopted’.69 The 
Organising Secretary, Captain Robert Smith, stated that ‘We are not linked to the Italian 
Fascists but use the name to denote citizens joining to defend the state.’70 The Brighton 
and Hove Herald reported on a meeting of fascists in the town where the speaker 
emphasised that the movement was ‘educational and evolutionary’ and should not be 
confused with the ‘Blackshirt Brigade’.71 Even the BF’s constitution stated that ‘there is 
no connection whatever between the British and Italian Fascists’.72 
 
 
63 ‘The Political Programme of the British Fascists’. 
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65 ‘Editorial Notes’, British Fascism, summer programme 1933, p. 2. 
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68 ‘National Fascisti’ The Fascist Bulletin, 12 June 1926, p. 7. 
69 Ibid. 
70 TNA HO 144/19069, Robert Smith to the Lord Chancellor, 17 June 1926. 
71 Brighton and Hove Herald, 20 March 1926. 
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However, Italian Fascism was unquestionably the ideological inspiration of the BF. In 
fact, incorporating the word Fascisti into the movement’s name and adopting the Italian 
Fascist salute is evidence of its founder’s admiration for Mussolini’s new fascist 
experiment.73 Fascism’s defeat of Communism in Italy inspired Lintorn-Orman to 
create the BF. Orman believed that the far left, aided by the weapon of the General 
Strike, was attempting to turn Britain into a battlefield similar to Serbia in 1916.74 She 
argued that if her movement was to accomplish its objective, which was ‘the 
extermination of Communism’, all ranks and all classes must unite and work together 
for this end.75 The BF’s constitution proclaims that 
 
[W]e realise and admire the wonderful spirit of patriotic devotion which enabled 
the Italians eventually to save their country from the horrors of a Red Revolution 
[…] in the words of Signor Mussolini, creator of the Fascist Ideal ‘Fascism is 
not for Italy alone, but is for all Nations, but each Nation must adapt it to the 
characteristics of its own people’.76 
 
Despite attempts to anglicise fascism, obsession with the Italian Regime is evident in 
BF publications. Besides regular tirades against the Red enemy, virtually every issue of 
the BF newspapers (and pamphlets) includes sections relating to Italy, most commonly 
on the ‘achievements’ under Mussolini. Correspondents sent reports from Italy to the 
BF lauding the fascist regime. For example, in a column titled ‘Practical Fascism In 
Italy’, the author, named as ‘A British Fascist’, gives a detailed (and heavily biased) 
account on the changes implemented by the fascists since the March on Rome: ‘There 
can be little doubt but that Sr. Mussolini and the Fascisti have effected a great 
improvement in the administration of the departments of the State, things are now much 
better managed than what they were, because inefficiency and slackness are no longer 
tolerated.’ The author warned would-be visitors of pickpocketing in Rome, claiming 
that the public is now so wealthy under fascism that ‘money is often displayed’.77 
Another account by a traveller, printed in The British Lion, claimed to have travelled 
 
73 ‘British loyalists adopted their title ‘Fascist’ because of the success attained by 
Mussolini and his supporters. [...] when Italy was on the brink of revolution and ruin’: 
‘Fascists in Italy and England’, The Fascist Bulletin, 29 August 1925, p. 2; ‘The King 
Gives Fascist Salute’, The Fascist Bulletin, 15 August 1925, p. 4. 
74 The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in Britain, p. 55. 
75 R. Lintorn-Orman, ‘Fascist Sunday Schools and Kitchen Meetings’, The Fascist 
Bulletin, 13 June 1925, p. 2. 
76 ‘British Fascist Manifesto. Constitutional’, The British Lion, Issue Number 31, p. 3.  
77 A. British Fascist, ‘Practical Fascism in Italy’, The Fascist Bulletin, 20 June 1925, p. 
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across Italy and mingled with all classes where ‘Fascism is deeply rooted in their 
hearts’. Communists ‘insulted, tortured and murdered [people] in the streets […] until 
Mussolini came and restored order and has gone on gaining the confidence of all decent 
citizens. His picture is to be found in houses and in the cottages of the peasants in the 
mountains.’78   
 
Devotion to Fascism is expressed through connections to its Italian counterparts. Over 
the course of its lifetime, the BF attempted to build a relationship with the Italian 
Fascists. Shortly after the movement’s inception, MI5 received information that, 
according to Hewlett, the BF had made a contact within the Italian Fascisti.79 The 
contact turned out to be Camillo Pellizzi, one of the founders of the London Fascismo, 
State Delegate for the Fascisti of Great Britain and Ireland and the London 
correspondent for Il Popolo d’Italia – founded by Benito Mussolini in 1914 and the 
organ of the National Fascist Party. Pellizzi appeared to have some impact on the BF as, 
according to MI5, he introduced the former Dublin Castle Intelligence Officer, Sir 
Ormond Winter, to the movement in which he went on to head the London District of 
the BF.80 Examination of The Fascist Bulletin identifies Winter as the head of the 
London area BF, but there is no mention of Pellizzi or the Italian influence.81 This could 
be because the BF published its first newspaper in mid-1925, around six month after 
MI5 produced a report on the BF featuring Pellizzi.  
 
The BF hoped to build a relationship with Mussolini. On 11 September 1926, anarchist 
and ardent antifascist, Gino Lucetti, tried to kill the Duce by throwing a bomb at him as 
his car went past him in the street. Unfortunately, for Lucetti, the bomb hit the target’s 
car but failed to explode until it fell to the payment metres away, blowing up in the 
faces of numerous innocents.82 In response to the ‘odious attempt upon his life’, the 
 
78 Briton, ‘The Daily Chronical and Fascism’, The British Lion, 18 December 1926, p. 
5. For more lauding of Italy by a traveller, see ‘The State of Italy’, The Fascist Bulletin, 
29 August 1925, p. 3. 
79 TNA KV 3/57, ‘Report on “The British Fascisti”’, 23 November 1924, p. 9 (31a).  
80 TNA KV 3/57, ‘Sir Ormond Winter’, 12 December 1924.  
81 ‘Great Fascist Rally in Hyde Park on Empire Day’, The Fascist Bulletin, 13 June 
1925, p. 3. 
82 Many attempts on Mussolini’s life were undertaken and, therefore, it is not certain 
what one the BF was responding to. For a biography on the would-be assassin, Lucetti, 
see Riccardo Lucetti, Gino Lucetti and his attempt to assassination Benito Mussolini (Il 
Duce) 11 September 1926 (Hastings, 2012 – original in Italian 2000).  
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BF’s headquarters sent a message directly to Mussolini ‘wish[ing] to convey to your 
Excellency their congratulations on your provident escape from assassination’. Augusto 
Rosso of the Italian Charge d'affaires responded, informing the British movement that 
‘His Excellency the Head of the Italian Government has received the telegram so kindly 
addressed to him […] and wishes me to convey to you his most sincere thanks.’83 The 
previous year, Mussolini was expected to visit London to sign the Locarno Treaty, 
although he sent an aide instead.84 Hoping to capitalise on the opportunity, the BF sent 
an invitation to Mussolini to ‘meet and perhaps address the British Fascists’ while in 
London. The BF explained how 
 
the moral, spiritual and fundamental objects of the British and Italian Fascists 
are identical; nor fortunately is there any danger that the patriots of the 
kingdoms may find themselves pitted against one another – on the contrary […] 
the corner-stone of peace in the near future probably rests upon a close alliance 
between the two.85    
 
In addition, the BF attempted to persuade ‘a leading Italian Fascist’ to publish a series 
of articles in its newspapers.86 However, their endeavours were unsuccessful as they 
only managed to attract an author known only as ‘An Italian Fascist’. The first article of 
the supposed series appeared in The Fascist Bulletin on 6 March 1926. Noticeably 
proud of achieving their coup, the movement devoted over half a page to the newly 
acquired Italian writer. Under the title ‘The Labour Policy of Fascism’, the author 
covers a variety of fascist-inspired subjects. For example, ‘The Pioneers of Fascism’, 
Fascist Corporations, interests of Fascism, strikes and the evolution of Fascism. Despite 
proclaiming that a series of articles would be published, ‘The Labour Policy of Fascism’ 
appears to be the only one written.87  
 
Perhaps the most famous attempt on Mussolini’s life was by an insane Irish aristocrat 
named Violet Gibson. For a forensic report on Gibson, who was freed by the fascists 
and spent the remainder of her life in an institution for the mentally ill in England, see 
Enrico Ferri, ‘A Character Study and Life History of Violet Gibson Who Attempted the 
Life of Benito Mussolini, on the 7th of April 1926’, American Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 211 (1928–1929). For an academic biography of Gibson, see Frances 
Saunders, The Woman Who Shot Mussolini (London, 2010).  
83 ‘Signor Mussolini’, The British Lion, 23 October 1926 Issue Number 9, p. 13. 
84 The Treaty was a peace treaty between the major powers, and it enabled Germany to 
be admitted to the League of Nations. 
85 ‘Signor Benito Mussolini Prime Minister of Italy’, The Fascist Bulletin, 21 November 
1925, p. 1. 
86 ‘Italia Felix’, The Fascist Bulletin, 6 February 1926, p. 4.  
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Despite the BF’s desire to establish links with the fascismo, their Italian ‘brothers’ were, 
for the most part, not receptive. However, they did receive a modicum of attention 
through the Fascist newspaper, Critica Fascista, whose founder, Giuseppe Bottai, was a 
Fascist politician and was present during the March on Rome. The paper devoted a 
lengthy article to a description of fascism in Britain, which included various quotations 
from the BF pamphlets, suggesting that ‘The principle characteristic traits [of British 
and Italian fascism] are identical. Its future depends partly on the tactics by which 
Communism will carry out its programme.’ The BF proudly reprinted the article in The 
Fascist Bulletin, emphasising the movement’s inclusion in it.88     
 
Aspects of Italian Fascism were adopted by the BF. One of the most telling examples is 
the movement’s willingness to use military tactics against their common enemy, as 
displayed by their Italian counterparts. Despite publicly claiming to be a defence force, 
the BF was, in fact, a violent outfit.89 In a pamphlet titled Taking Off The Gloves, the BF 
described the need for violence to defeat the ‘workers of evil’: ‘We [shall not] defeat 
our opponents by fighting in kid gloves. Let us attack and go on attacking the Bolshevist 
enemies of our Empire by every means and by every device in our power. We can only 
win by hitting and by hitting hard.’ The pamphlet concludes with a call to arms: ‘let us 
take off our gloves, and get busy’.90 Another pamphlet lists its objectives. Number one 
on the list is ‘[t]o oppose Communism […] by all means in our power’.91  
 
Prominent members of the BF perpetuated the need for violence. The leader of the BF 
units in Scotland, Lord Glasgow – who visited Mussolini, Hitler and Franco in the 
1930s – spoke to crowds of fascists about ‘the necessity for Fascist action’ against the 
Communists.92 John Cheshire, District Officer Western Command, declared that the 
military aspect of Fascism is one that should appeal to every man, and no place exists in 
its ranks for the ‘coward, neurotic or pacifist’.93 Threats of violence were sent to 
 
88 ‘The Italian Press on British Fascism’, The Fascist Bulletin, 12 September 1925, p. 3. 
89 ‘Fascism & Force’, The Fascist Bulletin, 5 December 1925, p. 1; ‘British Fascism 
Purely Defensive’, The Fascist Bulletin, 3 October 1925, p. 3; ‘“No Force Unless” 
Objects of British Fascists’, The Sunday Times, 28 December 1924, p. 10.  
90 R.A.C.,‘Taking Off The Gloves’, The British Fascists, 1926  No. 16. 
91 ‘Objects’, The British Fascists, 1926.  
92 ‘Successful Meetings at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Newcastle’, The Fascist Bulletin, 
13 June 1925, p. 3. 
93 ‘A Defence of Militant Fascism’, The British Lion, Issue Number 28.  
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prominent left-wing campaigners by the BF; for example, envelopes with packets of 
gun cartridges were received with the warning ‘remember the recent attempt on 
Mussolini. Our men won’t miss’.94 These commands were taken on board by the 
movement’s rank and file and physical attacks on communists became commonplace, as 
did the well-publicised court cases that followed.95  
 
The kidnapping of the politician and leading activist of the CPGB, Harry Pollitt, by the 
BF in 1925 appears to have been inspired by the abduction of the prominent Italian 
socialist politician and outspoken critic of the Italian Fascist government, Giacomo 
Matteotti, by Mussolini’s men months earlier. On 10 June 1924, Matteotti was forcibly 
bundled into a vehicle outside his house by agents of the Fascist secret police. Two 
months later, his corpse was found near Riano, a few kilometres from Rome.96 On 14 
March 1925, in an almost identical plot, five fascists approached Pollitt at Edge Hill 
station forcing him into a motorcar. In a bizarre turn of events, the Communist appears 
to have charmed his captures into releasing him unharmed after a weekend in captivity. 
According to Pollitt’s court testimony, he realised that ‘physically he had not a chance’ 
and therefore decided to ‘pit his wits against theirs’ by being ‘diplomatic’. The tactic 
worked and when the fascists freed him at Shrewsbury station, they shook hands before 
he departed back to London. Remarkably, the jury found the fascist defendants not 
guilty of kidnapping, believing their defence that they ‘thought it would be a good 
practical joke to […] take him away for the weekend’.97 The British press reported 
extensively on the Matteotti incident and the methods used. Therefore, it is certain that 
the BF would have had knowledge of the event. Tellingly, the BF sent threatening 
letters to leading left-wing activists reminding them to ‘Remember what happened to 
Matteotti. Your fate will be far worse.’98   
 
94 ‘Threaten Miners’ Officers’, The New York Times, 28 April 1926. The reference to 
Mussolini was referring to one of many attempts on his life. 
95 ‘Activities in Glasgow: Clashes With The Communists’, The Fascist Bulletin, 11 July 
1925, p. 3; ‘Communists Bombed’, Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette, 15 May 1928, p. 
8; ‘Liverpool Fascists Fined’, The Manchester Guardian, 15 May 1928, p. 14; ‘Fascist 
Who Was Provocative: Sequel to the Arrests in Trafalgar-Square’, Daily Herald, 14 
October 1924, p. 3. 
96 For more on the Matteotti murder and its impact on the Fascist regime, see Mauro 
Canali, ‘The Matteotti Murder and the Origins of Mussolini’s Totalitarian Fascist 
Regime in Italy’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14:2 (2009), pp. 143–167. 
97 ‘Pollitt Kidnapping Charge – Accused Not Guilty’, The Manchester Guardian, 24 
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The kidnapping of the leading communist and the court case that followed attracted 
significant attention in Britain. Both the national newspapers and the regional press 
covered the story comprehensively.99 For example, under the heading ‘The Amazing 
Story of Mr. Pollitt’, The Manchester Guardian devoted regular columns to the Pollitt 
affair.100 The incident was also debated in Parliament a number of times, with the then 
Home Secretary, Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, who investigated the kidnapping, responding to 
questions from fellow MPs.101 As Robert Benewick has stated, ‘The publicity value of 
the kidnapping was worth more than a dozen speeches or demonstrations to both 
organisations.’102  
 
Although both sides gained greater publicity from the event, the Pollitt case provided an 
important insight into British society’s attitudes to both fascism and communism at the 
time. In summing up the case, the judge was clearly unprejudiced. In his address to the 
jury, Mr Justice Finlay highlighted the importance of the case and demanded their ‘most 
serious consideration’. He stated that  
 
It would be disastrous if Pollitt, admittedly a Communist who had made 
seditious speeches, did not get that to which he was entitled – fair justice at the 
hands of the British law. It was said that the defendants did this thing as a 
practical joke. If they had brought themselves into the law it did not matter 
whether they did it as a practical joke or not.103    
 
The verdict of ‘not guilty’ by the jury is telling. It is an example of the negative attitude 
of the British public towards communists in the 1920s. The result also identifies how 
strongly sympathetic British society was towards the fascists, particularly towards their 
belligerent actions against Bolshevism. In an address to the Commons, in which 
members openly showed their lack of interest by persistently laughing, Joynson-Hicks, 
revealed that the railway officials, although witnessing Pollitt’s abduction, did not 
intervene despite Pollitt’s appeals because they thought that he was ‘legally under 
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restraint’.104 This is clearly untrue as the fascist perpetrators were dressed like 
‘hooligans, with their caps down over their eyes, mufflers on, and their coat collars 
turned up’.105  
 
Newspapers such as The Times and The Manchester Guardian referred to the ‘not 
guilty’ verdict as a stain on British justice, and a minority of MPs challenged the 
leniency shown to the BF. A small group within the Liberal Party – including the future 
Labour politician Tony Benn’s father, William – requested that the party file a motion 
to Parliament about the ‘friendly treatment’ of British fascists by the courts, declaring 
that ‘there is strong feeling about it’. Consequently, the group were defeated at a party 
meeting and, therefore, the motion was not put down. Nevertheless, the group thought it 
necessary to register their protest in the form of a motion on the order paper of the 
House of Commons.106 Members of the Liberals were not the only politicians to 
complain. The incensed socialist Labour MP for West Ham Silvertown, Mr J. Jones, 
questioned Joynson-Hicks over the lenient treatment of the fascists: ‘Does the […] 
Gentleman know that the British Fascisti […] are saying that, when they cannot get 
their own way by constitutional methods, they are prepared to fight for it? Is the […] 
Gentleman prepared to take any steps to stop this display of force on the part of the 
Fascisti?’ The question went unanswered.107  
 
The most significant development during this period was the BF’s attitude towards the 
relationship with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The exodus of members included 
those who sat on the Grand Council. They were replaced with more fanatical 
individuals, including Mandeville Roe, an enthusiast for corporatism, Neil Francis-
Hawkins, known for his military zeal, and Mrs Harnett, now Commander of the Ulster 
Command. Mandeville Roe and Francis-Hawkins later joined Mosley’s BUF, the latter 
becoming Director General as well as Mosley’s deputy. Harnett, in the late thirties, was, 
with Francis-Hawkins, a member of the pro-Nazi organisation, the Link. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that the BF shifted to a more ardently pro-fascist position and 
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evidence of transnationalism is apparent throughout the period, particularly concerning 
ideology. 
 
Corporatism became a central theme of the movement’s ideology. Mandeville Roe, now 
the BF’s Propaganda Officer, played a key role in this shift. In 1930, he visited Italy to 
study the ‘conditions and policy of the country’, reporting his ‘research’ in October’s 
edition of British Fascism. Europe’s ‘most well-beloved ruler’, according to the 
Mandeville Roe, ‘has benefited all, from the baby to the centenarian. […] Italian life is 
full of the improvements he has wrought. No public service is untouched’. He described 
a type of worker-bliss now firmly entrenched in the Fascist state. It is ‘[n]o wonder the 
workmen employ spare moments to daub the remark “Viva il Duce !” upon walls, 
fences and bridges’. While in Italy, Mandeville Roe secured an audience with the Duce, 
presenting ‘Europe’s greatest living man’ with a letter from the BF ‘congratulating him 
upon the success of his work, and wishing him many more fruitful years in the service 
of his country and humanity’.108 On return, Mandeville Roe wrote a series of articles 
championing Italy’s political and economic system.109 
 
The BF periodically updated its policies and practices, cumulating in a 24-point 
‘political programme’ in which it set out how the Fascist State – strikingly similar to the 
Italian model – would be erected in Britain. This included the abolition of the party 
system in favour of a corporate state, formed through the guilds and corporations of 
workers, traders, employers and owners; state supremacy over all sections, classes and 
interest – ‘All to be within, non against the state’; an almost identical phrase used by 
Mussolini in a speech in 1925 – the elimination of class barriers in favour of ‘merit, 
character and work’ as the ‘only passport of the new aristocracy’; and the outlawing of 
strikes.110   
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The Nazi Influence 
The rise of Hitler’s Nazi Party clearly impacted on the BF. Most notably, its adoption of 
rabid antisemitism, which – despite claims to the contrary by the movement – was 
heavily influenced by German Nazism. This is partly as a result of the Council’s radical 
turn and partly in an attempt to attract more support from the public at home, as Hitler 
was doing so successfully in Germany. Attacks on Jews by the BF were rare before the 
Nazis came to prominence in the early thirties. In January 1932, the BF published the 
translation of a violently anti-Jewish article titled ‘Hated by All Humanity!’ from 
Völkischer Beobachter, the Nazi Party’s newspaper. In the same issue, a very 
favourable review on an English translation of, the German antisemite, Theodor 
Fritsch’s The Riddle of the Jews’ Success, which – among many other accusations 
against Jews – argued that the First World War was ‘one glorious profit making ramp 
for the Jews’.111 The BF also attacked politicians who ‘can find time to shed crocodile 
tears on behalf of the poor persecuted Jews in Germany’.112  
 
Antisemitism became a prominent feature of the BF. Jews were singled-out in its 
programme for a corporate state. ‘Members of the Jewish race [are] to be classified as 
aliens, to be debarred from holding official positions in the State, from voting and from 
controlling the financial, political industrial and cultural interests of the British 
people.’113 Pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish articles and comments became commonplace in 
the pages of British Fascism, as well as the publishing of antisemitic letters sent in from 
its readers. For example, in 1933, the BF printed a triple page spread by, ‘Special Press 
Correspondent in Berlin’, Cyril G. Philipoff, titled ‘Germany and the Jewish Question’. 
The article staunchly defended the Nazis treatment of Jews, who ‘in every part of the 
world [are an] organised an unscrupulous minority and the main body of the people 
[are] totally unconscious of their real danger’. According to Philipoff, ‘Adolf Hitler’s 
struggle is the first stride towards the liberation of the whole of the Aryan race from the 
yoke of the hook-nosed sons of Israel.’114  
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Physical connections to the Nazis are less apparent, particularly when compared with 
those of Fascist Italy.115 However, in the latter years of the movement, when 
antisemitism was a key feature, links were made with Hitler’s men. In early 1933, 
members of the BF’s Executive Committee did call at the German Embassy to give 
their congratulations on the Nazis coming to power.116 In the October, MI5 received a 
report from an unnamed source stating that the BF had received a donation from the 
Nazis. The service was unable to confirm the report and the BF made no mention of it 
in its literature, but MI5 did note that ‘the Stanhope Gardens organisation [the BF had 
recently moved their headquarters to the area] has recently been sticking its posters all 
over Chelsea may be an indication of increased wealth’.117 Although the BF’s 
implementation of antisemitism to its doctrine was influenced by the German Nazis – a 
policy that Mussolini was yet to adopt – and it may or may not have received funds 
from them, the British movement was (and always had been) ideologically closer to and 
had a higher regard for Fascist Italy than Nazi Germany.  
 
The Quest to Become an Internationalist Movement  
The British Empire had the utmost significance for the BF. They saw it as a force for 
creating a ‘better’ world and a higher form of civilisation, with the mother country at the 
forefront. In its early months, President Blakeney wrote a series of articles in which the 
importance of the Empire was emphasised. Blakeney claimed that the BF was a ‘great 
army of patriots who believe that the British Empire has an essential part to play 
towards building up a nobler civilisation in this century.’ This ‘nobler civilisation’ 
would consist of ‘Christianity […] a greater sense of civic responsibility and pure 
patriotism’. Italy was lauded as the blueprint to follow: ‘The regeneration of Italy under 
a Fascist regime is the admiration of the civilised world, and the example which Fascist 
Italy set for a disorganised Europe holds a lesson for the British Empire, and especially 
for Great Britain as the pivot.’118  
 
115 Besides Mandeville Roe’s tour of Italy and his audience with Mussolini, the BF 
continued to send letters to the Fascists. For example, a note of congratulations was sent 
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The Empire, according to the BF, was in grave danger of a communist invasion, 
something that the fascists were determined to prevent. The British movement claimed 
that a ‘secret book’ from Moscow was in circulation among communists, with ‘great 
precautions taken to prevent copies “straying”’. Apparently, the book called for the 
breakup of the Empire and set out how it was to be achieved: ‘That object is to be 
attained by preparation of the ground, thanks to a flood of doctrines, many of them 
innocuous, to conceal the hidden poison which is to sap the vitality of the Empire.’119 
The BF took defending the Empire very seriously indeed. Each new member was 
required to sign a pledge to uphold the Empire, promising to ‘render every service in 
my power to the British Fascists in their efforts to destroy all treacherous and 
revolutionary movements that may endanger the Throne and the Empire’.120 
Furthermore, included in the movement’s number one ‘object’ was ‘To oppose 
Communism and any movement that is calculated to endanger […] the Empire by all 
means in our power.’121 
 
To combat this danger, ‘Imperial growth’ was required. According to the BF’s 
Propaganda Officer for Southern Ireland, Mr C.W. Higginbotham, the movement 
 
must expand and rise in every corner of the Empire. We must think and act 
Imperially at all times. We cannot remain an insular force, when the 
ramifications of Communism and disintegration extend throughout the Empire. 
Every Imperial city, town and hamlet should have its Fascist centre, with its 
group of steadfast British Fascists, ever looking to the Flag, and honouring the 
King, as the constitutional head of the Commonwealth. To work unceasingly 
towards that goal should be the aim of every unit in the Organisation. This 
conscious Imperialism should be ever present in mind. Every member should 
say to himself, ‘Come what may, I will without personal consideration, assist to 
the best of my strength and ability, in maintaining the Empire’.122  
 
One of the BF’s key objectives was to grow their organisation in foreign lands, some far 
beyond the island of Great Britain, to combat the perceived rising threat of a communist 
uprising in the Empire and beyond. In June 1925, the BF declared that ‘The phenomenal 
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growth of British Fascism is by no means confined to the British Isles. Indeed, it may 
almost be spoken of as “world wide” for today, just over two years, we can boast of 
branches in every part of the Empire.’123 The following year, a report by a regional 
newspaper in Australia sympathetic to fascist ideals identified BF branches in every 
dominion and Crown colony under the British flag. and among the British communities 
in the Argentinian Republic, Belgium, China, Denmark, France, Hawaiian Islands, 
Holland, Italy, Mexico, Persia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.124 
Although both these claims were outright farcical, the movement did expand its network 
overseas. 
 
Given its relative insignificance at home, it is surprising that the BF managed to spread 
its tentacles across the Empire. Perhaps the most interesting example of this 
transnational dimension is the BF’s activities in far-flung Australia. A genuine fear of a 
communist takeover engulfed Australia in the early 1920s. Inspired by the Russian 
Revolution, a group of socialists including the prominent trade unionists Jock Garden, 
Thomas Walsh and suffragette Adela Pankhurst (daughter of Emmeline and wife of 
Walsh) formed the Communist Party of Australia in October 1920. In the following 
years, the party infiltrated and influenced trade unions and related social movements 
alongside the rise of the Australian Labor Party.125 Supporters of communism appeared 
to many contemporary observers ‘hell-bent on following in the footsteps of Lenin’s 
Bolsheviks.’126 In 1923, unprecedented scenes of rioting and looting took place on the 
streets of Melbourne in the wake of a police strike, perceived to be a communist 
endeavour. Andrew Moore (1991) stated that the ‘reverberations of this “Bolshevik 
Orgy”’ had a significant impact on Australians.127  
 
Looking to capitalise on the unrest and feelings of alarm, the BF introduced its branches 
into the country through the game of cricket. In 1924, England travelled to Australia to 
play the Australians in the Ashes series. Both the captain of the England cricket team, 
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Arthur Gilligan, and their tour manager, F.C. Toone, were active members of the BF, 
Gilligan occasionally contributing to the movement’s periodicals. In an article titled 
‘The Spirit Fascism and Cricket Tours’, Gilligan explained the relationship between 
cricket and fascism: ‘In [...] cricket tours it is essential to work solely on the lines of 
Fascism, i.e. the team must be good friends and out for one thing, and one thing only, 
namely the good of the side, and not for any self-glory’, a direct reference to the 
collectivist element of fascism.128 
 
Before leaving for the tour, the ‘undercover fascists’ were given enrolment forms, 
internal memoranda and propaganda to carry in their luggage by the BF’s Recruit and 
Propaganda Department with instructions to ‘[t]alk about the movement to everyone 
you meet’. They were also told to ‘Always carry at least one enrolment form and one of 
each of the other pamphlets with you wherever you go’.129 Despite the Australian 
cricket commentator, M.A Noble’s, assertion in his book, Gillian’s Men, that the 
visiting cricketers were too engaged with cricket to sample the ‘real Australia’, the 
English fascists found the time to disseminate the BF literature among the ‘heaps of 
good friends’ that they made while in the country.130 Shortly after the tour, officers of 
the Commonwealth Investigation Branch came across the BF material, which was ‘all 
printed in London [and] the contact address on the enrolment form being altered in 
handwriting to a GPO [General Post Office] Box Number.’ in Australia.131 However, it 
appears that the branch did not take the matter further. 
 
Toone and Gilligan’s efforts instigated the creation of BF branches across Australia, 
which were reported in Australian newspapers as well as The British Lion. By the end 
of 1925, three branches had been set up in Melbourne, Sydney and Hobart. The 
Commander of British Fascists in Australia and leader of the Melbourne division was 
retired naval officer, Captain James Older Hatcher, a fervent anti-Communist. Hatcher, 
an English emigre from Hampshire, joined the Commonwealth Public Service in 
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Tasmania in 1922, before becoming an Inspector of Seamen in Melbourne. Through its 
mouthpiece, The British Lion, the BF informed its readers that ‘There is no doubt 
Captain Hatcher is the man for the job, and his knowledge of Communism and 
international intrigue are of the greatest use to the cause for which we all work.’132 
  
The Australian BF had two main objectives. The first was to assist ‘every patriotic 
organisation and individual in awakening our fellow countrymen to the [Communist] 
danger of the whole of the British Empire’. The second, to ‘plant groups of Fascists in 
every corner of the large cities, also in towns and districts throughout Australia, not 
only to assist in countering Communist poisoning but to encourage self-sacrifice and 
brotherhood […] in the event of attempted revolution’. According to Hatcher, the 
ideological underpinning of the movement was to defend the Empire for ‘we believe 
that the stronger the British Empire the better for the world. […] [T]he welfare of the 
[Empire] depends upon the character of its people, and so we reject these conditions of 
life which are detrimental to character and consequently detrimental to the good of this 
glorious country.’133 In other words, Communism is a direct challenge to Australia, the 
British Empire and the character of its citizens. 
 
The Australian branches were unquestionably under the control of the BF from London. 
The most obvious indication is that they operated under the name ‘the British Fascists’. 
Furthermore, the groups in Australia used the emblem of the British Fascists: ‘a disc 
surmounted by a rose, and in the centre is the letter “F”’.134 In fact, badges were made 
with the emblem printed on and members, in exchange for no subscription charge, were 
asked to buy a badge and wear it. Hatcher himself adhered to this command and when 
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he told an interested Labor official what the badge represented. The anti-fascist official 
retorted ‘You ought to be shot, and you will be shot.’135 
 
The Australian arm of the BF did not attempt to hide its subordination to London. In 
fact, they were proud to be part of the British movement. ‘We are a British Fascisti’, 
declared Hatcher to the Australian press. ‘We are a registered company in London upon 
constitutional lines, under the name of the British Fascists […] Our headquarters are at 
75 Elm Park Gardens, London, S.W., and the president of the association is Brigadier-
General Blakeney.’ The honorary secretary of the Victorian Command, Mr W. G. Park, 
boasted to the press that ‘the Australian Fascisti was a branch of the organisation known 
as the British Fascists’136 Furthermore, the membership forms of the Australian BF were 
signed by the London based ‘Mr. A. Kirby Hewlett, organising secretary, British 
Fascists’.137 
 
It is difficult to estimate the membership numbers of the Australian branches, but they 
appear to be low. Australian newspapers occasionally reported on the movement’s size. 
On 24 November 1925, Hatcher told The Daily Standard (Brisbane) that 600 people in 
Victoria had joined the BF.138 The following year, Hatcher claimed that in states where 
Labor Governments were in power, ‘Fascisti flourished’.139 On 29 January 1927, 
Smith’s Weekly (Sydney) were informed by the BF that its Sydney branch had over 
1,000 active members as well as the staff.140 The fascists were eager to inflate the 
importance of the movement to the public in an attempt to attract members. Therefore, 
they exaggerated the size of its membership numbers in Australia.  
 
It is likely that the size of the BF in Australia did not exceed the low hundreds at any 
one time, and there is no evidence to suggest that the BF ‘flourished’ anywhere in 
Australia. By the end of the decade ‘Fascism was in such a bad way in Australia that it 
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numbered only a few zealots’.141 Previous leaders resigned their posts and publicly 
distanced themselves from the movement. Hatcher had left the BF by the summer of 
1926, after having ‘provided a mild sensation as the un-Mussolini-like leader of the 
Victorian Fascists’.142 In response to a report identifying him as an active fascist, the ex-
head of the Tasmanian division, Captain Victor Holyman, wrote to the newspapers 
explaining that he had ‘severed connection with the Fascists four or five months ago 
[mid to late 1926], since which time he has had absolutely nothing to do with the 
movement’.143 Around the same time, The Mercury reported that Wagstaff had also split 
from the organisation.144 Similarly, the ‘State commander’ of Melbourne resigned in 
January 1927.145 
 
The resignations were likely down to the realisation by the men that they were fighting 
a lost cause. In November 1928, the ‘general organiser in Australia for the British 
Fascists’, Mr Chas. P. Godhard, admitted that membership was becoming non-existent. 
While on his way to London from Sydney, Godhard explained to The West Australian 
that ‘the organisation in Australia had no difficulty in obtaining money, but there was a 
dearth of man power necessary to counter the propaganda of Communists. Money was 
not as necessary as volunteers willing to carry on the work of the organisation.’146 It 
appears that the Australian arm of the BF was dissolved soon after. 
 
According to Godhard, ‘[t]he ignorance of the ideals and objects of the British Fascist 
organisation was the cause of the apathy of Australians towards the movement’. He 
explained how the they devoted their activities ‘entirely to peaceful ends, but that aspect 
is not generally realised by Australians’.147 However, throughout the movement’s 
lifetime, the Australian press gave regular column inches to the BF to explain their 
motives. For example, when reporting on the Hatcher affair (covered below), many 
papers across the country printed Hatcher’s statement that ‘Communism [is] the only 
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organisation that we [are] against. We will loyally support any Government 
constitutionally elected’.148 More locally, The Advertiser [Adelaide] printed a letter 
from the Australian BF secretary, F. W. Darley, who emphasised that ‘the British 
Fascists have no time and have no cause for the unconstitutional methods of Mussolini. 
We Britishers have an Empire, and it is our duty as such to protect and develop that 
Empire on constitutional and peaceful lines, doing any bit to avoid internal trouble’.149 
The letter prompted responses from members of the public and reporters.150  
 
Although Godhard’s explanation has merit, many believed fascism to be synonymous 
with the Italian brand and its revolutionary methods. A number of other factors explain 
the low membership numbers. Firstly, during the first half of the movement’s short 
lifespan, the Australian branches had limited amounts of literature to disseminate – 
presumably only those left by the English cricketers. The Hobart branch only had two 
BF pamphlets available for distribution: ‘Communism Unmasked’ and ‘The Union Jack 
and Rulers of Your Own Race or the Red Flag and Alien Domination’, both written by 
Blakeney.151 In response to enquiries about joining the movement, Hatcher admitted to 
would-be signups that ‘We are short of literature at the present time.’152 Perhaps, a 
variety of BF propaganda in greater numbers at their disposal would have resulted in 
greater interest.  
 
Secondly, the intention of the Australian BF was to operate covertly and therefore 
attracting members would undoubtedly be difficult. When Wagstaff was approached in 
person by a reporter from The News [Hobart], he expressed surprise: ‘With a penetrating 
glance, he surveyed the “News” man as if to say, “what do you know about it?”’ The 
reporter informed him that he had ‘on good authority’ reason to believe that Wagstaff 
was the ‘Tasmanian representative of the Fascists’. ‘Oh well’, Wagstaff replied, ‘I 
suppose the other fellow has “blown the gaff” and there is no use in denying it. Yes, it is 
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quite true […] We have remained quiet about it because the Communists work quietly, 
and we thought that the best way would be for us to do the same.’153 London appeared 
to be the main recruiters for their Australian arm. The Fascist Bulletin requested ‘all 
Fascists to send names and addresses of relations and friends in Australia, so that we 
may be enabled to get in touch with them.’154 
 
However, the most likely reason for the low membership numbers of the Australian BF 
is the political climate in Australia during the 1920s. The attitude and policies of the 
country’s government were pro-British, pro-Empire and avidly anti-Communist. The 
Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce (1923 to 1929), made major reforms to the 
Australian federal system to strengthen the role of the Commonwealth. He also formed 
closer ties to Britain and the rest of the Empire and actively encouraged a stronger 
emigration policy to attract more British migrants. Bruce successfully pressured the 
British government into allowing a permanent political ‘liaison officer’ in London to act 
as a conduit between Westminster and Melbourne.155 His strong pro-British sentiments 
led the press to depict him as ‘an Englishman who happened to have been born in 
Australia’.156  
 
Furthermore, Bruce was fiercely anti-Communist. He was appalled at Britain’s decision 
to formally recognise the Soviet Union in 1924.157 Bruce’s refusal to accept the policy 
played a major role in Britain signing the General Treaty with the Soviet Union on her 
own behalf only, marking a major split between Britain and Australia on foreign 
policy.158 At home, Bruce sought a ‘new spirit of co-operation in industry’ between the 
unions and the employers.159 In 1925, he had controversial amendments to the 
Navigation and Immigration Acts passed to break a strike. When, under the amended 
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Immigration Act, Bruce attempted to deport Walsh and fellow Communist, J. Johnson, 
Labor demanded that the prime minister held a federal (general) election. His campaign 
linked strikes and the ‘foreign agitator’ with loss of wages and rising prices, denouncing 
the ‘wreckers who would plunge us into the chaos and misery of class war’.160 Bruce 
won the election increasing his party’s seats by 11 overall and continued his quest to 
overhaul Australia’s industrial relations system. This eventually brought about his 
downfall in 1929 when his own party turned on him after he attempted to abolish the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, an Australian arbitration court 
that sought to settle industrial disputes.161 The Australian government’s programme of 
the 1920s mirrored the key ideological principle of the Australian BF: anti-Bolshevism. 
This strongly suggests that the Australian BF was not necessary and may explain why it 
was virtually a non-entity to the Australian public. 
 
The Australian BF was undoubtedly unsuccessful in attracting significant members to 
the movement. However, it did attract considerable attention in Australia, unwittingly 
finding itself at the centre of a plot by the Labor Party to discredit Bruce in the run-up to 
the federal election on 14 November 1925.162 Two weeks before Election Day, while 
the country was in the midst of a series of industrial disputes Labor undertook a 
campaign to connect the Federal Government to the Australian BF, claiming that Bruce 
and his men would ‘pet and pamper local fascists’ if they won the upcoming election, 
turning Australia into a ‘Fascist Dictatorship’.163 In perhaps overzealous terms, The 
Labor Daily declared that ‘to protect our country against Fascist outrage-mongers and 
conspirators, the electors must put Labor into power’.164  
 
Despite its desire to remain a covert force, Mr Charles O’Neill, President of the 
Overseas Strike Committee and Labor Party member, exposed the BF at a meeting held 
at Socialist Hall on 2 November 1925. His intention was that the press would ‘take the 
matter up’ to provoke an ‘outcry’ by the public who already reduced fascism to the 
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brutality of Mussolini’s Blackshirts.165 O’Neill accused the government despite its 
claims to the contrary of not only knowing about the Australian BF but of supporting it 
by letting Hatcher use the Melbourne Mercantile Marine Office, a government building 
in which he worked to promote the movement.166 Rumours spread that Hatcher issued a 
circular inviting people to meet him at ‘his’ office.167 O’Neill stated that he was going 
to see the Director of Navigation, Captain John King Davis, to insist that he remove 
Hatcher from the premises. If Davis refused, O’Neill remarked, then he would make 
sure that the Seamen Union declare the BF offices ‘black’; therefore, boycotted by 
trade-union members.168 Furthermore, O’Neill called on Bruce to shut down the 
‘unlawful movement’.169  
 
To the delight of O’Neill and Labor, the incident played out widely and effectively in 
the Australian press. Hatcher was asked for comment and flatly denied that the 
Mercantile Office was being used for fascist business, as the organisation was ‘self-
supporting’.170 A bemused Davis released a statement in which he considered it ‘clearly 
unthinkable that a public department should be used for the purposes of political 
activities’.171 According to Davis, the paper reports were unclear as to whether the 
office was being used for political purposes. He claimed that Hatcher shared the office 
with three other officers, each ‘might arrange to have someone meet him there before 
going elsewhere to discuss political matters’.172 Even Prime Minister Bruce entered the 
argument: ‘There is no possible authority to use any Government department for this 
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purpose [….] and I would certainly not permit it to be done.’173 Following the affair, the 
government appeared not to act, Hatcher remaining in the Mercantile Office and 
O’Neill did not action his threat. In isolation, the Hatcher affair had little effect on 
politics in Australia. It was, however, the catalyst that provoked accusations of a BF-
Bruce pact against Labor. 
 
Following this, The Labor Daily – the mouthpiece of the Labor Party – undertook a 
series of sinister actions to convince the public of a relationship between Bruce’s 
government and the fascists. In the week of the election, portraying the Australian BF as 
a violent outfit ‘prepared to use any weapons’, the newspaper complained daily that the 
fascists were undertaking a violent campaign against the newspaper and its staff with 
the backing of Bruce.174 It claimed to be receiving menacing letters from the Australian 
BF ‘similar to those which anticipated the brutal Maletotti [sic] murder in Italy and 
criminal assaults on trade union officials in England’, accusing Bruce of refusing ‘to 
arrest and punish […] these advocating organised pillage and murder’.175  
 
Then, on 12 November 1925, The Labor Daily claimed that masked ‘probably fascismo’ 
criminals attacked their premises. According to the paper, an armed gang ‘invaded’ their 
offices at 11:30 pm, some ‘held the staff at bay with wicked-looking automatics and 
pick-handles, others made a hurried and amateurish attempt to wreck the ground floor 
and capture the Editor [Mr Spedding].’ During the attempted kidnap, while ‘struggling 
violently’, Spedding and one of his ‘assailants’ slipped on ‘some inflammable liquid’ 
poured on the floor by the gang. ‘One man’, the article claimed, ‘had been detailed to 
sprinkle the building with petrol or kerosene, which was contained in 1-gallon oil tins’. 
The inflammable liquid was ‘dashed promiscuously over the general office’ but the 
‘desperate invaders’ did not have the time to ignite it. Spedding put up a ‘determined 
resistance [that] evidently interfered with their plans’ and the ‘noise of scuffling’ 
attracted members of staff from various parts of the building before the ‘desperadoes’ 
escaped in an awaiting car parked outside.176  
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The paper blamed Bruce for the apparent actions of the Australian BF. ‘If the Fascismo 
were responsible for last night’s outrage, and we are confident that it was their actions 
[that] had a sinister interpretation. And having a political significance, Mr Bruce must 
be held culpable.’177 It called for the ‘effective’ punishment of the ‘[i]mpudent violators 
of the law’, remarking that ‘Imprisonment with hard labor (sic) seems almost too good 
for them.’ ‘Will Bruce deal with them?’, the newspaper asked, ‘We are sure that he 
won’t. They are too valuable to his political existence’.178 Other newspapers ran the 
story. Some, for example, The Daily Standard [Brisbane], believed The Labor Daily’s 
explanation of events; others were more sceptical.179   
 
As events unfolded in the following days, sources identify that The Labor Daily had 
staged the attacks. On behalf of the Australian BF, bewildered fascist, Neville. W. 
Smith, wrote a lengthy letter to The Labor Daily, which it published, denying that the 
movement had ever sent letters to its offices. Referencing the ‘threatening’ facsimile 
published by the newspaper purporting to be from his movement, Smith stated:  
 
I should like you to understand clearly that NO letters are official unless under 
the above letterhead which is distinctive, nor unless signed by Capt. Hatcher 
himself or through me, or by our accredited agents in Sydney in which case 
similar letterhead to this will be used. 
 
Smith asked the newspaper for help in ‘tracking down the writer of these offensive 
epistles’. In so doing, Smith explained, ‘you would not only be doing us a great service 
by vindicating us, but you would be assisting to rid the community of many 
undesirables, who are making trouble but have not the courage to side with one party or 
the other.’ Smith even complimented The Labor Daily for ‘stand[ing] as the voice of the 
true Labor Party, for we sincerely trust that the Communists are as obnoxious to 
yourself as to us’. He also excused the newspaper’s ‘drastic attacks upon us [as] purely 
the result of enthusiasm piqued by the approaching elections’.180  
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More convincingly, however, is the police report on the supposed office attack. The 
report identified the ‘strange feature[s]’ of The Labor Daily’s story. First, although 
many members of staff witnessed the event, no one intervened to help Spedding. 
Several were questioned as to why they did not go to his assistance. One told the police 
that he attempted to do so but was held back by other employees. Second, despite an 
intense scuffle taking place, nothing was ‘stolen, broken or damaged in any way’ in the 
building. Third, a puzzled sergeant Sheehy said that despite the group allegedly being 
armed, there had been no intention to damage or injure anyone. If they so desired ‘it 
would have been a very easy matter to have cleaned up the lot’. Forth, as the sergeant 
also pointed out, the fuse on the explosive materials was ‘faked before being connected 
with the gelignite, thus making it ineffective.’ Fifth, no detonators were found on the 
premises. ‘[N]o one with any knowledge of explosives would be foolish enough to try 
to explode gelignite without the usual percussion cap.’ Six, the police were unable to 
resume their investigation as the witnesses said that they were unable to identify or 
describe the ‘invaders’, beyond stating that they were masked, and were unable to 
provide details of the getaway vehicle as it had no plates.181   
 
However, the incident that captured the most attention, including that of the British 
press as well as the Australian, revolved around another supposed letter, this time sent 
from London. Three days before the election, The Labor Daily printed a letter 
supposedly from ‘The British Fascisti’ in London to Hatcher ‘exposing the fact that 
there is a cunning Fascism’s [sic] plot to hand Australia over to the brutal domination of 
the “Black Shirts”’. The Letter revealed how the federal government had been assisting 
the Australian BF with their ‘organizational work’:  
 
If necessary steps should be taken to precipitate open hostilities with the militant 
unions. Open rioting would give us an opportunity to smash the unions and 
cripple Labour politically. In this we have the definite assurance that the present 
Federal Government would co-operate and will secretly instruct its officers to 
work in conjunction with our forces […] You need have no fear therefore. Use 
your force to prevent Labour from assuming office should a Labour victory at 
the poll eventuate.182  
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A quotation was included from ‘Our present Chancellor of the Excehquer [sic], Mr 
Austen Chamberlain’, who said ‘“Were Labour [in Britain] returned with a working 
majority [from the 1925 General Election – which they were not] it would be necessary 
in the interests of the nation to suspend constitutional government and forcibly present 
[sic] it from assuming office.”’ ‘Fortunately’, the letter continued, ‘the last elections 
made the position safe in England, but in Australia the position is different. Labor is in 
power in four states and our experience has been such that almost any means would be 
justified in preventing it from ruling Federally.’183 Surely, as the various sources 
suggest, the publishing of the letter was a deliberate attempt by the newspaper and 
Labor to turn the public against Bruce and his party. 
 
Fortunately, for Bruce, the letter was riddled with glaring errors, which he readily 
exposed. Two days after it was printed, Bruce, in a speech to the nation, identified the 
various inaccuracies. According to the Australian prime minister, the heading of the 
paper differed from the actual letterheads used by the British Fascisti, the wrong address 
had been used, the phone number was invalid and, perhaps most glaringly, the letter was 
dated before the announcement of the election had been made. Furthermore, Austen 
Chamberlain was not Chancellor of the Exchequer but was Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. Bruce pointed out that ‘had the letter been written in London, as it was 
alleged to have been, there would have been no possibility of such an error’.184    
 
The BF from both countries became embroiled in the scandal. Bruce had secured a 
sworn affidavit from Hatcher in which he swore that he had 
 
never received such a letter or any letter containing similar sentiments; that he 
had never written to the British Fascists inviting or requiring a reply in such 
terms; that he never communicated with or received any communication from 
any person of the name of A. Kirby Hewlett, and that he was of the opinion that 
the letter was an attempt to ascribe to British Fascists a communication which 
was never authorised or sent by the organisation.185  
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November 1925, p. 19; ‘Forged “Fascist” Letter’, The Times [London], 13 November 
1925, p. 12. 
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Denouncements also came from London. Hewlett, the alleged sender of the letter, had 
resigned from the BF months before the date printed on the correspondence and gave a 
statement denying that he had never communicated with Australia, ‘completely 
shatter[ing] Labour’s […] canard.’ BF president Blakeney and, vice-president, Admiral 
Armstrong, both denied that any such letter had been sent, describing how ‘the 
sentiments expressed were contrary to the principles of the organisation.’186  
 
Bruce was clearly upset by this ‘impudent and malicious forgery’. Describing the attack 
as a ‘despicable attempt to discredit the Ministry’, the Australian PM announced that 
‘There have been many slanderous misstatements made during this campaign [...] but 
none so utterly mischievous as this’.187 Incensed by the newspaper’s actions, the 
government sought legal advice from the Attorney-General, John Greig Latham, as to 
whether it was possible for successful action to be taken by the Government against the 
editor of The Labor Daily in respect of the letter. Latham warned against undertaking 
such procedures:  
 
I am […] of opinion, that although the words used appear to be defamatory, in 
view of the fact that no injury appears to have been suffered either by Captain 
Hatcher or the members of the Ministry by reason of the publication of the letter, 
the success of an action for libel brought by any of those persons would be 
doubtful, and even if an action were successful, the measure of the damages 
would be very small. I think, therefore, that it would be inadvisable for any such 
action to be brought. As regards criminal proceedings, they will only lie if the 
libel tends to a breach of the peace by the person libelled. There appears to have 
been no such tendency in this case and, I think, therefore that criminal 
proceedings would be futile. I am of opinion that it is not likely that successful 
action could be taken against the Editor of the Labor Daily in respect of the 
publication of the letter in question.188 
 
As a result, no legal action was taken. However, the scheme by Labor backfired. As 
reported by The Times [London], the letter was regarded as ‘an extremely clumsy 
attempt to injure the Government on the eve of the election.’189 Labor’s attempts to link 
Bruce and his government with the BF and, as a result, lead Labor to power were 
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unsuccessful as Bruce’s party won 14 seats more than Labor, forming the next 
government. In fact, the farcical and sinister effort to smear Bruce likely appalled the 
Australian public; therefore, costing the Labor Party votes.190 The effect the malicious 
campaign had on the Australian BF was to elevate the movement into the public sphere, 
albeit briefly.   
 
The General Strike occurred in Britain in 1926, lasting just nine days before the General 
Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) called it off with little violence having 
occurred. Therefore, Lintorn-Orman’s vision of her movement gallantly saving the 
country from the clutches of Communism and ‘proving ourselves as true fascists’ never 
materialised.191 In fact, the General Strike had a disastrous effect on the movement. 
First, in the run-up to the Strike, the movement suffered a major split. To mobilise a 
non-striking workforce in the event of a strike, the government created the Organisation 
for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS). Before the BF could join the OMS, a few days 
before the strike, Prime Minister Baldwin’s government insisted that it relinquish the 
name ‘fascism’ from its title first as well as remove its militant element and support the 
principle of parliamentary democracy. One faction, headed by Lintorn-Orman, favoured 
an outright rejection of the government’s proposal; the other agreed to accept it. 
Following a close vote on the Grand Fascist Council (40 to 32) in favour of the Lintorn-
Orman faction, a number of senior figures, including Blakeney, resigned to form the 
British Loyalists, who accepted the government’s edict.192 Second, the peaceful and 
relatively nondescript General Strike, as opposed to the BF’s prediction, was evidence 
to many that no ‘outside force’ was likely to succeed in harbouring significant unrest, 
let alone a full-blown revolution, in Britain. Therefore, interest in the BF declined.  
 
In an attempt to attract much-needed members to the organisation, the BF set up 
branches across Ireland in an attempt to capitalise on the discontent in the country.193 In 
the late 19th century, there was a growing demand for home rule in Ireland, which 
eventually led to the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) followed by the Irish Civil 
War (1922–1923). By the time the BF arrived – the Free State Command in 1923 and 
the Ulster Command in the late summer of 1926 – Ireland was divided in two: Northern 
 
190 The threat of a BF takeover continued post-election. See, for example, ‘The Boast of 
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Ireland remained in the UK while their Southern counterparts broke away to form the 
Irish Free State. As Northern Ireland was (and still is) part of the UK, it has to be 
excluded from analysis of ‘transnationalism’; instead the regional exchanges should be 
categorised as ‘transregionalism’. However, to exclude Northern Ireland from this 
study, and focus exclusively on the south, would result in an incomplete investigation as 
the two are, at least in part, interwoven. The fascist movement ‘regret[ted] the inane 
division of our common country into two separate administrative areas, but as British 
Fascists, we recognise no boundary line between loyal British subjects.’194 Much of the 
bloodshed had ceased by 1926, but incidents of sectarian conflict still existed, 
something that the BF intended to exploit; therefore, transforming the movement’s 
political fortunes. 
  
Behind the unrest was, according to the BF, ‘the Soviet Worm’.195 The fascist group’s 
main recruitment drive was to instil fear in the population by claiming that a communist 
uprising was imminent and only by supporting fascism could it be prevented. BF 
publications regularly ‘exposed’ ‘Moscow Plots’ in Ireland. For example, over the 
summer of 1928, The British Lion ran a piece on the ‘Red Army activities in Belfast and 
Dublin’, claiming that ‘cargoes of arms and ammunition’ were being smuggled into 
Ireland from ‘ports on Russia’s European frontier’. Men and young boys were being 
‘lured’ into the ranks of the Red Army where they swore an anti-British oath before 
being trained as revolutionary ‘street war experts’, using the imported weapons. 
Although Moscow is still trying to bring about a revolution in Britain, the article claims, 
it is finding more ‘fertile soil’ among the Communist Republicans of Ireland.196 
 
In a bid to attract support for the BF among the British public, Mrs Harnett, the District 
Officer of the Ulster Women’s Units, was summoned by the party to address meetings 
held in London. As the principal speaker, she explained the political and social 
landscape in Southern Ireland. Harnett’s job was to emphasise the threat of a communist 
uprising in the UK made possible through Southern Ireland. During a meeting at 
Kensington Town Hall in early 1928, she depicted Southern Ireland as ‘seething with 
Germans and Bolshevists’, considering the country ‘an enemy at [the UK’s] back door’. 
Harnett described how ‘the enemy’ was gaining a foothold in the country: 
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The acceptance of a German tender for the Shannon electricity scheme had had 
very disturbing results for the local population. German workmen could now go 
to the homes of people in Southern Ireland, cut down trees, demolish walls, or 
even pull down houses if they wished, and the owners could do nothing because 
the intruders were backed by the authority of the Government.197 
 
Harnett then ramped up her warning, describing Southern Ireland as a ‘German colony’. 
‘Half the shops in Dublin had been bought by Germans, and they had enormous stores 
of their own where they used German token money.’ She claimed that Germans were 
intermarrying with the native population, despite the effort of priests to deter it lawfully. 
‘[I]t doesn’t matter if they try to stop it legally; the result will be just the same’ – 
communist children raised as revolutionaries.198   
 
Certain members of the public were outraged by Harnett’s depiction. Following the 
meetings, The British Lion reported, ‘a stream of abuse had arrived at GHQ pointing out 
that it was wicked to refer to the growing menace to the Empire in Ireland as it was all 
past history’. The BF dismissed the remarks, reminding its readers of a quotation from 
the ‘Arch Red Marx’ that ‘Ireland is the Achilles heel of England’, and pleaded with 
readers ‘not to be gulled by false talk of peace and quietness’.199    
 
Branches in Ireland were clearly under the control of GHQ in London. In late 1927, 
Lintorn-Orman, her Chief of Staff, Miss Ray, and leading members from Western 
Command embarked on a ‘grand tour’ of the Irish divisions – Belfast, Newry, 
Newcastle, Kilkeel and Dublin – undertaking a number of ‘important’ duties. Lintorn-
Orman held inquiries into the conduct of certain members, dismissing several from the 
Women’s Unit in Belfast. While in Dublin, the delegates were chaperoned around the 
city by local branch members, before inspecting the fascists’ new headquarters and 
addressing the unit. The Western Commander, Captain Rowlandson, mentioned 
‘matters of particular interest to this Command, and delivered several well-deserved 
homilies and pieces of advice regarding Fascism.’ To ensure the fascists adhered to BF 
policy and ideology, he gave a lecture to the Irish unit on what the British movement 
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stood for. The Dublin men’s unit won the accolade for being ‘undoubtedly the smartest 
in the organisation, as well as being one of the best-disciplined commands’.200   
 
Each branch was expected to disseminate BF propaganda to the Irish public. Country 
Commander, Captain E.G. Morgan, who ‘set about the propagation of British Fascism’ 
in Ulster, was commended for ‘spreading our propaganda [including] the sale and 
distribution of The British Lion’ while the Kilkeel branch sold the Lion at local fairs, 
undertook ordinary drills and put on First Aid Classes. GHQ was particularly impressed 
with the efforts of, Cadet Fascist, D. H. Harnett for selling £2 12s. 4d. worth of Fascist 
matches during his Easter holidays.201 In fact, in any fundraising that a branch 
undertook, a significant proportion of the money made went to GHQ. For example, 
Kilkeel raised £7 by hosting a Christmas carol card party; nearly half of the proceeds 
went to London.202   
 
BF publications and local Irish newspapers identify how it was the duty of each branch 
to attract new members and supporters to the movement as well as fundraise. Kilkeel 
district, for example, held cake sales, carnival dances and sold flowers. To cheer in the 
New Year of 1927, Belfast headquarters organised a whist drive and dance at the 
Strandtown Unionist Club Hall, followed by another dance later that month, which 
attracted about 150 members.203 It appears that the Dublin command was not as 
successful in fundraising and recruiting as their Northern counterparts were. The 
branch’s main fundraising strategy appeared to be sending requests for money to 
contributors to local newspapers, whose addresses were printed. Mr John Souter of 24 
Colchester Street, St. George’s Square, Dublin, wrote to The Evening Herald in early 
1925 asking if readers would help him identify the origins of the first tennis ball. The 
paper duly published his letter including his address. Among the many responses Souter 
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received, enough to make a book he claimed, was ‘a request to hand over five pounds to 
an organisation calling itself the British Fascists’.204 That said, the Free State division 
did undertake at least one conventional fundraiser. On 24 September 1927, under the 
leadership of Divisional Officer, C.E. Thompson, members put on a concert consisting 
of various artists. The financial results were, according to one member, ‘most 
satisfactory’ and people were ‘eager’ to know when the next one was.205   
 
However, The British Lion reveals the hostility shown towards a pro-British, fascist 
movement in Southern Ireland which at the time made progress very difficult. In late 
1926, the premises occupied by the Dublin branch were set on fire, probably 
deliberately, making the venue unusable. Due to ‘the political atmosphere’ that they 
faced, proprietors were reluctant to rent to the BF and it was not until a year later when 
new offices were found.206 The division regularly wrote to The British Lion complaining 
of the problems that confronted them, bemoaning the ‘difficulties here, in the Irish Free 
State, which are not in evidence in other Commands’.207  
 
Due to the ‘difficult problems owing to the political antagonisms that are rampant’ in 
the country, recruiting and raising ‘badly needed’ funds was an almost impossible 
task.208 GHQ acknowledged the issues that the Irish Free State command encountered. 
‘It must not be forgotten that conditions in Ireland are such that it not only is trebly 
difficult to organise but in many cases is attended by personal risks to the officers and 
the members, who are true Fascists in every sense of the word.’209 Lintorn-Orman also 
showed sympathy to the Dubliners by pronouncing that Southern Ireland was ‘probably 
the most difficult place to organise Fascism in Europe’.210 
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Southern Ireland was clearly a dangerous place for a pro-British group to operate in 
during this period, particularly one that was ‘fully awake to the absolute necessity of 
keeping alive the respect and honour due to the Imperial Emblem, the Union Jack, so 
that future generations of loyal Irishmen will not lose any of their inherited respect for 
our great heritage, the Empire.’211 The bloody Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) 
and the years preceding it, saw atrocities committed by both sides. Therefore, when Eire 
gained independence from the British state, hostilities towards their old rulers remained. 
Antagonisms were always evident, particularly each year before and on Armistice Day, 
11 November, when violence erupted. However, the issue that the Republicans had was 
not the honouring of the war dead, many nationalists had also served in the British 
armed forces, but the overt display of loyalist sentiments such as the singing of ‘God 
save the King’ and the selling of memorial Poppies by the Royal British Legion.  
 
Local, national and international newspapers reported on the ‘numerous ugly incidents, 
free fights, and occasional truncheon charges by the police’, that occurred during the 
yearly events.212 Across the city, Union Jacks were stolen, trailed in mud and ‘torn into 
shreds’, and poppies were ‘snatched’ from wearers and ‘torn off the bonnets of motor-
cars and trampled underfoot’.213 Stones and stink bombs were thrown by angry mobs 
chanting ‘Up the Republic’.214 On Armistice Day 1925, ex-British soldier, Charles 
Oates, who was marching with other men from Grafton Street into College Green, died 
of a heart attack after a bomb, thrown by Republicans, exploded near the marchers.215 
On parade-day 1928, three bombs targeted the statues of previous English kings: 
William III, Edward VII and George I, causing damage to the sculptures but, 
remarkably, not injuring anyone. Following the explosions, police raided premises 
across the city, seizing ‘three machine guns, a large quantity of ammunition for them, 
several thousand rounds of rifle and revolver ammunition, 36 bombs, 300 detonators 
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and various other military equipment’, undoubtedly to be used by Republicans against 
their ‘oppressors’.216 
 
The Dublin branch of the BF made its presence known during the yearly 
commemorations. In the weeks preceding the 1926 event, they undertook a fundraising 
campaign to commemorate the war dead. On 11 November 1926, a wreath was laid at 
the Wellington Monument in Phoenix Park beneath ‘the weather-beaten wooden Celtic 
Cross, specially brought from the Flanders’s Fields, where it had marked the graves of 
thousands amongst our 50,000 heroic Irish dead.’217 The Dublin fascists made it clear 
that they would not tolerate agitators, instructing members instead of parading to mingle 
with the crowd for the purpose of maintaining order and enforcing (if necessary) the 
two-minute silence.218  
 
Trouble ensued on the day. Higginbotham claimed that in the weeks before ‘the 
glorious 11th’, a ‘discordant extremist body calling itself The Anti Imperialist 
Association’ endeavoured to ‘disturb the equanimity of loyal citizens with dire threats 
of force to be used against the promoters of what they were pleased to term “an 
Imperialist display on Poppy Day”’. Throughout the day, BF members went on picket 
duty in the principal streets and guards were placed at the local Poppy Depot in Dawson 
Street. Despite labelling republican efforts to disrupt the day as ‘futile’, Higginbotham 
admitted that the BF was involved in fights with them: ‘[T]ussles took place throughout 
the principal streets for Flags and Poppies, but in almost every case the agressors [sic] 
were defeated in their objectives’. He singled out one member for praise for recovering 
a small Union Jack single-handed from an attacker who had supposedly snatched it 
from ‘the person of a loyal citizen’. According to Higginbotham, as a result of their 
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‘gallant’ efforts, the Dublin BF earned the respect gratitude of the officials of The 
British Legion.219  
 
As a result, a friendly relationship developed between the Irish Free State Command 
and the Legion. In-between Armistice Day 1926 and 1927, a series of tournaments took 
place between the two groups. The Dublin BF welcomed a tennis team sent by the 
Legion. A series of matches took place, the hosts winning every one. In return, the 
Legion arranged a billiard tournament between them and the fascists, winning three 
games out of four. In addition, the Legion was invited to the concert held by the BF, 
proving ‘so popular’ by all that attended.220 The relationship between the two had 
clearly become close as the Legion asked the fascists to work with them in an official 
capacity. 
 
In the lead up to Armistice Day 1927, the Organising Secretary of the British Legion, 
who foresaw trouble, approached the Dublin fascists to ‘obtain our services as a 
bodyguard for the Legion banners and standards that were to be carried in th[e] 
procession.’ Although the BF ‘furnished special guards and patrols for all the Flanders 
Poppy Deports in the city’ between 5 and 12 November, they refused to assist the 
Legion due to the organisation’s demand that the fascists refrain from wearing ‘Fascist 
badges or any other indication that we belonged to the organisation’.221 This identifies 
that despite the Irish fascists – and the BF in general – outward display of loyalty to the 
Crown, including its willingness to fight for the cause, fascism was perceived, even by 
its allies, to be an essentially foreign and ‘un-British’ movement.  
 
The Ulster fascists were also embroiled in street fighting with their Republican enemy, 
which was reported widely in the press. The first public meeting of the Belfast branch 
of the BF, held at Clarence Place Hall in late November 1926, resulted in a riot. The 
Belfast Evening Telegraph and the Larne Times devoted several columns to the 
melee.222 Reporters present predicted ‘stormy scenes’ when they saw a large police 
 
219 ‘Remembrance Day in Dublin’. Unsurprisingly, Higginbotham’s depiction is in 
contrast with contemporary newspaper reports, which state that the Republicans were at 
least in part successful in disrupting proceedings.  
220 ‘Irish Free State Command’, The British Lion, October–November 1927, pp. 15–16. 
221 ‘Irish Free State Command’, The British Lion, December 1927, p. 14. 
222 Belfast’s Mass Meeting’, The Belfast Evening Telegraph, 23 November 1926; 
80 
 
presence outside the building before the event had begun. During the meeting, when the 
speaker, Captain Morgan, condemned socialism, a mass brawl ensued in the crowd. 
Morgan jumped down from the platform and began attacking hecklers who were being 
ejected by a large body of stewards. ‘Words led to blows, and in a few minutes the 
scenes were most disorderly’, a reporter from The Manchester Guardian wrote. ‘Blood 
was spilled’ but the only serious casualty of the evening was Morgan who was hit with 
a ‘loaded stick and had his arm dislocated’ before being taken to hospital. The pressmen 
jumped on the table allocated to them to see all the fighting. Their attention was fixed 
on an ‘interrupter’ who ‘jumped on a chair and threw himself into an attitude of defence 
[…] but eventually the interrupter was bowled over and, dishevelled and heated, carried 
with a rush to the door and flung out, amidst the victorious cheers of the Fascists.’ 
Eventually, order was restored and the meeting continued.223 
 
The anti-fascists in attendance were not the only ones hostile to the BF. Many in the 
audience were concerned about the Irish contingent being subservient to London. 
Captain Turner-Coles, the movement’s Chief of Staff at GHQ, who spoke at the 
meeting, had been informed, in the way of a note passed to him while on stage, that ‘the 
organisation meant good jobs and fat salaries’ for those in London. Turner-Coles 
assured the crowd that ‘at GHQ only two persons were paid, the editor of the British 
Lion, the Fascist journal, and their secretary, and neither were paid wages higher than 
that of a labourer.’ In his speech, Herbert Jackson, chairman of the Ulster Fascists, 
assured the crowd that ‘the British Fascists in Ulster were going to come into the open 
and let their aims and ideals be known.’224       
 
This it did. Three months later, the Socialist party held a meeting at the Ulster Hall in 
Belfast, where two socialist MPs from Glasgow were principal speakers.225 Despite 
tight security, consisting of both police and party stewards, Ulster members of the BF 
smuggled themselves in. Part way through the meeting ‘a woman in the centre of the 
end gallery rose and unfurling a Union Jack waved it’. As the lady was ‘being gradually 
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dragged along, still waving the flag, in the middle of a struggling mass of people […] a 
crowd of young men stood up and began to sing in strong volume, “Rule Britannia”’. In 
the brawl that followed, the police ‘with extraordinary difficulty’ managed to wrestle 
the fascists out into the corridor where they continued singing to the annoyance of those 
in the hall who could ‘plainly hear the strains of “Rule, Britannia”’.226          
 
Following their ejection and, much to their annoyance, the locking of the doors behind 
them, the fascists congregated outside of the hall and held a ‘public demonstration’, 
which attracted hundreds of people.227 ‘A huge Union Jack formed a background for the 
speakers, who used the window-sills as a platform.’ Addresses denouncing Socialism 
‘in all its moods and tenses’ were met with cheers from the onlooking crowd.228 The 
Belfast branch claimed that it had enrolled over fifty new recruits that evening. ‘It is, 
therefore, obvious’, according to the British Lion, ‘that British Fascism has gone about 
its work in Ulster’s capital with a will’.229   
 
As well as running battles with Republicans and communists, the BF did have an impact 
on Irish society, socially and politically, which is identified in the local and national 
press as well as BF publications. The fascist movement was particularly aggrieved at 
the British government’s refusal to ban anti-British ‘revolutionary material’. The BF 
claimed that ‘seventy publications in this country directed towards revolutionary 
purposes’ were targeting the ‘weak spots’ of society. It is ‘the hearts and heads of little 
children […] that the Communists are attacking by stealth today’: 
 
[T]housands of British children are falling week by week under the dreadful 
influence of these people, and are being taught blasphemy, sedition and class 
hatred and scorn for the marriage tie; to ridicule religion, to be disloyal to the 
King and to hate all those who are not of their own way of thinking.230   
 
 
226 ‘Anti-Socialist Scenes in Belfast: Ulster Hall Uproar’, Ballymena Weekly Telegraph, 
12 February 1927, p. 7. 
227 This figure was given by the Ballymena Weekly Telegraph; the BF put the figure at 
‘about a thousand’.  
228 ‘Anti-Socialist Scenes in Belfast: Ulster Hall Uproar’. 
229 ‘British Fascism in Ulster: The Work of the Command’, The British Lion, 19 
February 1927, pp. 3–4. 
230 The BF claimed that 15 Communist Sunday Schools operated in London, attended 
by up to 100 children, and 25 in other parts of the country: ‘Communist Sunday 
Schools: England’s grave danger’, The British Fascists.  
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As well as regular complaints voiced through their main publications, in September 
1924, the BF produced a six-page pamphlet on the ‘grave danger’ of ‘Communist 
Sunday Schools’ which were ‘held in private houses and elsewhere, in many parts of the 
country’. The fascists claimed that a ‘very large and extensive literature is published and 
distributed among the children in these Communist Schools, while oral teaching is 
given on similar lines. The literature includes weekly and monthly papers, song-books 
and all sorts of propaganda.’ Extracts from a pamphlet titled How to conduct a 
Proletarian School, supposedly published in Glasgow shortly after the establishment of 
the Communist International in March 1919, identifies the key objectives of the schools:  
 
To teach the children the ideal of the revolution should be the primary object of 
a Socialist Sunday School. All other teaching is of no avail […] A boy and girl 
should be learned (sic) a real live, red-hot revolutionary speech to take about ten 
minutes […] Our work is to train the children of the working class to accomplish 
the revolution.231 
 
Concern over Communists schools went far wider than the BF. Members of both 
Parliaments and religious organisations argued for these schools and journals, such as 
the Young Communist and Young Worker, to be banned. Subsequently, Lord Danesfort 
(Sir John Butcher) tabled the Seditious and Blasphemous Teaching to Children Bill in 
the House of Lords in June 1924 to ‘prevent the teaching of sedition and blasphemy to 
children under sixteen years of age.’ The Bill, Danesfort explained, was aimed at ‘the 
regular type of Communist propaganda, common to all Communists in all countries, 
teaching which was described by Mr Winston Churchill as the vile garbage of atheism 
and revolution.’ The Bill passed by 102 votes to 20 in the Lords and by 213 votes to 85 
in the Commons, with many prominent individuals supporting it – including the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Home Secretary William Joynson-Hicks – before 
being defeated at the Report Stage in the Commons in July 1927.232   
 
231 The BF publication also includes extracts from ‘Ten Proletarian Maxims’; 
Communist children’s magazines, which ‘delights in the foulest blasphemies’; ‘papers 
specially prepared and published for Children’, which emphasised that ‘Capitalism must 
be destroyed at all costs, even if it means the use of force. Force means hatred. We 
preach the gospel of hatred’; a book of ‘proletarian poems’ titled ‘A Child’s Reading’; 
and posters that were ‘pasted up’ in a ‘Communist School at Southwark, in London’, 
which read ‘Fight Damn it, Fight!’. Many of the fascist’s quotes were taken from a 
speech delivered by Lord Danesfort (Sir John Butcher) in the Lords months earlier: 
‘Communist Sunday Schools: England’s grave danger’, The British Fascists. 
232 ‘Seditious and Blasphemous Teaching to Children Bill (Second Reading – Lords)’, 
Hansard, 3 July 1924 Volume 58; ‘Seditious and Blasphemous Teaching to Children 
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To counter ‘the Red lotion poured into these small children’, the BF set up schools of 
their own, as this was the ‘only practical method of fighting the Red Sunday Schools 
and Clubs’.233 More than a year after the first ‘Juvenile Branch’ was held by Mrs Eslip 
at Homles Road School, Kentish Town, on the evening of 8 September 1925, Jackson 
announced the intention of the Irish BF to form ‘Children’s Clubs’ in Ulster ‘to teach 
the young the best ideals of citizenship’.234 The first of these clubs opened on 23 March 
1927 at the Church Army Labour Home, Oldpark Road in Belfast, and the following 
month the Belfast division boasted a membership roll of almost 1,000 children ‘to 
whom they taught the glories of the British Empire, and the teaching of Ulster’s 
bulwark, the open Bible.’235 The Ulster kids clubs remained active until mid-1930.236 
 
It is, of course, impossible to measure how successful the fascist youth clubs were in the 
‘prevention of the spread of sedition amongst our children’.237 Formed primarily to 
deter the younger generation from falling prey to the ‘Red Menace’, the clubs in Ireland 
also took on a philanthropic character, which undoubtedly had a positive impact on Irish 
society. For the working class, 1920s Belfast was a grim place to be. ‘[T]here were 
appalling slums, over-crowded and unsanitary alleyways, rack-rented millworkers 
hovels, byres and stables used for human habitation’.238 On 22 December 1927, The 
Northern Whig and Belfast Post described how the Fascist Children’s Club (FCC) gave 
about 250 poor children a ‘Christmas treat’ at P.E. School, Avoca Street, Belfast: tea 
was provided, a Christmas tree erected and toys were distributed by a fascist dressed as 
Santa Claus to the children.239  
 
 
Bill (Second Reading – Commons)’, Hansard, 11 March 1927 Volume 203; ‘Seditious 
and Blasphemous Teaching to Children Bill – Clause 1’, Hansard, 1 July 1927 Volume 
208. 
233 ‘Communist Sunday Schools: England’s grave danger’, The British Fascists.  
234 ‘N.W. 5 Women’s Branch’, The Fascist Bulletin, 26 September 1925, p. 1; ‘Belfast 
Meeting Scenes – British Fascisti Launched’, Larne Times, 27 November 1926, p. 6; 
‘Belfast's Mass Meeting’, The British Lion, 4 December 1926, pp. 4–5. 
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The Ulster fascists opened the ‘Hunter Moore’ FCC on 4 January 1929. According to 
The British Lion, fifty children attended the first week, ninety the second. As a late New 
Year’s treat, children were given tea and presents.240 Over Easter, the Belfast Newsletter 
reported, the club entertained 160 young people at its premises in Belfast and provided 
them with tea and presents.241 In July, at the invitation of the Earl and Countess of 
Kilmorey, who were keen to assist the BF with their philanthropy, an outing was 
arranged for the children to spend a day at Mourns Park, County Down. A ‘splendid’ 
programme of sports was arranged and prizes presented, and ‘dinner and tea’ were 
provided for the children.242 The British Lion printed a photograph of the ‘summer 
treat’, identifying at least a hundred children and staff present on the day.243  
 
To create and maintain the FCCs, the branches had to fundraise. The raising of money 
began before the first club opened. A series of dances were organised by the Women’s 
Units Ulster Command to raise funds for their branches, part of which went to the 
‘loyalty teaching’ FCCs. According to The Northern Whig And Belfast Post, the fourth 
dance attracted ‘a very large attendance’. Interestingly, it appears that the Ulster 
division trialled the children’s clubs before deciding to open one officially. The 
experiment proved successful as no less than 150 children attended one club on the 
evening of Thursday 17 February.244 On 28 October, clearly impressed with the 
commitment shown by the Irish BF, GHQ ‘subscribed’ £15 (equivalent to almost 
£1,000 in 2019) for the Ulster FCCs, ‘with the promise of an endeavour to collect 
sufficient to have a permanent paid member of staff for this branch of Fascism.’245 The 
clubs became so successful that public meetings were held to obtain more workers.246 
 
However, their endeavours did not always run smoothly. The following year, in the 
days leading up to Christmas, a party of BF toured some of the villages and small towns 
of South Down, the part of Ulster that is near the Free State border, to raise funds for 
the FCC. Their activities included ‘singing carols in the streets’ and, ‘as usual with the 
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British Fascists’, they finished every performance with the singing of the National 
Anthem. The vehicles that took them from place to place flew Union Jacks from the 
radiators. Several days later, a male member of the ‘carol party’ was ‘accosted after 
dark’ by an unknown man, who warned him that ‘if he ever dared again to “drive about 
the country flying the Union Jack, singing God save the King in the streets” he would 
“get a good kicking”’. In addition, a woman member was ‘mobbed’ by a crowd of 
young men for flying the Union Jack on her car, the mob stamping the emblem of the 
I.R.A. on her car windscreen.247  
 
Although the Irish fascists created and organised their own children’s clubs, GHQ still 
officially controlled them. In December 1927, the Belfast clubs, by this time there were 
two – ran by Mrs Adair and Miss Bristowe – were inspected by Lintorn-Orman and 
Ray. The pair commented on the ‘vital necessity for this work [as] proved by the 
terrible state of the slum children who are the members of the clubs’. Both clubs sang 
God Save the King in a ‘hearty manner, especially considering that until the F.C.C. 
started the children did not know the National Anthem.’ Furthermore, GHQ made it 
clear that it had authority over the clubs’ finances and dictated who could visit them: 
‘All contributions to this fund are guaranteed to be spent on nothing but the 
development and maintenance of Fascist Children’s Clubs. Accounts may be inspected 
at GHQ and those interested in this branch of the Organisation may visit the Clubs, and 
see for themselves how their money is spent.’248   
 
The BF was also involved directly in Irish politics. Another example of the Ulster 
fascists attempt to defeat its enemy was its engagement in the Belfast Municipal 
Elections held in January 1927. The branch decided to offer its assistance to those 
Unionist candidates who they considered ardently ‘Anti-Socialist’. A circular letter was 
sent from the Area Commander, Frank T. Williamson, to eight chosen Unionists, 
detailing how the BF was prepared to support them. The fascists were willing to 
advertise for the candidates and provide them with vehicles. In addition, ‘we are 
appealing in the papers for all Anti-Socialist voters to record their votes on Saturday in 
 
247 Irish Loyalist, ‘The Achilles Heel: The Truth about Ireland’, The British Lion, March 
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favour of those candidates who are, we feel certain, as anxious as we are to see the 
Bolshies out of this province’.249   
 
In a contest that The Times labelled ‘a straight fight for and against Socialism’, the 
Unionists won the elections convincingly, increasing its seats and vote share.250 The BF 
claimed credit for this victory. The British Lion printed ‘remarks’ from an unnamed 
successful candidate who, when thanking the Deputy Returning Officer, said that his 
party at the election ‘had received voluntary support. That had never happened before 
[…] In that election there was one party that had worked with great determination – the 
British Fascists.’ A defeated Socialist candidate, Mr Haslett, apparently blamed the 
Ulster fascists for his loss, claiming that ‘imported movements’ influenced the vote. 
One Unionist candidate who refused the Command’s assistance lost his seat. 
Conceitedly, the BF commented: ‘He will know better next time’.251 Apart from an 
appearance by Ulster Unionist MP for Queen’s University, Sir John Campbell, at a BF 
meeting alongside Lintorn-Orman in 1928, the BF’s support for the Unionists was not 
reciprocated.252   
 
Towards the end of the BF’s life, when the movement was ‘rapidly fading into 
obscurity’, transnationalism continued to be a fixture.253 Despite its claim of good 
recruiting in Ireland and issuing a number of awards and commendations to its Irish 
members, sources suggest that by the beginning of the 1930s, the BF in Ireland reflected 
the movement’s steadily declining fortunes more generally.254 For example, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Northern Ireland) reported that, instead of being occupied by 
‘prominent’ individuals, the new governing body of the Belfast branch – the BF’s 
flagship branch in the country – consisted of ‘two clerks, a tramway driver and an 
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assistant in a pawnbroker’s shop’.255 As Loughlin remarked, this ‘registered a distinct 
lowering of social class, indicative of a “lack of public support and enthusiasm”.’ Apart 
from the children’s clubs, ‘the activities of the organisation are practically nil in 
Belfast.’256 
 
‘Hunter Moore’ FCC was still operating successfully into the 1930s, attracting two 
hundred children every Friday. Local and BF newspapers continued to report on the 
club’s activities. On Armistice Day 1930, three members of the FCCs Cadet Corps, in 
uniform, laid a wreath on the Belfast Cenotaph. This was the first time that uniformed 
cadets of the BF had taken part in a public ceremony. An event held by the BF attracted 
press attention the following month. A ‘sale for work’ fundraiser took place in the 
Lounge of the City YMCA, Wellington Place, to give children a Christmas treat. 
Contributions were received from sympathisers, including Mrs Hunter-Moore, founder 
of the club, the Countess of Kilmorey and many ‘well-known ladies and gentlemen’, 
while several of the Belfast bakeries and restaurants donated cakes and buns to the 
event. Lintorn-Orman also attended the gathering.257  
 
In the following years, activities of the fascist clubs continued to feature in local 
newspapers. The Belfast Telegraph reported on the clubs annual outings – arranged by 
the BF’s County Commander Mrs Waring and the Newcastle Company Commander 
Mrs Persse – to Mourne Park, Kilkeel. The children, numbering two hundred, marched 
through the town, and then ‘thoroughly enjoyed themselves’ playing sports ‘in the 
beautiful demesne’ before having tea. In December 1932, the Belfast Telegraph covered 
a bazaar organised by Waring in aid of the ‘Hunter Moore’ FCC. Similarly, in 
December 1933, the Ballymena Weekly Telegraph covered a sale held in Kilkeel 
Courtroom to raise funds for the club. A photograph of the club’s officials – including 
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Waring, Kilmorey and Hunter-Moore – accompanied both pieces.258 In one of the last 
articles written by the BF, Lintorn Orman devoted her column to the significance of the 
British Fascist Children’s Clubs, describing them as ‘one of the most important works 
of the Organisation.’259 
 
The membership numbers of the Irish branches are unknown. The Dublin division 
appears to have had attracted the least interest. In his article titled ‘Rotha Lintorn-
Orman, Ulster and the British Fascists Movement’, Loughlin puts the figure at around 
100 members at its height.260 The British Lion, proud of its Dublin outfit for persevering 
through ‘difficult times’, devotes its front page of a 1929 issue to a photograph of 
‘Officers of the Irish Free State Command, British Fascists’, numbering 12.261 In 
contrast, Northern Ireland attracted considerably more support given the pro-British and 
anti-Communist sentiment that was more prevalent in the region. The Irish Times 
reported in August 1927 that the Belfast command had reached 1000, not an 
insignificant number considering that the branch had only been open for a year.262 The 
statistics of other units in Ulster are difficult to estimate. On her tour of the island, 
Lintorn-Orman remarked that the County Down divisions had a large number of 
recruits, most likely to in be in the hundreds; the Newcastle branch had ‘a long waiting 
list of loyal citizens anxious to join up and do practical work against the Empire’s 
enemies.’263  
 
Nevertheless, the BF failed in its mission to attract the ‘hearty cooperation of every 
loyalist’ in Ireland.264 By the time the BF expanded the organisation to Northern Ireland 
in 1926, Unionism was already entrenched in the country, leaving little space politically 
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for the British movement. The ceasing of the Boundary Commission the previous year, 
the body that decided on the precise delineation of the border between the Irish Free 
State and Northern Ireland – signed off by representatives of the Irish Free State, 
Northern Ireland and the British government – resulted in a Unionist regime capable of 
defending its constitutional position. In effect, the BF was marginalised by the Irish 
Prime Minister James Craig and his Ulster Unionist Party.265 South of the border, 
particularly in Dublin, during the interwar period was a risky place for individuals 
expressing outward loyalist views and therefore it was no surprise, given the turbulent 
atmosphere and hostility that was commonplace towards the British at the time, that the 
Dublin branch was unable to match the recruitment numbers of their northern 
counterparts. 
 
The BF’s greatest overseas ‘successes’ were undoubtedly in Australia and Ireland. 
However, the movement reached other parts of the Empire. In 1927, a women’s unit 
was set up in India. Mrs Simpson was appointed Company Officer from 4 February and 
members who happened to have the addresses of members residing in India were 
requested to forward their names and addresses to the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
Women’s Units, GHQ, so that they could be drafted to Indian Units. Despite the BF’s 
claim to have units in India, it is likely that Simpson was the only active member in the 
highly populated country as nothing further was mentioned in the BF newspapers. 
Interestingly, there was no mention of a men’s unit.266  
 
The movement was particularly pleased to receive interest from South Africa. In 
response to the sending of some Fascist literature to one of its members there, the BF 
received ‘a most generous response’ from Mr A.W. Jones of Lake Chrissie, East 
Transvaal: ‘Not only did the gentleman send a donation, but conveyed his cordial good 
wishes to the British Fascists, at the same time requesting that copies of the “British 
Lion” should be sent to him regularly, as well as Fascist literature’.267 However, similar 
to their exploits in India, it appears that no further developments materialised through 
the connections.  
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Although the BF failed in its quest to ‘expand and rise in every corner of the Empire’, 
support appeared to come from unusual places.268 A branch formed in Buenos Aires by 
Mr J. H. Petter was reported in The Fascist Bulletin (June 1925). The article claimed 
that ‘a substantial nucleus established’ had already been established there and 
enrolments were ‘coming in splendidly’.269 In September 1925, a member living in 
China approached the BF requesting to set up a branch there.270 In 1926, the BF was 
establishing a branch in Genova, Italy. According to the paper, the BF representative in 
Italy, Captain G. Strina, was carrying out the task with the ‘greatest possible energy and 
enthusiasm, which can only be rewarded by the success of the movement […] The 
Catechism which he has formulated for all prospective recruits is as convincing as it is 
necessary, and such thoroughness must certainly “get here”’.271 Letters were also sent to 
The British Lion from supporters in countries such as Madeira and Rhodesia, 
commenting on recent articles published in the newspaper.272 Despite the hype, nothing 
further was mentioned in the newspapers on the interested parties. Therefore, interest 
must have faded away soon after. 
 
A simple explanation can be given as to how the BF was able to put down, albeit quite 
shallow, roots abroad. With its fierce patriotism, the BF appealed to certain individuals 
with strong emotional attachments to Britain, most notably the British diaspora 
communities. In Australia – aside from Northern Ireland, the most successful of the 
BF’s overseas exploits – the BF had a presence in the most Anglophone areas (Victoria, 
New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania), where many 
established English migrants resided as well as recent arrivals.273  
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In Ireland, the BF did have a longstanding branch in Southern Ireland. However, the 
movement’s endeavours were considerably more prosperous in the North due to the 
pro-British sentiments held by many of its inhabitants. In its first ‘Overseas News 
Bulletin’, The British Lion announced that British citizens resident in Italy were the 
target for recruitment by the ‘Legion of Fascists’ in Genova.274 Furthermore, a letter 
received by the BF from the British fascist in China urged GHQ to create a headquarters 
in China of British Fascists. The unnamed author offered to enrol members from 
established British communities in Hong Kong, Shanghai and other ports: ‘I think it is 
quite possible I could secure in time a very large number’.275 The author suggested that 
Britons abroad were rich pickings for the BF: ‘Even the most hardened sinner at home, 
after he has been abroad for a number of years turns out to be the most patriotic of 
Britons. This was proved only too well during the Great War.’276 As Jones declared, 
‘We look forward to the time when our movement has spread wherever English is 
spoken, and every link with our overseas dominions is a step in the right direction.’277 
  
The BF’s hatred towards Bolshevism also appealed to some. For example, the BF 
member in China suggested that ‘this [1925] is an excellent time for enrolling members 
in view of the present disturbances here, which are […] entirely due to Bolshevism. In 
fact, a Bolshevist was caught in Shanghai […] [H]e was the accredited agent of the 
Government sent over for the purpose of undermining British prestige in China.’ The 
fascist also bemoaned the British government’s disinterest in the matter, turning to the 
BF instead.278 Complaints of Russian meddling were commonplace in Shanghai and 
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Hong Kong at the time.279 The fear of a Bolshevist takeover was also a grave concern of 
BF members in Australia and Ireland, as aforementioned.  
 
A number of reasons explain the failure of Britain’s first fascist movement. Firstly, the 
creation of the OMS by Baldwin’s Conservative government to take over the jobs of 
striking workers during the General Strike of 1926, not only ‘stole the thunder of the 
British Fascists’, but left the movement badly split, a sizable disgruntled faction left to 
form a new movement.280 Secondly, the strike failed to produce the Bolshevik uprising 
that the BF had assured its members would greatly assist them to obtain power. This 
lack of a communist plot removed many of its members’ overarching fear: the 
Bolshevik takeover of Britain. As a result, the movement’s membership numbers fell 
considerably from probably a few thousand in the mid-twenties to a matter of hundreds 
within a few years.281 Thirdly, a number of fascist groups emerged in the late twenties 
and early thirties, most notably, the formation of the IFL (1929) and, more significantly, 
the BUF (1932). Skidelsky has noted, that the remainder of the BF’s membership was 
‘mostly eager to join Mosley’, marginalising the movement further and leaving it with a 
membership roll of just 300; or, as Mosley jibed, ‘three old ladies and a couple of office 
boys’.282 The company’s accounts identified this dwindling support. Revenue 
dramatically fell from £6,848 in 1925 to £604 in 1928 and to an average of 
approximately £330 in the next five years.283 Furthermore, the rivalry with the BUF 
resulted in 40 or 50 of Mosley’s men raiding the BF headquarters, ‘undoubtedly 
thoroughly smash[ing] it up’, causing £25 (almost £1,700) of damage, which the 
perpetrators, although found guilty, were not made to reimburse.284 To recoup some of 
their losses, the BF launched a circular to raise £25,000 but ended up losing money as 
the cost of the colour printing was more than the donations received.285 Finally, and the 
 
279‘Find New Evidence of Soviet in China’, The New York Times, 12 July 1925, p. 3; 
‘Strike at Shanghai Spreads: Marines Ordered to Scene’, The Washington Post, 5 June 
1925, p. 1. ‘Conditions in Shanghai Mills: Political Influence at Work’, The Manchester 
Guardian, 12 June 1925, p. 13; ‘The Crisis and the Need in China’, The Observer, 23 
August 1925, p. 8. Furthermore, a debate on the ‘Chinese Trouble’ took place in 
parliament.  
280 ‘British Fascists’, The Times, 1 March 1934, p. 7. 
281 Oswald Mosley, p. 291. 
282 Ibid., p. 291; ‘British Fascists’, The Times, 1 March 1934, p. 7. 
283 ‘British Fascists Limited’, The Times, 20 July 1935, p. 4 
284 ‘Rival Fascist Bodies’, The Times, 30 September 1933, p. 12. 
285 ‘British Fascists’, The Times, 1 March 1934, p. 7. 
93 
 
final nail in the coffin for Britain’s first fascist movement, was the death of its founder, 
Lintorn-Orman, in March 1935. The movement officially dissolved soon after.286   
 
Considering the relative insignificance of the BF (in numbers and influence), it was 
remarkable that they made any transnational headway at all. Of the countries of which 
they had the most impact on, the governments of the time – through their policies and 
ideology – prevented (unintentionally) the BF’s growth and played a major role in its 
decline abroad. Bruce’s government in Australia, for example, displayed – through 
policies and rhetoric – contempt for militant left-wing politics and suppressed it 
significantly. Furthermore, under Bruce, Australia strengthened its ties with Britain and 
the Commonwealth. Together, these played a leading role in the BF’s failure to advance 
and its ultimate decline, the few remaining supporters became disinterested in the 
movement and left. The major ideological unpinning of the BF – pro-British, pro-
Empire and anti-Bolshevism – mirrored that of the Australian government’s. Likewise, 
in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Government captured the majority of support 
from loyalists. The vast majority of the Australian and Northern Ireland public 
sympathetic to the views held by the BF would surely support an established and 
respectable party instead of an obscure and a politically insignificant movement with its 
roots elsewhere. 
 
An overarching problem with the BF abroad was that the movement was British. Its 
name was ‘British’, its headquarters were in Britain, and the majority of its policies 
were focused on Britain. Therefore, the pool of support for an essentially British 
movement came exclusively from Briton’s abroad (an exception was Southern Ireland 
where the appeal was meant to be loyalism, but being a British movement presented 
many problems for the Irish outfit). Consequently, this was a significant drawback to 
recruitment as the majority of the population of other countries is not British. The 
failure of one-man units abroad in their quest to build a following for the British fascist 
movement in their respective regions is evidence of this. For the BF, being a British 
movement abroad was perhaps its greatest strength but also its greatest weakness. 
 
Transnationalism can be applied to the BF in a number of ways. Throughout its 
existence, it was heavily influenced by ideas from abroad specifically from Fascist Italy 
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and later Nazi Germany. In fact, it is plausible that the BF would not have come into 
existence if not for the triumph of Mussolini and his Blackshirts in Italy – Lintorn-
Orman may have diverted her energies on anti-Communism elsewhere or stayed away 
from politics altogether. The BF was not only a receiver of ideas that spanned across 
borders, but they also disseminated their own that transcended national boundaries. 
Furthermore, BF transnationalism also incorporated the physical. BF Branches overseas 
were formed and patriotism and anti-Communism was spread in foreign lands.  
  
There are similarities and differences between the BF and the other two British fascist 
movements examined in this thesis: the Imperial Fascist League and the British Union 
of Fascists. As with the IFL and the BUF, BF transnationalism did spread across 
national boundaries. Although continental fascism had a significant impact on the three 
British fascist movements, each differed in the extent of the influence, the factors of the 
influence and to which regime they favoured. The BF’s principal influence was Italian 
Fascism, which was consistent throughout its lifetime. From Fascism it adopted its 
name, symbolism, violence and military tactics and later corporatism became central to 
the movement’s ideology. In the second half of its existence, the movement copied 
extremism antisemitism from the Nazis.  
 
Another key difference that distinguishes BF transnationalism from that of the IFL and 
the BUF is its lack of physical links with either fascist power. The transnationalism 
between the BF and Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany was almost exclusively ideological 
– very few relationships were formed with Italian or German fascists. Furthermore, the 
BF did not have a presence in either Fascist state. This is because when Hitler 
consolidated power in Germany and Mussolini focused on Italian foreign policy and 
‘opened up’ Fascism to the world it was 1933. By this time, the BF was a spent force 
and all but bankrupt and of no interest to the Fascist powers – other far right and fascist 
movements in Britain were by now considerably more important – and, even if the BF 
desired connections at that time, they were in no position to build them or form 
branches outside of Britain. This is in contrast to the other case studies, which had many 
physical connections with fascists and, to varying levels of success, operated in Fascist 
countries. Therefore, the periods in which the case studies operated had a major impact 
on the transnationalism of each movement.  
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Despite a consensus among historians that the BF should not be considered fascist (for 
various reasons), this chapter has challenged this viewpoint.  When measured against 
Roger Griffin’s fascist minimum – ‘Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose 
mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-
nationalism’ – the BF is fascist. There can be little doubt, and historians concur, that the 
BF was a populist ultra-nationalist movement, but historians do not accept that the BF 
harboured revolution intent – a crucial ingredient to fascism as identified by Griffin. 
However, many in MI5, including the respected Major General Sir Vernon Kell, 
considered the movement dangerous and harmful to the state and democracy. Certain 
national newspapers noted its threat to democracy and the potential for the movement to 
use violence to achieve power. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the 
movement’s revolutionary aims is found in the pages of its own publications. Almost 
immediately after its inception, high-ranking members, including the founder Lintorn-
Orman, discuss ridding all political parties and destroying democracy. This became 
even more obvious following the change in personnel in the Grand Council in the early 
thirties. Replacing parliamentary democracy with a fascist corporate state was a 
recurring feature in the movement’s literature. Therefore, the BF should be considered 
fascist. 
 
There is no debate or confusion over whether the IFL and the BUF were fascist; no 
historian doubts this. Various explanations may account for this:  a) revolutionary intent 
only became publicly central to the BF’s ideology following the change in personnel in 
the Grand Council and the rise of the Nazis. Before this, even though revolutionary zeal 
had always been part of the BF’s make-up, other issues most notably anti-Communism 
may have taken precedence over it. b) the lack of thorough investigation in to the BF’s 
ideology by historians – due to its perceived ultra-conservativism and affiliation to the 
Tory party (i.e. stewarding Tory meetings in its early days) historians have overlooked 
its palingenetic aspect. In addition, the BF’s aims differed from the IFL and the BUF’s. 
Although the three groups were fiercely anti-Communist, the BF’s overarching aim was 
to protect the Empire from the ‘Red menace’. The IFL and the BUF hated Communism, 
but they were not single-issue movements as the following chapters explain.  
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Chapter Two: ‘Thank God for Hitler!’287 
 
The IFL was first and foremost a White supremacist, antisemitic movement, and its 
transnationalism centred on this. The IFL incorporated the Italian Corporatist system 
into its ideology. Unlike Mussolini, however, Leese saw this modern, anti-democratic 
system as a way of ridding Jewish influence from his country. The rise of the Nazi Party 
in Germany – particularly its election success of September 1930 – impacted the IFL 
considerably. Initially, Leese was reluctant to unleash the full extent of his racism on 
the British public for fear his movement would be rejected and ridiculed, as the majority 
of Britons had not yet awakened to the idea of racial politics. Hitler’s ‘success’ resulted 
in a realisation for Leese that a racist party, only open to members of pure ‘Aryan’ 
decent, was able to attract considerable public support. From then, Hitler was the 
movement’s messiah, while Mussolini was subject to a campaign of scorn and ridicule 
for ignoring, or in some cases rejecting, antisemitism, until 1938 when Italy introduced 
racial laws. Therefore, Mussolini but particularly Hitler had a major impact on IFL 
thought. 
 
The IFL’s transnationalism also contained a myriad of physical links and influences. By 
far the most important was its relationship with the Nazis, where strong connections 
were built with many lasting for the remainder of the movement’s lifetime. Due to its 
overt White supremacist ideology and hard-line antisemitism, the Nazis considered the 
IFL a natural ally and used the Jew-hating British movement as its mouthpiece in 
Britain. In fact, the IFL essentially operated under Nazi influence. Evidence suggests 
that the Nazis funded the IFL regularly during the thirties. By so doing, this indicates 
that the Nazis had a vested interested in the IFL; therefore, adding an important aspect 
to this transnational relationship. Regular columns in the IFL’s newspaper were devoted 
to prominent Nazis to disseminate Hitlerism and to glorify its work in Germany, while 
large sections of The Fascist sold Nazi propaganda such as Nazi literature – including 
the infamous Der Stürmer magazine – and Swastika-laden merchandise. The IFL even 
visibly promoted Nazism by undertaking such activities as erecting giant swastika flags 
on building in London and instructing its members to don Swastika armbands while in 
public. As part of this relationship, the IFL was invited to Nazi Germany where 
 
287 The Fascist, 28 May 1938, p. 2. 
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members attended and spoke at rallies and even had a presence at the Nazi HQ, the 
Brown House.  
 
Another key aspect of the IFL’s transnationalism was its role as a worldwide anti-
Jewish influencer. Due to its rabid hatred of Jews and avid pro-Hitlerism, the IFL 
proved to be a popular movement for like-minded groups and individuals abroad. Due 
to his extensive research and writing on the subject, Leese was seen as an expert on the 
Jewish question and IFL material was printed in or referred to in literature published by 
antisemitic ideologues and movements overseas. Connections were formed between the 
IFL and these individuals and groups and, as a result, the IFL became a hub of 
transnational activity, selling racialist propaganda on behalf of its friends from abroad 
while inviting them to attending gatherings and/or give lectures usually at its HQ in 
London. 
 
Chapter Two attempts to enhance the scholarship of the IFL by examining the 
movement’s transnational influences and connections, an area that has largely been 
unexplored by historians. The leader of IFL was the eccentric veterinary surgeon, 
Arnold Leese. Leese’s ‘political awakening’ began in 1926 when he heard the monetary 
theorist Arthur Kitson, who lived in the same town (Stamford, Lincolnshire) as Leese, 
address political meetings. Under Kitson’s tutorage, Leese learnt that there was 
‘something affecting the lives of men, women and children everywhere, and which 
existed as an unrecognised evil manipulated in secret by a few people greedy for Power. 
In fact, I saw that control of the issue of Money was Power.’ Kitson had introduced 
Leese to ‘the Jewish Menace’. The virulent antisemite also introduced Leese to the 
proto-fascist publishing society, The Britons, founded by the Jew-hating pioneer, H. H. 
Beamish. Here he got a copy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which identified a 
Jewish plot to take over the world: 
 
Everything in this little book rang true; I simply could not put it down until I had 
finished it. When I came to investigate further, I realised how little information 
was really available for [a] detailed study of the subject; want of knowledge 
among the public was the result of a deliberate conspiracy of Jewish silence; I 
[was] determined to break that silence and to make the knowledge public 
property. […] I have been conducting research on the Jew Menace ever 
since’.288  
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In some of the academic work on transnationalism, scholars have stressed ‘transnational 
personalities’, whose biographical identity reflects a history of cross-border activity.289 
Both Kitson and Leese fall into this category. Leese became an expert on camels while 
working as a veterinarian in India. He later toured Africa curing them of diseases. Leese 
served as a Veterinary Officer to Army Service Corps Units in the First World War, 
plying his trade mostly in France. He also spent time in Somaliland collecting camels to 
assist the British plight in the Middle East.290  
 
In contrast, Kitson was heavily aligned with the United States. His racist ideas were 
profoundly influenced by the US populists of the late nineteenth century. Many 
populists believed that Jews made up a class of international financiers who were 
crippling the rest of society.291 Kitson’s was particularly impressed by William Jennings 
Bryan – a three-time Democratic Party nominee for President of the United States. 
Byran was fiercely opposed to the US move to the Gold Standard on the grounds that 
Jewish interests were behind the system. On 14 February 1895, the then Congressman 
told the House: ‘We cannot afford to put ourselves in the hands of the Rothschilds [the 
Jewish banking giants …] I only ask that the Treasury shall be administered on behalf 
of the American people and not on behalf of the Rothschilds and other foreign 
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bankers.’292 Kitson was so impressed by Bryan that he worked for him in the 
Presidential election campaign of 1896 of which was centred on rejecting the US 
adoption of the Gold Standard.293 Almost twenty years later, Kitson was still banging 
the drum for Bryan. In 1914, he wrote an article for Fortnightly Review – one of the 
most prominent and influential magazines in Britain – titled ‘William Jennings Bryan’ 
in which he lauded the American politician for his monetary thinking.294 As Alec Marsh 
states, Kitson’s relationship with Bryan linked American Populism to English monetary 
reform movements.295  
 
Aside from Kitson’s influence, Leese was greatly impressed with Mussolini and his 
Italian Fascist movement, Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF). He had watched the 
‘bloodless revolution’ with interest. He was in awe of the Duce who through 
determination had rescued Italy from the chaos that Liberalism had apparently caused. 
Leese hoped that Mussolini’s movement would end ‘political humbug’ and his 
declaration of ‘My Aim is Reality’ appealed strongly to Leese.296 So impressed was 
Leese that he wrote a pamphlet titled Fascism for Old England (c.1923). In it, he argued 
for an alternative voting system that would result in a less individualistic society.297 
This would be achieved by forcing every man to contribute a day’s wage for the right to 
vote. It appeared to Leese, ‘good realism that what a man had to pay for, he would value 
and that the electors would become a body of people who would vote for the country 
instead of for their own selfish interests’.298 For a brief time, Leese was a member of the 
British Fascisti (BF) – representing them as a town councillor – but left soon after, as 
Rotha Lintorn-Orman’s movement lacked what he believed to be fascism.299 
Unperturbed, Leese formed the Imperial Fascist League (IFL) in 1929.  
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Like the BF, the IFL has received scant attention from historians, particularly when 
compared with Mosley’s BUF. Richard Thurlow declared that ‘No-one wastes any time 
in explaining why such quixotic and eccentric movements as the British Fascisti in the 
1920s and the Imperial Fascist League in the 1930s were minute elements on the 
political fringes.’300 Of the limited historiography on the IFL, which ironically includes 
Thurlow, the discussion has largely been on the movement’s marginality. Gerald 
Anderson, for example, claimed that it was merely a bodyguard for its eccentric 
Director-General (Leese).301 Alan Sykes has all but dismissed the IFL by suggesting 
that it numbered only hundreds and was more or less a paper movement.302 Experts 
have agreed that Arnold Leese and his organisation were overshadowed by his political 
nemesis, Mosley, in terms of resources and recruits. This, they argued, pushed groups 
such as Leese’s into the political wilderness.303 However, Kenneth Lunn made a strong 
point when he explained that to concentrate on the major players and political successes 
limit our understanding of the broader picture of the lives and communities who were 
involved, willingly or not, with these marginal misfits.304  
 
Equally as important, a number of scholars have explored the movement’s racism. In his 
chapter on IFL racism, John Morell argued that the reason for Leese’s adoption of 
fascism as a political ideology was that he had found a regime that would defend and 
encourage the ‘indigenous Aryan stocks’ in Britain.305 Of the five pages that Sykes 
devoted to the IFL in his survey on The Radical Right in Britain (2000), all are on 
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Leese’s antisemitism, notably on the court case that resulted in his incarceration.306 
Stephen Woodbridge suggested that ‘race and Aryan “superiority” had come to 
dominate everything Leese did and was fundamental to the IFL’s whole purpose.’307 As 
Richard Griffiths asserted, the IFL was a ‘vehicle for the extreme, and often crazed 
views of its founder’.308  
 
What sets aside the IFL from other British interwar fascist movements was the extent of 
its antisemitism. In fact, as Nick Toczek notes, Leese was the first person in Britain to 
link fascism with antisemitism.309 Thomas Linehan stated that ‘The IFL advocated a 
doctrine of racial antisemitism and Nordic supremacy that would set it apart from the 
great majority of its contemporaries on the interwar fascist fringe.’310 Paul Stocker has 
examined the attitude of the IFL to the British Empire. He argued that the IFL vision of 
the British Empire was a distinctly racial one based on the biological supremacy of the 
‘Aryan’ coloniser. According to Stocker, a Jewish invasion of British Overseas 
Territories was the IFL’s main fear: ‘[T]he imperialism of the IFL was overshadowed 
by their extreme antisemitism. Jewish conspiracy pervaded every single aspect of the 
IFL’s relationship with the British Empire.’311According to Linehan, Leese was one of 
the period’s most ‘fanatical, uncompromising and idiosyncratic fascists’.312 
 
The IFL left a lasting legacy on far-right politics, and subsequently British society, long 
after the movement had ceased. Its ‘scientific’ racial ideology and themes were at the 
forefront of developing modern fascist thinking in Britain. Expert on British fascism, 
Richard Thurlow connected the IFL racial theory to post-war far-right groups such as 
the National Front, the British Movement and the British National Party.313 In his 
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biography (2017) on British neo-nazi, Colin Jordon, Paul Jackson described the 
considerable impact Leese had on Jordon. He suggested that Leese’s ‘extreme 
perspective’ held the greatest influence.314 Furthermore, Leese provided much-needed 
ideas and ballast that helped Jordon carve out a career as one of Britain’s most well-
known Nazis.315 Morell has argued that Leese merits attention if only for his racist 
thinking, which is still current today and ‘firmly allied fascism as developed within 
Britain to a racist message’.316 It was Leese’s legacy, and not Mosley’s, that evolved 
after 1945.317 
 
The chapter is divided into two sections. Part one analyses the ideological makeup of 
the IFL. Beginning with its formative years in which an idiosyncratic mix of 
Mussolini’s Fascism and Leese’s own fascist philosophy – anti-democratic, anti-
Communist and White supremacist – dominated IFL thought. Attention then turns to the 
impact of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party on the British movement. It argues that 
Hitler’s election success of September 1930 influenced the IFL significantly. With 
newfound confidence that a racialist party might make headway in European politics, 
Jew-baiting became central to its policy and activities. This can be seen in a number of 
ways, including the dissemination of pro-Hitler propaganda and the adoption of Nazi 
insignia. Both fascist leaders had a profound impact on IFL thought, firstly Mussolini 
then Hitler, the latter idolised by the movement for the remainder of its (and Leese’s) 
lifetime.  
 
Part two focuses on transnational physical links and influences relating to the IFL. From 
September 1930, Leese actively sought connections with influential Nazis in both 
Britain and Germany. Relationships developed between the two movements and 
propaganda was exchanged. The IFL effectively became an arm of the Nazi Party 
shortly after it consolidated power in 1933 and they did Hitler’s bidding in Britain. The 
IFL was given an office at Nazi headquarters in Germany as well as money. Using the 
topic of war, the section also investigates if the IFL favoured the Third Reich over its 
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own nation, concluding that it did. The IFL was first and foremost a pro-Hitler 
movement due to the Führer’s ‘Aryan’ supremacist ideology. Lastly, connections 
between the IFL and racist fanatics overseas are investigated. It claims that, under 
Leese’s guidance, the IFL developed into a well-respected and important player in the 
worldwide extreme antisemitic scene. 
 
‘All for the State. None against the State’318 (1929–1931) 
In its formative years, the IFL was an idiosyncratic mix of indigenous factors – such as 
anti-democracy, anti-Communism and Leese’s racial theory – and Italian Fascism. 
Robert Benewick has argued that Mussolini had no impact on the British movement’s 
early programme.319 However, its mouthpiece, The Fascist, of which the majority of the 
content was written by Leese, was decorated with the fasces, the symbol – a bundle of 
sticks featuring an axe – adopted by Mussolini. In only its second issue, the movement 
called for the implementation of the Italian Fascist model in Britain: ‘The undoubted 
success of Fascism in Italy naturally caused the minds of serious people in Britain, who 
were dissatisfied with the trend of events since the War, to turn to this new Philosophy 
of government with the purpose of ascertaining if it could be applied to their own 
country.’320 The trends referred to were an increasingly corrupt, weak, indecisive and 
self-serving democratic system and ‘its kindred infection’ of socialism, which aimed to 
create a stateless world where private property is abolished.321 The IFL referred to them 
as the ‘enemies’ of Fascism.322 Yet, ‘Every disease, sooner or later, brings about the 
invention of a remedy’.323 This remedy was Fascism and ‘its inventor [Mussolini]’ was 
‘gradually but very surely bringing it to perfection’.324  
 
The IFL adopted the Italian corporatist model. This was a quite alien tradition in British 
politics with few historical precedents. In Britain under an IFL state, the Corporate State 
would replace the hated parliamentary democracy. A Fascist Grand Council, made up of 
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high officials of the corporations and headed by Prime Minister Leese, would 
coordinate all acts and activities of the fascist regime. The Council would also act as the 
final Court of Appeal on all questions of the interpretation of the laws. Under the 
Council would be the Fascist Parliament: the Upper House consisting of members who 
had distinguished backgrounds in national affairs while the Lower House would 
represent ‘interests rather than citizens’.325 This ‘industrial parliament’ would govern 
with representatives of vocational corporations – the employers and employees of 
industry – and not of geographical areas, each representative would be chosen by his 
peers in industry. The industries would be divided into Great Federations – made up of 
Employers Federations, Employees Federations and Intellectual Workers – working 
under a ‘special’ Ministry of Corporations. Trade unions and strikes would be outlawed 
and excessive profiteering by capitalists prohibited. Disputes that occurred between the 
federations would be settled by the state. The IFL argued that this corporative 
organisation of industry would eradicate ‘money-making selfishness on the one hand 
and of Parliament’s paralysing interference on the other’.326 Leese stressed that the 
‘better organisation of Industry can only be attained through the corporate State […] 
created by Signor Mussolini’.327 
 
Furthermore, the state would dominate public life, as was the case in Italy. Individual 
interests would be subordinate to those of the state, which held the power. The 
individual would not be an ‘isolated unit’ but a member of the community.328 Since 
living by the community, citizens would be encouraged to have particular interests, but 
forbidden to ‘seek his happiness in a direction contrasting with the general good’.329 
Press freedom would be abolished as the media, left to its own free will, would 
disseminate information that went against the views of the fascist state. Printers, 
publishers, advertisers and financial backers would be made to register with the 
government while any newspapers that committed ‘anti-national offences’ would be 
committing a criminal offence.330 Leese argued that the liberty of the individual and the 
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liberty of the press meant anarchy; ‘both are impossible in a civilised State’.331 A clear 
and obvious example of Leese’s adoration for the Italian State can be seen by the 
regular appearance in The Fascist – one in every four pages – of Mussolini’s well-
known slogan: ‘All for the State, None against the State.’332 According to the IFL, 
fascism was not merely an ‘Italian phenomenon’, but ‘a human and scientific method of 
government applicable to any civilised nation with equal benefit.’333 
 
Leese believed that the conditions in Britain at the end of the twenties were a carbon 
copy of these in Italy at the beginning of the decade: i.e. a growing resentment towards 
democracy and the rise of Communism. Leese viewed the IFL as a reincarnation of the 
Italian Fascist movement. In the first issue of The Fascist, Leese explained how at this 
early stage in the movement’s life, the IFL had to seek fascist representation through 
democratic means: ‘we have, at present, to fight, as Mussolini did, with the same 
loathsome weapons as are used by our democratic adversaries.’334 The IFL never did put 
up a candidate for election, preferring instead to act as a propaganda machine until the 
fall of democracy. Only then would Leese make his move for power.335 Leese 
prophesied that in the coming years public apathy towards democracy would result in 
the British public’s demand for change. Fascism would then come face to face with 
Communism in a fight for power. Fascism would eventually be victorious. He described 
how ‘A large proportion of citizens will “sit on the fence” whilst the same struggle is 
going on; these same people, the liberal-democrats, will grouse and grumble under the 
subsequent Fascist regime as long as they live, just as their prototypes have done in 
Italy.’336 
 
To prepare for the coming struggle, the IFL sought to ‘build an efficient “militia”’ 
called the Fascist Legions, under the command of the Commandant-General, L. H. 
Sherrard.337 Based on the Italian Fascist Blackshirts, the Legions, dressed in black shirts 
and emblems of the fasces, would be made up of the ‘best’ IFL members.338 These 
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‘elites’ would be trained and given ‘the necessary machinery’ to ensure that the fascist 
regime came to power with as little disturbance to the economic affairs of the country as 
possible.339 The early days of the Fascist Government would by ‘strength, discipline and 
steadiness’ maintain order and suppress any attempt at a counter-revolution either by 
socialist or democratic forces.340  
 
Examination of The Fascist identifies the extent to which Italian Fascism inspired the 
IFL in its early years. Favourable comments on Mussolini and his Blackshirts are in the 
majority of pages during its 1929 and 1930 issues. The very first article in The Fascist 
lauded the Italian Fascists for their role in the peaceful overthrow of parliamentary 
democracy in Yugoslavia in January 1929 (known as the January 6 Dictatorship).341 It 
claimed that the revolutionary change without the loss of life could not have been 
possible without Mussolini ‘set[ting] the fashion’ in 1923: ‘The Italians who lost their 
lives in the cause of Fascism were not merely good Italians but good Europeans; and, 
although they did not realise it, they were sacrificing themselves not only for Italy but 
for Europe and, incidentally, for Yugo-Slavia.’342 
 
To the IFL Mussolini was ‘the man of destiny’.343 In The Fascist, the IFL regularly 
referred to Mussolini for inspiring and guiding its readership. When discussing its 
strategic takeover of government, the paper pointed out that Mussolini had forty 
parliamentary candidates before his revolution. This was an obvious message to its 
supporters to keep the faith.344 In an article titled ‘Royalty and Fascism’, the IFL 
answered critics who said that ‘Kingship in Fascism is a sinecure’.345 The article 
explained that ‘nothing could be further from the truth’ and pointed to the Italian model 
as evidence: ‘It was the king who called Mussolini to form a Government, […] 
prevent[ed] the use of the Army in opposing the Fascists, […] saw that […] Ital[ian] 
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democracy had to go, and that Mussolini was the man of destiny.’346 The article, of 
course, praised the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, for inviting Mussolini to become 
Prime Minister of Italy. According to the IFL, the monarchy was a necessity for any 
fascist state as the king of Italy was the ‘guardian of the people, as a King should be’.347  
 
At the (indirect) behest of Mussolini, the British movement advised its readers to avoid 
what it described as ‘Bastard Fascists’:348 organisations formed under the ‘Fascist’ name 
yet were not fascist. ‘Mussolini warns us’ about these ‘wretched failures’, whose 
leadership, made up of ‘the adventurer and the melancholic intellectual’, led them to 
‘disaster and ridicule’.349 During this period, the IFL was referring to the British 
Fascists, who were, according to the IFL, nothing more than anti-Socialist, with a 
membership who joined to help strengthen the Conservative Party.350 Contrastingly, the 
IFL considered themselves as true Mussolinian fascists, made up of the conscientious 
and the unselfish.351  
 
A further example of the IFL’s devotion to the Fascist state can be seen by the large 
amount of ‘Great works’ and ‘must reads’ on Italian Fascism that featured in The 
Fascist. Reviews on such literature were also commonplace. For example, a column 
was dedicated to an American professor of religion and philosophy, Herbert Schneider’s 
pro-fascist book, Making the Fascist State (1928), which was a must-read for ‘serious 
students’.352 The book provided a ‘laboratory study of the mind and imagination at work 
in the making of the Fascist State’.353 It presented the ‘most illuminating account of the 
splits, faction-fights and difficulties met with among Il Duce’s followers’.354 Likewise, 
British writer and fascist sympathiser, Harold Goad’s influential pamphlet, ‘What is 
Fascism’, was described as the ‘best short work on Fascism’.355 Not only did the IFL 
suggest the aforementioned fascist propaganda to its readers, but it also sold them and 
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other works that glorified Fascism.356 The IFL claimed that ‘If we can distribute far and 
wide, we shall be doing a great service to the country and to Fascism.’357  
 
The IFL reviewed and sold pro-fascist literature to counteract what it saw as a unilateral 
bias by mainstream newspapers against its Italian brethren and its beloved leader. The 
movement was frustrated with the British (and worldwide) media for ‘misrepresenting’ 
Fascism for ‘partisan purposes’.358 The British fascist movement argued that politicians 
and the media viewed Fascism as a threat to their respective positions and, therefore, 
had conspired against the new political creed, brainwashing the British public into 
thinking that Fascism represented dictatorship, extremism and violence. Columns in The 
Fascist were devoted to countering the ‘Democratic Press campaign against Italy’.359 
The weekly satirical magazine, Punch, was singled out for its ‘continued gibes against 
the “Duce”’.360 The IFL informed its readers that Mussolini ‘has done a lot more for the 
service of mankind than even the Editor of Punch can ever hope to do’.361 According to 
the IFL, the hostile press had ‘successfully hidden from the British public the 
philosophic basis of the Fascist creed although its actual achievements in Italy could not 
be kept from its readers’.362 
 
Yet, this appears not to be the case. An examination on the attitudes of British 
newspapers and politicians to the Italian regime between 1923 and 1930 suggests that 
no consensus existed. The Manchester Guardian, for example, depicted Mussolini as a 
potentially dangerous tyrant: quashing free speech, overseeing an unjust and failing 
education system in which teachers were forced to adhere to a strict Test Act and 
potentially stockpiling weapons to use in a bid to conquer Europe by force.363 By 1930, 
the paper argued, ‘the best of Italy is now in exile or in prison’.364 Likewise, Punch was 
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also heavily critical of the Italian regime. It ran a series of cartoons representing 
Mussolini as an absurd and idiotic ruler.365  
 
However, Mussolini’s regime also attracted support in Britain. As Richard Bosworth 
has explained, conservative opinion on Italy between 1924 and 1935 was far from 
damning: ‘Restraint, order, and success were attributed to Mussolini’ by British 
conservatives.366 What particularly appealed to conservatives was the Fascists’ heroic 
‘struggle against socialism-communism-bolshevism’ and their intense patriotism.367 
Many hoped that Mussolini’s movement would morph into ‘a real Italian Conservative 
Party’.368 A.J.P. Taylor went as far as to suggest that the government’s reluctance to 
deal with Italian aggression in the lead up to, and during, the Abyssinian invasion (see 
chapter 3) in 1935 came from conservative ideological sympathy with the Fascist 
regime.369 The most well-known example of admiration for Fascism is from a speech 
delivered by, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill:  
 
I could not help being charmed, like so many other people have been, by Signor 
Mussolini’s gentle and simple bearing and by his calm and detached pose in 
spite of so many burdens and dangers. Anybody could see that he thought of 
nothing but the lasting good, as he understood it, of the Italian people, and that 
no lesser interest was of the slightest consequence to him […] If I had been an 
Italian I should have been wholeheartedly with you from start to finish in your 
triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism.370 
    
British newspapers collectively were far from hostile to Fascism. Conservative papers 
such as the Daily Mail, The Observer and The Morning Post supported Mussolini’s 
attack on Corfu in 1923.371 The following year, The Times, The Morning Post and the 
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Daily Mail refused to condemn Mussolini over the Matteotti crime (see Chapter 1).372 
The Times, for example, dismissed the scandal, claiming that ‘homicide is more 
commoner [sic] in Italy’.373 By the end of the decade, the same paper hailed Mussolini’s 
‘great daring and great statesmanship’.374 The Daily Telegraph described the Italian 
leader as an ‘uncompromising realist’ who had an ‘honourable record’ on peace and 
disarmament.375 The paper was particularly impressed by Fascist labour laws, which it 
considered a ‘daring innovation [inspired by] pure patriotism’.376 In Under the Axe of 
Fascism (1936), the Italian anti-Fascist, Gaetano Salvemini claimed that the Daily 
Telegraph was one of the most pro-Fascist papers in England.377 The Morning Post 
marvelled at the ‘trim handsome black-shirted lads’ while the Daily Mail considered the 
Italian leader a modern day Napoleon.378 As Bosworth remarked, ‘no firm position had 
been taken’ among the British press or politicians on Italian Fascism.379 
 
A number of reasons may explain the IFL’s ‘oversight’. Perhaps the reason for its 
hostility was the lack of public attention that Leese’s movement received during this 
period. In his typical style, Leese viewed himself and the IFL as more influential on 
British society than they were and may have been perplexed and annoyed by the little 
coverage that they received from the national papers. When reading the papers, perhaps 
Leese missed the sympathetic coverage given to Fascism, although given that he was an 
avid reader of newspapers – as can be seen by The Fascist’s regular attacks on editors, 
writers and politicians of which the knowledge must have come from the papers – this is 
extremely unlikely. The most likely explanation is that the IFL blindly believed 
Mussolini’s public gripes to the worldwide press over its supposedly negative reporting 
on Italian Fascism. Mussolini addressed foreign journalists living in Italy requesting 
they ‘depict the truth as it is […] as it presents itself to your eyes and your 
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intelligence’.380 The story was published in the British mainstream newspapers shortly 
before the IFL made its inaccurate claim.  
 
Evidence of Leese’s commitment to Mussolini’s brand of fascism can be seen by his 
role in a transnational organisation funded by the Italian government. Leese was the 
‘British correspondent’ for the Centre International d’ Études Fascistes (CINEF), 
advertising the centre in The Fascist.381 Based in Switzerland, the CINEF was, 
according to the Home Office, ‘a sort of elite intellectual “think-tank” on fascism’, 
professing to be independent and impartial.382 It claimed to provide ‘for the general 
public exact information’ on the new political ideology.383 For example, each year 
CINEF published a Yearbook that was translated into various languages and 
accumulated contributions by scholars and politicians from across Europe.384 Despite its 
claim to objectivity, the CINEF was a propaganda arm for Mussolini and his Fascist 
state.  
 
Mussolini employed Major James Strachey Barnes as Secretary General of the CINEF. 
Barnes, an Englishmen living in Italy and a friend of the Duce, featured in The Fascist. 
Leese ‘found great encouragement’ in an article Barnes wrote in National Review titled 
‘Fascism’. It gave the IFL belief that ‘something can be done’ in Britain: 
 
Major Barnes likens the political outlook of the average British citizen to an 
elderly bachelor who has fallen into the clutches of his landlady (liberal ideas) 
and who has never met the right girl (‘little Miss Fascism’). The idea that 
Fascism may be represented by a ‘flapper’ may help to increase its popularity 
with the youth we wish to attract!385 
 
Italian Fascism undoubtedly influenced Leese’s movement during its formative years. 
However, two key differences separate his movement from the Italian model. This, 
therefore, suggests that the IFL was not a slavish imitation of Italian Fascism but a 
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movement that had indigenous characteristics. Firstly, although it adopted Mussolini’s 
corporatist model, the IFL argued that the Italian Fascist system was underdeveloped. It 
claimed that the ‘corporate spirit’ under Fascism only went as far as incorporating the 
interests of the employer with the employed equally under the state.386 According to the 
IFL, ‘the real problem before the Western World is not “Capital versus Labour”; it goes 
much deeper, and may be expressed by the words “Finance versus Industry”.’387  
 
In mid-1920, Britain and Italy were among the many countries that returned to the 
international Gold Standard.388 The IFL argued that Jewish interests were behind the 
fixing of currencies and therefore economies. This was, according to the IFL, a key part 
in their conspiracy to take over the world, as outlined in the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion. The argument of many antisemites, including the IFL, is that wealthy Jewish 
money lenders conspired together to fix the Gold Standard rate to make themselves 
healthy profits at the detriment of the nations.389 ‘Moneyed interests’, the IFL argued, 
‘were unpatriotic and hostile to the economic interests of productive industry.’390 
According to Leese, ‘the economic system under which both Italy and Britain are 
suffering […] wants a thorough overhauling.’391    
 
Under an IFL state, the Gold Standard would be scrapped. In its place would be the 
monetary model put forward by Kitson’s Economic Freedom League.392 This called for 
a ‘national money’ system to replace the Gold Standard.393 This would free Britain from 
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the Jewish ‘Money Monopolists’, restoring national credit to the Crown.394 In turn, the 
Crown would act as a trustee of the nation. Moreover, in any country that was linked to 
the Gold Standard, all other industries were subordinated to banking. This included in 
Italy under its corporate system. In fact, banking was an industry of its own, paying 
large dividends whatever the country’s economic situation. A ‘national money’ system 
would go some way to curtailing ‘Jewish control over Anglo-Saxon affairs’.395  
 
The second was the role of antisemitism. Richard Griffiths suggested that the IFL ‘took 
a violently anti-Semitic line’ from its beginnings.396 Similarly, Colin Cross has argued 
that Leese considered himself a ‘racial fascist’ from the outset, modelling his outfit on 
Der Stürmer.397 This is unlikely, as Der Stürmer was not mentioned in The Fascist until 
much later. Gisela Lebzelter, however, asserted that antisemitism was not a feature of 
the IFL during its first year.398 Antisemitism did indeed play a role in IFL ideology from 
the outset, in contrast to Italy where it was not officially adopted until the late thirties. 
However, as Linehan pointed out, ‘the “Jewish question” did not occupy the centre 
ground of party policy’ during the movement’s early years.399 The IFL did not officially 
label Jews as the ‘enemy’ until early 1930 but even then it claimed that ‘many Jews are 
innocent of evil intent’.400 Nevertheless, an examination of The Fascist’s early issues 
uncovers disdain towards Jews as well as the belief in a Jewish conspiracy operating in 
the country. 
 
According to the IFL, Jewish money power controlled every important area of British 
society. Jewish influence, for example, had penetrated into British politics. These ‘Jew-
controlled party politicians’ refused to prevent the ‘international alien financier’ from 
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controlling the press.401 Therefore, attacks on the ‘Jewish menace’ along with 
democracy and the Gold Standard – both of which the IFL argued were Jew-influenced 
– ‘rarely receive publication or report’.402 However, a study on newspaper bias 
undertaken by Andrew Sharf (1964) concluded the opposite. He claimed that the British 
press as a whole had a slight antisemitic tone in the 1930s.403 As well as powerful 
players within the newspaper industry, the IFL also argued that Jews were heavily 
invested in the British wireless, theatre and cinema through which they were 
disseminating their propaganda at will.404 Indignant, Leese declared that ‘The whole 
object of British Politics is the maintenance of British character and its gradual 
evolution in harmony with British tradition. But all our Parties maintain Jewish 
character and Jewish policy’ of self-interest and Zionism.405  
 
One of the key factors to this ‘Jewish policy’ was Zionism. According to the IFL, there 
was no dispute between Arabs and Jews in Palestine but, rather, the situation was the 
result of Jewish financial influence over British politicians. Zionism was a Jewish plot, 
orchestrated by the elites, to prevent their coreligionists from assimilating with Gentiles 
and therefore save the Jewish ‘race’ from disappearing.406 Leese declared that ‘Jews had 
no right whatever to claim a domicile in the Holy Land, the population of which was 
chiefly Arab [and] was ignored, and so the British Empire […] foolishly advertised 
itself sponsor for the interests of the Jew against those Arabs’.407  
 
Like many Britons of the interwar period, the IFL viewed the British Empire with 
immense pride and as a sacred entity worth persevering: ‘The History of the British 
people is a great epic of sacrifice, through which has been built up the greatest Empire 
the world has seen’.408 It reminded readers of The Fascist that Britain ruled two-fifths of 
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the habitable land of the world.409 As with Britain, however, the Empire was being 
surrendered to Jewish interests. ‘[I]nternationalism’ [a synonym for Jewish interests], 
through its ‘clever propaganda’ sought to weaken the Empire and ‘subvert’ its 
subjects’.410  
 
The League of Nations, of which Britain played a leading role, was regularly attacked 
by the IFL. Stocker suggested that the IFL viewed the League as a ‘Jewish-dominated 
threat to the British Empire’.411 The IFL claimed that it was ‘closely allied’ to Jewish 
Money Power and the Gold Standard.412 Leese argued that the League ‘was not a British 
interest at all’ and its ‘evil influences’ intended to undermine ‘Imperial Unity’.413 In 
fact, the Paris Peace Conference (1919) – where the main discussion was the creation of 
the League of Nations – ‘forced upon’ the victors of the First World War a ‘Jewish idea 
set forth in the second of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, published in 1905’.414 
When discussing the League, the IFL claimed that due to Jewish influence and pressure 
‘no party politician, hunting for votes, dare oppose it’.415 
 
In addition to the unhealthy influence that they were perceived to have held over both 
national and global institutions, Jews were portrayed in The Fascist as unpatriotic and a 
threat to British society, culture and ‘race’ and were determined to replace the 
‘indigenous’ Briton with their own ‘alien’ kind.416 Featured on the front page of the 
May 1929 issue is a report from an IFL ‘correspondent’ who attended the laying of a 
foundation stone at a ‘new Jewish settlement’ near the Commercial Road in London.417 
The member claimed that ‘Greasy caps had to be removed from the heads of their 
owners’ during the singing of the National Anthem.418 The IFL bemoaned provisions to 
increase accommodation in London synagogues as this would result in more Jews and 
more Jewish worshipping.419 In an attempt to increase the population percentage of 
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Jews, the fascist movement stated that prominent Jews were advocating birth control 
among the Gentiles. As a result, this would increase the population percentage of their 
coreligionists and assist greatly with their mission to turn Britain (and the world) into a 
Jewish state.420  
 
The IFL proposed a solution to counter this apparent growing Jewish influence. They 
argued that any Jew in favour of Zionism – presumably this meant all Jews as the IFL 
argued that they were all unpatriotic – was, by definition, not British: ‘The Jewish 
Zionists domiciled in Britain have, by accepting Zionism, deliberately decided to 
remain National Jews with the interests of the Jewish Race coming first. The term 
‘“English Zionist” is, therefore, a contradiction.’ 421 As a consequence of their 
disloyalty, the IFL demanded that Zionists be stripped of any political power that they 
held and had their British citizenship removed as ‘A Zionist has no more right to British 
citizenship than a Chinaman.’422 A short poem printed in the October 1929 issue of The 
Fascist identified the movement’s contempt towards the Jew: ‘“Tis odd; That God; 
Should choose; The Jews.”’423  
 
The Nazi Influence. ‘Hail Hitler and his Aryan Policy’424 
Race 
Certain historians have suggested that the IFL’s turn towards zealous antisemitism was 
to distinguish itself from Mosley’s variant of fascism. To Leese, Mosley was a ‘Bastard 
Fascist’.425 He labelled Mosley a ‘kosher fascist’ and his movement, the BUF, the 
‘British Jewnion of Fascists’.426 This is because Leese believed that antisemitism did 
not play a leading role in Mosley’s brand of fascism and therefore Jews must control 
Mosley and his BUF. According to Linehan, Leese ‘tried gamely to carve out a separate 
niche for his party on the fascist right in 1932 by making the antisemitic and racial 
components in the IFL’s ideology more explicit so as to distance it from the BUF’s 
“Judaic Fascism”’.427 Likewise, Morell claimed that by taking the IFL to the extremes, 
 
420 ‘Jew Versus Gentile’, The Fascist, December 1929–January 1930, p. 4. 
421 ‘Zionism’. 
422 Ibid.  
423 ‘The Chosen Race’, The Fascist, October 1929, p. 3. 
424 ‘Hitler’s Work for the White Peoples’, The Fascist, June 1933, p. 3.  
425 ‘Mosley Manifesto’, The Fascist, January 1931, p. 2. 
426 Fascism in Britain, p. 50.  
427 British Fascism, pp. 77–78. 
117 
 
Leese hoped to attract members from the radical fringe of Mosley’s movement.428 
However, the IFL went from a ‘softer’ type of antisemitism to all-out hatred for Jews a 
year and a half before Mosley’s official conversion to fascism. 
 
The rise of the Nazi Party in Germany altered the direction of the IFL considerably. 
Racial politics shifted from a feature of its ideology to the central component. Hitler and 
his movement only came on the IFL’s radar when it unexpectedly finished second in the 
Reichstag election of 14 September 1930, winning 107 out of 577 seats with almost a 
fifth of the vote share (progressing from the smallest party in 1928 with 2.6 per cent and 
12 seats). As a result, Mussolini was replaced as the IFL’s Messiah in favour of the 
Führer and race-based politics dominated the party’s ideology. The IFL had always 
been a White supremacist party, but before the September election, Nordic racial 
superiority was not a central component, featuring only occasionally in The Fascist.  
 
Leese was reluctant to unleash the full extent of his racism on the public. He feared that 
his movement, which intended to achieve power through electoral means, would be 
rejected by the British people from the outset as the majority of Britons had not yet 
awakened to the idea of racial politics. The electoral ‘success’ of Hitler’s movement 
resulted in a realisation for Leese that a racist party, only open to members of pure 
‘Aryan’ decent, was able to attract considerable public support.  
 
The IFL’s turning point can be clearly identified in October’s edition of The Fascist. 
Three of its four pages were dedicated to German fascism. Previously, neither Hitler nor 
his party had been mentioned in its newspaper, appearing to only come on the IFL’s 
radar following their electoral surge. The IFL was clearly inspired now that a (racial) 
fascist movement had come to prominence in northern Europe: ‘German Fascism will 
now […] help us to demonstrate to the British Public that Fascism is just as natural to a 
Nordic-Alpine racial mixture like the Germans as it is to an Alpine-Mediterranean 
mixture like the Italians. In other words, Fascism and Maccaroni [sic] are not 
inseparable.’429  
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As a consequence of its newly acquired racial hegemonic zeal, a hardening of IFL 
attitude towards Jews is also evident in October’s issue of The Fascist. In previous 
issues, the movement had portrayed Jews as unhealthy and unpatriotic pests who had an 
unscrupulous influence on British society. With this newfound Nazi-inspired 
confidence, the IFL now argued that the Nordic peoples, the earth’s ‘aristocrats’, were 
under attack by the amalgamation of inferior races; particularly Jews.430 For the IFL, 
Jews were the ‘mongrels’ and the ‘scum of the earth’, hell-bent on dominating the world 
through their ‘money-power’ before ridding the globe of gentiles.431 Leese argued that 
‘The Jewish problem is one of Nationality; that a Jew can be an Englishman is 
impossible.’432 Despite being ‘utterly alien to our national life’, the Jew was, according 
to the IFL, dominating British society and public life by financial power alone.433 ‘[I]n 
sympathy with the German Fascists’, Leese called for the expulsion of all ‘aliens’.434 
Until then, the IFL demanded that Jews be removed from influential positions – such as 
‘responsible posts in public life’ including newspaper editors.435 The IFL intended to 
‘rid the country of the Jewish plague’.436 
 
For the remainder of the movement’s (and Leese’s) lifetime, race was the central and 
overarching theme. Morell stated that Leese was obsessed with the ‘Aryans’ and the 
Jews as ‘the conflict between whom he regarded as crucial for the future of the 
world’.437 Writing in 1935, Leese described race as ‘the true basis of politics’ in which 
the ‘Aryan’ Europeans were the most superior while the Jews the most inferior.438 The 
‘softer’ cultural antagonism towards Jews – complaining about their behaviour and 
attitude as well as their apparent unhealthy influence on British society – morphed into 
an innate zealous hatred towards them that consumed the movement.  
 
The IFL undertook an aggressive anti-Jewish campaign. Hundreds of Swastika, the 
infamous symbol of Nazism, badges were made and sold to supporters. ‘Wear a 
Swastika Badge by which you commit yourself (1) Never to buy from Jews (2) Never to 
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employ Jews (3) To do all you can to stop the Jewish invasion of our country.’439 When 
discussing ‘the Jewish problem’ in 1932, as well as Germany’s ‘numerous long overdue 
steps [that] are being taken to deal with [it]’, the IFL admitted that ‘We are getting on: 
twelve months ago such matters could hardly have been discussed.’440 This identifies 
how inspirational the Nazis were to the IFL.  
 
The IFL’s extreme antisemitism and admiration for the Nazis was noticed beyond those 
who supported its cause. The hatred towards Jews was so fierce that the British 
intelligence services, who began monitoring the movement in the early thirties, 
considered the IFL a single-issue party. In 1933, for example, the Secret Service 
claimed that Leese’s movement was ‘moribund’, its ‘only ordinary form of activity is 
the issue of violently antisemitic pamphlets’.441 The following year, it reported on an 
IFL pamphlet titled ‘To Cyclists and Car Drivers’.442 In it, the movement stated that 
many insurance companies are becoming ‘Jew-wise’ by refusing to lease cars to Jews. 
The same pamphlet attacked the appointment of the Jew Leslie Hore-Belisha as 
Minister of Transport, questioning why an ‘[A]ryan Briton’ was not chosen instead. 
Desperate to disseminate its antisemitic propaganda, 5,000 of these pamphlets were 
distributed by the IFL to the public free of charge.443 The IFL’s main aim, according to 
MI5, was to ‘enlighten public opinion’ on the Jews.444    
 
Hatred towards Jews is evident throughout the issues of The Fascist post-September 
1930. From early 1931, each issue included a section titled ‘News from the Jewish 
Front’.445 In them, the IFL would attack Jews as well as report on Jewish activities at 
home and abroad. Crude cartoons depicting Jews as unscrupulous people, ‘gross and 
fleshy with large hook noses’, scheming to take over the world featured in the paper’s 
pages.446 In a lengthy report on the IFL, MI5 remarked that the cartoons ‘bore a close 
resemblance to those published in Der Stürmer’, the virulently antisemitic Nazi 
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propaganda paper founded and published by the Jew-hater Julius Streicher.447 In fact, 
the IFL prided itself on the clarity of its position through The Fascist comparing the 
paper to the clear ‘utterances’ of Streicher.448 Woodbridge considered Leese’s 
admiration for Streicher and his newspaper so great that he ‘saw his own paper, The 
Fascist, as the British equivalent of Streicher’s publication’.449  
 
The IFL (positively) reviewed and sold considerable amounts of antisemitic literature. 
This included works written by Nazis. For example, The Riddle of Jews’ Success by 
Theodor Fritsch (under the pseudonym Ferdinand Roderich-Stoltheim), appeared to be a 
particular favourite of the movement for it gave ‘a complete character study of the Jew, 
showing exactly what makes him a disturbing factor wherever he goes’.450 A further 
example is a book titled Terror. The authors, Adolf Ehrt and Hand Roden, were 
commended for uncovering the ‘ghastly’ account of the ‘many hundreds’ of National 
Socialists ‘done to the death by Jewish Bolshevists before Hitlers [sic] revolution’.451  
 
In 1935, a three-part instalment appeared in the movement’s newspaper containing the 
names of British aristocrats who the IFL believed were of ‘Jewish blood’.452 The 
movement claimed that the public had a right to know who were ‘contaminati[ng] and 
destr[oying] the Aryan aristocracy of this Kingdom’.453 This provoked a small number 
of those mentioned to contact Leese denying that they were Jewish. This included the 
famous actor, Sir Cedric Webster Hardwicke; the business mogul, Sir Bernard Eckstein; 
and the first president of the European Association in India, Sir D. B. Myers.454 
Consequently, Leese was forced to publicly express his ‘sincere’ apologies for the 
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errors.455 This suggests that the impact of The Fascist reached a broader constituency 
than simply hard-core antisemites. 
 
From September 1930, the IFL developed its philosophy on the British Empire. The 
movement now championed the ‘preservation of Aryan standards in the Nation and 
Empire’.456 As Paul Stocker pointed out, given the IFL’s overt antisemitism, it is 
unsurprising that historians have neglected the movement’s relationship with the 
Empire.457 Stocker devoted a page in his journal article – titled ‘“The Imperial Spirit”: 
British Fascism and the Empire’ – to the IFL’s attitude to British overseas territories.458 
In it, he claimed that the IFL provided a ‘distinctly racialist perception of the British 
Empire’.459 Britain’s Empire was, according to the IFL, the pinnacle of the 
achievements by the Nordic race and evidence that ‘Aryan’ Europeans were vastly 
superior to all other creeds. Therefore, the ‘Aryans’ must display complete dominance 
over the inferior races.460 
 
This newfound confidence can be seen in the IFL’s attitude towards the Palestine 
issue.461 Previously, as aforementioned, Leese had used The Fascist to accuse the 
establishment of being controlled by Jews. Now, he targeted MPs directly, which was 
covered by the press. In the evening of 2 March 1933, a number of prominent MPs – 
including the leader of the Labour Party, George Lansbury, the Solicitor General, Sir 
Boyd Merriman and Clement Attlee – attended a dinner at the Savoy Hotel in London 
organised by the Friends of Palestine. During the day, each attendee received threating 
letters on notepaper headed ‘Imperial Fascist League’. In them, they were informed that 
their names had been noted as ‘guest[s] and supporter[s] of the enemies of our 
country’.462 Mr W. McKeag, one of the MPs who received the letter, sent it to the Home 
Secretary and the Speaker of the House of Commons and informed the Home Office.463 
The recipients regarded it as a ‘stupid joke’ and most ‘threw [the letter] into the 
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wastepaper basket’.464 Nevertheless, the incident put Leese and his movement firmly on 
Parliament’s radar.465  
 
Shortly after MPs condemned the IFL for the same ‘intolerable Jew-baiting’ on which 
the ‘Nazi revolution in Germany was based on’, Leese and the printer of his newspaper, 
Walter Whitehead, were charged with seditious libel and public mischief.466 The 
newspapers followed the case. The charges were founded on statements published in 
The Fascist that were ‘intended and likely to incite ill-will and hostility between Jews 
and other subjects of his Majesty’.467 Leese and his co-defendant, who both denied the 
charges, were acquitted of seditious libel but found guilty on two counts of public 
mischief and were fined. Whitehead paid the charge but Leese declined and was 
sentenced to prison for six months. Leese preferred the martyr status and chose to 
become a political prisoner as his hero Hitler had been a decade ago. In fact, Leese told 
the judge that ‘Hitler [is] a man whom I greatly admire’.468  
   
The IFL put forward three possible solutions to the Jewish problem: their extermination; 
their assimilation; or their compulsory segregation. It preferred the former but conceded 
that ‘pogroms are out-of-date in Britain’.469 Assimilation was also unacceptable as ‘no 
decent Nordic man or woman could consider seriously [this]’.470 Therefore, it settled on 
permanent forced exile to Madagascar for the Jews as to totally isolate them from the 
rest of the world.471 According to Toczek, the idea had been mooted by ‘enthusiastic 
member’ and zealous antisemite Henry Hamilton Beamish in the 1920s who, during that 
decade, ‘steadily cultivated useful friendships within the ranks of German Nazism’.472 
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Through his contacts – the Jew-hating publisher, Theodor Fritsch, and the leading Nazi 
theoretician, Alfred Rosenberg – Beamish had his Madagascar plan published as an 
article in Der Stürmer in 1926.473 This was the same as the Nazis’ plan for the 
deportation and settlement of the Jewish community to Madagascar in 1939. However, 
the reality of the Madagascar plan for the Nazis was fraught with difficulties, especially 
after their capture of France in 1940. The most overwhelming problem was the transport 
of millions of Jews to a remote island. Morell suggested that this made it more than 
likely that Madagascar was no more than an ‘elaborate camouflage designed to conceal 
the Nazis’ long-term plan to exterminate the Jews’.474  
 
However, the IFL appeared to take the plan seriously only after it reappeared in Der 
Stürmer in 1931. This identifies the considerable influence of the Nazis on the IFL. The 
article, which suggested that Jews be banished to the sparsely inhabited but huge island 
nation off the southeast coast of Africa, was transcribed in The Fascist: ‘Madagascar is 
particularly suited for the ultimate National Jewish Home; the island has the climate 
which would suit the Jew and can support 50 million people. In that island, the world’s 
public nuisance, the Jewish Nation, could be isolated and permanently quarantined’.475 
The following year, the British movement officially adopted the ‘Madagascar solution’ 
for ‘the unwanted’ Jews in Britain.476 For the IFL, Jews should go ‘to Hell or 
Madagascar’.477 
 
In the October 1930 issue of The Fascist, the IFL promised its readers that ‘German 
Fascism will now get more publicity in our newspapers’.478 This was most certainly the 
case. The IFL followed the Nazis very closely for the remainder of its lifetime and 
supported Hitler’s aggressive attitude and hostile treatment towards Jews. After 
consolidating power in March 1933, one of Hitler’s first racial policies was the ‘re-
organisation’ of Freemasonry in Germany. Hitler hated Freemasonry, as he believed it 
promoted the interests of Jews around the world: ‘Freemasonry […] has succumbed to 
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him [the Jew] completely, he has an excellent instrument with which to fight for his 
aims and put them across.’479 In 1931, Nazi party officials were given a ‘Guide and 
Instructional Letter’ stating ‘[t]he natural hostility of the peasant against the Jews, and 
his hostility against the Freemason as a servant of the Jew, must be worked up to a 
frenzy’.480 Until 1935, when all lodges and branches were to be dissolved and their 
assets confiscated, freemasonry became increasingly under the control of the Nazis. In a 
column titled ‘Germany and the Lodges’ in the December 1933 issue of The Fascist, the 
IFL stated that ‘the Old Testament will be cut out of any connection with the New 
Masonry in which no Jews will be tolerated’.481 Enthused by this, it prophesied that 
‘Some-day, British Freemasons will realise how they have been gulled by the “Craft” 
into a status of Equality with the Racial Scum of the Earth, the Jews.’482  
 
The IFL supported other attacks carried out by the Third Reich on Jews. In 1935, for 
example, the Nazis outlawed marriages (and extramarital relations) between Jews and 
non-Jews as part of the so-called Nuremberg Laws (The Law for the Protection of 
German Blood and Honour). Any person who violated the prohibition faced Zuchthaus 
(prison with hard physical labour). Race-mixing was a major obstacle to the Nazis 
desire to create a ‘pure Aryan’ Germany. The IFL defended the Nazis campaign: ‘In 
Germany, misguided Aryans who so far forgot their race as to try to marry Jews find 
themselves pilloried and, in a few cases, have been committed to the concentration 
camp where they can reflect upon their folly’.483 The IFL fully supported Hitler’s ‘chief 
aim’ to rid the world of Jews.484   
 
Hitler versus Mussolini  
Due to Leese’s innate antisemitism, the IFL was slavishly devoted to Hitler after the 
Nazis came to its attention in September 1930. As well as the many pro-Hitler articles 
that featured in The Fascist, examples of this infatuation are identified in a number of 
other ways. For example, Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf (My Struggle), written 
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while imprisoned in 1925, was the IFL’s bible. A translated version was referenced at 
length regularly in The Fascist. Many books on Hitler were sold, reviewed and 
celebrated. For example, the IFL claimed that the Nazi Heinz A. Heinz’s book titled 
Germany’s Hitler (1934) was ‘by far the best biography of Hitler which has been 
published in the English language’.485 As well as ‘saving’ Germany, the book portrays 
the Führer as a philanthropist, describing how he personally handed out Christmas 
presents to disabled children and donated his salary to poor relief work. He was soon to 
be ‘the White Man’s’ hero when he forces the Jews out of Germany. The IFL ‘strongly 
recommend all admirers of this great spiritual revolutionary to read it’.486 Leese even 
recommended a pictorial biography on Hitler featuring 170 ‘excellent’ photographs but 
complained that not enough antisemitism was included.487 Anti-Hitler material was 
dismissed as ‘Jewish propaganda’ and was certainly not sold.488 The British fascist 
movement announced that it was ‘not pro-German. But we are pro-Hitler […] whose 
policy is that of Nordic Fascism’.489 
 
Besides its racial theory, a further reason why the IFL was different to other far-right 
interwar British movements – that may or may not have sympathised with the Nazis – 
was that it considered itself the British defender of Hitler and attacked those who dared 
to criticise the Nazi leader. The movement instructed Britons to ‘believe nothing they 
see in the Press about Hitler unless they get it out of The Fascist’.490 It referred to 
‘Hitler’s proverb’: ‘If you fail to see your name maligned in the Jewish Press in the 
morning, you have made no good use of your time yesterday.’491 As well as the many 
pro-Hitler books that were reviewed and sold by the IFL in The Fascist, lectures were 
also held at its headquarters in London for those who wanted to learn ‘The Truth about 
Hitler’.492 The IFL considered itself ‘Hitler’s most genuine friend’ in Britain.493 
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Individuals, newspapers and organisations who made anti-Hitler comments were 
targeted by the IFL.494 When the Jewish Chronicle reported the death of Hitler’s niece, 
Geli Raubal, it suggested that she was Hitler’s mistress and was expecting his child.495 
The IFL retorted that ‘The man who wrote that would do well to hang himself.’ 496 Even 
prominent members of the clergy were attacked. For example, in 1933, Reverend Dean 
Inge received a letter from Leese (reprinted in The Fascist) following Inge’s criticism of 
Nazi racial policy. Before ‘condemn[ing] Hitler’, Leese demanded Inge educate himself 
on the topic as ‘you are, on your own showing, so ill-equipped with the information 
necessary for a sound judgment on his action’.497 With the letter, Leese enclosed 
‘information’ for Inge to read. No reply was received by the IFL from Inge.498  
 
In an attempt to shame those hostile to Hitler’s racism, a blacklist of individuals who 
were publicly hostile to Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies was created. Described as ‘Jew 
Pollutionists’, their names and titles were published in The Fascist.499 Unlike the 
‘Jewish blood’ list, this published list only prompted a single response. Mrs Corbett 
Ashby wrote to the IFL to make clear her objection to Hitler’s antisemitism as an 
individual and not as President of the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship 
as the IFL had stated.500 The single response was probably because 1) the list was far 
shorter than that of the ‘Jewish blood’ list and 2) many of those on the blacklist 
genuinely did publicly denounce Hitler. 
 
The hostility towards the press was to continue into the movement’s pro-Hitler years. 
For some time, Leese had claimed that the press was controlled by Jews and worked for 
Jewish interests. Obviously, given the Nazi party’s unashamed and long-rooted history 
of overt antisemitism, which it expressed openly, the supposedly Jewish-run 
newspapers would have to be portrayed by the IFL as against Hitler. However, a 
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consensus did not exist on the attitudes of British newspaper on Hitler, as it did not on 
Mussolini. Using The Times and the Daily Mail as sources, Eric Lai Chun Yue 
examined ‘British Newspapers’ Representation of Nazism’ in the 1930s.501 His results 
identified contrasting opinions between the two organs. 
 
Yue found that The Times viewed Nazism as ‘distasteful’ and preferred ‘traditional’ and 
‘cultural’ practices.502 For example, it held the Nazis totally responsible for the outbreak 
of violence in Austria in February 1934 and held Hitler responsible for brutal ‘Röhm 
Purge’ against Nazi leaders a few months later.503 Yet, the Daily Mail often supported 
Hitler. It blamed the ‘un-nationalistic behaviour’ of the Jews for the German 
Chancellor’s ‘anti-Semitic boycott’ in which notable people, such as Albert Einstein, 
were forced to leave Germany.504 In contrast to The Times, the Daily Mail refused to 
condemn Hitler’s ‘Röhm Purge’ and blamed ‘Socialist conspiracy’ for the troubles in 
Austria.505 Even in the lead up to the war, the paper refused to criticize the Nazis.506 
According to Yue, ‘Scrutinizing the news articles and the editorials of the Daily Mail it 
is easy to come to the conclusion that the paper was a steadfast support of Nazi 
Germany.’507  
 
Following its turn towards Nazism in late 1930, Mussolini was denounced by the IFL 
for not adopting racial politics. In May 1931, an article was published in The Fascist 
titled ‘A Warning to British Readers’. In it, the IFL set out its position on Hitler and 
Mussolini: ‘Hitler is facing the real enemy of the white races, the Jew, Mussolini is not 
doing so […] we see in the Hitler movement something more far-reaching for the White 
Man that there is even in the Italian movement.’508 Without the racial element to it, the 
IFL considered the fascism of Mussolini ‘incomplete’ because it ignored race as ‘the 
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ultimate basis of politics’.509 In its typical grandiose style, the IFL claimed that, due to 
its racial-centred ideology, its fascism was ‘more complete’ than that of Mussolini’s.510   
 
Suspicious that Mussolini was not attacking Jews, the IFL declared that Italian Fascism 
was dominated by Jews. From being its idol in its formative years, Mussolini became a 
hate figure for the British movement for letting ‘Jew Money Power’ control Italy and 
encouraging ‘Jewish blood’ to ‘contaminate’ the Italian nation.511 According to Leese, 
Jews had cofounded the PNF with Mussolini in 1921 and the Duce had surrounded 
himself with them ever since.512 Subsequently, the IFL claimed, Mussolini placed Jews 
in leading positions in his government. For example, his closest friend was ‘the Jewish 
Financier’, Count Volpi; and his son-in-law, Count Ciano, was a ‘great friend’ of the 
wealthy Jewish banking family, the Rothschilds, staying with them when in England.513 
From May 1931, the IFL considered Italian Fascism ‘represented under the light of a 
five-pointed star’.514 
 
‘Jew-friendly’ measures introduced under Mussolini incensed the IFL. ‘The Jews’, 
Mussolini remarked, ‘have lived in Rome since the days of Kings [and] shall remain 
undisturbed’.515 In 1931, the Jewish Communities Law came into force in Italy. 
According to the then Jewish professor of Canon Law at the University of Milan, Mario 
Falco, the law ‘accomplishes, at last, the unification of Italian Jewry, at which attempts 
have been made continuously since 1865’.516 The IFL considered this ‘sheer poison for 
the Italian people’.517 It argued that ‘To recognise the Jews as a part of the Nation is a 
first-class error in Statesmanship […] it will separate the Italian Fascist from the 
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German and from the English Fascist by a gulf which cannot be bridged.’518 The IFL 
also attacked Mussolini for allowing Jewish immigrants to study at Italian universities 
and for allowing Jews fleeing Germany to settle in Italy.519 For the IFL, Mussolini was 
pro-Jewish and Italian Fascism was essentially Jewish. By 1936, the IFL did not even 
consider Mussolini a fascist.520 He was a ‘Bastard Fascist’. 
 
However, in 1938 Mussolini began an antisemitic campaign. Carefully chosen (fascist) 
scientists were employed to investigate race. Published in July 1937, the Manifesto of 
Race, based on pseudo-scientific claims, declared that European races were biologically 
superior to all others and that Italians were of the ‘great’ ‘Aryan’ type.521 The Jews were 
singled out as inferior and therefore ‘do not belong to the Italian race’.522 Racial laws 
were implemented in November prohibiting Jews to ‘serve in the military, act as legal 
guardians, own companies with roles in the national defence, own lands or buildings, 
employ “Aryan” domestic help, and that foreign Jews would be expelled from the 
country’.523 This was the beginning of the so-called Italian Racial Laws, which until 
1943 enforced racial discrimination in Italy before the fall of Mussolini. 
 
Historians disagree over the roots and reasons for the shift to antisemitism. Traditional 
historiography has suggested that transnational factors were behind the abrupt change in 
policy, namely, a strategic alliance with Nazi Germany.524 These studies demonstrated 
the considerable influence Hitler had over his Italian counterpart. However, more recent 
scholarship has challenged this view, arguing that national circumstances created the 
shift. Franklin Adler, for example, suggested that Mussolini had defeated all internal 
enemies (liberalism and communism) by the end of the twenties; therefore consolidating 
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an authoritarian dictatorship.525 With the opposition gone, the focus turned to creating a 
new society and transforming the Italian people. The racial policy was an aspect of this 
development.526 Similarly, Aaron Gillette considered it a part of Mussolini’s ‘cultural 
revolution’ that had always been promised to the Italian people but not realised.527 
 
Following ‘a careful comparison of all anti-Jewish laws enacted in various countries 
from 1933 to 1945’, Michele Sarfatti noted how Rome differed from Berlin.528 For 
example, violence against Jews never reached the same level under Mussolini as it did 
under Hitler. In addition, Sarfatti found that Mussolini was ‘a step ahead’ of Hitler in 
some areas of legislation.529 These included the banning of Jewish children from state 
schools, the removal of foreign Jews from the country and limitations placed on Jews as 
to the ownership of businesses and real estate. From his findings, Sarfatti concluded that 
the ‘Italian Fascist passage of racial laws in 1938 was the decision of a strong country 
acting on its own’.530  
 
As a result, the IFL discontinued its campaign against the Duce. Yet, he did not receive 
the adulation from the IFL as he once had during the movement’s early years. Instead, 
Mussolini was viewed with a combination of suspicion and ambivalence. Although 
commended for no longer fearing ‘Jewish Money Power’, as indicated by the 
‘tremendous welcome’ he gave Hitler during his visit to Italy in May 1938, he was 
ridiculed for the ‘lateness of his awakening to racialism’.531 The IFL made it clear that 
Mussolini could not be trusted to join its fight against Jews.532 He was mentioned 
infrequently thereafter in The Fascist.  
 
The Italian Fascist newspaper proprietor and a well-known figure in the PNF, Roberto 
Farinacci was at the forefront of Italy’s new racial policies. Therefore, he became the 
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IFL’s new favourite in Italy. Farinacci represented the most radical syndicalist faction 
of Fascism (anti-clerical, xenophobic and antisemitic), one that believed Mussolini to be 
too liberal. He was violent, xenophobic, slavishly pro-Nazi and one of the party’s most 
ardent antisemitic proponents.533 The March issue of The Fascist contained a eulogy on 
Farinacci. It claimed that under Farinacci, who is using his newspapers to lead the 
‘informative propaganda so necessary in Italy’, the anti-Jewish move is in ‘excellent 
hands’.534 According to the IFL, ‘the best news we have to give our readers this month 
[is] that the Italian anti-Jewish movement is led by such a fine character’.535 In July, the 
IFL commented favourably on Farinacci appointment as a Minister of State in the 
Italian government.536 Although Farinacci was commended for his anti-Jew work, Hitler 
was still the IFL’s Übermensch.  
 
The IFL’s attitude towards a foreign nation depended entirely on its approach to Jews. 
A paragraph in the March 1935 issue of The Fascist, likely written by Leese, is an 
excellent example of this: 
 
Not so long ago, we were charged with being “pro-Italian,” but any readers of 
our publication today know that once it became clear that Mussolini – whom we 
once admired – had apparently sided with Jewry, our concern with Italy ceased. 
So too, if Hitler retracted, we should no longer lean towards Germany.537 
 
The adoption of Nazi symbols and slogans 
German fascism undoubtedly influenced IFL policy and galvanised the movement 
spiritually, but the IFL also implemented certain unmistakable features and 
characteristics unique to Nazism. For example, from December 1931, the British 
movement began using the term ‘Hail Hitler’ or ‘Heil Hitler’ at the end of certain 
articles in The Fascist and as the concluding words to speeches at meetings.538 Cartoons 
of ‘patriots’ giving the fascist salute also featured in its newspaper.539 Both of these 
examples were adopted in the 1930s by the Nazi Party to show obedience to Hitler. 
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From May 1932, the IFL added ‘Perish Judah’ (death to Jews), the long-time antisemitic 
rallying cry, to its vocabulary.540 These examples give a clear indication of the IFL’s 
admiration for – and loyalty to – the Third Reich. 
 
Perhaps the most telling example of this transnational influence and certainly the one 
that made the greatest impact is the IFL’s adoption of the Swastika, the infamous 
symbol of Nazism. At the end of 1932, the Nazis were the largest party in the Reichstag 
by a wide margin and it was very likely that Hitler would shortly become Germany’s 
Chancellor (which he did on 30 January). As a result, the IFL entered the new year with 
a new masthead for The Fascist featuring swastikas. Its emblem became a swastika 
superimposed on a Union Jack and was a key element of the IFL’s identity. The 
emblem was superimposed onto armbands, becoming part of IFL uniform, flags and its 
letterheads.541 Following Hitler’s consolidation of power in March 1933, the IFL had 
swastika-laden merchandise made. As well as badges, tiepins, swimsuits, jerseys and 
wooden plaques, all swastika decorated, were sold through mail order for the remainder 
of the movement’s lifetime.542   
 
In a show of solidarity with the Nazis and to protest Britain’s allegedly Jewish policies, 
the IFL used the Swastika symbol in the form of a giant flag and flew it from buildings 
attracting the attention of the British public, the Home Office and newspapers. In 
October 1933, Leese erected a swastika-incorporated flag outside IFL offices in Craven 
Street, London. After being made aware of this, the concerned proprietor confronted 
Leese who removed the flag immediately. When interviewed by The Manchester 
Guardian, Mr H. Pinks, the proprietor’s representative, cited the swastika on the flag as 
a concern for the business premises nearby: ‘Shopkeepers do not like undue notoriety; 
and we thought it might cause some inconvenience.’543 Pinks noted a clause in the lease 
‘that tenants should not disturb others’ and he clearly thought that a Swastika flag flying 
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in full view of the passing public ran the risk of causing alarm.544 The incident attracted 
the attention of a number of newspapers.545  
 
A few months later, under the cover of darkness, several members erected a Swastika 
flag on the building of London County Hall. This incident attracted wider attention than 
when the IFL waved a similar flag from its offices because it defaced a public building 
with what was perceived to be an emblem from a foreign dictatorial power. At least 
twenty local and regional newspapers covered the story as well as a number of 
mainstream papers, including The Times, Daily Herald, Daily Telegraph and Evening 
Standard.546 The leader of London City Council, Mr Herbert Morrison, was clearly 
annoyed at the episode and through the media, he sent a message to Hitler. ‘If the 
Imperial Chancellor of Germany was a wise man, he will tell his fanatical followers in 
this country to leave British public property alone.’547 Morrison added that ‘it is 
thoroughly objectionable that the propaganda of foreign political parties should be 
fastened on to public buildings […] such conduct might easily lead to serious trouble, 
and it must be stopped’.548 Gummed round the base of the pole were a number of anti-
Jewish mottoes such as ‘The reason our flag bears the Swastika is that at present the 
Union Jack is a flag of the Jews, and the Swastika puts the white man’s mark upon it. 
We are racial Fascists.’549 After ‘flutter[ing] for some hours from a flagpole’, the flag 
was eventually ‘hauled down’ and replaced with the Union Jack.550  
 
The previous examples identify the attitudes of many in Britain towards Nazism. 
Businesses were concerned that a visible Nazi symbol would offend potential 
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customers, and therefore, deter them from commercial premises. Politicians, such as 
Morrison, thought that the openly displaying the swastika would insult citizens. They 
were correct. Certain members of the public felt strongly enough to write to newspapers 
complaining about the Union Jack being defaced by the swastika. Mr John Hayes of 
West London, for example, wrote to the editor of his local newspaper to complain after 
he saw IFL members wearing Union Jack Swastika armbands. ‘Sir, – No doubt many of 
your readers have seen members of the “Imperial Fascist League” wearing an armlet 
associating our National Flag with an alien device, a black swastika, symbolic of Nazi 
Germany and its present system of intolerance and truculence. Certainly, this appears 
gross abuse and unconstitutional.’551 Hayes called for readers to petition MPs to support 
an Act to protect the flag against such ‘abuse’.552 No such act was proposed possibly 
because the circulation of the local paper was so limited that little attention was given to 
it.  
 
Nazis in Britain  
In early 1933, Hitler had risen to German Chancellor. By March he had, in effect, 
turned Germany into a dictatorship. However, the Nazis were active in Britain for more 
than two years before Hitler became Führer. In October 1930, the Nazis sent their first 
officially sponsored party member – the UK correspondent of the Nazi newspapers 
Der Angriff and Völkischer Beobachter – Dr Hans Wilhelm Thost to London as a show 
of strength after becoming the second largest political party in Germany.553 To date, the 
Nazis focus had been on national issues, attracting much support. Now they intended to 
improve their image overseas and cultivate better foreign relations. MI5 files and 
primary sources of prominent Nazis identify Thost’s mission as twofold: to attract 
support for Nazism in Britain as well as inform the Nazis and – through his newspaper – 
the German people of the happenings in Britain.  
 
Hitler saw Britain as Germany’s natural ally. He had gained much respect for the British 
fighting spirit during the First World War. His confidant, Albert Speer, later recalled 
that the bravery and determination of the British forces had won Hitler’s respect.554 By 
1923, Hitler wanted to launch a joint invasion with Britain against Russia to secure 
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living space in the east. According to Ian Kershaw, Hitler also foresaw the two powers 
combining again, this time against France, who, after the First World War, was 
Europe’s most powerful nation.555 In Mein Kampf (1923), Hitler argued that ‘the 
English nation will have to be considered the most valuable ally in the world as long as 
its leadership and the spirit of its broad masses justify us in expecting that brutality and 
perseverance’.556 Even in 1936, when tensions between Britain and Germany were 
increasing, Hitler told a courtier ‘If I had a choice between Italy and England […] I 
would naturally go with the English […] I know the Englishmen from the last war, they 
are hard fellows.’557 As Peter John asserted, ‘It is remarkable how, up to two decades 
later, Hitler’s views had changed very little since the publication of Mein Kampf.’558 
 
As identified in the (Alfred) Rosenberg Papers, Thost was particularly interested in 
coercing prominent and well-respected British subjects into openly favouring National 
Socialism. He did this in order to increase the profile and popularity of the Nazis, both 
at home and abroad. For example, Winston Churchill’s niece, Clare Sheridan, was 
encouraged by Thost to write favourably about Hitler and his burgeoning movement.559 
In a letter to his boss, Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitler’s closest confidants and later 
leader of Nazi Germany’s Foreign Policy Office, the Nazi enthusiast stressed how 
important it was to ‘influence favourably her articles, which will be read by millions in 
England and America’. He assured Rosenberg that he would be ‘able to guide the 
conversation accordingly’. He also requested that Rosenberg convince The Times 
correspondents in Germany to write more positively about the Nazis.560 James Barnes 
and Patience Barnes stated that, within a year of his post, Thost had made great progress 
in legitimising the Nazis to the British authorities and press.561  
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Following Thost’s new appointment, the head of the Nazi Auslandsabteilung [Foreign 
Department], Dr Hans Nieland was tasked with creating Ortsgruppen [local groups] in 
foreign cities. These branches abroad were set up with several key aims: to monitor 
overseas party members; to encourage non-party members with German citizenship to 
join the groups and, in turn, sign up to the Nazis; to emphasise the Teutonic roots of 
ethnic Germans; to improve the image of the Nazis in Britain and then, after 1933, the 
Third Reich to non-Germans; and to provide a communal base so fellow members could 
build strong relationships with each other while also being informed of party 
expectations.562  
 
Nieland sent a memorandum to all Nazi party members abroad with instructions for 
setting up Ortsgruppen. The memorandum, handed to the British Foreign Office by a 
concerned London barrister who managed to obtain a copy, was a rallying cry to ‘all 
Party Comrades abroad’.563 It spoke of fighting ‘liberals and Marxists […] who have 
brought low our once proud Reich’. It also claimed that ‘Party Members who are so 
devoted to the cause at home are sure that comrades abroad will not stand idly by but 
will join in the struggle to secure freedom within Germany.’ Nieland concluded the 
letter by stating that all Ortsgruppen created were to report regularly and directly to him 
in Berlin.564  
 
The first and most important Ortsgruppen in Britain was the London branch. Formed in 
October 1931 by several Nazi members, the leadership was tasked to convert Germans 
to Nazism. Followers were encouraged to spread Nazi ideology across the wider 
German community, including businesses, educational establishments, religious centres, 
clubs and the arts.565 Thost even delivered a lecture to the renowned Oxford University 
Union in which, to the heckling of Jews and Communists, he described and promoted 
National Socialism.566 By the time Hitler came to power, the group had around 50 to 
100 members.567 As the London branch increased its membership, meetings shifted 
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from public locations (for example, cafes and restaurants) to private rooms.568 
Unsurprisingly, activities were Nazi and Germanic themed. For example, amongst the 
drinking of German beer, singing songs from the fatherland and indulging in patriotic 
poems, members listened to speakers specially chosen to address the branch with the 
instruction to instil a ‘sense of occasion as well as ideological purity’ upon the 
audiences. German movies were also shown and regular ‘bonding trips’ were 
organised.569 The London Ortsgruppen ‘provided Party members with a place to 
congregate with like-minded Germans and share their enthusiasm for the [Nazis]’.570 
 
As the 1930s progressed, the Ortsgruppen became more Nazified. Hitler wanted to 
install party discipline across branches. Initially, members were encouraged to appear at 
meetings and functions. However, after Hitler came to power, encouragement changed 
to requirement. This new policy attracted the attention of the British press. While 
interviewing Otto Bene, head of the Ortsgruppen in Britain, a reporter from the Daily 
Express asked why a ‘young German domestic [had] received a letter demanding to 
know why she had neither taken part in Nazi activities in London; nor contributed to the 
party funds’.571 Thost replied by asking for the complainant’s name and address, which 
the reporter refused to provide, citing concern for the young German’s safety.572 In an 
attempt to avoid media attention and potential agitators, non-members became 
increasingly unwelcome at meetings and events while German Jews and political 
refugees were banned.573 In the early days, the Nazis focused exclusively on building 
Ortsgruppen. Later, as a sign of their growing dictatorial intentions, they took over 
other German community organisations, such as veterans’ groups, churches and the 
YMCA.574 In this way, Hitler sought to control all Nazi Party members both at home 
and abroad. 
 
Hitler and his representatives were keen to emphasise that Nazi policy was not to 
interfere in political or governmental issues abroad, stating that their only interest was 
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influencing German citizens.575 This approach was reiterated throughout the thirties, but 
by the middle of the decade, after initially ignoring Ortsgruppen activities, the British 
authorities became increasingly uncomfortable with the growing number of Germans 
entering the country and of the activities that some were alleged to be perpetrating, such 
as espionage. Consequently, a rift appeared between various government bodies. In 
1936, MI5 argued that the banning of individuals would merely result in them being 
replaced with likeminded Nazis and was, therefore, a pointless venture. Instead, they 
strongly favoured outlawing the Ausland-Organisation completely citing their 
‘dangerous potentialities’ if war were to break out.576 Despite initially disagreeing with 
the domestic intelligence service’s stance, especially the claim that banning Nazi 
organisations would drive activity underground where it would be more difficult to 
monitor, the Foreign Office (together with Special Branch) accepted their memoranda 
the following year and the proposal was put to Cabinet. However, much to the anger of 
the said authorities, Cabinet refused to action the plea claiming it would aggravate the 
‘existing difficulties in securing agreement over questions relating to Spain’.577 In 1938, 
head of MI5, Maxwell Knight, reversed his position on the expulsion of individual 
Germans. The Cabinet’s rebuff and the Third Reich’s aggressive foreign policy on the 
Continent led him to favour expelling some local Nazi leaders.578 German journalists 
were the first targets for removal.579 By the early stages of the Second World War, mass 
deportations and incarcerations of Germans (and Austrians) were implemented across 
Britain.580    
 
Transnational Physical Links and Influences with Fascists Abroad 
The Nazis 
Examination of IFL publications, MI5 files, police reports and the British press identify 
transnational physical links and influences with fascists abroad. In fact, the IFL had a 
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web of networks with fascists abroad. By far the most important was its relationship 
with the Nazis. By the time Hitler had consolidated power in Germany, the IFL had 
already built strong relationships with its German counterparts. Reviews of official Nazi 
material – including a booklet on Nazi foreign policy – appeared in The Fascist.581 
Leese had struck up a friendship with ‘Hitler’s special representative in London’, 
Thost.582 Thost wrote an article for The Fascist titled ‘The Truth about Hitlerism in 
Germany’, appearing on the front page, and delivered a lecture on ‘The German 
National Socialists’ at IFL headquarters.583 The following year, Leese wrote a letter to 
Thost expressing ‘complete sympathy’ with the Nazis.584 The IFL declared, ‘with 
considerable pleasure’, its ‘growing understanding and goodwill between the German 
“Nazi” Fascists’ and its own movement.585 By December 1931, the IFL claimed to be 
well connected to the Nazis.586    
 
The IFL was also becoming known in Germany. In August 1931, member and a regular 
contributor to The Fascist, H.H.L. (no further information provided) was in Munich as 
the IFL’s ‘Special Correspondent’ to report favourably on Hitler.587 Either Thost or 
H.H.L. informed Hitler’s propagandist and Nazi foreign press officer based near 
Munich, H.R. Hoffmann (almost certainly Rolf Hoffmann), about the IFL. 
Subsequently, Hoffman sent articles lauding Hitler and berating Jews to Leese in 
London for publication in The Fascist.588 Probably due to Hoffman, regional pro-Nazi 
newspapers in Germany translated articles featured in The Fascist to German and 
published them in their respective newspapers.589 By doing this, the Nazis hoped to 
impress upon the German people that they were respected and supported abroad; 
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therefore, legitimising the movement at home to attract more support. During this 
period, many links and relationships were established between the IFL and the Nazis.  
 
Relations between the IFL and the Nazis changed considerably almost immediately 
after Hitler’s rise to führership. The IFL essentially became an arm of the Nazis, 
operating under their influence. On 11 January 1934, The Manchester Guardian 
translated into English an article published in Der Stürmer referring to a ‘secret Nazi 
movement in England’ named the ‘Imperial Fascist Guard’ (IFG).590 The IFG was the 
IFL’s ‘active section’.591 Its objectives were threefold: to ‘spread national and racial 
consciousness’ in England; to undertake ‘propaganda raids’; and to defend IFL 
meetings from hecklers.592 The Nazi organ published a report sent by the IFL to Hitler 
and Streicher on the ‘activities’ of Nazis in England.593 IFL member Cecil Serocold 
Skeels authored the report. In it, he forecasted that Britain would go National Socialist 
within five years.594  
 
Like Leese, Skeels was a fanatical antisemite and a ‘trusted member and friend’ of the 
IFL.595 He was one of the principal liaisons between the British movement and the 
Nazis during the early years of the relationship, regularly travelling between England 
and Germany, and appearing at various events. He was present at the Day of German 
Art in Munich (1933) wearing a ‘huge Union Jack armlet decorated with a swastika’.596 
Attended by Hitler, ‘Aryan’ art was paraded through the streets to celebrate ‘Aryan’ 
culture.597 Skeels became friends with Streicher and, according to the IFL, shared a 
platform with him at the 1933 Nuremberg Rally – the annual rally of the Nazi Party.598 
In front of 100,000 people, Skeels delivered a fanatically pro-Hitler speech in German: 
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The Anti-Jewish Fascists of England, the Imperial Fascist League, whose 
representative I am, bring greetings to you. We fight with Hitler against the 
Jews. We know full well that the question before you tomorrow is, ‘Are you for 
the Nordic Race or for the Jewish Nation?’ 
 
We desire friendship between Germany and England. We are your Nordic 
brothers and never again shall war be waged between our peoples. I shall, on my 
return to England, tell the truth for Germany. You have won, in spite of all! Our 
fight begins. Hail Hitler!599   
 
Once Skeels had delivered the speech, he left in Streicher’s car ‘amid loud applause and 
cries of “Hail England”’.600 Skeels was praised in The Fascist for undertaking ‘good 
work for the Imperial Fascist League in Germany’.601 However, he was ‘thrown out’ in 
early 1934 for joining a non-Jew obsessed movement named the United British Party. 
Within a month, Skeels was also expelled from that group; this time his antisemitism 
had led him to be ‘dropped like a hot coal’.602 Following his forced absence from 
British politics, Skeels devoted himself to the Nazis. During the Second World War, he 
was sentenced to two years imprisonment for sending information to the enemy then 
subsequently detained under defence regulation 18B.603  
 
A report in the July 1936 issue of Munich Monthly – the principal organ of the Munich 
Nazis – forwarded by the UK’s Ambassador at Berlin to the then Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden, provided further evidence that the IFL was under Nazi control. It stated 
that an IFL ‘agent’ was assigned an office at the headquarters of the Nazi Party, named 
the Brown House. This unnamed member was tasked with attracting British and foreign 
visitors to the existence and activities of its organisation in Britain in order to enrol 
members ‘in a universal war against international Judea’.604 Through the IFL, the Nazis 
intended to, at best, attract support in Britain or at least gain sympathy.  
 
The aforementioned examples of antisemitic and pro-Nazi activity of the IFL certainly 
attracted attention in Britain. However, it is unlikely that its efforts assisted the Nazis in 
making a favourable impression on the vast majority of Britons. In fact, it likely did the 
opposite. Most Britons would have been unimpressed by flags embodied with symbols 
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of a foreign power being waved in public or seeing its members in the street wearing 
Nazi-emblems. In addition, reading about the leader of such an organisation professing 
his allegiance to Hitler before being sent to jail for causing public unrest, sending 
threatening letters to M.P.s and attacking clergymen for speaking out against the 
German Chancellor, was also unlikely to garner public sympathy. That said, for the 
small number of Britons that did hate Jews and support Hitler, The Fascist was 
informative, if not influential, to them: reinforcing and crystalising their ideas. Yet, 
Leese regularly received requests from readers of the organ complaining of its obsessive 
antisemitism.605 Of the Britons who were aware of the IFL, the vast majority probably 
agreed with MI5’s assertion that Leese was ‘a fanatical anti-semite who regards Jews as 
the enemy of mankind […] see[ing] their influence in every department of human 
activity’ instead of someone who made convincing arguments for the greatness of Hitler 
and his Nazi party.606 
 
Examination of The Fascist identifies an area of disagreement between the IFL and the 
Nazis. From 1935, the IFL regularly used The Fascist to print articles warning the Nazis 
against claims to former German colonies in Africa now ruled by the British.607 One 
such article read: ‘However much we may be Fascists, we are first of all Englishmen; 
because of that, whilst we favour friendship on the highest plane with Nazi Germany, 
that will not blind us to the fact that our overseas possessions are ours as a sacred trust 
and must be ceded to nobody.’608 Another written by Leese and published in 1938 stated 
that his movement was opposed to the return of the former German territory because 
‘we are British, not German’.609  
 
Leese reiterated this claim in a letter to Hoffmann in 1939. On headed IFL paper, Leese 
declared how he was 
 
with you in everything except Colonial policy […] But when it comes to the ex-
colonies of Germany, for reasons often given in The Fascist I am absolutely 
opposed to any surrender whatever […] Neither do I like to hear German 
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143 
 
statesmen say that the Colonies were stolen from them, for they were not stolen; 
nor has Germany, as far as my investigations go, the slightest grounds, moral or 
otherwise, for claiming them […] I think that Germany is fitter than anyone else 
except ourselves to have tropical colonies but not on our cabbage patch.610 
 
These examples suggest that the IFL favoured nation over a foreign power. Leese 
wanted to state publicly that he and his movement were anti-Jewish but pro-British to 
avoid attention from the British security services who would, Leese believed, expose his 
and the Nazis’ activities and, therefore, impact on the relationship and the IFL’s mission 
of ‘Aryan’ supremacy. However, an agent working for the Home Office who had 
known Leese ‘intimately for years’ disagreed that Leese was ‘really pro-British’. Agent 
62, as he or she was known, was  
 
emphatic that Arnold Leese had merely carried out certain instructions given to 
him several years before the war when German National Socialism was 
uncertain of its strengths and wanted to ensure the survival of some of its friends 
in case anything went wrong and Germany lost the war […] He assured 62 that 
his real views were only known to three [unnamed] people.611 
 
Furthermore, two years before sending the letter to Hoffmann, Leese claimed that the 
movement’s post was being monitored: ‘We believe there is pilfering or sabotage going 
on in the Mails and will take whatever steps we can to counteract it, including supplying 
another address for correspondence.’612 Therefore, Leese would have undoubtedly been 
selective in the messages sent from IFL headquarters. He clearly staged the 
‘disagreement’ with the Nazis in his letter to Hoffmann (and in The Fascist) to make the 
British security services believe that he was above all else a patriot defending his 
country. Although MI5 had been reporting on IFL activities from 1934 – when it began 
compiling reports on British fascist groups – the Home Office only began monitoring 
correspondence (sent and received) from the movement’s headquarters from early 1939 
when war was on the horizon and the potential of a fifth column operating in Britain 
became a real possibility. As Agent 62 remarked, the IFL was in secret a ‘fanatical pro-
Nazi organisation.’613  
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Further evidence points to Nazi dominance in the channels of funding. The IFL relied 
on three avenues to finance the movement. The first was Leese himself who regularly 
contributed to the IFL bank account. The second was from the sale of propaganda 
advertised in The Fascist. The third was through donations. When the police searched 
Leese’s home in June 1940, they found ‘cash-books’ from September 1930 to August 
1933 and from June 1937 to November 1938.614 According to MI5, who analysed the 
sources, the ‘chief subscriber’ was Colonel Macdonald of Brussels, who gave £5 each 
month to the movement and an additional £50 in November 1938. MI5 described 
Macdonald as ‘having strong Fascist views’ and as being an ‘intermediary’ between 
fascists in Britain and Germany: ‘The suspicion arises that he may have been the 
conduit-pipe for any funds which the Germans may have thought it worthwhile 
spending on […] the I.F.L’, although the service admitted that they had no evidence for 
this.615 However, there is evidence that the IFL did receive funding from the Nazis from 
as early as March 1931. In April 1931, a column was printed in The Fascist thanking 
the Nazis for ‘donat[ing] to our funds’ the previous month.616 The IFL described the 
payment as ‘an instance of the way in which the White Races will eventually get 
together to fight the Asiatic peril of the present day, which is spelled J-E-W’.617 
 
Effectively a branch of the Nazi Party, the IFL did Hitler’s bidding in Britain. Lebzelter, 
for example, considered the IFL a ‘devoted mouthpiece’ for Nazi ideology in Britain.618 
Readers of The Fascist were encouraged to purchase Nazi propaganda from Germany, 
fees and office addresses were given. This included newspaper subscriptions, transcripts 
of Hitler’s speeches, books, magazines, leaflets. For example, the August 1935 issue of 
The Fascist advertised the full text translated into English of Adolf Hitler’s Peace 
Speech (21 May 1935), which was available from Deutscher Fichte-bund, Hamberg.619 
The IFL claimed that other publications in English on general German problems were 
also available from the German address.620  
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As well as the abundance of pro-Nazi books and articles advertised through its 
newspaper, the IFL also sold other Nazi-related propaganda. Copies of the Jewish 
Ritual Murder number of Der Stürmer (1934) – by now the most widely read paper in 
the Third Reich621 – were sold to ‘Help The I.F.L. Funds!’622 Readers of The Fascist 
were also encouraged to purchase Third Reich cultural propaganda from Germany such 
as stationery, cigarette cards and Christmas cards.623 Twelve months after the IFL 
advertised Christmas Cards of Hitler – available to purchase from the Nazi publishing 
house in Frankfurt, Juengersche Buchhandlung – the IFL copied the idea, selling 
Christmas cards with a portrait of Leese printed on them.624 
 
Members of the British fascist movement visited Germany under the Third Reich. First-
hand reports eulogising Hitler’s ‘achievements’ appeared in The Fascist and became the 
feature at GHQ Meetings.625 Through this, the IFL attempted to provide the ‘truth’ as 
opposed to the ‘press lies and half-truths’ that displayed ‘contempt [for] the Hitler 
regime’.626 Reports on the brutal suppression of German opinion were denied. Writing 
in late 1933, an unnamed IFL member claimed that anti-Hitler newspapers were 
‘permitted to be sold openly from newsstands to anybody who is so misguided as to 
wish to waste his money’.627 The military arm of the Nazi Party, the Brownshirts, were 
depicted as not uniformed bullies but cultured members of the Aryan race who ‘seldom 
carry anything more lethal than banners [and] folded leather case[s] containing a few 
papers’. The German people were not ‘bullied and browbeaten’ but liberated. There was 
no begging on the street, no starvation, five million more employed, and – to the ‘horror 
of Liberals and other muddle-headed morons in Britain’ – those who were jobless were 
‘doing useful and necessary work […] at the same time, regaining physical and moral 
strength’. For these and many other reasons, ‘Britain can do with a dose of it 
[Nazism]’.628     
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To attract support for Hitler among British subjects, the IFL devised schemes to connect 
Britons to Nazi Germany. The British movement encouraged British people to ‘stop 
going to Jewish cinemas […] and with the money so saved pay an early visit to 
Germany and learn, on the spot, the truth which our papers are unwilling to tell 
them’.629 From 1934, the IFL collaborated with ‘a non-Jewish’ London travel agent 
inviting British citizens to ‘Come and See New Germany’.630 With a promise of ‘Good 
Hotels’, customers could choose between touring the Rhine and Moselle by steamboat 
and car for eight days; the Harz Mountains by car for nine days; and Dresden, 
Nuremberg, Munich and the Bavarian Alps for 15 days.631 In the years that followed, 
perhaps as a result of its tours of Germany, the IFL regularly advertised a guest house in 
the Bavarian Alps for ‘Aryan Visitors Only.’632  
 
In addition, The Fascist was used as a medium for cultural exchanges between the two 
countries. This included an Au Pair exchange and pen pal requests as well as stamp 
swapping.633 An advert in the October 1938 issue read ‘The Nuremberg representative 
of The Fascist would like to write to I.F.L. members who would exchange Stamps.’634 
Free German language classes were held at headquarters in London to encourage 
‘Aryan’ British people to build relationships with their ‘Aryan’ German counterparts.635 
In 1938, the IFL claimed to have ‘done more in the last ten years to cement friendship 
between this country and Germany than any other organisation could achieve’.636  
 
The Nazis capitalised on its relationship with the IFL. Due to its fanatically pro-Nazi 
content, IFL literature was disseminated in Nazi Germany. In 1937, an IFL booklet 
titled Mightier Yet! – ‘the official declaration’ of its aims and policies – featured in an 
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English book series published by Rohmkopf for the study of the English language.637 
The Fascist was translated into German by the Nazis and sold through Juengersche 
Buchhandlung. German readers in England were also able to subscribe to the German 
translation through their local Post Office provided they paid in German currency.638 In 
1938, to run alongside The Fascist, the IFL began publishing a magazine for German 
and British readerships called Angles. The new title was to be issued weekly in Britain 
and monthly in Germany, available from addresses in Nuremberg and Hamberg.639 Free 
IFL literature was also obtainable from both of these outlets.640 By 1939, all of the IFL’s 
literature was orderable through one address: Herr Emil Rohmkopf, Leipzig.641      
 
The IFL appeared to have had a particularly close relationship with Streicher and Der 
Stürmer. As official guests of the leading anti-Jewish organ in Germany, IFL members 
attended Nuremberg rallies. In addition to Skeels’ visit in 1933, four IFL members 
attended the 1935 rally to which they ‘received the most generous hospitality from their 
genial hosts’.642 In 1937, two members were present for the celebrations. They claimed 
to find themselves in a ‘free country’ where they could wear IFL uniform and Swastika 
symbols while enjoying the ‘heartiest reception from everyone’.643 The hospitality went 
both ways. According to MI5 source, Gordon Woods – adjutant to the then deceased 
Rotha Lintorn-Orman, the founder of the British Fascist – Streicher’s son, Lothar, 
stayed with Leese during his seven-week visit to Britain in 1934.644 The IFL also 
assisted Otto Bene, the head of the Nazis in London, in arranging the visit of two young 
Nazis connected with the German paper the following year.645 In his 1941 report on the 
IFL, T.M. Shelford, from MI5’s F3 counter-subversion section, remarked that the IFL 
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had made every effort to ingratiate itself with the Germans and to make contact with the 
Nazi Party.646 
  
The IFL presented itself as a British first movement. It regularly referred to its members 
as ‘patriots’ while the Jewish-run British government were the enemy, not Nazi 
Germany.647 Its vision of an ideal Britain was that of a nation free from the 
‘contamination’ of alien influence – a synonym for Jews – who, to enrich themselves, 
controlled Britain in every sphere: politically, financially and socially (through 
newspapers and cinemas, for example). Historical accounts of Jewish influence in 
England feature in the movement’s literature. During the mid-Medieval period, the Jew 
took advantage of the outlawing of usury by the Church.648 This ‘monopoly’, the IFL 
argued, gave them such power they essentially ran the country, ‘bully[ing] and 
oppress[ing]’ non-Jews at their will.649 The ‘great’ King Edward I and his parliament 
were eulogised for murdering hundreds of ‘the detested and despised Jews’ before 
expelling them from the country in 1290. Contrastingly, Cromwell is condemned for 
allowing their return, branding his great-grandfather, Horatio Pallavacini, Jewish. The 
IFL declared that history was repeating itself, that the country was ‘over-run’ by the 
hated Jews. The only ‘cure’ was by (re)implementing the ‘same measures now 
advocated by the Imperial Fascist League […] total expulsion of Jews from these 
islands’.650 
 
Therefore, when discussions of a potential war with Germany began in Britain after 
Hitler’s consolidation of power in 1933, the IFL had to take a position. Did it side with 
the country that, according to the movement, was controlled by its nemesis, the Jew; or 
should it support the foreign power in which it was ideologically aligned to and under 
the influence of? The IFL campaigned for peace between the two powers. They accused 
Jews of conspiring to create war with Germany to save their coreligionists from the 
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tyranny of Hitler’s regime and of attempting to consolidate world domination, as Nazi 
Germany was the Achilles heel due to its breaking of Jewish influence within Germany; 
and of enriching themselves, as the most lucrative profit base for Jews, the arch-
capitalists and moneylenders, is through war.651 The IFL insisted that its members 
would never fight on the side of Jewry. In fact, if war did break out, Leese claimed, IFL 
members would arrest the leading Jews: ‘If Jews are successful [in causing war] there 
will be war upon them here in England, We shall see to that.’652  
 
Months before the outbreak of war, the IFL published a pamphlet titled ‘Race and 
Politics’ (1938). In it, the movement stated that nationality is of ‘secondary importance’ 
to race. ‘The Supreme Political Fact is that Civilisation was established by people of 
Aryan Race and only by them can it be maintained at its high level. The Supreme 
Political Object is, therefore, to maintain the strength of this Aryan stock on which the 
hope of the world depends.’ The pamphlet claimed that the overarching threat to the 
IFL’s ‘Supreme Political Object’ was the Jews as ‘The Jew Money Power works from 
behind the Gentile line, and uses one Gentile Power to destroy the other.’653 
 
Although not explicitly stating that it would take the side of Nazi Germany if war were 
to break out, it was clear where IFL sympathies lay. Britain and France (among others) 
as well as the League of Nations – all, according to IFL, were controlled by Jews – were 
constantly berated by the IFL for not allying with Nazi Germany. As opposed to its own 
country, ‘Germany is no longer controlled by Jews, but by Germans and Germans are 
people of our own race, who we understand and can deal with as White men and 
equals’.654 The IFL depicted Hitler as a friend of Europe as he had defeated Jewish 
Bolshevism, therefore, preventing the takeover of the continent by alien forces. 
 
In April 1938, Leese wrote an article titled ‘Who Wants War? Only the Jews!’. In it, the 
IFL leader argued that Hitler’s invasion of Austria the previous month was not an act of 
aggression by Nazi Germany but an example of its passive foreign policy. The ‘Jew-
backed government’ of Austria was hell-bent on war, claimed Leese, but Hitler 
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‘marched straight in with overwhelming force, thereby preventing war’. Leese also 
stated that if any county defended Czechoslovakia – where all land belonged to ‘Jewish 
usurers’ – against a Nazi attack, ‘we shall see our duty clearly, and that is to oppose any 
Government which attempts it to the death. If it is necessary for British people to die for 
a cause, let it be in a righteous one’.655 If the IFL supported Hitler’s invasions of 
supposedly Jewish controlled countries then why would they not support Hitler in a war 
with Britain that, according to the IFL, was also run by Jews? The last sentence in ‘Race 
and Politics’ instructs readers that ‘In all political thought and action, let Race be the 
guide of his alliance’656 In the event of war between Britain and Germany the evidence 
suggests that the IFL favoured Britain’s foe over its own country: race over nation.  
 
In Britain, the IFL was identified as being a pro-Nazi movement. As well as the 
aforementioned reports, other examples of IFL pro-Nazi activity were commented on in 
the press. Newspapers reported on IFL representatives at Nuremberg giving fascist 
salutes after laying wreaths on the graves of German soldiers killed fighting in the First 
World War. They also covered ‘excited members’ shouting ‘Heil Hitler’ at anti-Jewish 
demonstrations’ in the UK.657 In the days leading up to the war, MPs discussed the ‘pro-
Nazi’ and ‘anti-British’ propaganda being spread by the IFL.658 Members did not 
attempt to hide their admiration for the German Chancellor. In September 1934, for 
example, the Portsmouth Evening News published a letter from ‘Imperial Fascist W’. In 
it, the writer stated that ‘I belong to an organization that has many similar views to 
Hitler, and we see eye to eye with most of his difficulties. We have first-hand details of 
conditions, what Hitler has to contend with in his fight to bring prosperity and peace to 
his country.’659 An anonymous reporter from the Eastbourne Gazette who had studied 
the movement summed up the general attitude towards the IFL in Britain: ‘Hitler is their 
God and Jew-hatred their gospel.’660 
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Other overseas fascist movements 
The IFL is an excellent example of the extent of transnational exchanges that occurred 
between fascists operating in various countries during the interwar period. Due to its 
zeal-like hatred of Jews and avid pro-Hitlerism, the IFL proved to be a popular 
movement for like-minded groups and individuals abroad. To them, Leese was an 
expert on the Jewish question, referring to himself as ‘a student of Jewry’, and The 
Fascist an authority on racial theory and Jewish (and anti-Jewish) activity.661 When his 
house was searched in the early stages of the war, police found ‘a complete name index 
of members of the Imperial Fascist League. Many countries of the world were 
represented in this index, and there is little doubt that Leese has a large and varied 
following’.662  
 
There is limited evidence as to the scope of relationships with fascists abroad (other 
than the Nazis) or how they began. However, occasional references in The Fascist and a 
small number of security service files provide an insight. Leese clearly set out to build a 
worldwide movement of ‘Aryans’ fighting for their race against the hated Jews who 
were hellbent on destroying it. He ‘hope[d] someday that all Racial Fascists will serve 
under the Swastika symbol’.663 These overseas contacts appear to have originated in a 
number of ways. Firstly, antisemitic individuals or groups abroad contacted the IFL 
directly after reading The Fascist. Secondly, antisemitic British nationals abroad who 
supported the IFL formed relationships with Jew-haters in their respective countries of 
residence. Thirdly, Leese approached antisemites whose activities were reported on in 
overseas newspapers of which he was an incessant reader. By the outbreak of war, 
Leese had created an impressive network of like-minded individuals and groups, all of 
them seeking to destroy Jewish influence.  
 
By the end of the thirties, Leese had successfully built strong relationships with ‘Jew-
fighters’ from across the global, mostly from English speaking countries. This resulted 
in a web of transnational activity. Pamphlets, books and periodicals were exchanged 
between the IFL and influential antisemites with many disseminating IFL propaganda. 
Perhaps the most notable was the IFL’s impact on Canadian Jew-haters, Adrian Arcand 
and William Whittaker, who regularly reprinted IFL material in their respective 
 
661 Police Report From Guildford, dated 28 August 1940, p. 1. 
662 Ibid., p. 2. 
663 ‘Public Mischief [Empire]’, The Fascist, October 1938, p. 3. 
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newspapers.664 Described by Leese as ‘one of the first World-Pioneers of the Aryan 
Racial movement against Jewish domination’, Arcand – the self-proclaimed ‘Canadian 
Führer’ – hero-worshipped both Leese and Beamish for their unswerving devotion to 
the spread of antisemitism, and considered the IFL an authority on the Jewish question, 
urging his adherents to read writings by Leese.665 In 1938, Leese was awarded 
‘honorary membership’ of Arcand’s movement, and the close relationship between the 
two continued into the post-war years in which Arcand sought to create an international 
far right built on common ideas.666  
 
Whittaker was equally impressed with the IFL. He described The Fascist as ‘an 
education’ and declared that there was ‘Nothing Kosher about The Imperial Fascists.’667 
In fact, Leese sent Beamish to ‘reinvigorate’ Whittaker’s Canadian Nationalist Party 
(CNA) in 1936 after the group had received a series of setbacks (i.e losing a defamation 
case in 1935).668 Beamish delivered a rabblerousing antisemitic speech at the Winnipeg 
Auditorium after which the CNA continued to function.669 Around 25 Jews turned up 
heckle Beamish and a fight broke out.670 As a result, The Jewish Post denounced the 
Jewish ‘mob’, warning them that ‘we cannot fight fire with fire’.671 On his death in 
1938, an obituary was published in its newspaper describing Whittaker as a long-time 
friend of the British movement.672 The IFL claimed that both these fascists had learnt 
their radicalism from them.673 The claim by Leese that ‘The Fascist has been packed 
with information which cannot be obtained anywhere else [and is an] accurate 
 
664 ‘Public Mischief [Empire]’; ‘The Fascist Outlook’, The Fascist, December 1934, p. 
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presentation of the real facts of international politics and economics’ was supported by 
his overseas counterparts.674  
 
Connections were also formed with fascists in non-English speaking nations. Besides 
the Nazis, relationships were created with Italian, French, Icelandic, Hungarian, 
Romanian and Norwegian fascists.675 The earliest overseas connection and, perhaps, the 
most interesting, other than with the Nazis, is with Norwegian fascists. In August 1931, 
the IFL received a letter from the long-running, rabidly antisemitic Norwegian 
newspaper, Nationalt Tidsskrift, edited by the Jew-hating typographer, Mikal Sylten. In 
it, Sylten praised the British movement for championing White supremacism and 
antisemitism.676 The IFL responded by advertising the Oslo-based ‘Fascist monthly’ in 
The Fascist the following month.677 The Norwegian paper printed names of known Jews 
in Norway and abroad, and Jewish foreign-owned businesses in Norway – the IFL did 
something similar with suspected Jews in Britain. When the Nazis captured Norway in 
1940, Sylten issued the representatives with the lists. The lists formed part of the 
German Gestapo’s systematic collection of material on Norwegian Jews.678 The IFL 
went on to establish links with Nasjonal Samling, a Norwegian nazi party – founded and 
led by the infamous Vidkun Quisling – active from 1933 to 1945 (and the only legal 
party of Norway from 1942 to 1945), sending it anti-war and antisemitic propaganda.679 
This included the ‘Jewish International Anthem’ in English with a Norwegian 
translation, a parody of ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’.680  
 
The IFL became a hub for transnational activity. To assist its Nordic friends, the 
movement sold their racialist propaganda in Britain. Material from Canada, South 
Africa, New Zealand, the United States and France was sold from IFL headquarters.681 
Leese made sure that the content was suitably White supremacist and antisemitic before 
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allowing it to be advertised in The Fascist. Despite the ‘frequently quoted’ IFL material 
included in the text, Leese refused to stock ‘The Case For Australians’ by W. G. Selkirk 
because the author had not fully awakened to racial ideas: ‘This effort from Australia is 
very encouraging; there is much valuable information in it on the World Jew Menace 
[…] But the author is not yet race-wise […] we cannot therefore stock this little 
book.’682 Any ‘fascist’ movement that does not adhere to racial discrimination, the IFL 
hoped would ‘die young’.683  
 
Leese was particularly impressed by the work of Arthur Nelson Field, a fanatical 
antisemite and far-right ideologue, from New Zealand. He saw Fields as a great inventor 
of antisemitic ideals. Field’s ‘best-selling’ Truth about the Slump (1931) and All These 
Things (1936) as well as the periodical Examiner, edited by the New Zealander, were 
sold by The Fascist.684 In fact, in his works, Fields acknowledges materials produced by 
Leese and the IFL.685 All These Things, seen by conspiracy theorists as a pioneering 
study on the development of the Jewish plot to take over the world, was described in 
The Fascist as ‘one of the greatest events […] on the side of the opposition to Jewish 
“economic” planning’.686 Quotations by Field are included in articles in The Fascist. 
For example, Leese quotes Field in a warning to readers: ‘“if you have no grip on the 
Jewish question, you have not begun to understand anything of what is happening 
before your eyes”’.687  
 
Marinus La Rooij has examined the relationship between ‘New Zealand’s most prolific 
anti-semitic agitator’ and like-minded people outside of New Zealand.688 He has 
claimed that thousands of copies of Fields books were sold outside of New Zealand in 
the interwar period including 2,000 copies of The Truth about the Slump by London-
based investment broker, Alexander Scrimgeour, to distribute among as many ‘patriot 
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p. 236.  
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written a further article on Field titled ‘Arthur Nelson Field: Kiwi Theoretician of the 
Australian Radical Right?’, Labour History 37 (2005).  
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persons as he knew’.689 It is conceivable that Scrimgeour found out about Field and his 
work by reading The Fascist and purchased the books from the IFL. Leese was more 
than happy to assist his kindred spirits, whoever they may be, in ‘driv[ing] a nail into 
the Jews’ coffin’.690  
 
Leese did not garner support in the Empire (or beyond) outside of the small circle of 
extreme antisemites and Nordic supremacists. Perhaps this is surprising given that 
Leese knew the empire well having spent a large part of his life there. A number of 
reasons may explain this. 1) Other countries had their own extremist fringes operating 
in them. Why would, for example, the Canadian public be interested in the IFL when 
they had two rabidly antisemitic movements of their own where contact and literature 
were easily accessible? 2) Due to their small membership and lack of visible impact, 
IFL attracted very little interest from newspapers abroad – newspapers were the largest 
outlet for information dissemination in the world at that time – therefore almost all of 
the people in the British colonies would have been unaware who Arnold Leese or the 
IFL was. 3) Certain countries like New Zealand and Australia had discriminatory 
immigration policies that excluded non-White migrants. This, therefore, reduced the 
need for non-‘nativist’ fascist imports. Furthermore, such politics was expressed in 
Australia by ‘nativist’-driven groups like the New Guard paramilitary militias after the 
First World War.  
 
Perhaps the main reason why Leese’s Imperial Fascist League drew so heavily on 
overseas influences, particularly from the Nazis later on, was that Leese (and his mentor 
Kitson) had such weak roots in the UK. Dependency on the ‘Protocols’, imported ideas 
of Jewish ‘money power’ and foreign Nazi precedents seem to show a transnational 
movement that lacked nativist roots, which probably contributed to its smallish 
membership. In that sense, transnational accounts for it as an import. That said, the IFL 
should not be seen as irrelevant to wider politics or society. To understand societies as a 
whole, the minor players have to be examined. The IFL, for example, had little impact 
on high politics or ‘mainstream’ society. Yet, its scientific brand of racism significantly 
influenced other far-right movements, particularly in the post-war period. Directly or 
indirectly, the IFL brought fear to the doorsteps of non-Whites and their communities, 
most notably Jews. 
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The IFL was arguably the most transnational of the case studies investigated in this 
thesis. The IFL’s transnationalism was similar to the BF and BUF’s in that it was 
heavily influenced by Italian Fascism and Nazism. However, what distinguished 
Leese’s movement from the others in this respect was its unadulterated adulation for 
Hitler, which is reflected in its literature and activities, and its ideological kinship with 
the Führer, which was based on Aryan supremacy and antisemitism; so much so that the 
IFL was the most respected of three British fascist movements by the Nazis. In addition, 
the IFL was the only case study investigated here to exhibit dislike (to put it mildly) for 
Mussolini and Italian Fascism, which it did for a large period of its lifetime. 
 
Although the IFL did not desire or attempt to expand its physical presence overseas, 
unlike the other two movements, which formed branches outside of the UK, it was 
possibly more influential than both of them on the transnational level through its paper-
based activities. Through his writings and dedication to the cause, Leese was considered 
an expert Jew-fighter by racialists and The Fascist an authority on the Jewish question. 
Because of this, Leese and his movement developed a large following among Aryan 
supremacists and ardent antisemites across the globe. As a result, the IFL formed 
relationships with many likeminded individuals and groups overseas, and it became a 
hub for the Aryan-supremacist movement. 
 
Even though Leese favoured a foreign power (i.e. Nazi Germany) over the UK 
government and political system, and supported a Nazi takeover of Britain, the IFL was 
an ultranationalist movement. It believed that Britain would benefit positively if 
National Socialism replaced its parliamentary democracy, and if Jews were eradicated 
from the country (and the planet), it would make for an incorruptible, prosperous place. 
This aim of revolution in order to achieve a national rebirth (palingenesis) is an integral 
element to Griffin’s fascist minimum. Therefore, the IFL fits Griffin’s minimum and 
should be considered fascist.   
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Chapter Three: ‘The Man Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune’1 
 
Mosley was a power-hungry dictator in waiting. Frustrated that his ambitious plans to 
solve unemployment in Britain were rejected by the political class of which he was a 
part, Mosley believed that the only way he would be able to force his will on the British 
people was through revolutionary means. Italian Fascism - with its strong leadership 
principle, low unemployment and Corporatism - was an ideal ideology to model his new 
movement on, replacing parliamentary democracy, which he grew to loath. Before its 
official inception, Mosley had incorporated the Fascist name, emblem, attire, salute and 
system of government into his new movement. 
 
During its existence, BUF transnationalism centred mainly on the quest for finances. To 
flourish, Mosley’s movements required vast sums of money, far more than they could 
muster in Britain. He saw the Fascist and Nazi regimes as not only natural allies of the 
BUF but also lucrative sources of income that were able to provide the funds required to 
grow his movement and thus create the fascist revolution in Britain that he craved. 
Initially, Mussolini ploughed millions of pounds in today’s money into the BUF in 
return for unconditional and wholehearted support from the movement. As a result, the 
BUF became obsessively pro-Fascist. The relationship dynamics are most evident in the 
BUF’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ campaign, which saw Mosley and his followers take 
to the streets and auditoriums of Britain to drum up public support to deter the country 
from interceding on behalf of Abyssinia after Italy invaded it (Britain was obliged to 
come to the aid of the African country under League of Nation rules). 
 
For the first half of its existence, Mosley played a delicate balancing act between Italian 
Fascism and German Nazism – who were involved in a power struggle to be the most 
powerful and prominent on the world stage – with the intention of obtaining funds from 
both. Antisemitism was a key ideological difference between the two regimes at the 
time – the Nazis were ardent Jew-haters, while the Fascists publicly decried the 
discrimination. The BUF, keen to court them both, was in a quandary over how to 
navigate the Jewish question so not to alienate either of the powers, and a review of the 
BUF’s literature uncovers this. The BUF only fully committed to antisemitism publicly 
 
1 Quote by the BUF’s Director of Political Organisation, F.M. Box, who was aware of 
overseas payments to Mosley: TNA HO 144/20145, ‘Report to the Home Office’, 23 
October 1935, (12–13). 
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when Mussolini’s funding was due to stop. Then, through its commitment to Jew-hatred 
and Hitler worship, Mosley was determined to curry favour with the Nazis, who later 
provided funds and other benefits to the BUF.           
 
Of the many fascist organisations in British history, the vast majority of academic 
attention has focused on the British Union of Fascists (BUF). From the early post-war 
period to contemporary times, a wealth of local and regional case studies have been 
written spanning the breadth of the country (Scotland to Devon).2 This follows the 
traditions established by historians of the Labour party, popular radicalism, and the 
broader British left, with which some of this work intersects and where the interest lies 
in charting the local dimension to broader platform movements. These were very much 
micro-level case studies deriving from local studies which were popular from the 1950s 
onwards in economic and social approaches to the British past. For example, Asa Briggs 
Chartist Studies (1959) argued the case for the priority of the local case study in 
understanding political movements from below through the locality in which they were 
embedded. This spawned a whole industry of case studies about radicalism and the 
 
2 For example, John Brewer, Mosley’s Men: The British Union of Fascists in the West 
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South-West Essex, 1933–1940 (London, 1996); Andrew Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East 
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Thesis: University of Sheffield, 1999); C. J. F. Morley, ‘Fascist Promise and the 
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(Master’s thesis: university unspecified, 1982 – copy held at the Wiener Library, 
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Economic and Political Change’, (PhD Thesis: University of Bradford, 1981); Nigel 
Todd, In Excited Times: The People Against The Blackshirts (Newcastle upon Tyne, 
1995); Gordon Stridiron, Blackshirts in Geordieland (London, 2013); Philip Coupland, 
‘The Blackshirts in Northampton, 1933–1940’, Northamptonshire Past and Present 53 
(2000); Todd Gray, Blackshirts in Devon (Exeter, 2006); Stephen Cullen, ‘Another 
Nationalism: The British Union of Fascists in Glamorgan, 1932–40’, The Welsh History 
Review 17:1 (1994), pp. 101–114; Henry Maitles, ‘Blackshirts Across the Border: The 
British Union of Fascists in Scotland’, The Scottish Historical Review 82:213 (2003); 
Stephen Cullen, ‘The British Union of Fascists in Scotland’, Proceedings of the 
Association of Scottish Historical Studies (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 116–123; Liz 
Kibblewhite & Andrew Rigby, Fascism in Aberdeen: Street Politics in the 1930s 
(Aberdeen, 1978). 
159 
 
early Labour party.3 In addition to the more localised work, national membership and 
support have also been of interest.4 Fresher perspectives have focused on the party’s 
ideology. Its vision for a corporate state, attitude towards antisemitism and the leader’s 
philosophy are all areas of interest to historians.5 Expert on British fascism, Richard 
Thurlow claims that the BUF was ‘intellectually the most coherent and rational of all 
the parties in Europe’.6  
 
The BUF has also attracted examination from a cultural viewpoint. The party’s vision 
for a theatrical and musical renaissance, the meanings and functions of the movement’s 
political uniform and the Blackshirts’ leisure time have all enriched this cultural 
approach.7  In addition, Mosley’s movement has appeared in popular fiction. For 
 
3 Asa Briggs, Chartist Studies (London, 1959). The point is adroitly made in Shelton 
Stromquist, ‘Claiming Political Space: Workers, Municipal Socialism, and the 
Reconstruction of Local Democracy in Transnational Perspective’, in Leon Fink (ed.), 
Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History (Oxford, 
2011), pp. 303–328. 
4 David Shermer, Blackshirts: Fascism in Britain (New York, 1971); G.C. Webber, 
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Contemporary History 19:4 (1984), pp. 575–606; Martin Pugh, Hurrah for the 
Blackshirts! Fascists and Fascism in Britain Between the Wars (London, 2005); 
Stephen Dorril, Black Shirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London, 2006). 
5 Gary Love, ‘“What’s the Big Idea?”: Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists 
and Generic Fascism’, Journal of Contemporary History 42:3 (2007); Bret Rubin, ‘The 
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British Fascist Antisemitism and Jewish Responses, 1932–1940 (London, 2015). 
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Culture of Fascism: Visions of the Far Right in Britain (London, 2004); Helen Pussard, 
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example, Tarzan and the Blackshirt (2016), a juvenile fiction novel by Andy Croft, tells 
the story of how a budding friendship turns to hate when, Irish boy, Alf, joins the 
Blackshirts much to the horror of his Jewish friend, Sam. Set in London’s East End in 
the 1930s, it tackles issues such as racial tension, gang crime and right-wing 
antagonism.8 The movement was even subject to several spoofs. Diana Mitford’s oldest 
sister, the famously left-wing and vociferous opponent of fascism, Nancy, wrote a 
satirical novel Wigs on the Green (1935) in which she mocked the BUF as ‘the Union 
Jackshirts’ led by the Poor Old Führer ‘Colonel Jack’ (Mosley). Unsurprisingly, the 
book deeply offended both Mosley and Diana.9 An even more humorous imitation was 
the comic fiction writer P.G Wodehouse’s The Code of the Wooster (1938). Wodehouse 
poked fun at Mosley, as ‘Roderick Spode’, and his ‘Black Shorts’, who went around 
shouting ‘Heil Spode’.10 Interestingly, associate professor and author of Fascism and 
Anti-Fascism in Twentieth-Century British Fiction, Judy Suh has argued that much 
middlebrow British fiction, despite its reputation for non-political content, theorised the 
rise and fall of fascism from the 1930s to 1960s.11 According to Suh, anti-fascist 
counterstrategies were firmly located within middlebrow genres associated with women 
writers (such as domestic fiction, melodrama, country house novels, and family sagas). 
The party has also been the focus of several pictorial books.12 
 
The BUF has prompted several other modes of investigation. For example, Martin 
Durham and Julie Gottlieb have examined the role of women in British fascism, largely 
concerning themselves with Mosely’s organisation.13 According to Mosley, the BUF 
 
8 Andy Croft, Tarzan and the Blackshirt (Nottingham, 2016).  
9 Nancy Mitford, Wigs on the Green (unknown, 1935).  
10 P.G. Wodehouse, The Code of the Wooster (unknown, 1938). During the Second 
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had ‘been largely built up by the fanaticism of women […] Without women I could not 
have got a quarter of the way’.14 He declared that his party had a higher percentage of 
women candidates than any other.15 Although the percentage of women that made up 
the membership is unknown, approximations by scholars are between a fifth and a 
third.16 Of fascist imperial policy in interwar Britain, the BUF has commanded the most 
attention. Liam Liburd has claimed that the BUF was an outlet for ‘unreconstructed 
imperialism’. He argued that the essential ingredient to Mosley’s vision of a fascist 
rebirth was the imperial ‘new fascist man’ carved out of the legacy of earlier 
imperialists.17 In his article ‘The Pivot of Empire’, Evan Smith examines the BUF’s 
attempt to build a ‘New Empire Union’. This, he argued, demonstrates that pro-
imperialism was central to the ideology of the BUF.18 The mass of academic work on 
the fascists has prompted research on their arch-nemeses antifascism, significant 
political events revolving around the Blackshirts and more obscure subjects such as 
farming and ecology.19 
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14 Quote from the interrogation that followed his arrest in 1940: TNA HO 283/14, Notes 
of Hearing: Second Day, 3 July 1934 (101). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Fascism in Britain, p. 96; The British Union of Fascists, 1932–1940, p. 47; Women 
and Fascism, p. 36. 
17 Liam Liburd, ‘Beyond the Pale: Whiteness, Masculinity and Empire in the British 
Union of Fascists, 1932–1940’, Fascism 7:2, pp. 275–276. 
18 Ewan Smith, ‘The Pivot of Empire: Australia and the Imperial Fascism of the British 
Union of Fascists’, History Australia 14:3 (2017). 
19 In Excited Times; Tony Kushner & Nadia Valman, Remembering Cable Street: 
Fascism and Anti-fascism in British Society (Elstree, 1999); Nigel Copsey & Andrzej 
Olechnowicz (eds.), Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in the Inter-War Period 
(Basingstoke, 2010); chapter titled ‘Opposing the British Union of Fascists’ in Keith 
Hodgson, Fighting Fascism: The British Left and the Rise of Fascism, 1919–39 
(Manchester, 2014); chapter titled ‘Opposition to Fascism 1936–45’ in Nigel Copsey, 
Anti-Fascism in Britain (Abingdon, 2000); Philip Coupland, Farming, Fascism and 
Ecology: A Life of Jorian Jenks (Abingdon, 2016). Jenks joined the British Union of 
Fascists, becoming one of the Blackshirts’ leading figures. As with Mosley, he was 
imprisoned without trial during the war. 
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Included in the immense amount of literature on the BUF is the party’s flamboyant and 
charismatic leader, Sir Oswald Mosley, who ‘probably had the greatest intellectual gifts 
[…] of all the fascist chiefs’.20 The leader himself appears to have instigated academic 
research into his colourful life by releasing his autobiography, My Life, in 1968. Shortly 
after, in his controversial biography Oswald Mosley, Robert Skidelsky published a 
sympathetic portrayal of Mosley and his political escapades. Today, biographies are still 
being published by authors attempting to investigate issues such as the ‘true nature of 
Mosley’s relationship with the Nazis and to challenge the prevailing view of Mosley’s 
descent into anti-Semitism’, and to demonstrate the ways in which ‘Britain’s home-
grown fascist icon remained a committed, unrepentant fascist and anti-Semite until his 
final days’.21 In 1998, Channel 4 aired a controversial biopic on the fascist leader titled 
‘Mosley’. The release of My Life also prompted an array of autobiographies by those 
close to Mosley.22 His wife Diana and his son Nicholas have told their life stories, as 
have prominent disciples of Mosley such as Richard Bellamy, Jeffrey Hamm, John 
Charnley, Robert Saunders and Nellie Driver.23 Active antifascists of the time have also 
written of their resistance to the Blackshirts. 24 All of these works have a significant 
focus on Sir Oswald. 
 
Despite the BUF ‘arguably receiv[ing] more retrospective notice and [being] the subject 
of more painstaking historical analysis than its impact on the 1930s alone might merit’, 
 
20 Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London, 2005), p. 75. 
21 These include Matthew Worley, Oswald Mosley and the New Party (Basingstoke, 
2010); David Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society, 1931–
81 (Manchester, 1987); Nigel Jones, Mosley (London, 2005); Black Shirt – first quote 
from cover; Graham Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the 
Resurrection of British Fascism after 1945 (London, 2007) – second quote from cover. 
22 For a critical view of the film and subsequent debate with the executive producer, see 
‘Mitch Mitchell on Oswald Mosley’, YouTube, 
[www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tng3le4ZKwk], accessed 2 July 2019. 
23 Diana Mosley, A Life of Contrasts (London, 1977), and Loved Ones: Pen Portraits 
(London, 1985); Nicholas Mosley, Memoirs of Sir Oswald Mosley and Family: Rules of 
the Game and Beyond the Pale (London 1994); John Charnley, Blackshirts and Roses 
(London, 2012); Jeffrey Hamm, Mosley’s Blackshirts: The Inside Story of the British 
Union of Fascists, 1932–1940 (London, 2013); Richard Bellamy, We Marched with 
Mosley – The Authorised History of the British Union of Fascists (London, 2013); 
Robert Saunders, A Tiller of Several Soils (unpublished, 1946); Nellie Driver, From the 
Shadows of Exile (unpublished, undated). 
24 Morris Beckman, The 43 Group: Battling with Mosley’s Blackshirts New Edition 
(Stroud, 2013). 
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several factors may explain the fascination with Mosley and his party.25 The periodic 
releasing of previously confidential files relating to British fascism, with large sections 
devoted, directly or indirectly, to the BUF and Mosley have brought more light to the 
field and continue to stimulate debate. During the 1980s and especially the 1990s, a 
wealth of documentary evidence was released by the Home Office on the activities of 
Mosley and his cohorts’ in the interwar period. More recently, the British Security 
Service has released files on the BUF’s funding arrangements, available at the Public 
Record Office in Kew, and a number of universities and libraries have established 
special collections that house primary material relating to fascism.26  Furthermore, BUF 
newspapers and other relevant materials have been digitised by a number of online 
research companies. UK Press Online, for example, hosts the ‘Mosley Press Personal’ 
package, which features complete collections of Action, Blackshirt, and Fascist Week. 
While, the British Online Archives house the ‘The British Union of Fascists: 
newspapers and secret files, 1933–1951’ collection, which includes Action, Blackshirt, 
Fascist Week and The East End London Pioneer, as well as government files relating to 
Oswald and Diana Mosley.27 This, therefore, makes original research easier for 
historians (and future scholars) to undertake.  
 
Although Mosley and his men have dominated scholarship in this area, several other 
lesser-known individuals and groups have occupied a small but important fraction of the 
plethora of literature on interwar British fascism. A recent biography of William Joyce, 
better known as ‘Lord Haw Haw’, by Colin Holmes, challenges existing works that 
focus on the Nazi propagandist, which have reflected not only Joyce’s frequent 
calculated deceptions, but also the suspect claims advanced by his family, friends and 
apologists.28 Holmes’ work, alongside David Baker’s biography of A.K Chesterton, 
 
25 Gottlieb & Linehan, ‘Introduction: Culture and the British Far Right’ in The Culture 
of Fascism, p. 1. 
26 These include the universities of Sheffield, Southampton, Birmingham and Bradford; 
libraries such as the Weiner Library, the British Library, and the LSE Library; and 
archives, such as the London Metropolitan Archives. 
27 www.ukpressonline.co.uk/ukpressonline/open/services.jsp; 
www.microform.digital/boa/collections/9/the-british-union-of-fascists-newspapers-and-
secret-files-1933-1951. 
28 Searching for Lord Haw-Haw; Mary Kenny, Germany Calling: A Personal 
Biography of William Joyce Lord Haw-Haw (Stillorgan, 2003); Nigel Farndale, Haw-
Haw: The Tragedy of William and Margaret Joyce (London, 2005); Peter Martland, 
Lord Haw Haw: The English Voice of Nazi Germany (Crawley, 2003); Francis Selwyn, 
Hitler’s Englishman: Crime of Lord Haw-Haw (Abingdon, 1987). 
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uncovers a variety of responses to the rise of Nazism from within the BUF. More 
recently, Henry Hamilton Beamish, John Beckett and Henry Williamson have also been 
the focus of books, while a limited amount of scholarly attention has been directed to 
the Britons, the British Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist League.29  
 
Another admirer of the Italian dictator was the British aristocrat and prominent 
politician of the time, Mosley himself. This chapter will examine the transnational 
aspects of the British Union of Fascists (BUF). Its leader, Oswald Mosley, was the most 
intelligent, charming and well connected of all his counterparts, while the BUF was by 
far the most prominent, successful and best supported far-right group in interwar Britain 
– considerably more so than the British Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist League. For 
these reasons, the BUF commands continued scholarly attention.  
 
The chapter is divided into a number of sections. It begins by analysing Mosley’s pre-
BUF years. Unlike Arnold Leese, Mosley may not have been, what some academics 
term, a ‘transnational personality’. However, he did have a history of cross-border 
activities. The transnational influences that Mosley adopted, based largely on 
economics, laid the groundwork for his eventual conversion to fascism. In addition, 
accusations from his contemporaries about his continental dictatorial leanings were 
commonplace before his fascist inception. Then, the BUF’s vision of a corporate state is 
examined. The BUF’s economic and political model was significantly influenced by the 
Italian system, but it also had its own idiosyncratic elements. In fact, in many ways, it 
was more advanced than the Italian Corporate State. Attention then turns to how Mosley 
 
29 David Baker, Ideology of Obsession: A.K.Chesterton and British Fascism (London, 
1996); Guy Yates, Henry Williamson: The Artist As Fascist (independently published, 
2017); Nick Toczek, Haters, Baiters and Would-Be Dictators: Anti-Semitism and the 
UK Far Right (Abingdon, 2015); Francis Beckett, Fascist in the Family: The Tragedy of 
John Beckett M.P. (Abingdon, 2016); Graham Macklin, ‘The Two Lives of John 
Hooper Harvey’, Patterns of Prejudice 42:2 (2008); John Morell, ‘Arnold Leese and the 
Imperial Fascist League: The Impact of Racial Fascism’, in Kenneth Lunn & Richard 
Thurlow (eds.), British Fascism: Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain 
(London 1980); chapter titled ‘The Arrival of Fascism: The British Fascisti and the 
Imperial Fascist League’ in British Fascism, 1918–1939; chapter titled ‘Fascist 
Movements, Anti-Semitism and Germany’ in Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the 
Right (London, 2010); chapters titled ‘Boy Scout Fascism’ and ‘Boiled Shirt Fascism’ 
in Hurrah For The Blackshirts!; chapter titled ‘The British Fascists and the ‘‘Jew 
Wise’’, 1918–1939’ in Fascism in Britain; Paul Stocker, ‘Importing Fascism: 
Reappraising the British Fascisti, 1923–1926’, Contemporary British History 30:3 
(2016); James Loughlin, ‘Rotha Lintorn-Orman, Ulster and the British Fascist 
Movement’, Immigrants & Minorities 32:1 (2014).  
165 
 
courted Mussolini from the outset in an attempt to not only create solidarity and 
brotherhood between the Italian Fascists and the BUF but also to extract financial 
support. Eventually, Mussolini agreed to fund the BUF in exchange for unequivocal 
support. Perhaps the most telling example of this agreement is the transnational 
dimension behind the BUF’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ campaign, which aimed at 
keeping Britain out of conflicts with Fascist powers. This, along with a number of other 
examples, demonstrates that the BUF did not just stop its activity at British shores. 
Following this, sections on BUF branches abroad and BUF imperial policy are 
investigated. Finally, the section titled ‘courting the Nazis’ examines the impact Hitler 
and his Nazi movement had on the BUF. By examining the party’s literature and 
speeches, declassified Home Office reports, mainstream media outlets and eyewitness 
accounts, it is clear that the BUF was significantly funded, inspired and aided by 
overseas fascist movements. Accordingly, this chapter will argue that the BUF was part 
of a transnational movement. 
 
Pre-BUF 
Scholars such as Thurlow have insisted that the BUF (and all British fascist groups) 
grew out of its own national traditions. Undoubtedly, the national scene contributed to 
the formation of the British movement. However, important overseas connections and 
influences are often overlooked.30 Radical economic policies had been part of Mosley’s 
remedy for combatting unemployment in Britain since before his first election contest. 
In his 1918 election manifesto, he insisted that ‘High wages must be maintained. This 
can only be achieved by high production based on increased efficiency and 
organisation. A high standard of life must be ensured by a minimum wage and reduced 
hours, which are proved to increase rather than curtail production’ and therefore create 
jobs.31 Unsurprisingly, as his time in politics grew and he matured, Mosley’s thinking 
developed. As he explained in his autobiography, ‘my economic thinking was first 
 
30 For example, despite Mosley dedicating a whole chapter of his autobiography to his 
American industrial fact-seeking tour, Thurlow does not mention it; Pugh contributed 
one sentence to it; his son, Nicholas, devoted approximately half a page of his near 600-
page biography on Mosley to the tour, claiming simply that it gave support to his 
father’s proposals. 
31 Keith Laybourn (ed.), Modern Britain Since 1906: A Reader (London, 1999), p. 181; 
Oswald Mosley, ‘A Soldier M.P’ (1918), in Michael Quill (ed.), Revolution by Reason 
and Other Essays by Oswald Mosley (New York, 1997). 
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developed by a study of Keynes more in conversation with him than in reading his early 
writings, for he did not write General Theory until the thirties’.32 
 
Examination of contemporary newspapers, writings of those close to Mosley and 
Mosley himself suggest that Mosley was a transnational actor before his turn towards 
fascism. As he also noted, besides Keynes, his trip to the US over the winter of 1925–
1926 significantly influenced his economic thinking. According to Mosley, the primary 
purpose of the trip was to study industry and to meet those who created it. He visited 
almost every industrial centre of America and, by his own admission, learned a lot from 
these experiences. These experiences ranged from going down coal mines in Pittsburgh 
to analysing the pig culling trade in Chicago and in Sears Roebuck’s mail order 
business. One of the most interesting experiences of his life was, he claimed, his visit to 
the Ford factory in Detroit. Here he saw his vision for a demand side, high wage 
economy in action: ‘Mass production for a large and assured home market is the 
industrial key’. This only reinforced his desire for a similar strategy in Britain.33  
 
Another ‘new fact’ struck him while at Ford, resulting in his rejection of classic 
economic teachings. He saw the exploitation of ‘backward’ immigrant labour. These 
‘primitive […and] illiterate’ types were performing the simplest of factory tasks 
(turning screws and fixing bolts) which ‘normal labour’ found too monotonous. 
Consequently, they were leaving the factory in droves. He related this situation to the 
cotton industry of Lancashire and the woollen trade of Yorkshire of which India, Hong 
Kong, Japan and China ‘knocked out our traditional trades with rationalised machinery, 
supplied by our English counties for their own destruction in open competition on the 
world and even on the British market’. Later, in a Pittsburgh factory, he experienced the 
opposite. A small number of highly skilled workers were operating modern machinery. 
This, in turn, resulted in unemployment for the many less or unskilled workers. He 
believed the future of the world market lay in these US factories. Therefore, ‘One thing 
 
32 Oswald Mosley, My Life (London, 2006 /original 1968), p. 150. The Keynesian 
principle was for a planned economy. For Keynes’s seminar work, see John Keynes, 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London, 1936) [Penguin Books 
have released a recent reprint]. For excellent scholarship on Keynes, see Robert 
Skidelsky’s three-volume biography (1983, 1992 & 2000).  
33 My Life, see section ‘Roosevelt and American Industry’, pp. 163–176. 
167 
 
was clear: those grave problems could not be left to settle themselves,’ the state needed 
to intervene.34   
 
Another positive Mosley discovered during the tour was how the private enterprise 
corporation worked successfully as a non-profit entity. The Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company of New York, for example, had no profit motive. Mosley explained that the 
management was salaried only so the twelve-million policyholders benefited 
handsomely. Many of the poorest immigrants were well looked after from the moment 
they entered American shores through to their ‘well-provided’ funerals.35 Although 
Mosley did not explicitly say it, his apparent enthusiasm for the scheme, which he later 
berated Britain for not considering, leads one to think he would have favoured the 
introduction of a similar scheme in Britain to assist those in squalor.  
 
However, what appears to have impressed him the most during the trip were the 
‘brilliant’ economists who sat on the Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve 
(formed in 1913) is (still) the foundation and guarantor of the US central banking 
system. It was created as a central body to control the nation’s monetary system, with 
the aim of avoiding economic crises. Mosley described the Board’s officials as ‘the best 
brains in America…[and] they surpassed anyone he saw in American politics.’ 
According to Mosley, they were fully informed on Keynesian thinking and were 
intending to apply similar techniques to the American economy (although were later 
refrained from doing so by politicians). When assessing the background of his economic 
thinking and subsequent action, Mosley rates Keynes and those on the Federal Reserve 
Board as ‘fifty-fifty’ influences.36 Following his return to Britain, Mosley wrote an 
article titled ‘Is America a Capitalist Triumph?’ Here, he suggested, the ‘America 
technique’ could hold the key to increased growth which, in turn, should eliminate 
poverty and unemployment. He championed the ‘amazing feats of mass production’ and 
claimed high wages was the ‘thinking medicine with which we must dose British 
industry’.37 The American journey had ‘completed the period of experience in my early 
 
34 Ibid., pp. 169–170. 
35 Ibid., p. 175. 
36 Ibid., pp. 174–175. 
37 Oswald Mosley, ‘Is America a Capitalist Triumph?’, New Leader, 2 April 1926. 
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life’.38 Throughout the remainder of the twenties, Mosley worked on and promoted his 
radical economic policies. 
 
His turn to fascism began to appear after his resignation from the Labour Government 
in May 1930 following its refusal to adopt his ambitious state-sponsored reforms to 
address the challenge of rising unemployment.39 Following his resignation, Mosley 
proposed even further state intervention and, crucially, an overhaul of the parliamentary 
system, which isolated him further from party and government. In July, he attacked the 
‘Parliamentary machine’, which ‘was designed in the old, easy-going days, when 
politics were not filled with stark reality, and when they were to a large extent a game 
between “ins and outs”’. ‘Today’, he argued, ‘the Government [has] the great dynamic 
age bearing down upon them, they must have a machine with which they could do the 
job’.40 At a luncheon given by the Association of British Manufactures for the Printing 
and Allied Trades in Holborn in late October, Mosley announced his desire to transform 
the ‘nineteenth-century debating chamber’ into a ‘twentieth-century business 
assembly’.41 He suggested that the Government should work as a board of directors and 
Parliament should be the shareholders.42 The following month, he published a new 
memorandum in which he wrote  
 
a movement which aims not merely at the capture of political power, [but] grips 
and transforms every phase and aspect of national life to post-war purposes; a 
movement of order, of discipline, of loyalty, but also of dynamic progress; a 
movement of iron decision, resolution and reality; a movement which cuts like a 
sword through the knot of the past to the winning of the modern state.43 
 
 
38 My Life, p. 176. 
39 In the run-up to the election, Labour promised to tackle long-term unemployment in 
the staple industries. Joblessness was the defining issue of the day, and Ramsey 
MacDonald’s party had been elected on the promise to conquer unemployment. For 
more on his resignation, see the article titled ‘Unemployment’, The Times, 21 May 
1930, p. 16. 
40 ‘Sir O. Mosley on Parliament’, The Times, 21 July 1930, p. 14. 
41 Cited in Robert Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain (London, 1972), p. 65. 
42 ‘Sir O. Mosley on “A New Situation”’, The Times, 30 October 1930, p. 9.  
43 Oswald Mosley, ‘Untitled Memorandum’, 19 November 1930: cited in Oswald 
Mosley and the New Party, p. 6.  
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He followed the memorandum with a call for ‘decisive policy and action – An 
immediate policy is required, more drastic and determined than any policy yet by 
Government […] we want action now’.44  
 
Consequently, newspapers began drawing parallels with Mosley and Hitler and 
Mussolini. The Daily Worker, once a supporter of Mosley’s form of socialism, attacked 
him for dropping socialism for fascism. They branded him an enemy of the working 
class and claimed ‘Mosley-Mussolini [would give] Parliament the sack, abolish 
unemployment benefit and put a 20 per cent, import duty on wheat, [and] no one may 
strike against it!’ The paper suggested that such strikers would either be shot or 
imprisoned.45 The Daily Worker described Mosley as ‘Something of a Hitler’ because 
of his ‘demagogic and anti-Socialist’ rhetoric.46 Similarly, The Manchester Guardian 
considered Mosley a potential Hitler of the Labour Party: ‘The parallel is not so absurd 
as it sounds, for […] resemblance might be found between the crude aspirations of the 
“Nazis” and the new Socialist Imperialism to its own Imperative needs, to which Sir 
Oswald Mosley is drifting’.47 The Daily Express stressed that Mosley ‘visualises a 
political dictatorship’.48 Similarly, the Spectator commented   
 
A few years ago […] he was pledged to the “nationalization of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange.” To-day the Utopia, desirable or 
otherwise, of State ownership, has faded over the horizon: he is thinking, like a 
practical politician, of our present emergencies and of “desperate remedies.” 
State control and supervision, on the War-time scale, he is prepared for in Peace 
time; and a Peace Cabinet with the powers and the vigour of a War Cabinet. 
There are elements of Fascism in his thoughts to-day.49    
  
Those close to Mosley also observed his authoritarian rhetoric. George Catlin, once his  
researcher, later claimed that Mosley responded to his own ineffective Labour 
conference speech of October 1930 by declaring to those sharing the same hotel as him 
 
44 ‘“We Want Action”’, Daily Worker, 11 December 1930, p. 3.  
45 ‘Act is Based on Tory’, Daily Worker, 23 December 1930, p. 1.  
46 ‘A British Hitler’, Daily Worker, 9 October 1930, p. 1; ‘Something of a Hitler’, 21 
October 1930, p. 3. 
47 ‘British Hitler’, The Manchester Guardian, 8 October 1930, p. 5.  
48 ‘The Prime Minister as “An Outsider’, Daily Express, 6 December 1930, p. 9. 
49 ‘Sir Oswald Mosley by “Amrcus”’, Spectator, 28 February 1931, p. 15. Other 
newspapers that drew parallels with Mosley and Hitler and Mussolini included: Daily 
Telegraph, 8 December 1930; New Statesman, 13 December 1930, pp. 292–3; 
‘Moslini’, Punch, 17 December 1930; W. Rust, ‘The Mosley Manifesto’, Labour 
Monthly, January 1931; Time and Tide, 21 February 1931. 
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that ‘this means dictatorship!’50 The previous month, the former Tory MP, Cuthbert 
Headlam, wrote in his diary that Mosley ‘professes a policy which he thinks would 
enable him to become an English Mussolini’.51 Refuting the allegations by claiming that 
this was ‘exactly the opposite of what I have in mind’, Mosley explained how he had 
‘merely suggested introducing into parliament the methods of twentieth-century 
business instead of the methods of a nineteenth-century debating society’.52 The 
aforementioned examples suggest that Mosley was conceived as either a fascist or at the 
very least on the road to becoming one before his ‘official’ venture into fascism 
sometime later.  
 
Besides fascism, it appears that Mosley was also taking an interest in Communism. In 
early 1930, he observed the ‘rationalisation’ being undertaken with ‘“peculiar intensity 
by Communist Russia”.’53 Later that year, in a bid to impress her husband, Cynthia 
Mosley secured an audience with the exiled Soviet politician, Leon Trotsky, who she 
sought inspiration from. In her letter to the man who facilitated the transfer of all 
political power to the Soviets, she told of her admiration for Trotsky and described his 
book as one of the most inspirational she had read. This ‘great’ man, she declared, was 
‘one of the enduring figures of our age’.54 In a letter to her husband, she marvelled at 
the ‘queer intangible new spirit’ of Russia where everyone was equal and no class 
structure existed.55 She also dismissed reports of poor health and living conditions as 
‘bunk from beginning to end’.56 Around this time, his close friend and governmental 
private secretary, John Strachey, who Mosley described as ‘One of my close political 
associates […] [and] one of the best analytical and critical intelligences I have ever 
known’, was also touring Russia.57 Sympathetic to Communism, Strachey thought 
 
50 George Catlin, For God’s Sake Go (London, 1972), p. 85. 
51 Stuart Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald: The 
Headlam Diaries, 1923–35 (Cambridge, 1992), 25–28 September 1930. 
52 Cited in Oswald Mosley and the New Party, p. 153. 
53 ‘Socialist Rationalisation’, Daily Worker, 27 February 1931, p. 6. 
54 Letter from Cynthia Mosley to Trotsky, in Nicholas Mosley, Memoirs of Sir Oswald 
Mosley and Family; Rules of the Game and Beyond the Pale (London 1994), p. 161.  
55 Letter from Cynthia Mosley to Oswald Mosley, in Memoirs of Sir Oswald Mosley 
and Family, p. 164.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Oswald Mosley, My Life (London, 2006 /original 1968), pp. 34 &155. Strachey was a 
frequent visitor to Russia. He had also visited in 1928. Mosley was the best man at his 
wedding.  
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Britain should seek a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.58 Undoubtedly, Mosley 
was interested to hear his wife and best friend’s experiences. What appears clear is that 
Mosley, frustrated by his failure to have his radical economic proposals accepted by 
government and his party, was taking an active interest in European political systems 
that wholeheartedly rejected democracy.  
     
Frustrated by his party’s refusal to adopt his radical plan, Mosley quit Labour, turned 
his back on the ‘old gang’ of mainstream politicians, and, with a number of other 
dissidents, formed the New Party on 1 March 1931.59 The New Party’s programme, the 
Mosley Manifesto, was built on the leader’s ideas. Mosley believed that he had 
sufficient support in parliament and across the country to overthrow the status quo and 
implement the ideas that had previously been rejected by his peers. He was adamant 
about turning the House of Commons from a ‘talk-shop to a work shop’. Mosley 
became more outspoken in his attempts to undermine and challenge parliamentary 
democracy. For Mosley, Britain’s move from a great industrial centre to the present 
parliament was ‘like going from one world to another’, complaining of the latter’s 
refusal to modernise in the world. Since the First World War, Mosley declared, the great 
measures needed to satisfy the people had been ‘beaten’ by the ‘talking shop’ at 
Westminster. At the formation of his New Party, he stressed that the country was on 
‘the road to disaster’. In contrast, he guaranteed that his policy challenged the position 
of all parties and the traditions of the British political system.60  
  
Throughout the year, the New Party moved closer to a fascist model. The Daily Worker 
was adamant that Mosley’s new movement was fascist from the outset: ‘The policy of 
the “New Party” is such a mixture of Fascism and demagogy that Sir Oswald has not 
been able to find a name to describe it: its present title is obviously only a stop-gap.’61 
The party’s policy, according to the paper, was for ‘Parliament to go into the 
background in favour of economic councils and investment boards – like Mussolini’s 
“Syndical” organisation’ of which the ‘inner Cabinet’ of five or six ministers will be a 
 
58 John Strachey, ‘Lest we forget, peace with Russia’, New Leader, 3 November 1929. 
59 Mosley explains at length his annoyance at the Labour Party for refusing to 
implement his plan in My Life, chapter ‘Resignation’.  
60 Oswald Mosley, A National Policy: an Account of The Emergency Programme 
Advanced by Sir Oswald Mosley M.P (London, 1931), p. 7.  
61 ‘Mosley Forms New Party’, Daily Worker, 2 March 1931, p. 1. 
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‘dictatorship’. The Daily Worker considered the movement ‘Pure Fascism’.62 Even New 
Party founding members, who denounced fascism, began to notice Mosley’s drive 
towards a more continental movement. In June, Strachey and Allan Young, who both 
desired wholesale economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union, were 
aghast to hear Mosley announce his vision for a Corporate State.63 They were 
‘squirming impatiently’ while listening to Mosley speak ‘soulfully of the Corporate 
State of the future’.64 As Matthew Worley has claimed, ‘Mosley’s embrace of the 
corporate state had already brought him ever closer to Mussolini’s Italian model.’65 The 
following month, a number of members – including Young and Strachey – resigned 
from the party, citing the ‘growing fascist tendencies in the party’ of which they had 
been unable to prevent.66 When analysing the New Party, the Daily Worker observed 
how ‘The Fascist outlook and character […] is becoming more and more manifest.’67 
 
Many of Mosley’s followers in the New Party also indulged in foreign affairs. As 
already noted, Strachey and Young took a keen interested in Communism. However, 
key figures such as the Sitwell brothers – Osbert and Sacheverell – were Italophiles and 
Cecil Melville favoured Nazi politics.68 For his part, the diarist and confidante of 
Mosley, Harold Nicolson attended Anglo-German meetings and pursued diplomats and 
journalists from the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Italian Lavoro Fascista to educate 
himself on continental political practices.69 Delegates travelled to Germany with 
instructions from Mosley to bring back information on the Nazis and study their 
methods and their organisation.70 Importantly, another Mosley confidante, Robert 
Lockhart, claimed that Mosley was ‘very interested in Hitlerism and has made a close 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 ‘Workless Give New Party a Rough Passage’, Daily Worker, 3 August 1931, p. 1; 
Strachey & Alan Young Blow the Gaff’, Daily Worker, 31 August 1931, p. 3. 
64 Jack Jones, Unfinished Journey (London, 1937), pp. 263–264. 
65 Oswald Mosley and the New Party, pp. 62–63. 
66 ‘Parliament’s Task’, The Times, 27 July 1931, p. 10. 
67 ‘Port Glasgow Workless Give Mosley the Boot’, Daily Worker, 28 August 1931, p. 4.  
68 C. F. Melville, ‘A Balkan Monarch Takes a Chance’, Action, 12 November 1931, p. 
11. 
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study of it’.71 Analysis of the party’s short-lived newspaper Action (i.e. pre-BUF) 
confirms Lockhart’s remark.72  
 
However, the General Election of October 1931 marked the moment when Mosley took 
a completely different direction. Any hope of electoral success for the New Party was 
shattered; out of the mere 24 candidates that stood, all were unsuccessful, with only two 
winning enough votes to have their deposits returned.73 The election loss was a 
crossroad in Mosley’s life. His high hopes of building a movement that would lead him 
to power were dashed within a year. Despite promising to ‘retire from public life for ten 
years’ if the New Party failed, Mosley decided that to leave politics would be to 
abandon his country at a time of ‘crisis’.74  
 
Although not to the same extent as in many other countries, the Great Depression of 
1929 hit Britain hard.75 Between 1929 and 1933, its world trade fell by half, heavy 
industrial output declined by a third, while employment profits plummeted in nearly 
every sector. By mid-1932, unemployment had reached an all-time high of 3.5 million 
(70 per cent in some regions), with many of those in employment only offered part-time 
work. This represented more than one-fifth of the working population.76 Between 1930 
and 1932, the notion of ‘capitalism in crisis was at peak and talk of revolution and 
dictatorship gained credence’.77 Due to the ‘old men’ of British politics, ‘whose 
idleness, ignorance and cowardice’ prevented them from deviating from the orthodoxy 
of classic liberal economics that emphasised maintaining a balanced budget at all cost, 
 
71 Diary entry of 27 August 1931 in Kenneth Young (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Bruce 
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Mosley argued that Britain would be in ruins if he did not act to save his country.78 Put 
simply, Mosley could not turn his back on politics and therefore looked elsewhere to 
challenge the political orthodoxy that, he believed, blighted his country. 
 
Following the election defeat, Mosley announced his intention, with other New Party 
members, to visit Italy, Germany and ‘probably at a later date Russia’. The members 
were to ‘study the modern movement in all countries’. Mosley explained the modern 
movement as ‘new political forces born of crisis, conducted by youth and inspired by 
completely new ideas of economic and political organisation’. This was in contrast to 
the British system, which was still stuck in the previous century.79 In January 1932, with 
his gang, Mosley travelled to Italy and was captivated by what he experienced there. He 
toured the country admiring Fascist achievements. For example, he commented upon 
the transformation of the Pontine Marshes from a malaria-plagued swamp into a 
functioning and modern settlement, where ‘for the first time since the days of Rome the 
Pontine waters rush to the sea’. At the time of his visit, this ‘great reclamation scheme’ 
employed over 110,000 workers, which undoubtedly impressed Mosley.80 He also 
lauded the number of Fascist holiday camp places available to children, child welfare 
systems and youth training, the state of the roads, the land reclaimed and the ‘new 
psychology of ‘solidarita!’ instilled in society.81 He met with prominent Fascist 
officials, including Mussolini, who he described, in letters to Cynthia, as ‘charming and 
asked a lot of very good questions’.82 He met, too, with Achille Starace, the Fascist 
Party secretary and choreographer of many a Fascist spectacle, witnessing first-hand a 
typically regimented Fascist parade.83 Nicolson, who accompanied Mosley to Italy, 
wrote in his diary about how the trip was influencing his companion: ‘Tom [Mosley’s 
nickname] cannot keep his mind off shock troops, the arrest of MacDonald [the then 
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Family, p. 208.  
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83 Letter from Nicolson to Forgan, 15 April 1932 in Harold Nicolson, Diaries and 
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British prime minister] and J.H. Thomas [an ex-colleague in dealing with the 
unemployment problem while in government], their internment in the Isle of Wight and 
the roll of drums around Westminster’.84   
 
People close to Mosley pleaded with him not to go down the fascist route. Cynthia, 
horrified by the thought that her husband could be sympathetic towards fascism, 
threatened to contact The Times and ask them to print a message disassociating herself 
from his ‘fascist tendencies’.85 Nicolson pleaded with Mosley ‘not to get muddled up 
with the fascist crowd’ as ‘in England anything along those lines is doomed to failure 
and ridicule’.86 The Conservative MP and close friend of Mosley’s, Robert Boothby, 
also tried to persuade him to reject fascism, doing all he could to prevent the ‘incredible 
folly’.87 Fearing where Mosley was heading, friends on either side of the House even 
encouraged him to rejoin their respective parties. All efforts were to no avail, as he 
refused to re-enter the ‘machine of […] the older parties’ arguing that a return to 
mainstream politics would be to ‘place himself in a strait-waistcoat’.88 While still in 
Italy, a jubilant Mosley commented ‘we are really learning a tremendous amount, and 
will be equipped more on return’.89 
 
This raises an interesting theoretical point on the potential costs and rewards of fascist 
transnational activism. The costs may result in mockery, condemnation or potential 
alienation from relatives, friends, colleagues and even the majority of the nation. It may 
hinder advancement in both private and professional life or, at worst, inflict ruin upon 
the individual. However, potential rewards may be great. To ally with big and powerful 
regimes and movements (or individuals) abroad may lead to new contacts, successful 
mentors and, arguably the most important gain, large financial subsidies. As Nicolson 
explained, Mosley was ‘prepared to run the risk of further failure, ridicule and assault 
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87 Memoirs of Sir Oswald Mosley and Family, p. 206; Robert James, Bob Boothby; A 
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[to become] leader of the fascists’.90 Mosley knew the risks and rewards of transnational 
engagement and he believed the rewards outweighed the risks.  
 
Mosley returned to Britain with a head full of ‘Mussolinian ideas’.91 He took to the 
newspapers to heap praise on the Duce and his nation. He ‘waxed lyrical’ on the 
achievements of Fascism in the Daily Mail: ‘every moment possible is wrung from 
time; the mind is hard, concentrated, direct – in a word, Modern’.92 For Mosley, Italy 
and its leader embodied a bright new future, and he called for a similar ‘modern’ 
movement in Britain.93 An alarmed Nicolson foresaw the influence that Mussolini’s 
Italy was having on him: ‘If Tom would […] retire into private life for a bit and then 
emerge fortified and purged – he will still be Prime Minister of England. But if he gets 
entangled with the boys’ brigade he will be edged gradually into becoming a 
revolutionary.’94 Within a few months of being back on home soil, much to the despair 
of Nicolson and others, Mosley took the ‘revolutionary’ route and formed his own 
fascist party: the British Union of Fascists (BUF). 
 
Why did Mosley choose to adopt Italian Fascism over Nazism, or even Bolshevism? 
Mosley may have been impressed by the planning principles of the Soviet state, but he 
considered Communists the enemy of Britain. He said he would use ‘every means to 
crush’ a Communist uprising in his country.95 During 1931, Mosley attacked 
Bolshevism by claiming it would ‘wade cheerfully to its objective of a Soviet State 
through the blood and starvation of a disgruntled society’.96 He considered a 
Communist government meant ‘“slaughter and starvation for thousands”.’97 For 
Mosley, communism meant destruction. In contrast, the corporate ideal was 
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‘constructive’ in its appeal to, and application of, national unity.98 In addition, he 
developed a personal hatred towards Communists as he blamed them for attacking New 
Party meetings.99  
 
Mosley was clearly impressed by the Nazis. He gained inspiration from the party’s rise 
from obscurity before 1929 to boasting 108 MPs and 18 per cent of the vote share in 
1930. In his autobiography, Mosley noted that the Nazis capitalised on their country’s 
high unemployment. He would have seen their ‘struggle’ as parallel to his own and was 
motivated by their successes.100 In September 1931, he lauded their electoral gains by 
declaring that ‘the bleating bourgeois block is dropping out of politics’.101 Mosley was 
certain that the same ‘phenomenon’ would occur in England.102 Action reported weekly 
on events in Germany and followed Nazi activities with interest.103 However, the Nazis 
did not come to power until 1933 (a year after the formation of the BUF). The New 
Party, therefore, did not have a system of government to emulate, unlike Mussolini’s 
Fascism, which had, according to the party newspaper, reversed the internal decline in 
Italy, and made a significant contribution to modern social and economic theory.104  
 
By the time of the New Party’s General Election catastrophe, Mussolini had been in 
power for nearly ten years. Unlike Hitler, Mussolini provided a stable and working 
template for the Englishman to research and, if desired, imitate. In the first few years of 
Mussolini’s rule, Mosley had been unimpressed with the Italian leader. He had not only 
spoken out against Italy’s invasion of Corfu but demanded military retaliation. Possibly 
related to Mosley’s hostile stance, his yacht was blown up in the waters of Venice by 
‘some festive young Blackshirts’, narrowly avoiding casualties. He later remarked that 
‘the conduct of the Italian leader and his supporters appeared an outrage’.105 However 
by 1932, as his son Nicholas stated, ‘Mussolini was emerging not only as someone who 
was giving the word “fascism” a recognisable meaning but as the leader of a nationalist 
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revival about some aspects of which it was difficult for even the most sceptical 
politicians not to be admiring.’106 The dire economic circumstances elsewhere in Europe 
made Mussolini and his apparent successes even more appealing. Through his Italian 
tour, Mosley had met and was impressed by Mussolini, and was clearly captivated by 
the new direction that Italy had taken under Fascist rule. 
 
Concept of a Corporate State 
Mosley was particularly impressed with the Italian Corporatist model. Following the 
Italian trip, Mosley wrote glowingly in the Daily Mail of the improvements in 
efficiency and capability of the Italian fascist system. He argued that it was far more 
appropriate and beneficial than the ‘right to blather’ so valued by traditional British 
politics.107 This new model was the embodiment of what twentieth-century government 
should be: ‘No time is wasted in the polite banalities which have so irked the younger 
generation in Britain when dealing with our elder statesmen.’108 His ‘immediate 
objective’ for Britain was not to secure the election of parliamentary representatives, but  
 
to convince the nation – and more particularly the young men of the nation – of 
the need to unite in a determined effort to establish the Corporate State in 
Britain, a State in which every interest and every class will be subordinated to 
the interest of the nation as a whole.109 
 
Mussolini’s Corporate State provided the blueprint for the BUF’s vision of an English 
state. Mosley even admitted that ‘the original corporate thinking belongs to 
Mussolini’.110 His party copied its basic structure. As in Italy, the corporate national 
economy would be collectively managed by state officials, employers and workers, and 
would be operated by formal mechanisms at the national level.111 This non-elected body 
was to be focused not on the singular interests of the individual – as is the alleged 
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purpose of a democratic voting process – but, in theory, incorporated all interests into 
the organic state.112 In Doctrine of Fascism (1932), Mussolini wrote  
 
when brought within the orbit of the state, Fascism recognizes the real needs 
which gave rise to socialism and trade unionism, giving them due weight in the 
guild or corporative systems in which divergent interests are coordinated and 
harmonized in the unity of the State.113  
 
In theory, this model has both the advantages of socialism (the state overseeing) and 
capitalism (profit and private enterprise).114 If Mosley got his way, the British state 
would be a reflection of Mussolini’s maxim: ‘Everything in the State, nothing against 
the State, nothing outside the State.’115 Mosley explained this concept as a nation 
organised as the human body: 
 
Every part fulfils its function as a member of the whole, performing its separate 
task, and yet, by performing it, contributing to the welfare of the whole. The 
whole body is generally directed by the central driving brain of government 
without which no body and system of society can operate.116  
 
However, to suggest that the BUF’s corporatism is merely ‘an extravagant eulogy of the 
Fascist State’ is clearly an overstatement.117 The only permanent solution to tackle 
unemployment, Mussolini proposed, was to use the government to maximise industry’s 
potential, not through wholesale industrial nationalisation, but by state planning to 
maximise production. He also encouraged private industry but only for the good of the 
nation; where problematic, the state would intervene.118 Although these were both 
stalwart proposals embedded in Italian Corporatism and were later adopted by the BUF, 
it would be incorrect to assert that the British movement simply copied them from the 
Italians. Immediately following war service, which ‘released in him the springs of 
creative energy, whose results were seen in his successive plans to realise his Land fit 
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for Heroes’,119 Mosley called for the state to play a greater role in Britain. His ‘marriage 
of Keynesian ideas’– adopted in the 1920s – consisted of stimulating domestic demand 
and a policy of economic autarky.120 Michael Quill claimed that these early declarations 
played a significant role in the main structural components of Mosley’s economic 
philosophy over his lifetime, earning Mosley the reputation among his parliamentary 
peers as ‘the most perceptive of all government critics actively opposing the consensus 
of economic policymaking in the 1920s’.121 While a Labour minister, Mosley called for 
state nationalisation of main industries, high tariffs to protect British industries from 
international finance and an ambitious and costly programme of public works to solve 
unemployment.122 Mosley’s long-term radical economic ideology is prominent 
throughout the BUF’s economic literature.  
 
Furthermore, as the movement frequently reminded its readers, the BUF’s model was 
far more advanced than that of its continental contemporary.123 Mussolini proposed a 
vague semi-pluralistic model; therefore, it is difficult to ascertain what the Italian leader 
actually believed. In fact, the doctrine, the Duce insisted, ‘shall not and must not be a 
robe of Nessus clinging to us for all eternity’, meaning that it is merely a guide and 
should not necessarily be adhered to in its entirety.124 In contrast, throughout its 
existence, the BUF offered a clear, coherent and regularly updated economic and 
political programme. For example, in The Coming Corporate State (1937), the party’s 
chief ideologue and Mosley’s representative to Germany, Alexander Raven Thomson, 
built on the BUF’s corporate vision.125 He mapped out in detail (26 pages) the three 
aspects of the BUF’s vision for a corporate state. First, economic policy, which is the 
‘science of organisational planning upon functional lines for the production and 
distribution of wealth’, is explained. Second, the political area is covered: ‘Central 
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government weld[s] the nation together by the exercise of authority.’ Third, the cultural 
element is explored, which highlights ‘the release of individual enterprise for more 
energy of invention and design’.126 The BUF even gave attention to the most 
insignificant of issues. For example, under the Corporate Government, ‘the necessary 
preventive measures would be passed [for the] practice of exporting horses for 
butchery’.127  
 
The BUF model also diverged from the Italian’s by focusing on higher wages for 
workers, which would become aligned with the new British home market-based 
economy, therefore protecting Britain from the fluctuations of the world economy.128 A 
British fascist state would 
 
release the great power of science into the productive field, giving at the same 
time purchasing power to the people that they may enjoy the wealth man’s 
genius has created. A managed currency will end the operations by which the 
masses are denied a share of Britain’s wealth. Through higher wages and 
salaries and great public works an increase in the buying power of the people 
will occur to provide a market large enough for both Co-operative concerns and 
private trades without competition.129 
 
The year preceding the creation of the BUF, Mosley declared that ‘the worker and 
consumer, as well as the employer, shall be protected by modern machinery, which will 
maintain in this country a stable market and a high standard of life based on high 
wages’.130 The theory was that government-led expertise would ensure that production 
was high; therefore, so were the wages. The resulting higher wages would be an 
increase in purchasing power of consumers which, in turn, would result in more 
production.131 These ideas then mingled with the influence of Mussolini as he shifted 
towards Italian-style fascism. 
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Cosying up to Mussolini from the Outset 
Italian Fascist influence was not just apparent in BUF ideology but also through the 
aesthetic style adopted by Mosley for the BUF. The most obvious was the inclusion of 
‘fascist’ into its name, the British Union of Fascists. In addition, BUF uniform, the 
Italianesque black shirt, and its emblem – the fasces, a bundle of sticks featuring an axe, 
which was a symbol of strength through unity – were almost carbon copies of Fascist 
insignia. Even the now infamous Fascist salute was adopted by the BUF. All the 
aforementioned are clear examples of the BUF’s adoration for Italian Fascism.  
 
Attracting capital for the new movement was not easy.132 As James Barnes and Patience 
Barnes have argued, ‘Growth and influence required money, and financial support for 
the BUF was lacking from the outset.’133 From the birth of his new movement, 
Mosley’s ambition was to court the only fascist power on the continent. Less than two 
weeks following the BUF’s launch, Mosley sent his deputy, Robert Forgan, to Italy to 
solicit funds from Mussolini. The Italian dictator rebuffed the advance questioning 
Mosley’s commitment to fascism: ‘he has been spending most of this summer on the 
French Riviera. I spent quite a lot of time on the Riviera myself, but I was in exile 
struggling to make a living with my hands.’ He stressed that it was not ‘a place for 
serious reformers to linger in private villas for more than a few days’. The Duce accused 
Mosley of ‘want[ing] too much the best of both worlds’.134 In fact, according to 
Britain’s ambassador in Paris, William Tyrrell, Mosley had been given a ‘terrific 
dressing down’ by Mussolini when Mosley later visited him in Rome.135 
 
Undeterred, Mosley continued to laud Italian Fascism and its leader. The first edition of 
the BUF’s first newspaper Blackshirt (February 1933) mentioned Mussolini in three of 
its four pages, including across the front page. The cover gave a heavily biased 
historical account of the Italian movement. Mosley explained how the country had 
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‘drifted to collapse and chaos’ before being ‘rescued’ by the Fascist revolution. He 
insisted that Mussolini had no choice but to be violent and that the continual use of the 
‘iron hand’ was inevitable. Inside the newspaper, phrases used by the Duce are printed. 
On page 3, under the title ‘Mussolini’s Tribute to Mosley’, for example, the BUF 
claimed that Mussolini had called the British fascist leader ‘a man of courage and 
intelligence’. Subsequent issues included commending Italy’s conversion to a self-
supporting agricultural nation, a policy Mosley wished to emulate in Britain.136 
Blackshirts even printed inscriptions from a Mussolini monolith in Rome.137 However, 
it was not Mosley’s continual pressure that eventually aroused Mussolini’s attention.  
 
Italian Fascism was arguably facing its biggest challenge since the March on Rome. The 
rise of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism resulted in tension between the Italian and 
German variants of fascism, most notably between 1933 and 1935. This period saw 
Hitler’s consolidation of power in Germany and concern over the Führer’s moves in 
Austria, which the Italians considered a potential threat to their northern territories. The 
greatest problem for Mussolini, however, was, with the rise of Nazism, he had – for the 
first time since gaining power in 1922 – to compete for international recognition as the 
true model of fascism. Italy had to reaffirm its identity as first among fascisms.  
 
Throughout the 1920s, Mussolini’s Fascism was the dominant fascist ideology. In 1921, 
Partito Nazionale Fascista (the National Fascist Party - PNF) established the Fasci 
all’Estero (Fascism Abroad). Luca de Caprariis and Claudia Baldoli have investigated 
Italian communities in Britain in the interwar period (and before). Until Fascism came 
to power, inconsistent and sporadic ‘patriotic societies’ operated abroad but were not 
integral to Italian foreign policy.138 Although Mussolini’s priority in the twenties was 
domestic issues, the Fasci all’Estero became an integral part of Italy’s foreign policy 
and by 1929 boasted 583 branches and 124,870 members spanning all corners of the 
globe.139 Pre-Fascism, Italian emigrants were assisted according to need (for example, 
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helping the illiterate and the poor, and providing religious guidance).140 However, under 
the Fasci all’Estero every Italian diaspora community was to be transformed into a unit 
of Fascist activity. Its mission was to create a new imperial patriotism.141 Local agents, 
whether they oversaw economic and trade coordination or with welfare institutions, 
made clear the party’s desire to seize practically all control over emigration.142 In 1925, 
the head of the Fasci to Britain and Ireland (1922–1925), Camillo Pellizzi, insisted that 
the activity of Fasci all’Estero was directed towards the ‘fascistisation’ of overseas 
Italians. This involved disciplining Italian emigres and encouraging them to join the 
‘great Fascist enterprise of the national Risorgimento’ while quelling any 
‘misconceptions’ of Fascism. However, Pellizzi was adamant that there was no attempt 
to convince foreign countries to adopt Fascism.143 In order to achieve this, Fascist 
organisations were created outside of Italy, publications founded, and attempts to 
control the administration of Italian schools abroad were undertaken.144 
 
As in other countries, Fasci all’Estero sought to create ‘little Italies’ in Britain. In fact, 
the earliest overseas branch was formed in London in 1921. Besides the capital, 
organisations were created in areas with a high population of Italians, such as Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Manchester.145 Newspapers were either acquired or created and then 
distributed throughout Italian areas. Content included comments on Italy, reports on 
‘little Italies’ in Britain, reviews of Italian literature, Fascist ‘achievements’, Italian 
radio programmes guides, job adverts and appeals to buy Italian products, and frequent 
Italian eateries.146 Due to ‘conflicts’ between the various bodies involved, Fasci 
all’Estero’s plan to control Italian schools in Britain did not materialise in the twenties. 
Before Fasci all’Estero, Italian schools were under the jurisdiction of two organisations 
– the Dante Alighieri Society and the Catholic Church – and they were unconvinced by 
the new organisation’s demands. The project was plagued with problems until 1932 
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when Pellizzi finally became president.147 In Britain, and elsewhere, the Fasci 
all’Estero’s attempts to ‘fascistise’ the Italian émigré population appears to have been 
largely unsuccessful in the twenties.148 Yet it did lay much of the groundwork for the 
more fruitful period of the thirties.  
 
The ‘spectacular ascendancy’ of the Nazi Party in the early thirties not only raised the 
interests of the Italian regime but also ‘reinvigorated plans for a transnational campaign 
in order to strengthen support for Italian Fascism.’149 Mussolini now diverted 
considerable attention and resources to indoctrinating Italians abroad. ‘Little Italies’ 
were turned into ‘little Fascist Italies’ and all Italians were ‘to work for the fascistisation 
of their communities and to be ready to act if the fatherland needed them’.150 All non-
Fascist organisations were amalgamated into the Fasci all’Estero and were subservient 
to Rome.151 Education was a priority. Great efforts and extensive funding were spent on 
the organisation of Italian schools abroad. These educational outlets were considered 
‘the most important institutions for the defence of cultural traditions’.152 In 1933, more 
than 300,000 pupils attended almost 2,000 Italian schools abroad.153 In Britain, it was 
obligatory for Italian children to attend Italian schools. If not, parents were depicted as 
traitors and therefore ‘foreigners twice over’ in both Britain and Italy.154  
 
Children were subject to a Fascist style of education. The schools taught the Italian 
language, Fascist culture, moral education as well as Italy’s ‘glorious’ past and present. 
Children recited Fascist poems and songs, analysed texts such as ‘I love and respect the 
Duce’ and drew images of Roman lictors. Considerable emphasis was put on health, 
fitness and discipline. Elena Salvoni recalled her time in an Italian school in Britain: 
 
every morning we were out in the grounds doing exercise, all in unison, jumping 
up and down and waving our arms about. At the end of each session we had to 
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march past the doctor and his wife with our right arms raised […] we did as we 
were told and had no idea that this was the Fascist salute. [...] For weeks one 
particular year we were drilled for a parade before Mussolini’s daughter.155 
 
Teachers and directors had to be Fascist. Directors were given ‘appropriate instructions 
for the coming year’ by the Fascist high command. In 1934, a British inquiry uncovered 
how the employment of teachers in Italian schools abroad was organised under the 
direct supervision of the Italian Foreign Ministry. According to the Dominion Office, 
they had to be ‘sound in the Fascisti faith to proceed to [teach] the Italian language and 
Italian culture. These teachers are in no sense employed in consular work’. The Foreign 
Ministry also paid their salaries. As Claudia Baldoli has claimed, this signified that 
Italian intentions were ‘propagandistic rather than merely educational’.156  
 
In addition, and unlike in the twenties, Fascist outreach was broadened to non-Italian 
citizens with the intention of spreading its doctrine. To achieve this, Italy’s political and 
cultural importance in Europe had to be promoted. From the early thirties, Mussolini 
opened his Fascism to the world. On the tenth anniversary of the Fascist assumption of 
power, the Italian leader ‘inaugurated the most enduring propaganda event of the fascist 
dictatorship’.157 He claimed Fascism represented the new universal civilisation of the 
twentieth century, and ‘in ten years Europe will be fascist or fascisized’.158 The British 
Ambassador to Rome, Eric Drummond, noted Mussolini’s desire to present his Fascism 
as an example for the rest of the continent.159 The Mostra della rivoluzione fascista (The 
Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution) glorified the March on Rome and subsequent 
Fascist ‘achievements’.160 During its two-year run, Italians and foreigners alike were 
invited to participate in the celebration of Fascist culture, which attracted almost three 
million visitors.161 In 1933, Mussolini formed the Comitati d'Azione per l'Universalita 
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di Roma (CAUR) with the purpose of uniting the many fascist movements in Europe.162 
CAUR developed secret links and distributed funds to the burgeoning fascist groups, 
including the BUF: ‘If Italy failed to institutionalize these contacts, a Fascist 
International might be co-opted by the Nazis, which was intolerable to Mussolini.’163  
 
Mussolini invited Mosley (and other European fascists) to his international Fascist 
exhibition, which intrigued the British press. With the Nazis now in power, Mussolini 
courted the British fascist leader. He instructed thousands of his Fascists to salute the 
Englishmen.164 They exchanged gifts. The Italian leader presented Mosley with a 
custom-made banner for his British movement, which was ‘dipped respectfully to each 
banner in the parade’.165 While on the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, Mosley, in 
return, presented Mussolini with a parchment BUF membership card in a leather 
case.166 Through the visit, the Italian leader had clearly intended to build stronger 
relations with the BUF. Mosley also sought closer ties in the form of financial support. 
This was successfully negotiated in return for active support for their Fascist 
counterparts.  
 
Despite ‘elaborate steps’ being taken to conceal BUF funding activity, the Mosley 
faithful later detailed their connections when interrogated by Special Branch.167 The 
Head of the Finance Department and Secretary General of the BUF, Major George 
Tabor admitted to opening a confidential account with Westminster Bank Charing Cross 
for his boss in March 1933 (while Mosley was in Italy). According to Tabor, the 
account ‘was fed to a very large extent, by deposits of notes in the currencies of various 
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foreign countries’.168 He claimed that he personally handled several bundles of French 
francs.169 According to Allen, payments from Italy were often received in Paris by 
Mosley’s Chief of Staff and ‘principal collector’ Ian Hope Dundas.170 Dundas then 
deposited the funds into the Charing Cross account. Allen himself was occasionally 
present when Dundas collected the prearranged packages of money from the French 
capital.171 The first of many instalments were personally handed to Mosley by 
Mussolini’s men while on his Italian visit.172 Intelligence gathered by the security 
services suggested that the BUF received £5,000 per month from the Italian government 
for at least 18 months.173 This was no small feat in the 1930s. 
 
It could be argued that MI5 and Special Branch goaded the informers to make false 
statements to satisfy the British establishment’s desire to see Mosley and other fascists, 
who they believed traitors, behind bars. To have evidence that the BUF had been paid 
by an enemy of the British state would undoubtedly help their cause. However, the 
number informants who admitted to being involved in or observing the secret financial 
transactions between the Italian State and the BUF – not just one or two but at least half 
a dozen associates of Mosley’s – casts considerable doubt over this theory. Yet, perhaps 
even more compelling evidence that the BUF did receive monetary backing from 
Mussolini can be seen in BUF publications and activities.  
 
Securing this ‘big spectacular success’ had a marked impact on the BUF.174 The 
movement went from making favourable comments about Italian Fascism (as 
aforementioned) to now wholeheartedly supported it. After securing financial support 
from the Italian leader, the BUF became obsessively pro-Italian. For example, the front 
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page of the April issue of Blackshirt is dedicated to Mussolini and his Italian Fascism. 
In an article titled ‘Fascism and Peace. Mussolini – The Realist’, Mosley lauded 
Mussolini as a ‘peacemaker […] chief of realists […] constructive thinker’ and a man of 
great skill. He claimed the Italian leader had a master plan to strengthen great powers 
‘while at the same time he preserves every possible usefulness which the League of 
Nations machinery may provide’.175 On the next issue’s front page – headlined ‘Visit to 
Rome – The “Immense Majesty” of Fascist Peace’ – the BUF hailed the close ties with 
Italian Fascism: ‘Our deep and abiding friendship with the Fascist movement of Italy is 
based on the solid rock of friendship between men who hold in common a vast 
conception and a great ideal.’176 The article argued that Corporatism was the ‘only 
constructive system of government in the modern world, [which] lifted [Italy] from the 
dust and ha[s] placed her among the foremost of the nations’.177 Mussolini was branded 
a ‘genius’ and an ‘inspiration’.178 Articles in these periodicals continued in this vein, 
with Mussolini mentioned no less than 50 times from June to December 1933, while 
appearing on the front page in almost 20 of them (60 per cent). 
 
Although the BUF championed itself as an ultra-nationalist movement, international 
aspects to its character become evident when Mussolini lent his support. The call for 
‘world’ or ‘universal fascism’ became a regular feature on the front pages of Blackshirt. 
For example, in an apparent reference to the book Verso l’Internazionale Fascista 
(1932) by the universal fascist Asvero Gravelli, the 17 April 1933 issue’s front page 
headline reads ‘Forward to World Fascism’.179 The first issue of the following month’s 
front page announced that ‘we are united with them [Italy] by indissoluble bonds of 
friendship in universal Fascism, the greatest creed which Western civilisation has yet 
given to the World.’180 A short time earlier, Mosley wrote a letter (presumably to the 
Italian embassy), admitting that he had visited Italy again to study Fascism: ‘we even 
had the honour of being received by His Excellency the Head of the government […] 
whom we fascists salute as the origin and inspiration of world Fascism’. Reflecting 
upon his time in Italy for Mussolini’s Exhibition, Mosley claimed that ‘the last few 
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weeks in Rome have carried a long stage forward the great conception of universal 
Fascism’.181 
 
The BUF and the Italian government were in regular contact throughout 1933 and 1934. 
Mosley and Dundas, in particular, made frequent trips to Italy.182 The Italian authorities 
in Britain also sought close ties with British fascists. Along with ministers, MPs, 
journalists and members of the royal family, the Italian ambassador to Britain, Dino 
Grandi, developed personal and political relationships with Britain’s fascists. Baldoli 
described Grandi as on the one hand a ‘respectable diplomat who dealt with the 
parliamentary and diplomatic establishment’ and on the other a ‘supporter of the British 
Union of Fascists and of fascism’.183 As the self-proclaimed ‘ambassador of the 
Revolution’,184 Grandi thought Mosley had the greatest chance of successfully 
undertaking a British-style ‘March on Rome’. Although Grandi accused Mosley of 
being ‘naive and frivolous’, he was particularly impressed by his oratorical skills: ‘he 
hits hard and has plenty of guts’.185 Grandi encouraged Mussolini to continue financing 
the BUF. 
 
While in London, Grandi was in regular contact with his leader in Rome. He repeatedly 
informed Mussolini that fascism was expanding its influence in Britain. He sent regular 
updates on Mosley’s progress and BUF activities such as marches, speeches, and 
conflicts with Communists. Two days before the 1933 Trade Union Congress in 
Brighton, Grandi wrote to Mussolini: 
 
The old leaders are planning to transform this Congress into an anti-Fascist 
demonstration. Yet rather than against fascism of the fascists, they want to 
attack the ‘fascism’ of the labour anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic youth 
organised by Cripps and Attlee, under whose flags most of socialist youth is 
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gathering [...] This country is the tortoise among the nations of the world. But 
like turtles, it will arrive, and I shall not be surprised by seeing tomorrow, 
perhaps after a violent domestic crisis [...] Mosley’s blackshirts, Cripps’ labour-
fascists, and Lord Lyvington’s [Lymington?] young imperialists fighting 
alongside one another.186  
 
In a subsequent letter to Mussolini shortly after the conference, Grandi identified two 
strands of fascism in Britain: Mosley’s BUF and a segment of trade unionism, organised 
by founding member and leader of the Socialist League, Stafford Cripps. In the same 
correspondence, he claimed that fascism was ‘snatching vital youth from the ranks of 
Labour’ and saw signs of a fusion of left and right in Britain: ‘seventy per cent of 
Britain’s Blackshirts are manual labourers’. Although trade union activists fed into the 
Italian propaganda machine, it was the BUF, ‘the only British movement organised 
along the lines of the Italian Fascist party’, where the Italian hierarchy focused their 
support and resources on.187 
 
Contact between the Fasci all’Estero and the BUF was a frequent occurrence. Before 
1933, the Duce’s guidelines to the Fasci all’Estero prohibited interference in domestic 
politics. Dealings with British fascists were to be ‘a relationship of friendly politeness 
[…] without getting involved in intimate and continuous relationships, and without 
having official contacts with the leaders’.188 Mosley’s new pact with Mussolini resulted 
in a significant change in the relationship. According to the Secretary of the Fasci 
all’Estero, Carlo Camagna, Italian Fascists were now frequent guests at the BUF 
headquarters, while BUF members regularly visited the Fasci all’Estero.189 Moreover, 
both groups became involved in each other’s public events. For example, the BUF were 
present at the annual Italian March on Rome celebrations in London and, with their 
counterparts, sat through films on the history of the Fascist movement.190 Italian 
newspapers in Britain followed the BUF’s movements with interest. For example, 
L’Italia Nostra, the Italian news outlet based in London, covered Mosley’s visits to 
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Italy.191 Local Fascist branches in Italy desired close corporation with Mosley. For 
example, the Milan branch contacted the BUF leader with regards to producing Italian 
publications on British fascism and, through the Italian embassy in London, invited him 
to address a Fascist gathering in the Italian city.192 
 
Jointly, The London Fasci all’Estero and the BUF organised social exchanges. For 
example, two hundred British teachers were invited to tour the Italian educational 
system. Greeted by Mussolini in Rome, the teachers, represented by Professor Vaughan 
Johnston, told the Italian premier how privileged they were to meet ‘the leader of the 
new Italy in Rome, which had always been the common mother of all nations and is 
today re-establishing its place of prestige and responsibility in the world’.193 In addition 
to UK holiday camps, BUF newspapers now regularly advertised excursions to fascist 
countries.194 ‘Student tours’ were arranged in Italy. Students would visit Rome, Turin 
and Milan while staying in the private homes of Fascists. Furthermore, they would 
spend time in the Students’ Camps in the Tyrol and the Alps.195 In return, 27 Italian 
university students visited London and stayed in Mosley’s countryside retreat, spending 
time with the BUF leader. Accompanied by BUF members, the group visited the Italian 
embassy in London where they met with Grandi.196 Furthermore, the BUF arranged, 
with the Italian embassy, a football match to take place in Rome between the British 
party and their Italian counterparts.197 A group of Mosley Blackshirts even walked six 
miles to the Bristol docks to welcome officers and crew of the Italian vessel, Monte 
Bianco.198 Both Mosley and Grandi stated that ‘such informal gatherings as these’ not 
only reinforced the ‘good understanding which already exists between Fascists of 
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different nations’ but argued that it ‘strengthened’ them.199 As Baldoli claimed, ‘it was 
probably the social encounters between members that had real consequences for British 
and Italian fascists in terms of their adherence to the concept of universal fascism.’200 
 
‘Mind Britain’s Business’ 
By 1935, it was clear that Mussolini was questioning the significance of the BUF and 
was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the British movement. Since April 1933, 
when Mussolini had agreed to send regular payments to the BUF, there was little sign 
that Mosley’s men had made headway in Britain. In March 1935, the Italian leader 
withdrew the BUF’s allowance. Around the same time, the UK ambassador to Rome, 
Sir Eric Drummond, informed Special Branch that ‘Sir Oswald Mosley’s stock had 
slumped very heavily with Signor Mussolini’.201 Reports were being sent to the Home 
Office from Italy citing the disregard displayed for BUF members in the country. For 
example, a dentist from Florence visited the UK embassy to complain of the treatment a 
family member was receiving from Italian businesses. According to the dentist, his 
nephew had been ‘expelled’ from two jobs because of his membership with the local 
BUF branch.202 As the Foreign Office stated, the British movement ‘cuts no ice’ with 
Mussolini anymore.203  
 
However, the Duce resumed the payments a short time later. This was partly due to 
Mosley pleading with him to reinstate the funds but also because Mussolini began to 
seriously consider launching an ambitious invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia).204 
Abyssinia lay within the Horn of Africa. Italy already possessed Abyssinia’s neighbours 
Libya, Somaliland and Eritrea but failed to conquer Abyssinia in their first attempt in 
1896. The Fascists viewed the conquest of the poor and weak African country as a step 
towards its quest to recreate the glory of the Roman Empire. As part of their imperial 
programme, Italy intended to transform the Mediterranean Sea into the ‘Italian Sea’ 
while extending its influence across the Balkans and North Africa. In addition, the 
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colonising of a relatively sparsely inhabited territory was the ideal antidote for Italy’s 
soaring birth rate (an extra half a million per year), particularly as resources were 
lacking at home.205 
 
Mussolini wanted to use the BUF as a tool to increase proletarian feeling in Britain with 
the intention of persuading the British government (and therefore the League of 
Nations206), not to endorse economic or military action against his Abyssinian 
campaign. When the funding recommenced, Mussolini gave Mosley strict instructions 
to ‘render the Italians all support in their power should this country attempt to interfere 
over the question of Abyssinia’.207 Special Branch reported that Mosley informed his 
followers that ‘capital was to be made out of the Ito-Abyssinian situation’.208 BUF 
official, F.M. Box, who was confirmed as the BUF’s funding source to the authorities, 
informed Special Branch that it was ‘a pity that Rome was now deciding Mosley’s 
policy […] [as] the man who pays the piper calls the tune’.209 
 
Mosley saw this as an opportunity to begin a ‘peace campaign’ and therefore increase 
party support. In August 1935, backed by Italian money, Mosley launched a new 
campaign under the slogan ‘Mind Britain’s Business’, in direct reference to Italy’s 
imminent invasion of Abyssinia. Mosley was given orders by the Italians to ‘carry out 
his pro-Italian campaign, which includes the chalking of Mind Britain’s Business and 
the distribution of pamphlets, in addition to speeches on the Ito-Abyssinia question’.210 
The BUF launched its crusade with four major rallies in London, with Mosley 
subsequently speaking three to four times each week.211 Across the country, members 
painted peace emblems on buildings and pavements, and ran a poster campaign to warn 
of an upcoming war – the slogan was even painted on the steps of 10 Downing Street.212 
Local newspapers reported on the ‘crop’ of police courts fines issued for defacing walls 
 
205 Hurrah for the Blackshirts, p. 46. 
206 Britain was a leading influence in the League. 
207 TNA KV 3/53, ‘Fascist Activities in London’, 27 April 1935’, p. 2. 
208 TNA KV 3/53, ‘Summarizing BUF/Italian activities between 1933 and 1935 for the 
Foreign Office’, September 1935, p. 3.  
209 TNA HO 144/20145, ‘Report to the Home Office’, 23 October 1935 (12–13).  
210 TNA KV 2/881, ‘A.D.S.(B), 18 October 1935’ [Minutes Sheet]. 
211 ‘“Mind Britain’s Business”. Public Opinion can Prevent Sanctions that will lead to 
War’, The Blackshirt, 30 August 1935, p. 1.  
212 Ibid. 
195 
 
with ‘Mind Britain’s Business’.213 Grandi reported to his boss that the BUF had assisted 
him when he needed to counteract anti-Italian demonstrations.214 Furthermore, Mosley 
instructed BUF members in Italy to sign the following declaration of support, addressed 
to the Italian government, for the Italian invasion: ‘The undersigned British subjects 
residing in Italy […] impressed by the magnificent conduct of the Italian nation […] 
express their approval of the political solidarity of Fascist Italy and formulate their 
fervent wishes for the triumph of the Duce’s firm action in defence of Italy’s well-
founded rights.’215 The campaign may have increased party membership slightly while 
increasing BUF newspaper circulation but it did not, as Mosley believed it would, bring 
him any closer to power.216 As Special Branch noted, although ‘Mosley ostensibly 
supported Mussolini during the Abyssinian war on the grounds of natural sympathy 
between the Fascist parties in the two countries, there can be no doubt that the financial 
assistance he received from Mussolini was a powerful motive for the energy displayed 
in this direction’.217 
 
Although it is difficult to assess the impact of the BUF’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ 
campaign on Britain’s and the League of Nation’s response to Italian aggression, it 
appears negligible. Although military combat was rejected, both Britain and the League 
condemned Italy’s invasion and imposed sanctions on Italy.218 In addition, the British 
public was overwhelmingly and openly hostile to Mussolini’s attack on a fellow 
member of the League.219 Therefore, Mosley’s campaign was ultimately unsuccessful in 
coercing Britain to ‘mind its own business’. However, the sanctions were relatively 
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ineffectual as Britain refused to stop the passage of oil through the Suez Canal, upon 
which Italy was so reliant.  
 
Shortly after the Second World War began, it was discovered, much to the dismay of 
the British populous that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, and his 
French counterpart, Pierre Laval, agreed to let Mussolini get away with his aggression 
in Abyssinia. Although the government discarded the Hoare-Laval Pact, the ineffectual 
sanctions policy continued. This lack of desire to tackle the Italians had little to do with 
BUF influence. The reasons were twofold. The British and French feared to push Italy 
towards an increasingly powerful Nazi Germany and, as the then Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin later recalled, the Allies had no military force to withstand an Italian 
attack.220  
 
Mussolini directly influenced BUF policy, the Italy-Abyssinia War being a case in 
point. Mosley’s insisted that his ‘friendship [with Mussolini] raises no question of 
subordination; it raises only a question of common service to a common cause’.221 This 
is clearly false. As Gary Love stated, for Mosley and the BUF to approach the Italians 
for financial aid proves their willingness to be influenced politically by a foreign 
regime.222 In the twenties, Mosley was an avid proponent of the League of Nations. He 
even backed the sanctions imposed by the League against Italy for occupying Corfu in 
1923.223 Yet, tellingly, he reversed his stance when it came to the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia because, as Stephen Dorril has remarked, ‘Mosley had to prove to Mussolini 
he was receiving value for money.’224 However, he failed to do so. During the 
Abyssinian crisis, Grandi realised how ineffectual the BUF was when it came to 
influencing the British government and subsequent British foreign policy. Therefore, 
with the advice from his ambassador, the Duce initially cut payments to the BUF 
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considerably before stopping them altogether in 1937, believing Mosley’s movement to 
be an insignificant political force that was simply not worth investing in.225  
 
Branches Abroad 
A largely overlooked area of scholarly research is on BUF branches abroad. Baldoli has 
described this lack of inquiry as a ‘completely blank page in the history of British 
fascism’.226 The BUF did, in fact, form many overseas offshoots, most notably in Italy, 
Germany and across the Empire (the latter two are discussed later in this chapter). 
Baldloi has suggested that sources on the BUF branches in Italy can only be found in 
the Home Office files at Kew and from Italian newspapers.227 However, BUF 
newspapers also regularly covered the activities of its Italian divisions. For example, the 
opening of new branches in Milan, Genoa, Bordighera, San Remo, Turin, Florence, 
Messina and Catania were reported in Fascist Week and Blackshirt.228 Columns were 
devoted to the ‘Promotions’ and ‘Appointment’ of BUF staff, which included those 
operating overseas.229  
 
Examination of these newspapers suggests that Milan was the BUF’s flagship Italian 
division. Shortly after it opened in April 1933, the BUF reported on its ‘rapid progress’, 
so much so that within twelve months the branch relocated to larger premises at Piazza 
Missori, Milan.230 Here, under the guidance of Branch Organiser, John A Celli, at least 
one member manned the branch all day ensuring that BUF propaganda was distributed, 
new applications were processed promptly and potential members could visit and ask 
questions.231 The Milan branch was either at the top or thereabouts of BUF’s ‘[Branch] 
Literature Sales’ competition.232 It held the record for Blackshirt sales of almost 100 per 
 
225 Exporting Fascism, pp. 37–41. According to the Home Office, funding from Italy 
was cut to £1,500 per month from mid-1936 and stopped altogether by late 1937: TNA 
KV 2/881, ‘Source of Information: S.B. Report [Dundas]’, 21 May 1937, (105b). 
226 Exporting Fascism, p. 46. 
227 Ibid. 
228 For example, ‘Fascist News Film’, Fascist Week, 11 May 1934, p. 6; ‘News of the 
Week’, Fascist Week, 30 March 1934, p. 7; ‘Larger Premises for Milan Branch’, 
Blackshirt, 30 March 1934, p. 2. 
229 For example, Blackshirt, 20 April 1934, p. 4. 
230 ‘Larger Premises for Milan Branch’; ‘News of the Week’. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Blackshirt: ‘Literature Sales’, 16 February 1934, p. 3; ‘Literature Sales’, 2 March 
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cent of quota.233 A photograph titled ‘British Blackshirts in Milan’ featured in 
Blackshirt, as did a telegram sent to Mosley from the branch boasting about a recent 
well-attended meeting they hosted to recruit Britons in Italy.234 The article read: ‘The 
large audience accepted “en masse”, the invitation to join [the BUF], and amidst 
manifestations of enthusiasm a telegram of loyalty and devotion was sent to the 
Leader.’235 The popularity of the Milan branch challenges the intelligence received by 
the Home Office that stated that the membership of the division did not exceed six.236  
 
BUF headquarters in London funded the creation and maintenance of foreign branches 
for two reasons. Baldoli, the Home Office, and indeed the Blackshirts themselves, claim 
that the main duty of BUF members abroad was to ‘support the struggle of their fellow 
countrymen in Britain for the rise of fascism in that country, by seeking to ‘fascistise’ 
British subjects living abroad’.237 To attract new members in Italy, BUF members were 
required to wear uniforms and make ‘direct contact’ with other British residents in Italy; 
frequent radio broadcasts given by Celli were directed at Britons in Italy, and postcards 
were distributed to Britons at ‘all stations at the various Italian frontiers’ offering 
assistance to new arrivals. According to the BUF, ‘in this way, a large British family 
has been established in Italy after the Fascist way.’238    
 
However, while undoubtedly Mosley was keen to make contact with British residents in 
the hope of converting them to his British-based cause, the BUF also wished to build 
relations with Italian Fascists in their home country as a further sign of solidarity with 
Mussolini’s men. Delegates from the various British divisions in Italy celebrated or 
commemorated significant events in Italian memory, often with Italian Blackshirts. For 
example, delegations from various BUF centres across Italy were present at the annual 
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Fascist Levy where they laid wreaths at the memorial tablet erected in Via San Lorenzo 
(Genoa) in memory of the Fascist who was killed there in the early days of the 
revolution.239 Before the party dispersed, ‘telegraphic greetings’ were sent to both 
Mosley and Mussolini.240 On the anniversary of Italy’s entry in the Great War, British 
fascists were received by their Italian counterparts at both the Palazzo Braschi in Rome 
and at the Casa del Fascio in Florence, where ‘flattering speeches were exchanged’.241 
According to the BUF, a film, which was described in Fascist Week as ‘the first all-
Fascist film’, was shown in the theatre at BUF headquarters and included ‘some good 
shots’ of the members of the Milan branch marching to the local cenotaph.242 Similarly, 
Italians attended prominent events hosted by BUF Italian branches. For example, 
important Italians, including a representative of the National Fascist Party and the Rome 
Federal Secretary, were invited to a meeting organised by the Rome branch of the BUF 
to celebrate King George V’s birthday.243 Furthermore, a school had been set up in Italy 
in connection with the BUF’s Milan branch. These free educational classes taught 
English to Italians to build a stronger bond between the BUF and Italian Fascism.244   
 
Other, less notable and little known, branches were formed in mainland Europe. In 
March 1934, an advert appeared in Blackshirt requesting British residents in Paris join 
its new branch there, headed by Mr J. E. Cleverly.245 Mr E.C. Yaldwin headed the 
Madrid branch.246 Mr de Piro was the Political Director of the Malta branch.247 The 
BUF also claimed to have branches in Brussels and Latvia.248 However, these branches 
were nowhere near as popular as those in Italy and Germany. The likely reasons for this 
are twofold. First, BUF time and resources focused far more on the countries in which 
the two fascist regimes operated, as Mosley hoped to curry favour with both Italy and 
Germany. Second, it is likely that British citizens living in Italy or Germany would be 
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far more receptive to fascism as they are residing in a fascist state than those emigres 
who did not live under fascism. They were more likely to adhere to fascist values or, at 
least, feel obliged to sign up to fascism to fit in.  
 
Imperial Policy  
Unlike the BF and the IFL, the BUF’s imperial policy was centred on achieving 
‘Empire autarky’ through trade between Britain and its overseas territories. In 
Blackshirt Policy (1933), Mosley declared that ‘The building of a Britain as nearly as 
possible self-contained, and an Empire entirely self-contained, is the declared objective 
of the British Union of Fascists.’249 Mosley claimed that collectively Britain and its 
overseas territories had the potential to build the markets needed to isolate it completely 
from foreign imports. For example, under a fascist government, Britain would undergo 
an agricultural revolution; therefore, ‘losing’ its reliance on food imports from 
Europe.250 The importance of doing so, Mosley argued, was to withdraw from the 
‘international struggle’ for markets and the ‘economic dislocation and war such 
struggles mean’.251 For the BUF, all the goods, foodstuffs and raw materials which were 
required for a high standard of living could be produced within the Empire.252    
 
However, for this to be successful, Mosley argued that a fascist government must 
replace the ‘old gang’ in Britain, who through their laissez-faire politics motived by 
vested interests had left Britain’s most prized asset to decline, and used its power and 
influence to create a protectionist block.253 Meanwhile, in July 1933, Mosley announced 
that he and the Australian New Guard leader Eric Campbell, who Mosley met when 
Campbell addressed a meeting at the BUF headquarters three months earlier, had 
established The New Empire Union, which claimed to dictate fascist activities 
throughout the Empire.254 In Blackshirt, the BUF declared that ‘we now have a united 
fascist drive throughout the Empire, against the great financial interests which have 
impeded Empire development, and towards the self-contained Empire which is our 
common objective.255   
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The BUF was confident that this new union would create ‘Empire Fascism’, made up of 
fascist movements across the Empire working together towards achieving the goal of 
Empire unity.256 However, the project was an abject failure, only the Ulster fascists 
joined as they professed to be ‘100 per cent’ loyal to the Crown.257 The reasons for this 
lack of interest were twofold. First, not all fascist groups in the Empire shared the same 
vision as Mosley and Campbell (and the Ulster fascists) for turning the Empire into a 
protectionist block. This appears to be the case with South African fascists. By far the 
most important interwar fascist movement in South Africa was the South African 
Gentile National Socialist Movement, otherwise known as Greyshirts. Its leader, Louis 
Weichardt, made clear his opposition to the aim of The New Empire Movement: ‘the 
vast majority of South Africans now think of the [South African] Union as an entirely 
independent state, sovereign in all matters both internal and external, whose connection 
to the British Crown and Empire is purely voluntary’.258 Weichardt claimed that even 
among English-speaking sections ‘imperialist feeling is often lukewarm’.259 Second, 
fascism had not been established in certain countries in the Empire at the time of The 
New Empire Union. In Canada, for example, no fascist party was established until 1934 
– when Adrien Arcand formed Parti National Social Chrétien (Christian National Social 
Party). By this time, The New Empire Union was all but finished.  
 
This venture came to an abrupt end only months following its inception.260 Stocker has 
argued that the partnership between the BUF and the New Guard was doomed from the 
outset. He has claimed that although the New Guard was akin with the BUF in many 
ways – militaristic, anti-communist, stylistically similar and supportive of Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany – it also differed from Mosley’s model in so much as favouring, to a 
degree, individual liberty and, most importantly, was a proponent of free-market 
economics (before adopting corporatism later on). For these reasons, Stocker has 
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claimed, the unity was built on ‘shaky foundations’ and ‘inevitably short-lived’.261 
Another reason that may explain the failed relationship is that the New Guard was not 
an actual party, but more like a paramilitary militia made up of veterans, so it would 
have been difficult to do a party political deal with. The fact that The New Empire 
Union was such a disaster and came nowhere near achieving a ‘Federation of the Fascist 
movements of the Empire’, identifies how distinct the various fascist movements could 
be from each other, even when united under the Crown.  
 
BUF imperial policy was rooted in Mosley’s time as an MP. While a Labour MP, 
Mosley published his memorandum (1930) in which he outlined how he would tackle 
the problem of rising unemployment. In it, Mosley argued for British trade based on 
imperial preference, emphasising the vast resources and markets of the colonies that 
could be opened up to Britain.262 In ‘A National Policy’ (1931), Mosley championed the 
notion of Imperial protection. Here, he argued that if Britain and its colonies could unite 
and negotiate exclusive trade agreements with each other, Britain and its overseas 
territories could obtain economic security and wellbeing without dealing in foreign 
markets.263      
 
However, influence from Italian Fascism is also evident in the BUF’s concept of 
Empire. In a bid to impress Mussolini, Mosley sought to connect Britain’s Roman 
heritage to the Italian model. In Greater Britain, he stated that ‘fasces are the emblem 
which founded the power, authority and unity of Imperial Rome. From the Rome of the 
past was derived the tradition of civilisation and progress during the past two thousand 
years, of which the British Empire is now the chief custodian’.264 This was not included 
in Mosley’s pre-BUF vision of the Empire; therefore, it undoubtedly derived from his 
attachment to Italian Fascism. 
 
 
 
 
261 Paul Stocker, ‘“The Surrender of an Empire”: British Imperialism in Radical Right 
and Fascist Ideology, 1921–1936’, (PhD Thesis: University of Teesside, 2016), pp. 75–
76.  
262 Oswald Mosley, The Mosley Memorandum (London, 1930), p. 13. 
263 Oswald Mosley, A National Policy: An account of the emergency programme 
advanced by Sir Oswald Mosley M.P. (London, 1931), p. 26. 
264 Greater Britain, Introduction.  
203 
 
Courting the Nazis 
Mosley saw the Nazi power grab of early 1933 as an opportunity to curry favour with 
the new European fascist power, but also to extract funds. As well as courting the 
Italians, Mosley also attempted to build relations with the Nazis, which is evident in the 
party’s literature, Foreign Office files and the British press.265 Blackshirt quickly paid 
homage to Hitler and his movement. Shortly after Hitler gained the Chancellorship of 
Germany in early 1933, the paper dedicated a profile to ‘Hitler – The New Man of 
Germany’ written by Mosley. The BUF leader attacked the ‘dreary columns of spiteful 
abuse which the English Press has spat at Hitler and the Nazi movement’. He then 
applauded ‘the spirit and the force which has lifted Germany from the mud and has set 
her on the road to becoming a great nation again. It is a spirit of struggle, of sacrifice, of 
great belief […] of fanaticism […] [The Nazis have] save[d] the soul of a great nation.’ 
Mosley described how the German movement ‘struggled on through unparalleled 
reverses and disasters’, and how their ‘will to action’ resulted in eventual glory not only 
for Nazism but for all Germanic nations. He compared the BUF to the Nazis by 
claiming the latter initially endured ‘slow progress, compared to the great strides’ 
Mosley’s movement made in the first months of its existence.266  
 
The result of securing much-needed funds from Mussolini shortly after the article went 
to print meant the paper’s admiration for Fascist Italy overshadowed its comments on 
the Nazis. Intent on not alienating the Nazis, the movement’s newspaper continued to 
compliment them. For example, in May 1933, Blackshirt proudly announced that 
Germany under Hitler ‘heats the iron that will beat out of a corrupt and broken 
Capitalism’.267 In the following months, the Blackshirt wrote about the excellent 
conditions of the prisoners in German prisoner camps, regularly challenged negative 
accusations against the new Germany in the British press reiterated Nazism’s claim that 
Hitler was a man of peace.268 For example, they claimed that the Führer had offered to 
‘march with all nations to the constitution of a new European civilisation […] [to] show 
that the men of Fascism are the enemies of chaos, and not the enemies of other 
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nations.’269 In an attempt to prove how ‘magnificent’ the new Germany was, the 
Blackshirt advertised tours to Germany for those interested in ‘see[ing] something of 
the Hitler movement at first hand’.270 
 
Mosley sought collaboration with the Nazis. In the autumn, Hitler sent the Nazi official 
Gunther Schmidt-Lorenzen to England to study British fascism first-hand. When 
Mosley met the German officer, he stressed his ‘great sympathy with the great Hitler 
movement and wished nothing more than to be able to remain in close contact with the 
events in Germany’. He informed Schmidt-Lorenzen of his intention to send ‘capable 
men’ to Germany on behalf of the BUF.271 Following the conversation, Mosley sent an 
official BUF delegation to Germany with the instruction to establish links with the 
Nazis.272 The group attended the 1933 Nuremberg Rally, the first since the Nazis’ 
accession to power, where they had based a liaison officer. According to the Home 
Office ‘At Nuremberg the British fascists will attend a review of the Nazi troops, and 
will later go to Berlin.’273 The representatives included the BUF’s chief emissary with 
the Nazis, Alexander Raven Thomson, who stayed at a Brownshirt camp. Saxony’s 
Minister of Justice reported to his colleague at the Chancellery that Raven Thomson 
was ‘so enthusiastic about his experience that he told me quite openly that Germany’s 
rise was now unstoppable and that it was high time that people in England sought an 
alliance with this re-awakened nation’.274  
 
BUF Branches were opened in Cologne and Berlin. As with Italian branches, the 
purpose was to attract British citizens living under Nazi rule to the party, but also to 
connect with Nazi officials. The head of the Berlin BUF, and a man of dubious 
reputation and ‘minor importance’, Mr B.A. Owens, reported to the foreign office that 
BUF branches in Germany were in ‘no way affiliated to the Nazi movement’. However, 
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the Nazis were made ‘fully aware’ of the organisation and Hermann Göring, President 
of the Reichstag, was sent monthly lists of branch members and their addresses.275  
 
Local members attended official Nazi commemorative ceremonies. Members from the 
Cologne branch, for example, visited a local ceremony commemorating the failed Nazi 
Putsch eleven years earlier. Leader of the delegation, and president of the Cologne 
branch, Captain Levi, gave a speech summarising the event:  
 
As leader of the British Fascists in Cologne it is my privilege to greet you […] 
This is the first time that our movement has officially met the authorities of the 
Third Reich. On this sacred day we have marched up to honour Germany’s 
warriors who bravely fought and died for their country. We also wish to 
remember the members of the N.S.D.A.P. who lost their lives for the movement. 
It is our hope that these sacrifices and our ideals may lead to the triumph of 
fascism in the whole world. My comrades, I ask you to give a hearty cheer for 
the Führer of the German Reich, Adolf Hitler and for Sir Oswald Mosley.276  
 
Two days later, on Armistice Day, Levi and his members attended the Cologne War 
Memorial in Germany where they laid a wreath. The British Consul, who was present, 
was both concerned with and embarrassed by the British fascists. Although the consul 
reported that Levi had been ‘perfectly respectful and did not attempt to make a speech’, 
he was concerned that they would cause problems in future: ‘I regard with some 
misgiving the activities of this branch. [...] Being men of little education, I fear that 
sooner or later they may do or say something to cause friction with the local 
authorities.’277   
 
The impact of BUF overseas branches is difficult to measure. No branch probably 
exceeded more than 100 members at any one time. Yet, the branches in Italy and 
Germany clearly integrated themselves well, while making connections with regime 
delegates. This most probably left some positive impression on Mussolini and Hitler, 
not least showing them that the BUF was a serious fascist movement with loyal 
supporters both inside and outside of Briton. The impact of these branches made little 
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impression at home. The newspapers hardly covered them, apart from BUF publications 
which occasionally reported on branches abroad.278  
 
They did, however, attract the attention of the Home Office who monitored their 
progress. The most curious and perhaps unexplainable element to the BUF abroad is 
that both Owens and Levi were Jewish, according to the Home Office.279 If this were 
true, it must beg the question why British subjects of the Jewish faith would choose to 
live in a country in which Jews were unashamedly hated by the regime – described by 
Hitler as the enemy of Germany – and were not only verbally but physically attacked by 
Nazis. The Home Office described their participation as ‘not without its humorous 
aspect’.280  
 
However, unlike the Italians, the Germans were reluctant to form a relationship with the 
BUF. Barnes and Barnes have argued that Hitler did not want to give the impression of 
interfering in British affairs. He wanted peace and friendship with the British state.281 At 
a Nazi meeting in London – infiltrated by Special Branch in late 1933 – Otto Bene, the 
head of Ortsgruppen in Britain, on instruction from Hitler, told members that it was 
‘strictly forbidden for any Nazi to discuss or participate in English politics and 
particularly they were not to fraternise with members of fascist organisations here’.282 A 
year later, Bene circulated a letter to members, which included a note to ‘draw your 
attention again to the order that you are not allowed to participate in British politics and 
particularly you are not to associate with Fascists. We are guests in this country and 
must behave accordingly.’283 When it was discovered that Lothar Streicher, son of 
Julius Streicher, a prominent Nazi propagandist and member of Hitler’s inner circle, 
was staying with a BUF member while holidaying in London, he was reprimanded by 
the party for defying the ‘no contact’ order.284  
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However, as identified in Chapter One and Chapter Two, the Nazis had relations with 
both the British Fascisti and, more notably, the Imperial Fascist League. Three more 
likely theories explain the reasons for the Nazis’ reluctance to build ties with the BUF 
from 1932 to 1935. The first is that they were unimpressed by Mosley. Shortly before 
forming the BUF, a key Mosley ally, Christopher Hobhouse, visited Germany and met 
with the Nazi leadership. They spoke negatively of Mosley, accusing him of not being 
‘a working man’ and insisting he would ‘disadvantage’ any party.285 This indicates that 
the Nazis, as well as the Fascists, thought Mosley more of a playboy than a serious 
revolutionary. Second, British fascist organisations were at odds with each other and the 
Nazis did not want to be seen to be taking the BUF’s side over, their favoured group in 
Britain, the IFL. Raven Thomson sent a signed photograph of Mosley to a Hitler 
representative with a request for one of the German leader in return. The request was 
refused, citing the British fascist movements in ‘conflict with one another’; the Nazis 
did not ‘consider it proper to enter the conflict’.286 Third, and closely linked with the 
previous reasons, was the BUF’s perceived ambivalence toward antisemitism.  
 
In a bid to be a ‘respectable’ party in the eyes of the British electorate, Mosley initially 
rejected that antisemitism played any role in the BUF.287 However, an array of evidence 
indicates that Mosley was ideologically antisemitic even before the BUF’s inception. In 
April 1932, he chaired a discussion on the subject titled ‘The Blindness of British 
Politics under the Jew [sic] Money-Power’. He invited two notorious antisemites on to 
the panel: the Imperial Fascist League (IFL) leader Arnold Leese, and the Britons 
founder Henry Hamilton Beamish.288 Evidence of Jew-hatred can also be seen in 
Mosley’s short-lived New Party venture. Party members were reported driving through 
south London, shouting ‘Down with the Jews’, and distributing antisemitic stickers.289 
According to his son, who witnessed the event, Mosley’s chief bodyguard and a former 
world boxing champion, the Jew Kid ‘Ted’ Lewis, asked Mosley if he was antisemitic. 
When Mosley answered in the affirmative and began to ‘reveal his full plans’, a 
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horrified Lewis hit him, leaving Mosley sitting on the floor.290 The British Jewish Board 
of Deputies was so concerned by the growing racism toward Jews from Mosley and the 
New Party that they wrote to the leader to air their anxieties.291 
 
In the draft of Greater Britain, Mosley alluded to the unhealthy influence of Jews in 
Britain. It was only on the advice of his friend Nicolson that Mosley decided to remove 
his ‘Nazi note’, which included a reference to ‘Jewish banking houses’. Nicolson 
informed Mosley that he was ‘prepared to believe that they [Jews] have been the villains 
of the piece [...] [but] English readers are always impressed by propagandists who take 
off their boots before they start kicking below the belt’. Mosley, however, did include a 
‘tone[d] down […] statement by a short qualifying phrase’, as suggested by Nicolson, in 
the final copy of the BUF’s founding manifesto.292 In a section on finance, Mosley 
noted that ‘we have within the nation a power, largely controlled by alien elements, 
which arrogates to itself a power above the State, and has used that influence to drive 
flaccid governments of all political parties along the high road to national disaster.’293 
This alien power, of course, was the Jews. 
 
In his extensive work on BUF antisemitism, Dan Tilles observed how ‘Jewish issues did 
not feature prominently in the party’s public agenda over the nine months or so after 
October 1932’.294 Yet antisemitism did occasionally rear its head in these early months 
of the movement. In the same month as its inception, while addressing a hostile meeting 
at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, Mosley verbally attacked three protesters 
branding them ‘warriors of the class war – all from Jerusalem’.295 This jibe was met 
with scorn by his sister-in-law, ‘Baba’, who questioned why the ‘silly little schoolboy’ 
Mosley had descended into ‘the Jewish inanity […] [as the] little man in the balcony 
was quite inoffensive’.296 A correspondent of The Times also noted this ‘hostility to 
Jews’ during Mosley’s speech.297 Following the meeting, Blackshirts were disbursed by 
police from the Cenotaph, where they congregated, for chanting ‘to hell with Jews’.298 
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Moreover, antisemitism was rife in BUF branches in Leeds and Hull, where walls were 
decorated with pro-Nazi posters. Similarly, in Manchester, Jews were threatened with 
violence and their shops graffitied with the words ‘Perish the Jews’.299 
 
Around the time he acquired funds from Mussolini, Mosley banned antisemitism in the 
BUF. While visiting the Italian leader, he was instructed not to copy ‘Nazi-aberrations’ 
as ‘anti-Semitism is a symptom, not of Fascism but of Germany’.300 This indicated that 
Mussolini would consider stopping his transnational support to the BUF if Mosley 
refused to conform. Almost immediately after his dressing down by the Duce, Mosley 
dedicated the front page of the next issue (1 April) of Blackshirt to explaining the 
relationship between ‘Fascism and the Jews’. In a lengthy article, and immediately 
following the line, ‘The Jewish issue was unknown to Italian Fascism’, the BUF 
announced their updated policy on Jews: ‘Jew-baiting in every shape and form was 
forbidden by order in the British Union of Fascists before the Union had been in 
existence two months. The Jewish question is no issue of Fascism, and the great case of 
Fascism should not be obscured by side-line or irrelevance.’301 Despite his claim, no 
evidence can be found that Mosley banned antisemitism in the movement. The 
statement he is likely to be referring to was in February’s issue of Blackshirt (two 
months earlier) which read: the BUF ‘did not attack Jews as Jews. No difference was 
made between Jew and Gentile, and only if either was anti-social would any action be 
taken against them’. Yet there was no mention of an outright ban.302 As Dorril 
remarked, ‘the statement [on the ban] was entirely to do with Mosley’s visit to 
Rome’.303 
 
In a bid not to alienate the Nazis, however, the newspaper was careful to justify or 
dismiss the Nazi’s treatment of Jews in Germany. In the same article, under the section 
‘Outrages Against Nazis’, a key passage described how the Nazi struggled to power: 
 
violence, struggle and political ferocity have inevitably increased. In that 
struggle, Jews have probably been killed or injured, like members of every other 
community. It must also be remembered that in Germany, Jews are 
conspicuously associated at one extreme with the Communist and Socialist 
 
299 Cited in Black Shirt, p. 224. 
300 Cited in Black Shirt, p. 232. 
301 ‘Fascism and the Jews’, Blackshirt, 1 April 1933, p. 1 
302 ‘I Accuse’, Blackshirt, 1 February, p. 4.  
303 Black Shirt, p. 231. 
210 
 
movements, and at the other extreme with International Finance. Jews, in fact, 
have been associated economically and politically, apart from every 
consideration of race, with the two main enemies of the Fascist movement.304 
 
In the following issue (17 April), the BUF printed an article it claims to have received 
from a ‘Jewish Correspondent in Prague [… which] emphasises in a marked degree the 
unaccuracy [sic] and dishonesty of the Press’s anti-Hitler campaign’. The Blackshirt 
claimed the contributor spent four days in Breslau, ‘a stronghold of the Hitler men’, 
which revealed no sign of a ‘Jewish pogrom’. The unnamed individual supposedly 
spoke with many ‘patriotic German Jews’, all sympathetic to the Nazis. In one 
conversation, ‘Several young Jews admitted [to him] that were they not Jews they 
would probably be enthusiastic Nazis and that if only hysteria were avoided the patriotic 
Jews would receive favoured treatment as distinct from that meted out to unpatriotic 
ones’. Apparently, an 84-year-old Jew told him, ‘I am afraid that we must admit that the 
Nazi movement was inevitable as the only hoping of saving the country. Jews who keep 
their heads will not be hurt. I believe that Hitler and his lieutenants are genuine idealists, 
though a few youthful members really got out of hand.’ ‘The final impression’ this 
traveller received was that ‘these Jews who are as good Germans as the British Jews are 
good Britons have little cause for alarm – unless from agents, provocateurs and 
misguided “friends”. “After all,” as a young German put it to me, “you cannot expect an 
entirely smooth revolution after 14 years’ corrupt government.”’ The column concluded 
with an appeal, perhaps with a nod towards Mussolini, to let ‘the British Fascists help to 
save decent Jews from the sentimentalists’.305 
 
At this time, the promise of payments from Mussolini were not as forthcoming as 
Mosley had hoped. In the autumn of 1933, BUF officials noted that ‘funds [from Rome] 
were not coming in as expected’.306 On 11 October, Mosley complained to Nicolson 
about his reliance on ‘canteens and subscriptions’ to fund his movement.307 It was 
around this time that Mosley became aware of the Nazis’ misgivings over his perceived 
leniency towards Jews. Schmidt-Lorenzen met with the British fascist leader while in 
Britain and raised these concerns. Mosley insisted that he was not paid by Jews, but that 
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his attitude and tactics with regard to the Jewish question was one more suited to 
the English character and which appealed more to the English sense of fair play. 
It is better to say “Here is a man who is in touch with the international 
communists and who are damaging English industry – both are Jews”. Judge for 
yourself what happens to them.308 
 
Furious by the accusations thrown to him by the Nazis, Mosley wanted revenge on the 
group he believed was spreading these ‘mistruths’: the IFL. The vehemently antisemitic 
IFL was suspicious of the BUF’s ambiguity over the ‘Jewish question’. From the birth 
of Mosley’s movement, the IFL’s newspaper, The Fascist, consistently taunted Mosley 
and the BUF about their relationship with Jews. For example, accusations of Jewish 
interests controlling Mosley was the front page headline of the January 1933 issue. 
Under the heading ‘Big Money “Fascism”’, the IFL claimed that ‘the word “Jew” must 
not be mentioned by members of the “British Union of Fascists,” under heavy 
penalties!’309 April’s issue of The Fascist continued in a similar vein: ‘the Big Money 
pro-Jewish Fascism of the Mosleyites spends itself like a shrieking gale over the head of 
a pilot clad in oil-skins’.310 The same month saw the two movements directly exchange 
insults. The Fascist denounced the BUF as not properly fascist: ‘Fascism is a thing of 
the spirit, a state of mind, which refuses to turn from realities, such as Jewish 
domination over white men’s civilisation and achievements. It is not simply a matter of 
collecting together a number of impecunious unemployed to do the shouting at a certain 
figure.’ Mosley, the paper declared, has ‘married a wife of Jewish blood, grand-
daughter of the Jew Leiter who cornered the people’s wheat to make money out of the 
transaction.’311 Through Blackshirt, the BUF responded by attacking ‘the vicious vet’ 
and his band of ‘cranks’, for, ‘in addition to the usual silly stuff which ignorance and 
jealousy throw at the Leader and members of the British Union of Fascists, this dreary 
nonentity now also attacks Lady Cynthia Mosley with a pack of lies’.312 The response 
concluded that the ‘organisation has stepped out of the realm of pure humour to which 
they usually belong’.313 Leese continued these pro-Jewish accusations against Mosley 
and his movement over the subsequent months, which included insults such as labelling 
the Blackshirts ‘Kosher Fascists’ and their party the ‘British Jewnion of Fascists’.314 
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On 24 November 1933, shortly after Mosley’s conversation with Schmidt-Lorenzen 
BUF members, on instruction from their leader, violently attacked an IFL meeting in 
Trinity Hall, Great Portland Street. Initially, the intruders demanded an apology from 
Leese for his repeated accusations that Mosley and his movement were conspiring with 
Jews. They then assaulted those present, including Leese, leaving him with head injuries 
and ripped clothing. Witnesses claimed that chairs were used as weapons to ‘strike’ 
opponents. Newspapers reported that ‘the interrupters tore down from the walls a Union 
Jack on which was superimposed a black swastika; a standard bearer was attacked and 
his flag torn to pieces; windows were broken; and one man [probably Leese] had part of 
his clothing torn off’. The fight, which lasted around a quarter of an hour, was 
eventually broken up by the police with two arrests made. When reflecting upon the 
melee, Leese explained the ‘real object’ of the ‘Jewish and typically “Mosleyite” attack’ 
was the ‘suppression of the truth about Jewish control of Britain’.315 
 
In these years, the BUF was desperate for funds. Driven by financial concerns over the 
uncertainty around Italian Fascist payments and, Mosley believed, the growing 
unlikelihood of securing financial assistance from the Germans due to his perceived 
attitude towards the Jews, the movement ‘slid into anti-Semitism’ with an overtly pro-
Hitler stance in a bid to impress the Nazis.316 In what Tilles described as a ‘watershed in 
the BUF’s commitment to antisemitism’, the first issue of the November 1933 
Blackshirt ran with the headline ‘Shall Jews Drag Britain to War?’317 For the first time, 
the movement openly argued that Jews were the ‘hidden hand’ behind various financial 
entities: 
 
[M]odern Conservatism in Britain is entirely subservient to the international 
finance of the City of London, which is of course largely Jewish […] Socialism, 
too, is dominated by so called intellectuals, many of whom are Jewish, while the 
rest are invariably under Jewish influence […] Their money power has 
established such a grip upon the Press and other organs for the creation of public 
opinion that they are in a position to hold up to ransom the established Parties of 
the State. Even if these Parties were not dominated by Jews or by Jewish 
influence, they would have to dance to the Jewish tune if they are to reach the 
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Democracy on whose favours they depend […] [U]se of Jewish money power 
for political purposes has just been brought to our notice in the cinema world. 
The British-owned company, Fox Movietone News, makes a news reel which is 
shown also under contract by the Jewish-controlled Gaumont British, which is 
under the control of those Polish Jews.318 
 
Yet, as the title suggests, among the many accusations, perhaps the most notable was 
the way Jews were ‘pursuing an anti-British policy’ by attempting to ‘drag this country 
towards war with Germany […] we state deliberately that Jews are striving to involve 
Britain in war’. As a show of allegiance with the Nazis, the BUF asserted that ‘For long 
past, great interests and great newspapers in Great Britain have striven hard to work up 
war fever against Germany [...] Germany, for reasons of her own, has suppressed the 
great Jewish interests which previously dominated that nation by their control of all the 
old Parties of the State.’319 Hitler, contrastingly, was perceived as a man of peace with 
no interest in foreign policy.320 Tilles assertion that the War article of November 1933 
denoted a ‘shift in policy’ was, perhaps, premature.321 
 
Over the ensuing months, while trying to appease both Hitler and Mussolini over the 
Jewish question, the movement seemed to be in something of a quandary about its 
official position on antisemitism. Two weeks after the War article, the BUF appeared to 
backtrack somewhat on the premise that Jews were warmongers, attempting to play 
down the hostility directed to them only a few days previously. For example, in a 
contradictory statement, an article in Blackshirt stated ‘We did not say “the Jews are 
striving to involve Britain in War,” but that “Jews” were doing so’. The article then 
emphasised that ‘We are not now and never have been, anti-Semitic.’322  
 
Also in the Blackshirt a month later, under the title ‘Italy’s Jewish Senator’, the BUF 
announced, in seeming admiration, that a ‘prominent Jewish industrialist in Turin’ had 
been elected to the Italian Senate.323 Yet at the same time, Blackshirt continued to attack 
Jews. For example, it claimed that ‘Roumania […] have changed an antiquated feudal 
system for the far more onerous tyranny of the Jewish money-lenders, who, during the 
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slump, have succeeded in getting whole provinces into their hands’. In consequence, 
Blackshirt predicted the coming fascist revolution in the country. The newspaper was 
also sympathetic to the idea of rich Jews purchasing an island abroad as a permanent 
home for all Jews irrespective of nationality.324 Perhaps the most telling response to the 
BUF’s precarious position was shown in early December’s Blackshirt: ‘some people say 
we are anti-Semitic, others say we are not anti-Semitic. We prefer to believe neither 
party.’325 
 
To suggest, as David Lewis has, that ‘the consistent elements of anti-Semitism were all 
there’ by the end of 1933 or, as Dorril asserted, that the decision to adopt antisemitism 
had been taken by the party by late 1933, are somewhat preemptive.326 In early 1934, 
the BUF changed its position on Jews again as a direct consequence of a cash injection 
from Mussolini. On 9 January, while on one of his regular trips to Italy, Mosley had the 
‘most violent argument’ with Mussolini on the subject of antisemitism.327 The Italian 
leader was furious over how Mosley had embroiled his movement in the attacking of 
Jews. Mosley agreed to curb the antisemitism on Mussolini’s instruction, which may 
well to have been a key condition in the financial negotiation between the two fascist 
leaders. Consequently, in a letter to his boss, Grandi noted how upon his return to 
Britain, he had ‘never seen him [Mosley] so sure of himself and so confident.328 He told 
me that the talk with you had enriched and illuminated him and he left the Palazzo 
Venezia more determined than ever to do battle’.329 On 24 January, a package was sent 
from Rome with £20,000 of foreign currency inside. A week later, it was passed to 
Mosley, who confirmed its content. BUF officials remember seeing hordes of foreign 
notes. A jubilant Mosley told his staff, who by now were desperate for money, that 
‘We’ll put you right up now’.330 In a report to Mussolini, Grandi noted Mosley’s 
gratitude for the ‘material assistance’, which was a key aspect of transnational 
corporations.331 
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As a result of the leader’s Italian visit, the next few months saw BUF publications 
soften their stance toward Jews. In March, the movement’s new publication Fascist 
Week reverted to the initial party line where ‘Jews, loyal to the interests of Britain, have 
nothing to fear when Fascism comes to power in Britain, and Fascists consider the 
whole Jewish question as being relatively unimportant as compared with the great 
national issues with which they are concerned’.332 The movement now even appeared to 
favour Britain as a safe haven for Jews fleeing the continent. A regular contributor to 
BUF publications, John F. Porte, argued that ‘Political events abroad have led to a 
considerable number of Jewish refugees seeking asylum in this country. That a 
sanctuary should be offered to the refugees no one will question […] we have every 
sympathy’. Porte did, however, have concerns over potential competition for jobs in 
roles such as teachers and, in his trade, musicians.333 Furthermore, a gesture was also 
given to Mussolini by dedicating a column to ‘The Jews in Italy’. Another BUF 
correspondent, Muriel Currey, declared that ‘there was no suppression of the Jews in 
Italy. On the contrary, the Chief Rabbi was a Fascist and was a strong supporter of 
Mussolini.’ Currey also spoke glowingly on issues such as the treatment of women and 
the Italian press.334 Mussolini even wrote a front page ‘exclusive’ for Fascist Week.335    
 
However, from early May 1934, the BUF took a complete U-turn regarding its policy 
on antisemitism, one that it would adhere to for the next six years until the internment of 
its leadership. On 4 May 1934, Fascist Week announced the banning of Jews from the 
BUF: ‘Our reasons for excluding the Jews from membership of the British Union of 
Fascists are: 1. Jews and the Jewish Press in this country have bitterly opposed Fascism, 
2. The great majority of Jews have shown themselves to be international in outlook and 
have placed the interests of their own race before the interests of the country in which 
they reside.’336 In the days following this ban – in response to a Conservative meeting 
where attendees criticised the BUF and its leader on a speaking tour of the Lake District 
– Mosley repeatedly attacked the Tories for ‘worshipp[ing] at the shrine of an Italian 
Jew’.337 This jibe was in relation to the Conservative Party’s admiration for their ex-
leader, Benjamin Disraeli. Fascist Week proudly reported the story under the banner 
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‘Conservative Worship of an Italian Jew’, where they poked fun at the ‘fanciful Jew’ 
and his party.338 Many newspapers picked up the story and quoted a Mosley speech in 
which he alluded to the Conservative leaders who ‘dance like portly dervishes before 
the altar of their Eastern divinity, chanting his obsolete incantations’.339 
 
The following months saw the BUF’s antisemitic sentiment continue. Conspiratorial 
accusations against Jews were now in full swing. Besides the Conservative Party being 
Jew-controlled and Jews allegedly being responsible for violence against Blackshirts, 
the ‘hidden hand of the Jew’ was held to task for exerting its influence in many other 
spheres. For example, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) was now deemed ‘subservient’ 
to Jews since they were planning to boycott German goods, a decision made in light of 
recent domestic events in the country: ‘The social democrat, the international financier; 
the Trade Union leader and the unsavoury Oriental, are now united by Jews, in the 
production of the most spectacular slanders against the German Government.’340 The 
BUF labelled the policy a ‘Jewish boycott of Germany’.341 The Depression-era collapse 
of the cotton trade in Lancashire was even blamed on this ‘Jewish boycott’.342 The BUF 
claimed that their members who were employed by Jewish businesses were being 
dismissed because they were fascists.343 This accusation resulted in newsagents refusing 
to distribute future BUF literature on account of a potential libel suit.344  
 
This new wave of antisemitism continued in Mosley’s Albert Hall speech of 16 October 
1934. As reported in the Blackshirt, he 
 
explained in detail how Blackshirts had been compelled by Jewry to defend 
themselves and to defend the nation; how Jewry has used every weapon of 
violence and of intimidation, to attack Blackshirts violently and overtly; how 
they had “blackmailed!” many who desire to support our Movement, and how 
for eighteen months they had injured British trade and had carried on a 
campaign of hatred and venom against a foreign Power with whom Britain was 
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at peace […] A new phase has entered the history of Fascism in Britain […] 
Fascism has accepted the challenge of Jewry.345 
 
Despite the leader’s annoyance that mainstream newspapers ignored him and his 
movement, several outlets reported on the meeting and its aftermath.346 Included in the 
Daily Express’s analysis were further examples from the speech of Mosley’s insistence 
on a so-called Jewish conspiracy: ‘Jewish employers have dismissed men and women 
for no other reason than that they are Blackshirts […] There is a whole organised 
blackmail of the Press through their advertisers, who are extraordinarily strong and 
largely Jewish.’ The newspaper reported on Mosley’s threat that ‘we shall deal with 
organised Jewry in this country because they have challenged the interests of the 
nation’.347 In a similar vein, The Times printed Mosley’s accusation of ‘big business 
men ha[ving] come to him and said that they dare not come out for Fascism, or dare not 
remain in it, because if they did Jews would ruin their business’. According to the 
newspaper, Mosley spoke of ‘the great organised blackmail […] [including] of any 
business man whose interests touched their [Jews] own […] we say to the alien race that 
rises against us to rob us of our heritage, we take up that challenge and deal with it. 
They shall have it.’348 Richard Griffiths noted that ‘by the end of the year, a full-
blooded policy had been developed in which “the force of international Jewish finance”, 
which had “dominated Britain ever since the war”, was blamed for all the ills of the 
present. This policy was to continue right up to the war.’349 
 
A consensus exists among historians that other prominent BUF figures besides the 
leader played a significant role in the BUF’s attitude to, and official adoption of, 
antisemitism. Almost sixty years ago, in one of the earliest scholarly studies on the 
BUF, Colin Cross explained how ‘pressure […] [existed] at every level in the BUF’ for 
Mosley to adopt antisemitism, a stance he ‘found [...] difficult to resist’.350 In his 
thorough study on British interwar antisemitism, Colin Holmes noted the influence of 
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‘some individuals […] [who] encouraged the expression of their hostility’.351 More 
recently, Thomas Linehan, Martin Pugh, Tilles, and Dorril (amongst others) have all 
highlighted the role other members contributed to the party’s antisemitic position, most 
tellingly via Mosley’s ‘influential lieutenants’ William Joyce and A.K Chesterton.352  
 
Salvatore Garau’s transnational study has investigated the influential ‘factions’ 
operating within the movement which, he found, dictated the party’s stance on 
antisemitism. According to Garau, throughout the movement’s lifetime, various 
opposing cliques operated. The two main internal groups were the 
‘conservatives/authoritarians who were more inclined towards Fascist Italy, and 
totalitarians/revolutionaries who were more inclined towards Nazi Germany’. These 
competing factions ‘reproduced at a micro level the competition between Italian 
Fascism and German national socialism that was playing out at the macro level.’ 
Preference was between a more moderate and ‘respectable’ form of fascism, like 
Mussolini’s, or for the extreme, radical and ‘truly revolutionary’ ideas presented by 
Nazism. The former wished to make the BUF into an organised political party, as the 
Italian Fascists had transformed the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento into the PNF a year 
before the March on Rome. This strand played down the paramilitary aspects of the 
BUF and wanted to increase its electoral profile in the hope of achieving success 
through the ballot box. The radical strand (including Joyce and Chesterton), who took 
Germany as its exclusive example, looked to cultivate virulent antisemitism. They 
dismissed the BUF’s existing elites, took on a more anti-capitalist rhetoric, and sought 
to turn the movement into a fully revolutionary party. In short, the ‘Mussolini-like’ 
element wanted respectability and adherence to the established order, while the Nazi 
faction did not believe in compromises, wishing instead to undertake paramilitary 
violence against its enemies in order to build mass appeal. These contrasting views, 
according to Garau, ‘became the two poles around which […] the BUF developed’. He 
argued that the ‘Mussolini-like’ element was initially in control of the party until the 
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adoption of antisemitism, which signified the Nazi group’s takeover. This, in turn, 
forced a shift from a Roman to a Teutonic model of fascism.353 
 
However, Garau, and others, appear to have seen considerably more authority in the 
character of those working under Mosley than is likely to be the case. If leading 
members in government, including prime ministers and cabinet ministers, were unable 
to hold sway over Mosley and – despite their most vigorous and sincere attempts – not 
to mention his best friends, closest allies and even his wife, it seems extremely unlikely 
that a bunch of cranks with little, if any, status would have been able to exert influence 
over the notoriously stubborn dictator, most certainly when it came to the policy 
decisions of his own party. The then Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and former 
colleague of Mosley’s, Clement Attlee, described Mosley’s manner as reminiscent of ‘a 
feudal landlord abusing tenants who were in arrears with their rent’.354 Likewise, the ex-
Liberal leader Jo Grimond declared, the fascist leader an ‘upper-class bully’.355 
 
It has also been argued that BUF antisemitism had been ‘merely suppressed during the 
Rothermere period’.356 Lord Rothermere was an influential press baron who owned 
several newspapers, most notably the Daily Mail. In January 1934, Rothermere, 
although holding Hitler in high regard, believed Mussolini’s brand of fascism was better 
suited to Britain given the latter’s conservative and traditional values. When Rothermere 
agreed to support Mosley, this resulted in an upsurge in conservative and middle-class 
support for the BUF. Rothermere withdrew his only backing six months later over 
concerns that the BUF’s use of antisemitism would lead to the withdrawal of Jewish 
advertisers in his newspapers.357 What scholars like as Dorril and Tilles have failed to 
explain, however, is that if it was true, as they have suggested, that Rothermere’s 
support led to the curbing of antisemitism in the BUF, why did Mosley openly ban Jews 
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from the movement in early May 1934, while still ‘under the influence’ of the press 
tycoon, and some two months before Rothermere turned his back on the fascists?  
 
More plausibly, the reason for the BUF’s turn towards open antisemitism was to attract 
funding from the Nazis, who had already criticised Mosley for his lack of antipathy 
towards Jews. As aforementioned, the financial agreement with the Duce began in 
March the previous year and was only guaranteed for 18 months. Therefore, Mosley 
would have been aware that the subsidies were likely to end in August 1934, a mere 
three months from the time of the banning of Jews from the BUF. Although Mussolini 
did continue with payments in the run-up to his African invasion, Mosley was not to 
know this at the time. In addition, as also aforementioned, despite Mussolini agreeing to 
send money to Mosley, the latter regularly complained of missed or delayed payments. 
In this way, Italian funding and transnational support was precarious and not to be relied 
upon. At the time, the Home Office estimated annual BUF expenditure was between 
£40,000 and £80,000 with Italy reported to contribute at least £36,000 to the BUF 
annually. MI5 noted that without funds from Italy, the British movement would cease to 
exist. Mosley was even reported to have informed Mussolini to that effect. It was ‘for 
all practical purposes dependant on foreign funds’.358  
 
Together with the BUF’s increase in open antisemitism in a bid to attract the Nazis’ 
attention, the movement also pursued an overtly pro-Nazi line. In May 1934, the rabid 
antisemite and Hitler worshipper, William Joyce, dominated the front pages of 
Blackshirt. On the same day as the BUF outlawed Jews, Mosley began a recruitment 
drive for speakers and Joyce, himself an impressive orator, was tasked with writing 
articles on ‘If you want to be a Speaker.’ Almost certainly copied from the Nazis, the 
instructions of the two-part piece insisted that ‘those who wish to represent us on the 
platform’ would need to immerse themselves in the appropriate literature, most notably 
the works of Hitler:  
 
Since Fascism cannot be dissociated from the great personalities who have made 
it, the student should read Drennan's book on the [BUF] Leader, Mussolini's 
autobiography, and Hitler's “My Struggle,” more famous as “Mein Kampf.” The 
latter work is of remarkable interest to speakers, who will find that Adolf Hitler 
has a shrewd appreciation of their problems. Whilst in training, the student will 
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naturally read as much of the daily and weekly press as he can absorb; and only 
a portion of what is absorbed can be retained.359    
 
The following month, Mosley purposely used his ‘monster meeting’ at the Olympia 
Stadium to instigate a large melee which, he hoped, would attract the attention of press 
and politicians alike.360 This, in turn, would alert the Germans and prove his 
commitment to the fascist cause, which the Nazis had previously doubted. Mosley was 
clearly aware that the meeting held on 7 June 1934 would result in ‘mass violence’.361 
Speaking on BBC radio days after the brawl, an unrepentant Mosley admitted that ‘we 
knew all about […] [the] Red violence […] and so did the authorities. For weeks before 
the meeting, incitements to attack it were published, and maps were printed to show 
how to get to the meetings.’362 He was also obviously aware of the 15,000 tickets 
purchased for the event, making it, at the time, the largest indoor event Britain had ever 
seen.363 Tellingly, Special Branch made no record of any preparations by Mosley to deal 
with the upcoming violence, which suggests he ‘took no special precautions’.364 In fact, 
the BUF member, Alex Miles later explained how ‘the hall had been surveyed in order 
to discover how many men were required to control each exit and entrance.’365 These 
2,000 Blackshirts from around the country were called to duty that evening to ‘swell the 
ranks of the Defence Force’.366 When they arrived at the venue, alcohol was freely 
available, ‘almost as freely as blood flowed during the course of the meeting’.367 
Violence at Olympia that evening was inevitable. 
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At Olympia, moreover, the Blackshirts were overzealous from the outset. As soon as a 
heckler attempted to speak, ‘there is no pause to hear what the interrupter is saying: 
there is no request to leave quietly: there is only mass assault.’368 Pugh commented on 
the ‘scores of eyewitness accounts of the violence meted out by fascist thugs on anyone 
who intervened to ask a question.’369 Storm Jameson, one of several writers and 
journalists present observed ‘a solitary man or woman stood up, made or began to make 
a remark inaudible to all but his close neighbours, and was instantly set on by a dozen 
or more Blackshirts and kicked and pummelled unrestrainedly, before being ejected.’370 
After being forcibly thrown out of the hall, Jameson claimed, 200 drunken Blackshirts 
set upon their prey like a pack of ‘wolves’.371 The BUF’s official photographer, Kay 
Fredericks, was unsurprised by the amount of ‘quite serious injuries [that] originated in 
this double beating-up process. It was not a matter of six to one this time, but about 
twenty to thirty’.372 The editor of the News Chronical described ‘a man lying on the 
floor, obviously powerless and done for, being mercilessly kicked and horribly handled 
by a group of Blackshirts’. He remarked upon how the scenes he witnessed that night 
were more brutal than ‘anything I have ever seen in my life short of war. It made me 
feel physically sick.’373  
 
Barnes and Barnes claimed that the assaults were conducted ‘in typical Stormtrooper 
fashion’ and ‘dismayed some of Mosley’s conservative supporters’.374 Special Branch 
noted how the ‘removals and interruptions’ lasted for an hour, yet the police – who 
‘were so disgusted that they drew their truncheons, driving the Blackshirts back into the 
main hall and calling them “bloody bastards”’ – were forced to leave the premises after 
a BUF official complained of their presence. Mosley had a strict ‘no police’ policy for 
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the meeting.375 The leader could have simply continued his speech, which contained 
‘virulent anti-Semitism’, as the loudspeakers would have drowned out any heckling. 
Instead, he stopped talking and spotlights were shone upon the fighting so all in 
attendance could see.376 According to Jameson, ‘even fascist supporters were at a loss to 
know why [Mosley] held up his speech at each interruption for periods varying from 
three to six minutes when he could perfectly well have drowned them with a voice made 
unbearably loud by the amplifiers. Slowly we all understood that it was done to allow 
his Blackshirts to make a thorough mess of the interruptor [sic].’377 Indeed, Mosely was 
‘cock-a-hoop’ with all the trouble.378 
 
His scheme worked. Attention was widespread. Reports of the melee flooded the press 
for days after.379 Three Conservative MPs, who observed the palaver, felt moved 
enough to write to The Times that same evening. These ‘involuntary witnesses’ reported 
on the use of ‘wholly unnecessary violence inflicted by uniformed Blackshirts on 
interrupters. Men and women were knocked down, and after they had been knocked 
down, were still assaulted and kicked on the floor. It will be a matter of surprise to us if 
there were no fatal injuries’.380 Politicians criticised the BUF. According to the News 
Chronicle, the 150 MPs present at Olympia were unanimous in condemning the 
behaviour of the Blackshirts there, and put pressure on the government ‘to get a grip on 
the situation’.381  
 
However, the condemnation of violence was not the only viewpoint expressed. Several 
commentators saw the Blackshirts as merely defending themselves and their meeting 
from their antagonists. For example, in the National Review Captain Luttman-Johnson – 
Secretary of the pro-fascist January Club – spoke of ‘the fine bearing of the young 
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Blackshirt men and women under extreme provocation’.382 Several Tory MPs 
complained that ‘without freedom of speech there can be no democracy’.383 Some even 
dismissed the melee as ‘the good old fashioned way by the use of a fist’, or as an 
average Saturday night at the Cow-caddens in Glasgow. Others asked the question: 
‘Why are we making all this fuss about this wretched meeting at Olympia?’384 The MP 
for Argyll, Mr Frederick Macquisten, perhaps made the most poignant comment when 
he attacked the MP who brought the debate to the House of Commons: ‘I should think 
that he [Mosley] will throw up his hat with glee to-morrow when he sees the 
magnificent advertisement he has been given by the hon. Member for Bodmin, and still 
more when he sees the House, and all parties in the House, in such a state of panic.’ 
Macquisten accurately concluded that Mosley must have been ‘profoundly grateful’ to 
the House for this debate.385 
 
Regardless of who was to blame, it appeared Mosley was achieving what he set out to 
do: to make the Nazis rethink their view of him and his movement. German newspapers 
marvelled at the ‘energetic defence of Blackshirts in a bloody battle’ against 
Communists. The German Foreign Ministry said that Olympia was symptomatic of 
events which were occurring throughout England: the ‘growth of support for British 
fascism, lively activity in meetings and recruitment together with the growth of an 
aggressive and defensive rejection of fascism by its opponents’.386 Discreet discussions 
took place between the BUF’s head of foreign relations, George A. Pfister, and the 
Nazis over a potential meeting between Mosley and the German Führer. In a statement 
passed to the Nazis, Mosley said ‘It is beyond question that the present and future 
outlook brings my operation even closer to Arnold’s [his codename for Hitler] so that 
close cooperation is absolutely necessary. We both have the same aims.’ In a clear turn 
from Mussolini to Hitler, Mosley declared that the BUF was in excellent agreement 
with Italian Fascism, but ‘Arnold’s business is of greater importance’. He also 
committed to hard-line antisemitism: ‘As far as our opponents of non-Aryan race are 
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concerned, we will have to take the most drastic measures as soon as we are in power, 
or we will have no rest.’387  
 
From this point until the movement’s proscription, Mosley continued to laud the Nazis. 
He regularly claimed that Hitler was Europe’s saviour from Communism.388 In early 
July, when the vast majority of the British public gasped in horror at the infamous 
Rohm purge, infamously coined the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, the BUF came out 
solidly in defence of the Führer.389 In Blackshirt, under the title ‘Hitler’s Stand Against 
Financiers And Intriguers’, the BUF claimed that international finance had prepared a 
revolution in Germany for the overthrow of Hitler. Moreover, the murdered 
‘conspirators’ had either succumbed to ‘financial inducements’ or were susceptible to 
influence: 
 
Out of gratitude for their help in the early days, Hitler had treated these officers 
with every consideration; and there is plenty of evidence to show that they 
repaid his loyalty by leading extravagant lives, most unworthy of their position. 
They now added, to these the greatest Fascist crime of disloyalty to their leader, 
through whom alone their cause had triumphed.390 
 
Blackshirt also began quoting from Hitler’s autobiography. A column titled ‘A Topical 
Quotation from “Mein Kampf’”’ was a lengthy extract from the infamous book, which 
included the following section on the Jews: 
 
international world-Jew is slowly, but surely strangling us, our so-called 
“patriots” are raging against the man and a System that have had the courage to 
tear themselves free, in one bit of the world at least [in reference to Italy], from 
the Jew-Freemason embrace, and to oppose the international world poison with 
the forces of nationalism.391  
 
By now some politicians, certain sections of the press and members of the public linked 
the BUF directly with Nazism. Antifascists would demonstrate at BUF meetings 
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holding caricatures of Mosley and Hitler while shouting ‘Unite to Fight the Fascist 
Terror.’392 General Secretary of the Community Party of Great Britain, Harry Pollitt, 
argued that Mosley was using the same methods in Britain as Hitler had used to gain 
power in Germany.393 The Observer described ‘the Nazi technique’ and the ‘Nazi 
temper’ of the BUF.394 The regional papers ran headlines, such as ‘Sir Oswald Mosley 
and Hitler’ and ‘Mosley Praises Hitler’.395 Reported widely in the press was ex-
Conservative MP and critic of Mosley, Lord Melchett, who, after hearing Mosley’s 
recent outbursts, labelled the British fascist leader a ‘second-hand Hitler’.396 In its 
coverage of the Albert Hall meeting, The Church Times stated how Mosley had 
 
declared war on the Jews, in terms that might have been quotations from Nazi 
speeches and publications […] [His speech] appears to be one more attempt to 
arouse sympathy here for the Hitler Government by charging the Jews with 
striving “to arouse in this country the feelings and passions of war with a nation 
with whom this country made peace in 1918.” If they have striven to do this, 
they have signally failed.397 
 
However, Mosley was unable to convince the leading Nazi in Britain, Bene, that the 
BUF was of any relevance. Furthermore, Bene was still of the opinion that the BUF was 
at the behest of Jewish interests. Bene repeatedly rebuffed Pfister’s attempts to arrange a 
meeting between Mosley and Hitler:  
 
During the past ten days [Pfister] visited the German Nazi Party offices in 
London on several occasions to negotiate for a meeting through Herr Bene of Sir 
Oswald Mosley and Herr Hitler in Germany. Bene has definitely refused to 
arrange the matter and moreover has informed Dr. E. W. Bohle, leader of the 
foreign department of the Nazi Party in Hamburg, of his decision; and further, 
that Mosley is a person of little importance. He also expressed the view that no 
good would accrue to the Party and its aims as the result of such a meeting. 
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Pfister intimated that he would attempt to bring about the meeting through other 
channels, but it is unlikely, in view of Bene’s attitude, that he will succeed.398  
 
These ‘other channels’, as mentioned in the Home Office report, included using the visit 
of Lothar Streicher to London over the summer. This was undertaken to persuade the 
young Nazi to return to Germany and convince his influential father, Julius Streicher, to 
negotiate a meeting between the two fascist leaders. Again, Pfister’s plan failed. Mosley 
even met with Bene in secret in an unsuccessful attempt to win him over. Mosley told 
the influential Nazi 
 
we have never received a penny from Jews. I give you my word of honour […] 
During the first few months I intentionally said not even one word against the 
Jews. If I had done so we would never have been able to withstand the power of 
the Jews. We would have been simply crushed. We were not strong enough 
then. Today we are so strong that we are feared […] [W]e should attack no Jew 
on the grounds of his religion or race. We attack them because of their damaging 
influence on the people, because of their internationalism, because of their many 
activities of all kinds against the good of the people. The outcome is the same. 
[The] anti-German world boycott by the Jews is led from London. And I 
imagine that you are well aware in Germany what it will mean if we break 
Jewish power here […] Open war […] I will contribute my part in order to 
hasten this explosion and I have so organised my plan of campaign that they will 
find us ready, whatever they do.399  
 
Mosley was finally granted an audience with the Führer in April 1935. Dorril has 
argued that Hitler had resisted meeting the British fascist leader, as he was concerned 
that the encounter would become public and therefore damage relations with the British 
government. He claimed that the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 1935, ‘eased 
British fears of a German sea threat and a naval arms race [… and therefore] Hitler 
believed the treaty freed him from British interference in his own plans.’400 However, 
the treaty was not signed by both nations until mid-June 1935, two months after the 
meeting, and was not registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series until July.  
 
A more likely explanation for the meeting was through a somewhat surprising and 
intriguing relationship between the Führer and two young aristocratic British sisters: 
Unity and Diana Mitford. Unity, the fifth of seven children, met Mosley around the time 
he formed the BUF. Her older sister, Diana, who was now Mosley’s mistress, 
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introduced them to one another at a party.401 As soon as Unity saw him, she called him 
‘the Leader’ and, almost instantly, donned the new black shirt.402 Both sisters were part 
of the BUF contingent who visited the first Nuremberg Rally in the autumn of 1933, 
where an excited Diana described how ‘an almost electric shock passed through the 
multitude’ when Hitler appeared.403 The Nuremberg Rally had a profound effect on 
Unity and Diana. Although already an admirer of Hitler, the Rally ‘turned conviction 
into worship’ for Unity.404 As the younger sister later said, ‘the first moment I saw him, 
I knew there was no-one I would rather meet’.405  
 
In February 1935 through stalking and ‘making eyes at him’ daily at his favourite 
restaurant in Munich, the Osteria Bavaria, she finally met her idol, Hitler.406 The Führer 
invited her to his table and spoke with the young Englishwomen at length, becoming 
‘intrigued by her’.407 She described that day in letters to her family: ‘It was the most 
wonderful and beautiful of my life [...] I am so happy that I wouldn’t mind a bit dying. I 
suppose I am the luckiest girl in the world. For me he is the greatest man of all time’.408 
Unity quickly became part of Hitler’s inner circle. She accompanied Hitler to party 
rallies and state events, and her family were even invited to dine with the Führer. Unity 
was very much ‘persona grata’ with Hitler until she killed herself on the day that war 
was declared.409 
 
The following month Diana, urged by Mosley to form a friendship with Hitler via 
Unity, drove to Munich where she was introduced by her sister to ‘sweet Uncle 
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Adolf’.410 The sisters, for several reasons, fascinated Hitler. First, he was attracted by 
their Nordic beauty. He described the two sisters as ‘angels’, and admired their physical 
features ‘so much so that both sisters got away with wearing the make-up of which he 
so disapproved’.411 After meeting Diana, he described the sisters as ‘perfect examples of 
Aryan women’.412 Second, Hitler was surrounded by ‘yes men’ who were afraid to 
question their leader. In contrast, the sisters were not seemingly scared of him, and 
would freely voice their own opinions. At least from these foreign guests, Hitler 
respected and appreciated that.413  
 
Last, and perhaps most importantly, there was also Hitler’s obsession with superstition 
and his own role in German history and mythology. One commenter branded him ‘a 
patron of occult mysticism’.414 The connections, particularly with Unity, appeared 
remarkable to mystically inclined Nazis. Unity was conceived in a tiny mining town in 
Canada called Swastika and her middle name was Valkyrie, after the war maidens in 
Wagner’s opera.415 Hitler was obsessed with Wagner, drawing ideas from his writings 
and opera.416 Furthermore, the sisters’ grandfather (the first Lord Redesdale) was a 
friend of Wagner’s.417 Redesdale had also written introductions for and translated books 
by the racial theorist, Houston Stewart Chamberlain: an author who had profoundly 
influenced Hitler when writing Mein Kampf.418 When he discovered the links it would 
have been, for him, ‘a sort of sign’ that the sisters were ‘sent to him, it was destined’.419 
Crucially, it was the two sisters who convinced Hitler to meet with their Leader, 
Mosley. 
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As Dorril has stated, no transcript of this pivotal meeting has survived.420 Therefore, we 
have to rely on Mosley’s depiction of the conversation. According to Mosley, his host 
became elated when he insisted that ‘war between Britain and Germany would be a 
terrible disaster’. Mosley guaranteed Hitler that if he was head of the British 
government, maintaining the British Empire would be his priority and German affairs 
(domestic or foreign) would be no business of Great Britain: ‘The men with whom we 
quarrel in life are those who want the same thing as we do, with consequent clash of 
interest; Hitler and I pursued different paths.’421 Following the conversation, Unity 
asked Hitler his opinion of Mosley. He replied, ‘Ein ganzer Keril! [Quite a man]’, while 
Goebbels claimed he made ‘a good impression’.422 Inevitably, the request for funds 
followed shortly after the meet.423  
 
In a bid to obtain money, Mosley continued to display his party’s commitment to 
antisemitism.424 Furthermore, as a mark of allegiance to Hitler, he made cosmetic 
changes to the BUF which clearly identified it with the Nazi model. In early 1936, he 
changed the BUF’s dress to a Nazi-style uniform, replacing the Italianesque black shirt 
with a black jacket, peaked cap and jackboots. Later that year, he extended the 
movement’s name to the ‘British Union of Fascists and National Socialists’ (‘British 
Union’ for short) and changed its emblem from the Roman fasces to the Naziesque 
flash-and-circle.425 In addition, at the behest of Hitler, Mosley agreed to marry Diana in 
Germany (October 1936). According to Allen, who was present at the wedding, Hitler 
had ‘certain bourgeois scruples in sexual matters’ and did not like the idea of the two 
living together while not married.426 Hitler was not only present at the wedding but 
arranged the event.427 Mosley insisted that the wedding be kept a secret because he 
feared Diana would be a target for violence if it became known she was his wife.428 He 
insisted they were not to marry in their own country or at a British embassy abroad, for 
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‘We might as well tell the town crier.’429 However, if this was a cause of great concern 
for Mosley, and if he was truly fearful for Diana’s safety, it begs the question why he 
would marry her at a time when he was subject to such hostility.  
 
A more plausible explanation for the marriage taking place in Germany was to build a 
closer relationship with Hitler in the hope of obtaining much-needed funds – at a time 
when Mussolini’s subsidy had shrunk considerably. It is likely that Mosley thought the 
wedding would strengthen the bond of friendship between the two fascist leaders in 
several ways. One, inviting Hitler to their ‘big day’ was in itself a symbol of friendship. 
Two, Mosley had not been granted another audience with Hitler since his first 18 
months earlier, and his wedding was an ideal opportunity to rectify that. Three, Diana’s 
(and Unity’s) relationship with the German leader had strengthened since Mosley’s 
initial meeting with him.430 By marrying Diana, it may have curried favour with Hitler 
because of the Führer’s fondness for his new wife. 
 
Although rumours of Nazi funding for the BUF were commonplace in the secret 
services, they could find no evidence to support the theories.431 However, in 2006, 
Dorril uncovered evidence of German payments. His analysis focuses largely on the 
diary of Hitler’s propaganda chief, Dr Josef Goebbels, and the Luxembourg Nazi Party. 
The diary shows entries during mid-1937 confirming that the Nazis did fund the BUF: 
‘Mosley needs money […] Wants it from us. Has already had £2,000 [...] £100,000 
necessary. £60,000 promised. Must submit to Führer.’ Shortly hereafter, Diana, on 
behalf of her husband, pleaded with Goebbels ‘for an infusion of £100,000’. Further 
requests were made over the summer but came with a warning: ‘Mosley must work 
harder and be less mercenary […] [Diana] wants money again for Mosley […] She was 
fed with hopes. Should help themselves sometimes.’432 This reinforces the Nazis’ 
suspicion that Mosley’s primary motivation to build and maintain a relationship with 
them was financial. Through examining the Luxembourg Nazi Party, Dorril revealed 
that £4,000 worth of francs was given to the BUF from the Germans through ‘Agent 
18’.433 Diana’s direct appeals to high-ranking Nazis appear to have secured funding for 
the BUF. It is likely the reason for the Nazis’ largesse on the grounds that, like the 
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Italians, they incorrectly believed that Mosley may have been able to stifle British 
hostility to their expansionist foreign policy.  
 
Although it appears Hitler did action Diana’s repeated requests for funding, the Nazis 
were significantly less generous in their financial contributions to Mosley than the 
Italians had been.434 Therefore, Mosley was forced to seek other moneymaking ventures 
to keep his personal affairs and his movement afloat. He took full advantage of his 
relationship with the Nazis. In 1938, Mosley successfully petitioned the Nazi regime on 
behalf of the wealthy Jewish banking tycoon Victor Rothschild for the safe passage of 
his cousin, Louis de Rothschild, who was imprisoned by the Nazis in Austria after the 
Anschluss. During his interrogation in 1942 by the head of MI5’s section for monitoring 
fascist groups in Britain, Francis Aiken-Sneath, Allen, who by this time was readily 
cooperating with the British authorities, described the event as ‘the ransoming of Louis 
de Rothschild’.435 According to Allen, who acted as an intermediary for the 
negotiations, Oliver Hoare (the banker brother of Samuel) had been approached by the 
Rothschilds in Paris and asked if he could obtain Mosley’s assistance. Rothschild 
offered Mosley £40,000 [£2.6 million approx.] if he could secure the release of his 
cousin through using his connections in Germany, but Mosley demanded £120,000 [£8 
million approx.] for his efforts. After retaining the services of a Belgian Rexist financier 
named Wryns who was to collect 25 per cent for receiving the money, Mosley sent 
Diana to Berlin to see Himmler who granted Louis’s freedom. Mosley received £80,000 
[5.3 million approx.] for his help in securing the release, some of which, according to 
Allen, was used to pay off a private mortgage.436 
 
By this time, the British press had reported on a number of incidents verifying Mosley’s 
ties to the Nazis. For example, in May 1935, it was revealed that Mosley had been 
exchanging friendly telegrams with, the rabid antisemitic Nazi, Julius Streicher; and by 
the end of 1938, it was common knowledge of the Mosley’s wedding in Munich, which 
was witnessed by Hitler.437 Furthermore, through its own publications, the BUF did not 
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hide its support for the Nazis (see below). Therefore, the BUF was viewed in Britain as 
having close relations with the Nazi regime.  
    
Another notable example of Mosley using his relationship with Nazis for his gain was 
the selling of radio advertising space from offshore broadcasting locations transmitting 
to the UK. Again, against the wishes of Ribbentrop and Goebbels, who had ‘not been 
particularly well disposed to the scheme’,438 Diana convinced ‘Uncle Adolf’ to sanction 
the use of German land for the radio plan. In an interview with the security services, a 
broadcasting expert assisting Mosley, Peter Eckersley, explained that ‘The Germany 
concession had been obtained by Diana Mosley who […] had sat in Berlin for over a 
year, nagging at Nazi officials to give it to her. At last she went to Hitler personally, and 
after some difficulty, got the concession direct from him.’ According to Eckersley, 
Mosley was going to use the money obtained from the profits for the BUF funds.439 
However, the Allied declaration of war in September 1939 meant ‘the whole lot had 
gone to smash’.440  
 
Unsurprisingly, given Mussolini’s rebuff and Hitler’s willingness to finance the 
struggling movement – while entertaining the radio broadcast plan on German soil – the 
remaining years of the BUF’s existence saw it continue its avidly pro-Nazi style and 
stance.441 These came under the guise of campaigns such as ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ 
and ‘Britain First’, which called for peace with Germany. Almost weekly, the 
movement’s newspapers attacked the British press over their hostile reporting of Hitler 
and the Nazis. In 1937, Action ran a weekly column called ‘National Socialism & the 
British People’ in which it argued that ‘Much ink has been spilt by the scribes of the 
gutter press in their efforts to persuade the people that National Socialism will deny 
them the rights of free speech. When in point of fact National Socialism will bring to 
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this country for the first time real opportunities for free speech.’442 The following year, 
Action regularly reported on and supported Hitler’s condemnation of the British 
press.443 In 1939, the BUF ran another regular anti-British press series in Action titled 
‘This Freedom! “Our Great and Glorious Press”’.444 Following the outbreak of war on 3 
September 1939, there featured in the same newspaper an almost weekly column titled 
‘The Press and The War’ in which examples of British newspapers being critical of the 
Führer were printed and ‘“popular” press reporters’ were branded ‘third-rate fiction 
writers’.445 
 
In addition, the BUF defended every major foreign policy move that the Nazis 
undertook in the run-up to the Second World War, Mosley describing Hitler as ‘a 
singularly shrewd, lucid intellectual’.446 For example, Hitler’s Anschluss (Union) with 
Austria, was vigorously defended in Action. The BUF attacked the ‘dishonesty of the 
Press racketeers: The impression of an Austria cowed into submission by brutal Hitler is 
[…] far from the truth […] [and the press have] serve[d] up dangerous falsehoods in the 
guise of truth.’ To support its argument, the BUF included an extract from ‘one of the 
few sane articles yet published on the Austro-German situation’. According to the Daily 
Express  
 
An Austrian plebiscite a few years ago would have given Hitler an 
overwhelming majority in favour of joining Austria to Germany […] Some of 
that fervour has cooled, but the Austrians in the mass are by no means 
unfavourable to the idea now […] Anybody who goes to save Austria from 
Hitler will find half the Austrians fighting on Hitler's side.447 
 
Despite insisting six months before the occupation that Germany would not invade 
Czechoslovakia – because ‘I reject utterly the whole conception of Hitler breaking his 
word’ – Mosley claimed that ‘internal disruption’ encouraged by the British was 
responsible for the Nazi invasion. This was nothing to do with Germany, but a ‘bid for 
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independence by the discontented Slovaks’ who pleaded to Berlin for assistance.448 By 
defending a ‘small but insolent people [who] love to lord it over their German 
minorities [the British government] have encouraged the Czechs to provoke a world 
catastrophe’.449 The BUF even bemoaned the Czechoslovak refugees fleeing from 
German occupation for ‘seeking Britons’ jobs’.450  
 
The day after the Nazis invaded Poland, the BUF attacked Poland and blamed the 
victorious governments of the First World War for the subsequent assault: 
 
The Poles were a perpetual nuisance to Czarist Russia, and there was a 
permanent state of rebellion among the many races which constituted the 
Hapsburg and Turkish Empires. In addition, it must be remembered that before 
the war a large part of the present Poland belonged to Germany […] The truth is 
that in destroying the Austro-Hungarian Empire – the only bulwark against 
German expansion – and dividing the Balkan States, the politicians made it 
inevitable that Germany should, at some time or other, dominate Eastern 
Europe. They also made it certain that we could do nothing practical to stop it. 
They have, in fact, only themselves to blame […] And that being the case, why 
should millions of British lives be sacrificed in an attempt to upset a situation 
which they themselves have created? 451 
 
In the days preceding the outbreak of war, fascists congregated outside, the soon-to-be 
prime minister, Winston Churchill’s Epping constituency office to chant ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’. To this, Churchill responded: ‘We are minding our own business. 
We don’t want organisations which seem chiefly to be minding Germany’s business.’452  
 
Attacks on Jews, who were ‘the aliens of peace’ with Germany, remained a significant 
feature of the movement’s rhetoric in its final years. Between 1937 and 1940, Jews were 
attacked on the front page of BUF periodicals at an average of almost one in every two 
issues.453 For example, in January 1937, the BUF proclaimed that ‘Not the whole of 
Jewry with all its Press, all its films and all its hacks can make the British people hate 
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the Germany which has found her soul in Adolf Hitler.’454 The following year, Mosley 
proudly announced in Action that his party has ‘at each stage opposed the quarrel with 
Germany […] [undertaken] in the interests of Jewish finance’.455 In the June 1939 issue 
of Blackshirt, Mosley wrote: ‘We hear their [Jews’] broken English from political 
platforms pretending to lead the workers and urging them on to fight Germany or any 
other country which has attacked the Jewish race […] Britons Never, Never Shall Be 
Slaves, Least Of All To An Alien Master.’456 In April 1940, eight months after Britain 
declared war on Germany, the BUF declared that ‘it is not the fate of small nations 
which keeps us at war with Germany, but the blood feud against that country of the 
Jewish Finance which is the master of Financial Democracy.’457 The following month, 
the British government interned Mosley and many BUF members, fearing they were 
operating as a Nazi ‘fifth column’.458  
 
This chapter has identified clear transnational activity in both Mosley’s pre-fascist years 
and in his movement, the BUF. Mosley’s early thinking was heavily affected by his 
industrial fact-finding mission across the United States in which he visited, among other 
types, a vast array of manufacturing and engineering works. Together with a tour of the 
US Federal Reserve Board, he took these experiences and formed his own ideas, which 
culminated in future attitudes and policies. Several years later, after becoming 
disillusioned with the British political system and those within it, he took an active 
interest in European political systems that unequivocally rejected democracy, including, 
somewhat surprisingly, Russia, where he was interested in the Communists 
rationalisation programme. However, the ultranationalist Italian Fascism was the 
inspiration behind the BUF, and it played a significant role in Mosley’s vision of a 
British Corporate State, which would replace what he saw as the tired, old and weak 
democratic parliamentary system. Therefore, the BUF, with its palingenetic and ultra-
nationalistic fascism, fits Griffin’s model of a fascist minimum.      
 
Mosley’s quest for funding led the BUF to take an overtly pro-Fascist attitude. This 
sentiment continued after payments were secured, but, in exchange for the subsidies, 
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Mussolini demanded the BUF work for the money, which resulted in the ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’ campaign. Therefore, financial assistance from the Italians had a 
direct impact on BUF policy. When funding decreased and eventually stopped 
altogether, Mosley and the BUF periodicals continued to refer to Mussolini and his 
nation in positive terms. By then, however, their attention had turned firmly in another 
direction. 
 
The second half of this chapter has been devoted to the BUF’s relations with Hitler and 
his Nazi Party. Alongside courting the Italians, Mosley also attempted to build relations 
with the Nazis. The BUF adopted an open policy of antisemitism and perpetrated 
violence to attract the attention of the Nazis in an attempt to acquire funds from Hitler. 
Furthermore, BUF branches were formed in German cities in an attempt to connect with 
Nazi officials. Yet, the intriguing relationship between the Mitford sisters and Hitler 
was what finally gained Mosley an audience with the Führer. From this, the BUF 
received a cash injection from the Nazis as well as permission to use German land to 
broadcast to the UK to sell radio advertising space. As a result of Hitler’s support, the 
BUF wholehearted supported every one of the Nazis aggressive foreign invasions that 
led to the Second World War, while doing its utmost to prevent war between Britain 
and Germany.  
 
Initially, each case study’s transnationalism began with the influence of Italian Fascism 
before taking different paths – Mussolini for a time was the messiah of all three 
movements. The BUF was obsessively pro-Fascist for the first few years of its existence 
and then favoured the German model thereafter. Likewise, at first, the IFL favoured 
Mussolini but when the Nazis emerged onto the scene, it immediately became zealously 
pro-Hitler and wholehearted supported him for the remained of its lifetime. The BF 
always considered Italian Fascism its ideological brethren moved somewhat ideological 
closer to the Nazis in the 1930s. Furthermore, the BUF, IFL and the BF adopted the 
Italian Corporatism – the BUF and the IFL from the outset and the BF in the second half 
of its life.  
 
It is almost certain that both the BUF and the IFL were, at least in part, funded by a 
foreign power (the BF may or may not have received a small donation from the Nazis, 
although the evidence for this is weak). However, it is evident that Mosley altered BUF 
polices and activities in exchange for funding from both Mussolini and then Hitler. In 
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contrast, the IFL’s funding, which came exclusively from the Nazis, was a consequence 
of its fixed and longstanding White supremacist ideology and antisemitism. From as 
soon as the Nazis came to his attention, Leese supported them fully. In contrast, Mosley 
courted them both and favoured whichever fascist power could benefit him and his 
movement. This is played out most obviously in the role of antisemitism in the BUF.   
 
Interestingly, despite it being the most well-known and popular of the three case studies 
and its leader the most intellectually gifted and charismatic of the three leaders, it 
probably had the least influence transnationally. Its attempt to form an alliance with far-
right movements across the Empire was a damp squib and collapsed almost 
immediately after its inception. On the other hand, the IFL was a well-respected and 
important source for extreme Jew-haters across the globe, while BF branches abroad at 
some degree of impact on the countries outside of Britain in which it operated.  
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Conclusion: ‘You choose your side once and for all – of course it may be the wrong 
side. Only history can tell that.’1 
 
This thesis has proved that transnationalism was an essential factor to interwar British 
fascism. It has uncovered, analysed, and explained the transnational influences and 
connections from abroad, most notably from Italian Fascism and German Nazism, on 
Britain’s three major fascist parties during the interwar era – the British Fascisti (BF), 
the Imperial Fascist League (IFL) and the British Union of Fascists (BUF) – and, in 
turn, the impact that these three movements had on their overseas counterparts. In so 
doing, this study has enhanced several areas of scholarship. First, it is the first in-depth 
investigation of the British far right from a transnational perspective. Second, it adds a 
further and much-needed dimension to the new and underdeveloped sphere of 
transnational fascism. In so doing, it has uncovered significant and unexplored aspects 
of the far right and, as a result, has offered a more complete picture of the larger context 
of which it is a part. Third, it brings a fresh approach to the abundance of work relating 
to interwar British fascism undertaken by historians. Forth, for the first time, this study 
brings together studies of British fascism and fascism in the White dominions in a way 
that shows the links and overlaps as, partly, imperial. Finally, it has crossed three 
spheres of scholarship: historical, cultural and political. Therefore, it has extended our 
understanding of the significance of the far right in Britain and beyond. 
 
However, to enhance this investigation, further areas of research are required. Due to 
the limitation on space, this thesis has only been able to investigate three interwar 
British fascist groups. Therefore, broader research is needed. Other interwar British far-
right movements, including the Right Club, the Anglo-German Fellowship, the Link 
and the rarely mentioned English Array, are worthy of examination. A key figure also 
worthy of further investigation is one of the leading British antisemites of the period, 
Henry Hamilton Beamish of the Britons. Beamish toured the transnational circuit. He 
spoke at a meeting of the Canadian Nationalist Party in Winnipeg, shared a platform 
with the ‘Canadian Führer, Adrien Arcand, in the United States at the behest of the 
German American Bund and embarked on a major lecture tour of Nazi Germany where 
he claimed to have mingled with prominent Nazi officials.2 Scholarship from a 
 
1 Graham Greene, The Confidential Agent (London, 1971), p. 68. 
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transnational perspective on the post-war far right is also underdeveloped. For example, 
very little has been written about the National Front (NF), the British National Party 
(BNP) and the violent neo-Nazi terrorist organisation Combat 18 through the 
transnational lens. In addition, the study would develop significantly if overseas 
movements, large and small, were also investigated through the prism of 
transnationalism.  
 
Transnational British fascism, however, did not stop at the outbreak of war in 
September 1939. Unlike countries on the continent, support for fascism was virtually 
non-existent in wartime Britain. Perhaps the most salient example of this is the BUF’s 
disastrous wartime by-election results: standing for the immediate peace with Nazi 
Germany, each candidate lost their deposit.3 The most famous of these is the Middleton 
and Prestwich by-election of May 1940. A veteran of the First World War, Frederick 
Haslam, who was awarded the Military Medal when fighting on the Somme, stood as a 
BUF candidate against a political novice representing the Conservative Party, Ernest 
Gates.4 Labour and the Liberal parties combined against the fascist candidature, 
standing down their candidates and allowing Gates to win the contest with a resounding 
98.7 per cent of the votes: an all-time record for any contested UK parliamentary by-
election. Prime Minister Churchill, who had only assumed the office days before the 
election, addressed a message of public unity against fascism to Gates and the voters in 
the lead up to polling day: ‘I look to the electors of Middleton and Prestwich to return 
you to Parliament by an overwhelming majority, and so demonstrate their united and 
unflinching support of a Government resolved to wage war with all the might and 
resources of the nation until victory is won.’5  
 
The vast majority of British people throughout the war duly adopted this message. 
Although there was clearly little appetite for fascism in wartime Britain, the government 
and the security services were intent on eliminating the threat. Many of the known or 
 
33 For example, BUF candidate, Tommy Moran, received just 1 per cent of the vote 
share at the Silvertown by-election of 22 February 1940, while Sydney Allen received 
2.9 per cent of the vote share in a two-man race against the Conservative, John Craik-
Henderson, at the Leeds North East by-election of 13 March 1940. 
4 ‘Another By-Election Fight’, Action. 2 May 1940. p. 1. The mainstream political 
parties maintained an electoral pact and agreed not to contest any by-elections in seats 
held by any other party in the Government. 
5 ‘Mr. Churchill’s Message to Electors’, The Times, 18 May 1940, p. 3. 
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suspected Nazis were already expelled from the country by the outbreak of war.6 
However, the rapid military successes of Hitler’s army in Scandinavia, a shock to the 
British government and public opinion alike, underpinned by the self-aggrandising 
opportunism of the Norwegian nazi leader, Vidkun Quisling, confirmed the suspicion of 
the British authorities that Nazi victories were the result of politically motivated 
sabotage by traitors. As Stephen Cullen has stated, ‘It seemed that there must be deeper 
reasons than military tactics alone that explained these defeats for the democratic 
countries.’7   
 
Foremost among these was the supposed role of the fifth column. This, together with 
the discovery by MI5 of thousands of secret documents at a flat occupied by Tyler Kent, 
a cypher clerk from the US Embassy in London who had links to the far right, ‘reached 
a tipping point’ for the British authorities.8 On the 22 May 1940, two days after Kent’s 
arrest, clause 1A was added to Defence Regulation 18B. Faced with ‘the gravest 
moment in our history’, this allowed for the incarceration without trial of British 
citizens suspected of being under foreign influence or control, or who might sympathise 
with any power with which Britain was at war.  
 
For this reason, the clause intended to ‘cripple’ the BUF. Despite admitting no evidence 
to substantiate their theory, MI5 insisted that Mosley’s movement consisted of ‘25–30 
per cent [of members…who] would be willing, if ordered, to go to any lengths’ to 
ensure a fascist victory.9 In the weeks following the adoption of 1A, around 1,000 BUF 
members, including Mosley and his wife Diana, were arrested and interned, ‘effectively 
decapitating the movement’s leadership’, while non-BUF far-right activists, most 
notably the former head of naval intelligence, Sir Barry Domvile, and Tory MP, Captain 
Maule Ramsay (Leese was captured by British authorities sometime later), were also 
 
6 18B allowed for the emergency internment of aliens and political dissenters in Britain 
during the Second World War. For more on the defence regulation, see Aaron Goldman, 
‘Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency: Internment of Aliens and Political. Dissenters in 
Great Britain During World War II’, Journal of British Studies 12:2 (1973). 
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Wartime Britain’, The Historian 100 (2008), p. 15. 
8 Ibid. For more on the Tyler Kent affair, see Bryan Clough, State Secrets: The Kent-
Wolkoff Affair (Hove, 2005); Warren Kimball & Bruce Bartlett, ‘Roosevelt and Prewar 
Commitments to Churchill: The Tyler Kent Affair’, Diplomatic History 5:4 (1981).  
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10.30 am’, pp. 213 & 220–221. 
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imprisoned throughout much of the war.10 In fact, as fascism was a non-entity in 
wartime Britain, the Nazis thought of attempting to use the Welsh Nationalists, led by 
the antisemitic Saunders Lewis, as supporters ‘on the line of Quisling in Norway’.11 
This action taken by the British subverted the potential of a fifth column operating 
within the country. 
 
Although fascist activity was now virtually suppressed in Britain, failing to ‘raise a 
squeak in protest’ when confronted with state power, more troubling for the authorities 
were the activities of certain home-grown fascists who, for a variety of reasons, ended 
up on the continent during the conflict.12 The most notorious of these was former BUF 
member and the Jew-hating, Hitler-worshipping William Joyce, infamously known as 
‘Lord Haw Haw’, who was executed by the British for treason shortly after the war.13 
As a result of his transnational activities during the conflict, most notably his radio 
addresses to Britain from Germany, Joyce is arguably Britain’s most well-known 
fascist, surpassing even Mosley. Before he was sacked from the BUF by Mosley in 
1937 as part of a cost-cutting cull, Joyce was a key player within the party. In the early 
stages of the movement, Joyce was, next to Mosley, ‘the most powerful figure of the 
 
10 A list compiled by the Mosleyite group, ‘Friends of Oswald Mosley’, puts the figure 
at 1,055, 982 of them ‘definitely BU’ and 73 ‘probably BU’: Jeffrey Wallder, The 
Defence Regulation 18B. British Union Detainees List; Second Edition to the Second 
Issue, (London, 2007), p. 2; ‘Fascists Behind Barbed Wire: Political Internment Without 
Trial in Wartime Britain’, p. 16. For a study on BUF internment, see Graham Macklin 
‘Hail Mosley and F’ Em All’: Martyrdom, Transcendence and the ‘Myth’ of 
Internment’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 7:1 (2006). 
11 Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London, 2008), p. 68. 
12 Quote from Graham Macklin, Deeply Dyed in Black Sir Oswald Mosley and the 
Resurrection of British Fascism (London, 2007), p. 1. Although largely suppressed, 
underground fascist gatherings appear to have taken place in Britain. In a later 
interview, ex-internee, Arthur ‘Wakey’ Mason, longstanding BUF activist and Branch 
Officer of the movement’s Limehouse branch, describes escaping from the Huyton 
camp and attending ‘illicit, underground meetings of the fascist movement’: However, 
these liaisons were monitored by the security services: Cited in ‘Fascists Behind Barbed 
Wire: Political Internment Without Trial in Wartime Britain’, p. 20. 
13 Although Joyce had been born in America, he lived in the United Kingdom from the 
age of three (spending the majority of his childhood in Galway, which had been part of 
the UK until 1922 – by that time Joyce had moved to England). For more on Joyce, see 
Mary Kenny, Germany Calling: A Personal Biography of William Joyce - Lord Haw-
Haw (Dublin, 2004); Francis Selwyn, Hitler's Englishman: The Crime of Lord Haw-
Haw (London, 1993); John Cole, Lord Haw-Haw & William Joyce: the Full Story (New 
York, 1965); Nigel Farndale, Haw-Haw: The Tragedy of William and Margaret Joyce 
(Basingstoke, 2005); Colin Holmes, Searching for Lord Haw Haw: The Political Lives 
of William Joyce (Abingdon, 2016). Jonah Barrington of the London Daily Express 
christened Haw-Haw and helped make his name a byword. 
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BUF’. His voice ‘ranted and sneered at the nation’s internal enemies, over the boarded 
baths at Paddington and Lambeth, the arenas of Streatham and Liverpool’.14  
 
Less well-known former BUF members also worked for the enemy during the war. The 
most sinister of these transnational operatives was Thomas Cooper, arguably the most 
violent, anti-British, antisemitic and pro-Nazi of all his traitor comrades. Cooper fled to 
Germany shortly before Britain declared war on the Third Reich, later boasting that he 
was on the run for attacking Jewish businesses and killing a Jewish man in a street 
fight.15 He was so unrepentantly fascist that he became a naturalised German citizen 
during the war. Cooper committed mass murder when volunteering for the SS in Poland 
and Russia. He systematically executed over 200 Poles and 80 Jews in one day ‘by 
merely lining them up against a wall and shooting them down’.16 Equally as frightening, 
while in charge of a squad of Ukrainian volunteers in Warsaw, Cooper described how 
he was involved in a ‘purge through the ghetto’: 
 
His attention was drawn to a house by reason of loud screams issuing from the 
back of it. On-going inside the house he found in the top flat a bunch of these 
Ukrainians holding at bay with pistols some twenty Jews. On asking them what 
the noise was about they told him in broken German that they had found a new 
way of killing Jews. This was done simply by opening the window wide and two 
men each grabbing an arm and a leg and flinging the Jew through the open 
window. The small children and babies followed their parents because they said 
they would only grow into big Jews.17 
 
The BF had ceased to exist long before the Second World War began, and its leader, 
Rotha Lintorn-Orman, had died in 1935, but Mosley and Leese continued along their 
respective fascist paths well into the post-war years. Interestingly, Mosley spent May 
1940 trying to convince his internment committee hearing that he was a nationalist yet 
in 1945 came out as an internationalist. By the time of his release from prison in 
November 1943, Mosley’s thinking had evolved significantly from the interwar years. 
During internment and the subsequent involuntary ‘detachment from the particular 
 
14 Hitler’s Englishman, p. 43. 
15 TNA KV 2/264, Statement of Francis Paul Maton, Corporal, 50th Middles East 
Commando. 1437735 [captured by and worked for the Nazis during the war]’, 9 
September 1944, p. 5; The Times covered Cooper’s arrest, court case and sentencing; 
‘Clerk on High Treason Charge’, 5 December 1945, p. 2; ‘Clerk on Treason Charge’, 8 
December 1945, p. 2; ‘Clerk for Trial on Treason Charge’, 21 December 1945, p. 2. 
16 TNA KV 2/254,’Statement of John Henry Brown, aged 37’, 23 October 1945, p. 5. 
17 TNA KV 2/264, ‘Maton statement’ p. 4; ‘Death Sentence for High Treason’. 
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problems of Britain that consumed his political life’, Mosley reflected on his failures 
and adapted his philosophy towards a new world that greeted him outside the jail 
gates.18 For Mosley, his, and fascism’s, struggle of the thirties had been fought on to 
narrow a front: ‘In reality, we were all too National – too narrowly concentrated upon 
securing the interests of our own nations.’ A new ‘healing synthesis’ was required, 
incorporating European culture and experiences. From inside the prison walls, Mosley’s 
mission was to learn how ‘to think and feel as a European’.19 
 
Letters to his oldest son Nicholas, who was fighting on the Western Front, identify this 
desire for European identity. While incarcerated, Mosley fed off an ‘intellectual diet’ of 
Germany theorists and Greek philosophers.20 Through mingling with German POWs, he 
learnt German.21 Therefore, he was able to dissect the works of Germanic philosophers 
such as Nietzsche and Spengler both of whom ‘exhibited a range and depth of 
speculation unknown to English “liberal” literature’.22 However, the German theorist 
that appears to have had the most impact on Mosley pan-nationalism was the ‘towering 
figure’ of Goethe, whose literature was largely unavailable in English.23 Goethe’s semi-
autobiographical masterpiece Faust (1832) conjures up a mythical figure that deals with 
the spirit of the Western Man; a man who overcame cruelty and tragedy and rose to 
heroic status through knowledge and action, a path Mosley perceived himself to be 
following. Yet, Faust dies before accomplishing his life’s work leading Mosley to 
comment: ‘Faust falls dead at this instant of supreme realisation [that he was no longer 
under the spell of evil – Mephistopheles] as he swore he would so succumb if he ever 
became content. But the heavenly hosts bear him away from darkness to the empyrean 
of light because he has so greatly striven.’24 From this, Mosley concluded that it should 
be possible to formulate a faith, which ‘draws the Spiritual in Life from the best of the 
thought, creed and civilisations that the world has so far produced, weaving it into a 
 
18 Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, Third Edition (London 1990). p. 466. 
19 Mosley, The Alternative (Ramsburg, 1946), p. 12. Also in Alternative, Mosley credits 
much of his revised ideology to his time spent in prison, which afforded him ‘intensive 
reading, reflection and creation’, p. 11.  
20 See letters exchanged with Nicholas in chapter ‘Conversations in Holloway’, 
Nicholas Mosley, Memoirs of Sir Oswald Mosley and Family (London, 1998); and the 
chapter titled ‘The Faustian Riddle’, Oswald Mosley.  
21 Mosley, My Life (London, 2006 /original 1968), p. 339. 
22 Letter to Nicholas, October 1943, in Oswald Mosley, pp. 468–469. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Letter to Nicholas, undated, in Oswald Mosley, p. 474. 
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coherent whole of conduct and attitude to human existence, and attuning it to the main 
tendencies of modern science.’25 
 
Mosley was fascinated by the place where the great European adventure had begun, 
ancient Greece. He absorbed the words of eighteenth-century German neo-Hellenists, 
Winckelmann, Wieland, Goethe and Schiller; the Greek tragedians, Aeschylus, 
Sophocles and Euripides; and the philosophers Plato and Aristotle.26 In addition, he read 
works on ancient Greece by contemporary scholars – Maurice Bowra, Lowes 
Dickinson, Werner Jaeger and Humphry Trevelyan. However, he was disgusted by their 
supposed inaccuracies on the subject and complained to Nicholas that ‘the depths of 
their intellectual dishonesty are unfathomable’, advising his son to always go to the 
original: ‘In the end even genius should be allowed to speak for itself.’27     
 
From these original works, Mosley found a utopian vision for Europe: a return to the 
‘glory days’ where Greek influence spread across the continent following the Greek 
victory in the Greco-Persian wars. These readings presented an idyllic society lavished 
with beauty, perfect developments and the highest achievement of plastic art. Greek 
poetry offered a contrasting view of civilisation: one in which men unashamedly 
showed emotion – from crying to rage.28 With nature forming the core, from these 
elements, the Greeks produced their ‘aristocratic philosophy of heroic pessimism’; its 
central theme was what Mosley branded the ‘fierce acceptance of life as it is’.29 Unlike 
the Judaic-Christian tradition where nature was something to be suppressed or 
overcome, the Greeks embraced nature viewing it as something to be fulfilled, its power 
raised to a higher degree of completion. These Supermen ‘can do on an enormous scale 
what man can do only faintly and fitfully’.30 As a result of much soul-searching fused 
with ideas and inspiration gained from the contents of his cell library, an unrepentant 
Mosley left prison, awaiting the opportunity to return to the political arena to publicise 
his new pan-European vision. 
 
 
25 Letter to Nicholas, 1 June 1943, in Oswald Mosley, pp. 475–476. 
26 Letter to Nicholas, October 1943. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Oswald Mosley, p. 469. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Cecil Bowra, The Greek Experience (New York, 1957), p. 50. 
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Through his early post-war writings, Mosley provided a blueprint for his new vision of 
Europe. The geopolitical climate of post-war Europe was almost unrecognisable 
compared to the years preceding the Second World War. Fascism had collapsed, 
replaced by a world dominated by American and Soviet power and influence, ruled by 
either capitalism or communism. One of Mosley’s main fears was that the Eastern Bloc 
was building atomic weapons to be used against the West. He claimed that German 
scientists and technicians were being forced to enter Russian service to create atom 
bombs to be used to inflict mass terror on Western cities. ‘In a few years, or less,’ he 
claimed, ‘a man behind the Ural mountains may loose an Atom projectile which will 
knock London and New York flat’.31 Unless a united Europe, alongside its ally, 
America, was powerful enough to challenge its foe, Mosley believed that the Soviets, 
through their sheer ruthlessness, may bring the end to both Europe and America. He 
argued that besides ‘any emotional sense’, a ‘European Union’ is essential to meet the 
danger.32 According to Mosley, a united Europe was an ‘absolute necessity’ if the 
European man were to survive: ‘Europe is not merely our [Britain’s] business but our 
life’.33  
 
The ‘emotional sense’ of European union stems from a Europe ‘which shares with us 
the sublime heritage of culture whose resplendent rays shone forth from Early Hellas’.34 
According to Mosley, the ‘family’ of Europe, which is bonded by the ‘same stock and 
kind’, should never have been separated.35 The death and destruction caused by the 
misery of European and world wars have gravely damaged the continent, but he 
believed ‘European kinship and solidarity [may] have avoided disaster’.36 In turn, the 
‘ridiculous structure’ of the ‘Tower of Babel [League of Nations]’ created after the 
Great War, with its obsession with committees consisting of an increasing array of 
diverse nationalities resulted in ‘grotesque failure’.37 Mosley argued that their procedure 
in the face of difficulty was ever to introduce more and more people who were less and 
less like each other in tradition, thought, feeling and instinct until ‘inevitably the 
difficulties became ever more insuperable until the whole attempt broke down in “tragic 
 
31 ‘Our Life at Stake’, News Letter, Issue No 1 (15 November 1946), pp. 4–5. 
32 ‘German Technicians’, News Letter, Issue No 1 (15 November 1946), p. 5. 
33 ‘Our Life at Stake’. Mosley also explains his European idea in Alternative, pp. 146–
148. 
34 Mosley, My Answer, (Ramsburg, 1946), p. 31. 
35 Alternative, p. 13. 
36 Ibid., p. 12. 
37 Ibid., p. 13. 
247 
 
absurdity”’.38 His solution was the rejection of this ‘old Internationalism’ and to 
transcend exclusive nationalisms which divided ‘natural friends and relatives’: 
 
Man moved from the village to the nation in the natural process of uniting with 
his nearer kinsmen as his mind and spirit grew. Now the time is come to move 
from the nation to the continent, or even beyond it, under the same natural 
impulse and process of next uniting with those nearest to us in blood, tradition, 
mind and spirit.39 
 
This ‘Idea of Kinship’ extended to the Americas where, through the export of British 
Puritanism, ‘kindred of our same kind’ flourished.40 Mosley describes how their 
spirituality was founded on almost three millennia of European history and culture: ‘In 
the deep realities and further ideals of this Age all Nature impels them in their final test 
to feel and think as we do.’41 This union, he envisioned, required a ‘synthesis of the best 
thought of Europe, and of America, on which we can build an idea that is new.’42 
 
For the successful creation of this new civilisation, a leader was essential. However, the 
man to undertake such a mammoth task had to be from outside the political elite. 
Mosley declared that ‘No alternative can come from the architects of chaos [… as these] 
existing rulers of the earth are responsible for this darkness of humanity; they stand on 
the graves of their opponents to confront the Communist power of their own creation.’43 
Moreover, the head of the new creed had to be prominent in international circles to 
bring nations together. Unsurprisingly, Mosley saw himself as the only man fit for such 
a role. As well as being distinct from the ruling class, he argued that his pre-war 
political activities made him known and respected beyond the confines of one country; 
his voice, he claimed, ‘has been heard before’.44 From a profound sense of duty and 
destiny, Mosley declared, ‘I must do this thing because no other can.’45  
 
In 1948, Mosley announced his arrival on the post-war political scene by forming the 
Union Movement (UM); its main aim was to develop a European nationalism rather 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 Alternative, p. 14. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 11. 
43 Ibid., p. 9. 
44 Ibid.  
45 ‘‘‘Interview” with Mosley’, News Letter, Issue number 1 (15 November 1946), p. 6.  
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than narrower country-based nationalisms under the policy ‘Europe a Nation’. A short 
time later, Mosley had his passport returned by the British authorities, who had 
confiscated it during the war. Even before Mosley was reunited with his passport, his 
post-war transnational activities were flourishing. Special Branch, who circulated 
monthly newsletters to the Home Office on the activities of British fascists, identified 
the importance of Germany in Mosley’s plan to create an international network of 
organisations working together to curtail Soviet influence and aggression. For Mosley, 
‘Germany is the key to the struggle between East and West and that he is the only living 
man capable of swinging her away from Russian influence.’46 Mosley was convinced he 
could rely on unconditional mass support from the Germans if he could find a way to 
reach its people.47 The first step in his scheme to influence the German public was to 
distribute his writings en masse throughout the country. Knowing that it would be 
impossible to run the operation from Britain under the noses of hostile and suspicious 
government, Mosley distributed his writings to associate companies in Europe and to 
those South American countries that have large German communities.  
 
With fascism, and those linked to it, now associated with brutality and barbarism, it is 
no surprise then that Mosley and his plan for ‘Europe a Nation’ failed to gain support 
among the British public, besides galvanising the few ardent followers who harboured a 
‘smothering devotion to Mosley’.48 However, ‘Europe a Nation’ did gain traction with 
continental fascists, and Mosley, unlike in the interwar period, became one of its 
leading lights, convincing unrepentant fascists across the continent to support his plan 
for a fully-integrated Europe. Included in the group was the ex-Waffen-SS officer and 
leading figure in the post-war German neo-Nazi movement, Arthur Ehrhardt, who 
established the journal Nation Europa to support far-right pan-European nationalist 
ideas, to which Mosley was a frequent contributor.49 Mosley continued to champion his 
European vision until long after he effectively retired from politics in the late 1960s.  
 
Leese’s ideas, on the other hand, did not alter. Until his death in 1956, he remained an 
unrepentant supporter of National Socialism, and by setting up his own ‘Jewish 
Information Bureau’ and publishing his own avidly antisemitic journal and Hitler 
 
46 ‘Fascist Activities. November–December 1947’ in TNA KV3/51. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Deeply Dyed in Black Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British Fascism, 
pp. 27–28. 
49 Ibid., p. 11. 
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worshipping, Gothic Ripples, soon after the end of the Second World War, it was clear 
that his main aim remained to rid the world of Jews. As early as July 1946, MI5 
believed Leese to be ‘heavily involved’ in establishing escape routes to South America 
(through Britain) for wanted German war criminals, who had been hiding in Germany 
since the end of the war. In addition, MI5 believed Leese to be planning a scheme to aid 
unrepentant fascist POWs in Britain to escape to Spain and thence to Brazil and 
Argentina.50 Their concerns were well-founded, as, after a brief period of freedom 
following his release from internment, Leese was back in prison in 1947 for attempting 
to help two Dutch Nazi POWs to escape to Argentina. The case, which attracted much 
press attention, saw Leese declare from the dock that his and a large number of his pre-
war followers’ views had not changed since the days of the IFL.51 As an example of his 
devotion to fascism, he even admitted to training his cat to give salutes for its dinner. 52   
Perhaps surprisingly given his lower profile and fewer followers, it was Leese, and not 
Mosley, whose legacy evolved after 1945. Leese’s ‘scientific’ racism meant that his 
racial ideas and themes were at the forefront of developing modern fascist thinking in 
Britain.53 For example, IFL racial theory influenced post-war far-right groups such as 
the National Front (NF), the British Movement (BM) and the British National Party 
(BNP).  
 
The transnationalism of British fascism did not end with the demise of Mosley and 
Leese. Leese’s protégé Colin Jordan, leader of Britain’s National Socialist Movement, 
was also a transnational actor. In 1962, Jordan and the leader of the American Nazi 
Party, George Lincoln Rockwell, combined to develop an international network 
between movements for the establishment of Aryan world order. Still in operation, the 
World Union of National Socialists is an umbrella group for neo-Nazis organisations 
 
50 TNA KV 3/37, ‘A Suspected Escape Route’, (1a). 
51 ‘British Ring Helping Nazis to Escape’, Daily Telegraph, 11 February 1947; ‘Aid to 
Escaped P.O.W.s Alleged’, Daily Telegraph, 12 February 1947; ‘Aided P.O.W. 
Summonses’, Evening News, 12 February 1947; ‘Police Hunt for Former Fascist’, Daily 
Telegraph, 13 February 1947; ‘Alleged Conspiracy to Aid Prisoners of War’, The 
Times, 25 February 1947, p. 2; ‘POW Smuggling Plot’, Daily Mail, 1 April 1947, p. 5; 
‘Photograph Clue to P.O.W. Escape Plan’, Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1947; ‘Mistake 
Unmasked POW Escape Plot, Daily Mirror, 1 April 1947; ‘Nazi Jew-Baiters Lose Their 
British Agent’, The People, 6 April 1947, p. 3; ‘“Many Fascists Still Here”’, Daily 
Herald, 29 November 1947. 
52 ‘Cat Gives Fascist Salute’, Daily Star, 28 November 1947. 
53 John Morell, ‘Arnold Leese and the Imperial Fascist League: the Impact of Racial 
Fascism’, in Kenneth Lunn and Richard Thurlow (eds.), British Fascism: Essays on the 
Radical Right in Inter-War Britain, (London, 1980), p. 57. 
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worldwide.54 The 1960s also saw the rise of racist nationalists with links made between 
British far-right groups and the American National States Rights Party (NSRP). 
 
Links with the NSRP continued into the 1970s, and new movements that propagated 
stronger European ties surfaced. The British Movement, headed by Jordan, and The 
League of St George forged links with like-minded groups in Europe. The League 
attended far-right festivals on the continent, such as the annual gathering of nationalists 
in Diksmuide, Flanders, where they took part in demonstrations with Flemish nationalist 
patriots. However, events were not always cordial. As part of the League’s delegation, 
Ray Hill described the frequent ‘bar-room brawls’ with right-wing militants from other 
countries.55 The issue ‘as often as not’ was Northern Ireland. Many nationalist groups in 
Europe actively supported the IRA in its quest for separatism, whereas the League was 
‘fervently loyalist’.56 In addition, the internationalised Holocaust denial movement (also 
known as ‘historical revisionism’) had become prominent in far-right circles in the 
1960s. Through his books, British writer David Irving deliberately misrepresented 
historical evidence to promote Holocaust denial. In the 1970s, former NF member 
David McCalden, along with American Willis Carto, established the Holocaust denial 
enterprise: the Institute for Historical Review.57  
 
The 1980s saw the rise and internationalisation of the British invention ‘White Power 
Music’. This politicised skinhead movement spread across the globe, most notably to 
North America and Europe. The NF developed very particular transnational links under 
its ‘political soldier’ faction. The NF suffered splits over ideology, and a certain section 
of activists, for example, Nick Griffin (later leader of the BNP), expressed admiration 
for black separatist groups such as the Nation of Islam. In addition, the group 
announced a ‘new alliance’ with Islamic leaders Muammar Gaddafi, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, and Louis Farrakhan while Islamic fundamentalists marched alongside the 
 
54 For more on the World Union of National Socialists, see Paul Jackson, Colin Jordan 
and Britain’s Neo-Nazi Movement: Hitler’s Echo (London, 2017), pp. 141–146. 
55 Ray Hill with Andrew Bell, The Other Face of Terror (London, 1988), p. 194. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and 
Memory (New York, 1994). For more on Irving, see Chapter Nine: The Gas Chamber 
Controversy. For more on the Institute for Historical Review, see Chapter Eight: The 
Institute for Historical Review. 
251 
 
NF at the pro-Palestinians event Quds Day.58 As scientific racism was, up to that point, 
at the heart of NF ideas, this form of transnationalism caused domestic tensions. 
 
The 1990s saw the emergence of the International Third Position. This anti-Communist, 
anti-capitalist movement was formed by the political soldier faction of the NF and 
became an umbrella organisation for various national revolutionary groups throughout 
Europe and beyond. The American National Alliance leader, William Pierce, came to 
prominence in British far-right circles at this time. He accepted an invitation by the then 
leader of the BNP, John Tyndall, to address the BNP’s national conference. The newly 
formed fascist group, Combat 18, idolised Pierce, and the neo-Nazi ‘London Nail 
Bomber’ David Copeland was motivated to start a race war by reading Pierce’s novel 
The Turner Diaries.59 
 
More recently, Nick Griffin’s election to the European Parliament in 2009 was a turning 
point in the fortunes of the British far right, benefiting it in several ways. The BNP now 
received funding from the European Union (EU) which could make them more 
‘professional’, they had access to EU resources and were able to network easily with 
other far-right European organisations, for example, strong connections were formed 
with the Greek fascist party, Golden Dawn. In contrast, the Front National of France 
refused to be allied with the Alliance for European Nationalists, which the BNP were 
involved with, as Marine Le Pen wanted to distance the party from her father’s past. 
This ‘detoxify’ strategy triggered the realignment internationally of extreme right-wing 
groups. However, these newfound riches came at a cost. Certain members in Britain 
thought Griffin was spending too much time on the continent instead of concentrating 
on his commitments back home. More recently, former EDL chief ‘Tommy Robinson’ 
forged links with the anti-Islam, pan-European group PEGIDA, after earlier attempts to 
set up a ‘European Defence League’, and often spoke at their meetings abroad. 
 
 
58 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics 
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[www.youtube.com/watch?v=qreNo9kTcYw], accessed 8 July 2019. 
252 
 
The single greatest benefactor to increase transnational corporation between far-right 
groups and individuals is the emergence of the World Wide Web. The internet connects 
across national borders. Arguably, the most well-known fascist group since 2010 is the 
Alt-Right. The Alt-Right is a loosely organised fascist movement that operates almost 
exclusively online, and although its most prominent figures are from Europe and North 
America, it attracts support from across the globe.60 This thesis has uncovered the fact 
that transnationalism was an integral component of the British far right in the interwar 
years. However, transnationalism also manifested itself in the post-war years. Therefore, 
transnationalism has been, and likely always will be, a crucial ingredient in the makeup 
of the British far right. Even in a world of hardening borders, British fascism remains 
capable, as this study proves it always has, of transcending national barriers. 
 
Transnational study contributes considerable value to the study of fascism. Examining 
the field from a cross-border angle both illuminates significant and unexplored aspects 
of fascism, and offers a more complete picture of the larger context of which it is a part. 
An ever-growing number of historians now view fascism not from a simply nationalistic 
point of view but endorse the cross-border approach.61 Events over the last century have 
undoubtedly identified overseas links, both ideological and physical. Therefore, it is 
imperative that fascism – in whatever permutation and whichever country – is 
investigated from a transnational perspective.  
 
Recent debates have focussed on transnationalism but have not really looked at 
transnationalism from a far-right point of view. Indeed, the far right has tended to be 
seen as impervious to transnationalism, and as an expression of the ‘national’ and the 
revival of the ‘nation state’ in narrow political terms. Transnationalism, in contrast, 
breaks down and navigates across borders, and is much more associated with the left – 
refugees, exiles, migrants, humanitarian relief, etc. Indeed, groups of early and 
 
60 Rob May & Matthew Feldman, ‘Understanding the Alt-Right. Ideologues, “Lulz” and 
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pioneering transnational historians, like the Annales school, came from an 
unequivocally left position.62  
 
This thesis, and the contribution of the case studies provided within it, shows that 
transnationalism sheds considerable light on the way in which the far right operates as 
well: Mosley really did take money from the Italian Fascists and the Nazis (as long 
rumoured by some researchers), it enabled the privileging of some fascist groups over 
others by foreign powers (the IFL did well out of this), and the creation of a joint 
culture bound together by the trade and the selling of souvenirs, books and memorabilia 
to raise money. Transnationalism is about a lot of things, so the selling of souvenirs, and 
the chain of supply and purchase that went alongside it is important, as is the use of 
international symbols of solidarity, and visits and the movement to, and reception of 
visitors and delegates from, abroad. All this is channelled through the international 
financial exchange systems that are often highlighted as a key component of 
transnationalism and the study of which began many of the debates about 
transnationalism in the first place.63 Much of this still pertains as part of a broader 
movement culture of the Alt-Right and has not had the consideration it deserves for the 
interwar period, particularly the 1930s, where it began. The seldom explored links 
between US and European far-right groups in the interwar period highlighted in this 
thesis may shed considerable light on this phenomenon. 
 
This is the first in-depth study to examine the imperial undertones of fascism. Links 
between British fascism and imperialism has often been assumed (Thurlow’s general 
study of British fascism detects imperialism as important in the early stages of the 
development of the radical right following the contraction of empire pre-191464) but a 
lot of these assumptions have simply been asserted, rather than tested. This thesis 
analyses these prevailing assumptions and identifies the fact that there is a very clear 
correlation with empire in far-right politics. Empire itself is a transnational experience, 
and this study contributes to the understanding of organisations that saw themselves as 
not just British, but Anglophone in nature, with pan-colonial implications and 
 
62 Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales school, 1929–1989 
(London, 1990), chapter 2. 
63 Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (London, 2009), chapters 1 & 2. 
64 Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History 1918–1998 (New York, 1998), pp. 8–
10. 
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relevance. This emerges very strongly indeed from the career of Arnold Leese, who 
appears to have arrived at his fascist point of view whilst travelling around the Empire, 
had a long colonial a back-story, and might be seen as the most ‘transnational’ 
personality in the body of this thesis. 
 
In addition, Labour under George Lansbury (1932 to 1935) was a ‘little Englander’ 
party and the Conservatives were very keen to avoid overseas, particularly European, 
entanglements. Therefore, the real transnational exchanges were coming from the 
political extremes. We know quite a lot about Communism in this regard (the CPGB 
International Brigades in Spain, for example) but much less has been written about the 
far right and British fascism. This thesis fills the obvious lacuna. During a period 
usually seen as characterised by movements expressive of economic autarky, 
protectionism and a narrow nationalism, transnationalism provides a new way of 
considering the cultural and political context of the 1920s and 1930s.   
 
All transnational investigation makes organisations and groups appear less marginal and 
fringe than when scrutinised in domestic isolation, British fascism is no exception to 
this. The relevance of this for British fascism is that it might make the British Fascisti 
and the IFL look hitherto neglected and this survey accentuates their importance, 
suggesting that they are not just three men and a dog, but organisations that deserves to 
be taken seriously, not least for their use of imperial propaganda. In addition, too much 
emphasis is traditionally focussed on the BUF and that looking at these other 
organisations is not actually a kind of antiquarianism, but rather shows an aspect of 
British fascism that does not emerge from close scrutiny of the larger organisations 
involved. Here transnationalism is actually providing a lens that enables us to see the 
details of British fascism and the sometimes-neglected groupings within it in a slightly 
different way and enables historians to re-calibrates our view of exactly how British 
fascist groups should be lined up in order of importance.       
 
The findings from this study will enhance historical scholarship in a number of ways: 
First, by uncovering the transnational aspects of the three most important fascist 
movements in interwar Britain, it will add a much needed cross-border dimension to 
British fascism, as recent transnational studies on Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany have 
achieved about their respective countries. Significantly, this is the first extensive 
investigation focused on transnational British fascism. By approaching the subject from 
255 
 
a transnational dimension, it has provided a greater understanding of British fascism. 
Second, it has added to the growing, but still under researched, field of fascist studies in 
general and therefore uncovered significant and unexplored aspects of the field as a 
result, offering a more complete picture of the larger context of which it is a part. Third, 
by investigating new subjects, it has added to the relatively new historical sphere of 
Transnational History, while illuminating the limited research on extremism in the field. 
Not only has this study of transnational history enhanced fascist inquiry, hopefully it 
will open the way for new cross-border research projects on British fascism (and 
fascism in general) and begin to fill the gap in the obvious lacuna in literature.  
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